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
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IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

THE GROUND AND GOAL
OF
HUMAN LIFE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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THE GROUND AND GOAL OF HUMAN LIFE

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TO
MY MOTHER

PREFACE

THE work contained in the following pages expresses, as it were, a treaty of peace between the forces of Individualism here and those of scientifico-social thought there. To one who has followed the parallel histories of egoism militant on the one side and naturalism triumphant on the other, the present situation appears full of promise for a future understanding between man and the things and persons around him. For the comprehension of this situation, one can do no better than to conduct an analytical review of the way in which the effort toward selfhood has expressed itself; just such a progressive delineation of individualism has engrossed the first two parts of the present work. The third, which is the progressive portion of the book, seeks to show in just what way man may re-relate his mind to nature, in what corresponding manner the individual may seek new repose in the social order. New years bring new problems with them; and, when the times are as suggestive as those of the new peace, it becomes imperative that one should cast about for new ideals. To the restricted number of individuals who are tempted to persist in the old anarchism of individualism in its ante-bellum days, it may be suggested that newer, deeper types of nationalism may offer to such liberals something like the social environment which their nature seems to demand. Those who before the war felt themselves 'superfluous' may come to the realization that even the most delicious, the most dissatisfied personality may find his place in the political world-order.

While the present attempt to arrive at the ground of human existence and the goal of man's striving may seem to call upon the old-time ego to be less of a non-conformist, it does not fail to point out that the

opposing forces known familiarly as science and social philosophy should not continue in the assumption that they have uttered the last word for man's nature or given the supreme command to his will. These objective principles are none the less due for appropriate revision in order that they may make room for every one who strives after the joy, worth, and truth of his own precious life. A new view of the individual demands a new view of the world. The scientific and social critics of subjectivity and personality have been prone to set aside man's belief in himself in the same way that Molière's Doctor in Spite of Himself sought to explain to the patient that the heart was no longer to the left or the liver to the right; for, said the 'doctor,' "we have changed all that—*nous avons changé tout cela.*" It is needless to point out that the location of the individual in his own private life is far less mutable than scientific rumor might suggest.

In printing this work, it is both the desire and the duty of the author to make most generous acknowledgement of the assistance given by Professor Arthur Huntington Nason, Ph.D., who, as Director of New York University Press, has edited the manuscript, corrected the proofs, and made the index. For his patience he must be praised and for his furtherance thanked. Moreover, it may be stated that the material here written out *in extenso* has been used already as the basis for a course in Ethics in the Graduate School of New York University, so that students in that course deserve some thanks for the way in which they have co-operated with the writer in developing a principle of ethical thought.

C. G. S.

University Heights
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September
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INTRODUCTION

OF all the problems which confront the philosophic mind, none is superior to or more important than a form of inquiry which seeks to relate the individual to the world. The special form which this problem assumes expresses itself in terms of "subjectivity" and "objectivity," although these conventional methods of speech may fail to convey to the reflective mind the significance of the problem and the severity of the situation in connection with which that problem must be discussed. The subjective includes the human self with its perpetual tendency to say, "I think" and "I will," while the objective has direct reference to the organized realms of the physical and political, the scientific and the social. To the individualistic "I think," the physical order may not respond; to the subjective "I will," the social order may pay no heed. As a result, the thinker may feel forced to resort to a sharp subjectivism which declares, "*le monde n'existe pas pour moi*," or he may relapse into a sullen objectivism which feels no sense of responsibility for that which is unique in human life. The form of philosophy which seeks to meet this problem of human life in the world, may, for want of a more adequate term, be called Philosophy of Life; that which is peculiar to such a method of speculation is its attempted combination of the metaphysical and the moral. It might seem as though one could examine the forms of the world without taking into account the leading species which that world has produced, just as it might appear plausible when one asserts that he may pursue his ethics without asking questions concerning the nature of the world in which the ethical subject is to exhibit its ideals.

Indeed, traditional metaphysics here and traditional ethics there have agreed to divide the twin fields between; hence moralist and metaphysician separated much after the manner of Lot and Abraham. Now philosophy of life proceeds upon the assumption that such separation is injurious.

THE PROBLEM

Can man be himself? Has he a right to attempt a passage outward from the subjective "I think" to an objective "I am"? This is the question which philosophy of life feels constrained to propose, even when it realizes that the self-satisfied thought of the day is inclined to assume that the self is all that it may hope to be. Nothing in the realm of contemporary culture is more confusing than the fact that those who have the least interest in the human self, the scientific and social thinkers, have persisted in assuming that that self exists, while those who have the most interest in the self, the aesthetical, ethical, and religious individualists, are never guilty of taking the self for granted. The objective thinker should say, "the self does not exist," and should go his scientifico-social way rejoicing; the subjective thinker should say, "the self does exist" and no longer seek to affirm the ego. The actual situation is the very reverse of this which would seem to be the expected one. Individualism feels called upon to regard the self, not as a physical fact, but as that which can come into being only after due self-affirmation. If there were no world of things, individualism might rejoice in sheer selfhood; but the world of things does exist, so that the human self, instead of silhouetting itself against the blue of spiritual life, must strive to shine through the opaqueness of an alien world-order. Man is everything else but himself, while his most natural tendency is to

elaborate forms of thought which ever tend to eliminate himself from the world.

Can man do his work; or, has man a work which he may call his own? If it is hard to say, "I am," it is no less difficult to assert, "I do"; for the inner life is usually marked by a decided *nescio* and *non facio*. Were there no social order, and did the ego feel free to act upon his own initiative, self-activity and the joy of self-expression would take their place in the inner consciousness of the self-propelled individual; but, with the actual conditions of social life hemming the individual about, pervading his nature within, it is evident that self-expression must be impelled from within outward in opposition to the alien forces of the larger human order. Man does everything but his own work; his most natural motive is to will himself out of the world of work. To the metaphysical doubt concerning the existence of the self in the natural order, there is thus added a moral compunction as to the right one has to express himself in the social world; apparently, it were vain for the individual to think of self-existence, while it were vicious for him to pretend to do that which he calls "his own work." As metaphysics has surrendered its forms to impersonal nature, morality has loaned its forces to the selfless social order; hence, there is no true "I am," no just "I do."

I. SELFHOOD, SCIENTISM AND SOCIALITY

The fact of an introvertive, introactive selfhood seems, then, both dubious and dangerous; the individual may think all things save his own being, may do all works except his own. Under what circumstances has this extraordinary condition of non-egoism arisen, and to what degree is our modern thought responsible for the plight into which the human self is now plunged?

The thought of selfhood did not arise until the inception of modern philosophy, even when the actual "I am" had long rejoiced in its interior and unconscious existence; and, with the coming of individualism, there arose the tendencies which were conspiring to effect its banishment. Modern thought has divided itself into two periods, one rationalistic the other positivistic, in which the fate of the human self has been, first, that of a confident self-assertion, then, that of a deliberate self-negation. Where modern thought began with a system of reason and rights which did not flinch from solipsism and egoism, it has turned to a scheme of the scientific and the social in which a perfect subjectivism gives way before a complete objectivism. In such a world as our contemporary one, the individual says, "I am not," "I do nothing."

The egoism of the Enlightenment, imperfect as it appears in the eyes of the contemporary individualist, had the will and the power to negate a mediaeval *traditio* and affirm a resolute *ratio*; in place of the one-time *auctoritas*, it did not hesitate to insert a bold *jus*; thus arose the "I think" and the "I do" of our modern thought; thus arose a characteristic irreligion of reason, an equally original immoralism of rights. In the midst of this plain and deliberate individualism, the conflict between the ideas of establishment and egoism was such as to result in an immediate victory for the forces which made for an inner life of independent initiatives, and it was only because the forces of self-assertion were so thoroughly taken up with resistance and defence that the failure to attribute content and character to the self led to the defeat of that self. The fortifications were strong enough, but the supplies were insufficient; hence the individualism of the Enlightenment failed from lack of nourishment. At the same time, this earlier form of individualism may have suffered from the want of

that stimulus which comes from strong opposition; at any rate, the mechanical metaphysics and altruistic morality of the period failed to penetrate the surface of the confident "I am" and "I do," and the egoism of that time simply lapsed.

A more thorough analysis of the Enlightenment's egoism reveals more perfectly the secret of the problem as it was then proposed, as it was subsequently resumed. What is individualism? Who is the self? What is its work? To these questions, the Enlightenment made no sufficient answer. The self of that time, so far as it assumed a speculative form, was felt to consist in nothing more than self-consciousness; to be one's self is to feel one's self. This individualistic premise failed to produce its just conclusion, because it did not evoke the sterner soul-stuff out of which selfhood must come; it did not affirm the self. On the ethical side of the argument, the question, "What is my work?" failed from an utterance equally feeble. The hedonistic moralist could find in the ego nothing more characteristic than the sense of self-love, whereby the self was felt, but not willed. Now self-consciousness and self-love are attributes which are singularly inadequate to express and exploit the essence and power of the ego, as this ego now conceives of itself.

The resumption of individualism in the age of positivism, having no system of reason and rights to further it, was called upon to affirm its being and assert its character in the face of opposition, as this came from an unfriendly science and an equally inimical sociality. In the light of these twin tendencies, man was conceived of as a thing among others in a world which was strangely indifferent to the inner character of human life, just as he was further viewed as a subject having no other place or meaning than that which could be attributed to him by a social philosophy.

Now science holds out to the self none of the promises once offered by reason, while society is calculated to afford none of the forfeited advantages of the philosophy of rights. Both the scientific and the social are by nature anti-individualistic; so that that which is unique can find no place in the physical and political thinking of the day. For a century, we have accustomed ourselves to consider the "scientific" as a final authority, just as we have accepted the verdict of the "social" as the decision of the highest human court. What is error? That which is unscientific. What is sin? That which is unsocial.

At the present time, when science has advanced far beyond the mind which originally produced it, we find mankind somewhat disconcerted at the outlook which the world presents to his philosophic vision. In the midst of this perplexity, where man is not quite sure of this world, there has arisen the feeling that, perhaps, science has not fulfilled its prophecies, that evolution has not kept its word with the species. In the same skeptical spirit, we are beginning to distrust the social alignment of ideals; so that both organic and social evolution are deemed less and less authentic. The individual, whose peculiar interests have so long been flouted, seems to be more and more discontented with the thought that, as an "I think," he is but an interloper in the exterior world, while, as an "I do," he is considered superfluous, if not vicious. Suppose one is unscientific; does it follow that he thus loses the truth of life? Suppose he is unsocial; shall we assume that he likewise loses the worth of life? The fruits of the world and of humanity have ripened on the tree of life, but they refuse to fall into the basket of the individual; the individual must shake the tree. If the scientific-social order now refuses to make room for the individual, the individual will need to elbow his way

through the crowd of impersonal facts and forces as they gather about him. Now this reaction of the individual is nothing new; the history of the egoistic revolt is contemporary with the course of the scientific and the social.

2. THE ANTI-SCIENTIFIC AND ANTI-SOCIAL

The individualistic repudiation of the scientific conception of the world and of the social estimate of man has been based almost exclusively upon the ideas and impulses peculiar to the aesthetic consciousness of the nineteenth century. The more complete analysis of the individualistic situation may show that, even in the Enlightenment, there were traces of anti-scientific irrationalism, anti-social immoralism; but it should appear that it was Romanticism and its dark shadow, Decadence, which placed the individual upon his feet, and that for the first time in the whole history of humanity. Romanticism differed from rationalism at points which have been the most critical for the development of individualism; Romanticism was impressed with the idea that the individualism triumphant, as this was celebrated in the Enlightenment, could not come to man as his kingdom until there had been an individualism militant; so that it is the polemical in individualism which will be found to afford the most essential and most influential element in the individualism of the present.

In particular, Romantic individualism differs from its prototype in that, where the earlier period was content to premise a selfhood in self-consciousness, the later one insisted upon an active "I am," which refused to abandon its program even when it was confronted by the irrational. In the same manner, where the preliminary individualism sought to settle accounts with the ethical and social by means of naïve self-love, the

more perfect formulation of the doctrine found the egoist in a position where he defied the social and willed the self. In this manner, self-existence arose as an ideal superior to that of scientific "truth," while self-expression was carried on, even when it seemed to threaten the ideal of social "duty." It will sound both strange and strident when we say that, having taken its stand upon the ideal of aesthetic personality, having made beauty supreme, romantic individualism felt free to receive or to reject the principles of the true and the good; nevertheless, such was the case, and by such means the individual was emancipated.

This vigorous doctrine of individualism, which thus issued its challenge to scientific metaphysics and social morality, far from exhausting itself in revolt—as a debater grows so weary in getting the floor that he has no strength left for his speech—was able to give definite expression to its doctrine, was able to answer that questions, "Who am I?" "What shall I do?" Romantic individualism finds expression in joy, in action, in truth; in the pursuit of these ideals, it produced an aestheticism, an immoralism, an irrationalism; and from the original intuition of joyous selfhood, it proceeded to think its own thoughts, perform its own deeds. From the earlier ideal of selfhood in self-love, no such happy result had followed; so that it was first in the nineteenth century that individualism became a doctrine as such.

The progress of the anti-scientific and anti-social, as our subsequent analysis of it will show, consisted in opposing the inherent sense of the joy of life to a view of nature which refused to credit the inner life, in an initiative equally in opposition to a science which refused to authenticate human strivings, in a culture which found nothing credible in the prosaic intellectualism with its anti-mystical tendencies. On the social

side, the conflict will be found to have renewed itself in a defiant Decadence, assumed in contrast to the inferior enjoyments of the established state, in a pessimism which neutralized the half-values of social life, in a skepticism which saw nothing true in social ideas. In the midst of this triple negation of both science and society, individualism developed a more positive character, when it maintained that the inner life was a joyous, valuable, and veritable one, just as it intimated that the scientific view of nature was not large or rich enough to contain the self, the social estimate of humanity equally incapable of contenting the self-affirming individual.

The shortcomings of the Romantic revolt appear at once in the persistently polemical attitude; for the elaboration of a concrete, humanistic content for the individual's life was often tainted by the unsound arguments and imperfect motives which the egoist advanced. Man must be himself; failing to find in either science or society the sense of joy which he seeks, has he the philosophic right to resort to the aesthetically decadent? Can we justify him, when, dismayed at the discovery that exterior life has no genuine values for him, he seeks relief in pessimistic immoralism? Is true individualism advanced by one who, finding no truth in the scientifico-social world, feels free to further his egoistic ideals by indulging in irrationalistic skepticism? This question, of supreme importance to the individualism of the future, may be answered in the following manner. When threats of the scientific and the social were so severe that all sense of selfhood seemed to be in vain, the decadent egoist was, for the time, justified in assuming the attitude of aestheticism, immoralism, irrationalism; nevertheless, this morbid method of formulating the individualistic argument can never be accepted as anything more than a means to a superior end. When,

as in contemporary thought, the battle for individualism has been won, it becomes necessary to restate the ideas of joy, worth, and truth, in such a way as shall make them more authentic, more healthful. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the individualist, who complains that the natural and social world do not contain or express the meaning of his interior life, to describe what kind of exterior order would thus afford him the true place of the self.

3. THE HIGHER SYNTHESIS

That which the individualist is expected to abandon is the extreme of a doctrine which vitiated the power of its contention when it resorted to the decadent, the immoralistic, the irrationalistic; that which he may be allowed to keep as his egoistic own is the inherent sense of the inner life as one of joy, worth, and truth. What, we may ask, should be the features of an external world of nature and humanity, in which the eudaemonistic, the ethical, and the religious world obtain? The career of individualism cannot fail to show that science does not give us Nature, that social thinking does not present Humanity; the scientific has drawn a small circle about an extensive subject, the social has been equally narrow in circumscribing its chosen field; nature is more than science, humanity more than society. If the individual cannot exist, in the Nature of science, if he cannot express himself in the Humanity of social thinking, it does not follow that he is homeless, worldless; for the trans-scientific conception of the world and the trans-social estimate of man may still be able to evince the august fact that the world does exist for the self.

There must be a new heavens and a new earth, a renewed and advanced conception of the natural order which environs us, of the social order which we have built in strange neglect of the fact that it was meant for humanity. When individualism assumes the responsibilities of restating the essential meaning of a world

whose forms have been so dominated by scientism that life has become all but impossible, it will find that the intellectual life of man is capable of furnishing such a view as shall evince the truth of life as such; when this individualism attempts to align a new ideal of human work, it will find that humanity is worthy of something superior to the social. Then, the individual may be said to live within, to work from within, while the content and character of the self will possess attributes free from the distressing features of Decadence.

The determination of the inner life of the individual, which was so empty and resultless with Rationalism, so vicious and forbidding with Romanticism, will appear with greater clearness, with increased value. That which individualism is really required to show is that life has both truth and worth. When the problem of life-truth is taken up, it will appear that it is in culture, rather than in aestheticism, that the true inwardness of the individual's life is to be found; and when the question of life-worth is isolated, it should be apparent that it is in work that the ego may best express its inner nature. Furthermore, individualism may expect to be cheered by the truth that the world, when surveyed in a trans-scientific manner, does not forbid culture; that humanity, when emancipated from the domination of the secular social ideal, makes it possible and desirable for the individual to do that which may justly be called his own work. But these desired truths and ideals cannot be appropriated gratuitously; to advance them with sincerity and confidence, we must first bring ourselves to the realization of the inferiorities of the scientifico-social and the superiorities of the cultural and individualistic. Then perhaps the crass objectivity of the one and the strident subjectivity of the other, which now lead to an annoying dualism, may give way before the higher synthesis of the individual with nature and humanity.

BOOK ONE
THE GROUND OF LIFE IN NATURE

BOOK ONE

THE GROUND OF LIFE IN NATURE

THUS far in the history of humanity there has never been any mutual understanding between the mind and the world. With both antiquity and mediaevalism, where the world had not been subjected to the analysis of physical science and where the mind had not been treated psychologically, there was no apparent need for the adjustment of the feeble Inner with the indefinite Outer. In modern thought, both mind and world have been so emphasized and so thoroughly intensified that mutual adjustment has become necessary. If the Enlightenment did not always say, "There is no world," it did persist in making the mind too great; if Positivism has not always asserted, "There is no mind," it has been guilty of making the world too great. In the midst of these contrasted views, individualism has suffered from the exaggeration of the mind here and the world there; whence the present need of mutual adjustment. In the earlier period of modern thought, it was the habit of the thinker to indulge in a naïve self-consciousness which caused the ego to lose sight of the world; in the later period, in whose midst we are still enveloped, individualism found it expedient to exchange self-consciousness for self-assertion. Then, the ego was a mere "I think"; now, egoism is based upon a vigorous "I will." At first, the world was a system of ideas over which the thinking self was able to gain ascendancy; finally the world became an order of things which has caused the ego to come into being as something asserted with all the violence of irrationalism. When rationalism was in complete possession of the world, it failed to

appreciate its good fortune; now that such rationalism has passed away, the egoist is forced to avail himself of irrationalism in order to assert selfhood in opposition to scientism.

The scientism which now attempts to interpret the world for man had its beginning with the inception of modern thought; but it was not until the science of the organic world advanced beyond the study of the inorganic that scientism gained the upper hand and drove the self from the world of things. How such scientism arose and how it achieved its victory over the self, must now become the subject of analytical investigation, in the course of which two tendencies of modern thought, the introvertive and the extrovertive, will come in for sharp contrast. The topics proposed by the problem at hand are twofold: (1) *The Naturalization of Life*, and (2) *The Struggle for Selfhood*.

PART ONE

THE NATURALIZATION OF LIFE

THE actual naturalization of man's spiritual life, implicit in the very genius of modern thought as this may have been, was not made apparent until the modern witnessed the abrupt transmutation of mind and world. Where, at first, thought had made itself the end and aim of all intellectual activity, there came a time when that thought was but the means to an end wholly different from itself; from having been master, thought became servant. If, with all its noble work, the mind of the individual had been recognized, the philosophic situation to-day would not be so trying; unfortunately for its own aspirations, the human mind has been buried beneath the mass of materials that it has itself brought to the light; the commander has been lost to view in the confusion dominant among his hosts. What madness led the ego to expel itself from the world; what disease changed its strength to weakness? The thought has repudiated the thinker; the deed has spurned the doer. At a period when the mind has displayed its inherent powers, we are confronted by the spectacle of a mental world minus the mind which produced it. As a result, the mind is in a world like a mouse in a mansion, for the great transmutation of mind and world has brought about the expulsion of the ego.

I. THE TRANSMUTATION OF MIND AND WORLD

In modern philosophy, it has been the fate of human thinking to undergo a grand transformation, the change

from thought to thing. While it is obvious that the human self exists within the world which it perceives, there to enjoy at least some kind and degree of inner life, the career of thought has been such as to place the self in such a superior position as to render it *a fronte*, then to shift it to the inferior place of *a tergo*. Expressed most directly, modern thought first placed consciousness above the cosmos, only to reduce the conscious to the cosmic; whence it was asserted at first, "The mind thinks," while now it is simply said, "Things exist." In the earlier period of modernity, it was the existence of the world which was doubted; now, it is the existence of the self that is called in question. In our orthodox thinking to-day, there is no system of either physics or psychology which has the will to assert the existence of the human ego. As a result, the assertion of the self as the bearer of man's spiritual life has been confined to aesthetic thought, where the method of individualistic self-assertion has been by means of irrationalism.

If the thought of the age were given up to none but physical speculation, this unhappy tendency to banish the human ego might easily be understood; but the age has excelled in both the physical and the psychological, although neither tendency has been willing or able to assist the self in its attempt at self-affirmation. Of what value for the self has modern psychology been? The Enlightenment, with meagre psychological equipment, was able to identify the self in the midst of a world all-too-physical; but the present age of introspection has discovered shadow instead of substance, the adjective instead of the noun. Our psychology has discovered everything but the self; and just now it seems as though the search for the personal poles of life were to be abandoned. In the study of processes, in the midst of quantitative analysis, and in the enthu-

siasm for the "stream of consciousness," the meaning of our soul-states has been lost to view. James' long, long chapter on "The Consciousness of Self"¹ is about the best example of what modern psychology has done for the ego; at the same time, it is brilliant, interesting, and suggestive. But, from the standpoint of positive individualism, this attempt at a contribution to the literature of the subject is practically valueless; in comparison with an aphorism from Friedrich Schlegel or a sharp sentence from Stirner, with a fragment of Ibsen's dialogue or a line from Wagner, it is nothing at all. In style artistic, in method irrationalistic, the psychologist was unable to turn his psychology in the direction of the individualistic problem. As in the case of James, so elsewhere; all psychology is democratic to the extremes of the commonplace and conventional.

I. THE SELF AS THINKER

The fruits of the Enlightenment are now all but lost to us in our age of scientism. After the transmutation of mind and world, we have awakened to the sombre fact that, whereas once the self was in the saddle riding the world, now the world has taken its place on the shoulders of the modern Atlas. Then, in the days of rationalism, the world stood in an apologetic attitude, and it was only by courtesy of the thinking self that the world was allowed to have an existence of its own. Now, it is the self which is on the defensive, and it is only the irrationalist and artist who has the will to assert that the world contains an "I think" and an "I will." The proud thinkers of the earlier period, so secure of their own existence, spent much of their precious time and effort in the lofty attempt to show that the exterior world has an existence which can

¹ *Psychology*, Ch. X.

compare with the existence of the self within. Then, it was the fashion for the epistemological and ethical thinker, after having satisfied himself with due measure of solipsism and egoism, to exercise a little concern for the exterior order, as if to suggest that the world also might have some claim upon existence in general. Nor was the ego satisfied with purely interior existence, so that the most characteristic efforts of the Enlightenment were only so many strivings after the physical and social. To-day, the individualist realizes that all attempts to arrive at the physical and social are equivalent to carrying coals to Newcastle.

From Descartes to Kant, the Enlightenment basked in the cool, rational rays of the midnight sun; at the present moment, individualism gropes about in the darkness of irrationalism. With the enfeeblement of the understanding, we are now at a loss to comprehend how Descartes could have made the self the centre of all existence; still less are we able to sympathize with Cartesianism when it rejoiced in the manifest solipsism which such an "I think" involved. How mighty must have been the Cartesian *cogito* when, after having established the self, it proceeded to prove the existence of both God and the world! In evincing the idea of Deity, Descartes was not content to assert that it is the idea of God *in intellectu* that leads one to assert God *in re*; for the modern thinker is so anthropic as to suggest that it is the idea of God in us that forms the basis of theistic belief. At the same time, this enraptured egoist comes to his conclusion concerning the existence of the exterior world by the specially human plea that God would not deceive man when man seems to perceive something like an exterior world. Egoism and humanism thus constitute the standpoint of the Cartesian system, and yet the net result for an individualistic doctrine of life was comparatively small. The existence

of the egoistic or solipsistic school of Cartesians, which is hardly more than hinted at by Reid,² might be taken to indicate that the Enlightenment was contritely individualistic; but the complete evaporation of the doctrine convinces us that the seventeenth century did not appreciate its own unique ideas. No, it was the existence of the all-obvious exterior world which caused them uneasiness; and they were glad enough to see that world enter the kingdom of existence as a camel passing through the eye of a thought-needle. In contemporary thought, it is the thinking self that must struggle to assert its existence.

The spirit of humanism militant, as this appears in the philosophy of Cartesianism, came forth as humanism triumphant in the French classicism of Pascal and Corneille. In an age like our own, where one is unable to distinguish between truth and error, good and bad, and where he is in doubt concerning the truth and worth of the human soul, it is refreshing to recall the victorious humanity as this is found in the philosophy of Pascal and the poetry of Corneille. The present age feels the "shame of thinking and the horror of being a man"; but it was the direct reverse of such sentiments which inspired the thought and art of these Cartesians, while the realistic temptation to consider man as a creature of finitude was one which they did not think to consider. In the case of Pascal, individualism finds an analogy to the thought of the day; "Pascal," says Morice, "is a poet of the hour which is now striking, of the synthetic period."³ With Nietzsche, we find an inverted Pascal, while in Ernest Hello the positive picture of the elder master comes to the light in the interesting analogy of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. That which makes Pascal

² *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, 1854, 269, note.

³ *La Littérature de Tout à L'Heure*, 108.

of importance to individualism, even where he like Geulincx condemned egoism as hateful, lies in the fact that, in a scientific age, Pascal knew how to affirm the independent existence of the thinking soul: observing how weak was this soul when contrasted with the exterior forces of the world, Pascal thought to compensate for this by attributing to the soul the single and superior quality of thought, whence man became for him "the reed that thinks." The unwillingness of Pascal to identify the soul with the self was only another example of the colorless individualism of the Enlightenment.

With Corneille, whose faith in the formal power of the mind reveals itself in the absolute formalism and unity of his drama, the supremacy of humanism appears in the heroism of the characters of the drama. Theology was still insisting upon the idea of God; science had elevated to the same height the idea of the world; Corneille insisted upon placing upon a third peak the idea of man. The superiority of this poet lies in the comprehensiveness and consistency of his art. Wagner did not fail to elevate man; Ibsen had enough power of belief to exalt a militant humanism; but, where our modern masters have had to degrade science and spirituality in order to save humanity, Corneille found it possible to keep the world, the Deity, and the human soul upon the same superior level. With such characters as the *Cid* and *Horace*, individualism perceives with what grandeur a poet can conceive of the supremacy of mankind; the Stoical indifference of man to the world and the direct relation of the soul to God conspire to raise the individual to an extraordinary height, whence anything "natural," or anything suggestive of finite weakness becomes an impossible sentiment. The Cartesian philosophy, which had made man soul alone, the beast body alone, here works to permit the absolute

perfection of the soul through reason. If these egos were artistic exaggerations, they can only persuade us that our own age has been indulging in the exaggeration of the impersonal, whence the ego of aestheticism, immoralism, and irreligion, has had to come forth to confute the stolid naturalistic argument against the truth and worth of human life. In the case of Rousseau, the assertion of the self becomes somewhat the same problem that it is to-day: both naturalistic and humanistic, Rousseau can find no inward satisfaction in a physico-political arrangement that denies to the self the right to exist within and to express itself from within; whence his resort to romantic idealism.

2. THE EMPIRICAL EGO

Lest it be imagined that it was the rationalistic tendency in the Enlightenment that inclined to exalt the ego above the world, while the empirical method remained true to the objective order, it must be recalled that empiricism was none the less able to withstand the tendency toward subjectivity. With Hobbes, this individuating was confined to the ethical; for the materialism of this writer did not permit him to advance to the place where he could render a decision as to objectivity and subjectivity. With Locke, however, the case was different, so that his empiricism was constantly threatened with egoism. In vain does Locke strive to persuade himself that the mind is a *tabula rasa* whose knowledge of the world, instead of being its own inner work, is dependent upon the impressions received from without. In opposing the rationalism of Descartes, Locke premised a conception of mind not wholly unlike that which had been the source of the Cartesian philosophy; in both systems, the inner, subjective principle is without content, and where in the one case it is a

mere "I think," in the other it is the non-committal *tabula rasa*. Both conceptions of mind are formal; both tend to show that knowledge is a knowledge of ideas rather than of things. In Locke's empiricism, this subjectivity comes to the surface in the distinction between "primary and secondary qualities," those that belong to the thing as such and those that are the property of the mind. With an empiricist, we should expect to find the assertion that the mind, which seems to owe its knowledge to the world of things, has a knowledge of their qualities; instead of this, we are informed that knowledge is confined to the secondary, subjective qualities, as a result of which knowledge is a knowledge of ideas. Hence, the mind is thrown back upon itself, while the system of empiricism furthers the humanism and egoism which sprang from the rationalistic principles of Cartesianism.

In the philosophy of Berkeley, this subjectivism reaches its climax; so that, where rationalism had ended in a willed solipsism, empiricism was driven to the same conclusion. In Hume, who took up Locke's problem of causality where Berkeley had confined his attention to that of substance, the same humanism is apparent. Like Descartes, Hume was a skeptic; only the skepticism of the empiricist was the postulate, where, with the rationalist, it had been the premise. An empiricism which deals with things rather than with thoughts, might be expected to reveal the connection between those things, but no such knowledge is forthcoming from Hume; instead of real, physical knowledge, we are forced to accept purely humanistic feelings, whose sway over us is expressed in the famous maxim of Hume, "Custom, then, is the great guide of human life." Berkeley's treatment of the substance-problem was solipsistic where Hume's attitude toward causality gave him a humanistic view-point. Berkeley's minor

idealism, founded as it was upon the percept rather than the concept, does not fail to bring the self into the foreground; for the perceiving being is the "mind," the "myself."⁴ The Cartesian *Cogito, ergo sum* becomes *Percipio, ergo sum*. Berkeley's empirical interests are shown in the fact that he is anxious to explain the existence of the exterior world, where Descartes was primarily interested in assuring himself of the soul's existence; so that the solipsism of the former is an unwitting conclusion where that of the latter had been frank and conscious. Moreover, Berkeley fails to come out clearly in favor of the self, partly because he stood in dread of materialism, partly because his philosophic was devoted to Theism. Descartes had started out free of both these notions; but Berkeley was prejudiced against the materialistic hypothesis of English thought, while he was equally prejudiced in favor of the Theistic postulate in English life. Thus, we find him endeavoring to place the idea of God in the stead of the idea of matter; and his opposition to abstractions, which places him in the surprising position of nominalism, is to be explained in the light of the fact that he was nominalistic toward the notion of material substance,⁵ while his attitude toward the idea of spiritual substance was thoroughly realistic. Now these strained attitudes toward matter and spirit tended to carry him away from the egoistic implication of his system, even where they do not forbid the solipsistic conclusion to his whole system of knowledge. Berkeley's idealism was thus calculated to exalt the ego in the same way that Descartes' had done; and it is the egoistic conclusion that the history of philosophy has drawn from his philosophy.

The aesthetic thought of England did not fail to

⁴ *Principles*, § 3.

⁵ *Ib.*, § 9.

exalt the moral man in the way that French art had elevated the rational man. Even where there was always a strong utilitarian tendency, the supremacy of man did not want for expression; for the utilitarian was almost as much of a rational calculator as the rationalistic moralist. Of what introspective powers must Smith's moral man have been possessed, and with what faculties of reasoning was Bentham's ethical subject endowed to have perfected a moral life out of the materials afforded by the senses! Man is ever in control; his reason has the last word. Pope's *Essay on Man*, with its subtle mixture of hedonism and rigorism, is the classic expression of this humanistic tendency. As the mind of the philosopher busies itself with its ideas, the mind of the poet makes a study of man. Sundered from the world and ensconced as the sovereign of creation, Pope's "Man" rejoices in a moral sense which is "a god within the mind," while "self-love thus pushed to social and divine" becomes so extensive as to embrace the whole external world of spirits. Thus does the wise, moral, and practical man possess an egoistic principle capable of adjusting him to life in its totality. In an age like ours, where man as individual must wait for nature to dictate his impulses while he further looks to society to direct these for him, such confident egoism is likely to be forgotten.

When the epistemology of the Enlightenment makes use of such expressions as, "human mind," "human understanding," and the like, one is likely to question whether the thought of that age was indeed aware of the humanity which rightly attaches itself to man's mind, just as one may be led to inquire whether those who to-day lay such emphasis upon "humanism" are equally aware of the fact that man as man is rational. Knowledge is a peculiar synthesis of the human and the rational; and the employment of the understanding is

one of the means by which man comes to the inner realization of his inherent humanity. Instead of being a purely formal affair, in connection with which the mind is content to receive facts and relations from the exterior order, thought has ever shown itself to be eminently creative. The creativeness of the mind, when it has been recognized, has usually been viewed in such a manner as to make man the creator of the knowable world, although it seems as though man were making use of the knowing process for the sake of establishing himself in the world where he has his being. The understanding must thus be esteemed as something affirmative rather than purely receptive, even when the understanding can perhaps do no more than elaborate the affirmation of the self. It is in the idea of an inward affirmation that the work of the mind is most clearly understood, and it is just this sense of mental self-assertion which tends to become obscured in the midst of imitative, scientific thought. Epistemology becomes plausible only as it makes mind something extra-mental.

The sovereignty of the mind over the world receives its most complete and convincing expression in Kant, even where this thinker first limits the sway of mind to the phenomenal order, and then delivers it in its crippled condition to the moral will. From within outwards, that is the leading motive of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The world of sense is easily overcome and its forms of time and space delivered to the mind when Kant idealizes the spatial and the temporal. And not only the immediate world of sense perception, but the more remote and vigorous order of physics is treated in the same lordly fashion. The static and mathematical world under his control in the intuitions of time and space, Kant proceeds to exercise the same lordship over the dynamic, physical system. The centre

of the physical world is placed at the self, "the synthetic unity of apperception."⁶ From this humanistic centre radiate the twelve possibilities of thought, the categories. These are not drawn empirically from the world, but are deduced from the mind to be imposed upon the world. As long as the mind is willing to confine its lordship to the limits of "a possible experience," it is so placed that it may indicate all the possibilities of physical science, which come forth in a duodecimal system in exact conformity with the self-sufficient categories. Quantitative and qualitative analyses, as also the principles of causality and substance, assume the superior rationalistic character of "Axioms of Intuition" and "Anticipation of Perceptions," "Analogies of Experience" and "Postulates of Empirical Thought in General." Never since the dawn of Creation, if indeed then, has the material world been so thoroughly at the mercy of mind. The climax of this humanistic style of thinking comes when Kant calmly says, "It is the understanding which gives law unto nature."⁷ It is of course true that Kant confines the mind to its own world, which is a phenomenal one; but, when he draws a circle about the human understanding, it is not with the aim of allowing the world to express its own existence in connection with the metaphysical ideas of soul, world, and God, topics beyond the power of thought to handle, but with the aim and result of showing how these transcendent principles are under the domination of the human will. For, where human understanding dictates to the physical world, the human will is equally rigorous with the metaphysical or noumenal order; in one department, man rules the world, and gives laws to it by means of the category of causality; in the other, he domineers

⁶ *Op. cit.*, tr. Müller, 87 *et seq.*

⁷ *Prolegomena*, § 36.

over it through the Categorical Imperative. Nothing is independent of man, whose "synthetic unity of apperception" and ethical "autonomy" have the world-whole well in hand.

While Kant was meditating upon his conquest over the world of philosophy, the aesthetics of Winckelmann and Lessing was enjoying that serene sense of world-mastery which the proud author of the *Critique* was awaiting. As yet, the Romantic striving in which the German mind sought to free itself from an entangling world of principles and customs had not been felt. Classicism was dreaming the dream of beauty, conscious only of the mind's power to control the world of forms. This calm conceptualism, with its lack of life and content, was expressed in Winckelmann's art-ideals, with their sense of stillness and nobility. The simplicity of classic beauty appealed to Winckelmann as rare wine drunk from a transparent goblet,⁸ while its rare essence was further compared to a spirit drawn from the material order as by fire.⁹ "*Nach diesem Begriff soll die Schönheit sein, wie das vollkommenste Wasser, welches je weniger Geschmack es hat, destogesunder geachtet wird, weil es von fremden Theilen geläutert wird.*"¹⁰

With the dawning of nineteenth-century thought, it is most difficult to understand how the individualistic forces at work in both metaphysics and morality should have come to the end of their reign. Man awoke from his bright dream of lordship over the physical and social worlds to find himself fettered. As if in a twinkling, like the political changes which took place in the French Revolution, the aristocracy of the individual intellect gave way to a physical and social democracy of dialectic. This instantaneous transmu-

⁸ *Werke*, lib. 4, Cap. 2, § 19.

⁹ *Ib.*, § 22.

¹⁰ *Ib.*, § 23.

tation, which had the effect of subordinating the ego, the world of nature, and society, seems to have been due to twin causes. In the first place, the individual, who had come into being so easily in the logic of Descartes and the ethics of Hobbes, was always taken for granted, was never forced to exist by means of the will-to-selfhood. Thus it was only a naïve ego whose sway over the world was a matter of circumstance rather than of conscious aim. In the second place, the ego which, for the time, held the secret of the physical and social worlds, was ever bent upon going forth from itself to the objective order. Solipsism and egoism were not really acceptable to the age that had evoked them. It was the objective order, not the subjective one, which was the goal of that period, so that the tendency was a centrifugal one, which led both metaphysics and morality to depart from the inner principle which thought had so rapidly achieved. The activity which might have been expended in elaborating the ego and organizing its inner life, left the ego to itself, and set about developing the physical and the social. Something of this was to be expected, since the Enlightenment was not monastic in tone; but it can only be regretted that such undue prominence was attached to the value of obtaining an exterior order in its scientific and social forms.

As early as Kant, the oppression from without had begun to be felt. The Critical Philosophy had used the *a priori* powers of the understanding to encircle the self with the phenomenal order; only within this finely empirical field was the mind able to rejoice in its powers. The ego, which was never really recognized by Kant, became the ruler of a petty principality. On the ethical side, the expression of the free ego was no more complete than its intellectual activity had been. As soon as Kant had educed the freedom of the will,

and placed it as the ruler of the noumenal order, he limited its activities to the moralistic work of fulfilling the demands of the Categorical Imperative, so that the self was as a prisoner in its own castle. The Kantian aesthetics, which tended to deliver the mind from the logical concept and the moral law, did indeed represent the possibilities of the inner life, where intuition and taste were supreme; hence we may attribute a goodly measure of the Romantic revolt which was to follow, to no other influence than the sense of freedom and feeling of creativeness which this aesthetic engendered. Yet, in all three phases of Transcendentalism, the sense of inner life and the buoyancy of the human will show themselves to have been infected with a touch of low-spiritedness.

II. THE ACTUAL NATURALIZATION OF LIFE

The modern movement toward the naturalization of human life was something more than a theoretical attitude; it was an attempt on the part of man to live his life in the world as such. With both classicism and Christianity, the immediate relation of man to nature had been negated, even when, as a matter of fact, the imperfect conditions of civilization had made that relation a most essential one. With the modern, when for the first time man begins to separate his life from the world, the spirit of paradox worked in such a manner as to make the life of immediacy seem desirable. Not only admitting that man was a creature of earth, modern thought seemed to take pleasure in the thought; whence it set up the ideal of immediate human realization by means of a system of utility. In the case of the earlier forms of life which had characterized the culture of the western world, there was a desire to consider man in such a humanistic capacity as to make

the obvious relation to the exterior world appear incidental. With the Pagan, it was the spirit of art which was evoked to humanize man; while with the Christian, it was religion which was expected to redeem man from the world. Now, the modern has set up the naturalistic in contrast to the aesthetical and religious.

I. THE SURRENDER TO NATURALISM

The relation of man to the world, as expressed by the spirit of classicism, may be understood when it is recalled how ancient thought, aware of man's terrestrial character and vocation, sought to ameliorate the situation by perfecting the world in which man was called upon to live. In this manner, the typical Grecian spirit was that of Apollonian culture, whereby man sought to supplant the raw and barbaric by the fine and intellectual. To place knowledge at the summit of all human activity and to curb the will by the ideal restraint of moderation, was to attempt the realization of the humanistic in man. It was from this type of Grecian, Apollonian culture that humanism as a doctrine of man's intellectual and aesthetical perfection arose. If, as Nietzsche has claimed,¹¹ the Greek was not loath to introduce at times the converse spirit of the Dionysian with its titanic and barbaric tendencies, it may be said that history had taught him how superior in character and force was the Apollonian spirit, so that nothing could be feared from an occasional Dionysian outburst, which could have only the effect of refreshing and reinvigorating the more formal intellect.

The formal spirit of antique culture is easily recognized in art, where the plastic ideal of the static and typical, rather than the dynamic notion of character and motion, was the supreme consideration. In its

¹¹ *The Birth of Tragedy, in loc.*

dialectics, antiquity knew only the poles of reality, as these were found in appearance and reality; of the medium world of activity and volition, the ancient mind was nobly ignorant, so that its supreme desire was to know the mind, while its highest energy was the "energy of contemplation." For this reason, the activity of the ancient mind was of the artistic rather than of the practical order, and it was impossible for the ancient to entertain the idea of work. The attitude of the classic mind toward nature was one in which the will sought the perfection of the natural order, and it was without difficulty that the aesthetic consciousness of the classic thinker gave its impress to the external world of appearances. In art, this was done when the principle of form, as this was observed in the human body, was brought to perfection; in philosophy, the same end was accomplished when the synoptic activity of reason reduced all scattered particulars to formal unity. In all its work, the ancient mind sought that completion of the exterior order which should make it possible and reasonable for man to assume his place in the outer world.

In contrast to ancient aestheticism, mediaeval pietism sought the perfection of the inner life as such, apart from any relation to the outer world. Where the first manner of European culture had been marked by beauty, the second laid its emphasis upon truth; where the mind had first sought the subjugation of sense, it now turned to the development of spiritual life, and an aesthetic classicism gave way to religious romanticism. Thus, it was no longer the world as contemplated according to the formal ideals of the mind, but the spirit, inwardly liberated so that it was enabled to press onward, outward toward a Beyond. The absence of such a Beyond, hardly felt by a classicism which found so much of beauty and nobility in the immediate world, has become

a more painful want in our modern life, which feels that it has lost much of that which the mediaeval period had achieved for itself. The ancient was in a position where he could be one with nature, but the ideals of mediaevalism were such that nothing in the immediate order of sense was able to explain the felt meaning of the inner life, or content the aspirations of the romantic will. In mediaevalism, the forms of Platonic and Aristotelian idealism may have prevailed, but the inward meaning of them was due to the creative spirit of the pietistic mind.

The special methods of mediaevalism, by means of which it attempted the transcendence of nature, appear in both philosophy and art, where a common romanticism obtained. This method was twofold: here, it showed itself in the desire to descend beneath the surface of consciousness, and thus discover the essential soul of man; there, it displayed itself in the longing to transcend the world, and find the realm of free spiritual life. Of these dual motives, Augustine and Anselm may be taken as representative. In the Augustinian theology, nothing was more significant than the introspective plunge into the depths of consciousness, whence the conscious certainty of inner, personal existence became a fact; in contrast with the self-knowledge of Augustine, the know-thyself of Socrates appears quite feeble. The completion of this style of spiritual reasoning appears in Anselm, who endeavors to postulate objectively that which Augustine had laid down as a fundamental principle of subjectivity; Anselm thus seeks the outward realization of the inner spiritual principle, when he takes the things which are true within for the intellect and strives to make them true without in the person of the Deity, the outer realization of the inward act of intellection. It is undeniable that the method of mediaevalism made no room for the

knowledge of things, so important in modern philosophy; but our modern knowledge of things has been equally neglectful of the knowledge of spiritual matters.

Modern life had naturalized itself in conscientious manner by turning away from the results of the inner life, as these were inherited from mediaevalism, and directing its attention toward the things of nature. In this objectification of the mind, modernism was as far from the classic as from the romantic ideal. Thus, it was neither the perfection of the outer nor the perfection of the inner, but the direct knowledge of world and man, as the cosmic and anthropic data were given in experience. In a certain sense, which followed implicitly would be misleading, the modern has pursued his naturalism in the spirit of disinterestedness: where the ancient looked to the world to express the meaning of his ideals, where the mediaeval pursued his spiritual aims in neglect of the facts of outer experience, the modern has felt free to indulge in no such freedom; whence he has studied man and the world for the sake of those humanistic and naturalistic facts which were presented by experience, and that with a resolute disregard of the ultimate interests of his being. In thus disclaiming both mental and moral responsibility, in abjuring questions concerning the truth and worth of his own life, the modern has placed his affair upon nature, heedless of what the results might be.

In this surrender to naturalism, the modern has not been blind to the question of human interest; the disinterestedness which inspired him must thus be understood in a restricted sense, for the modern was willing to relinquish the remote values of his existence, as these appeared in art and religion, only as he was able to realize those immediate interests which naturalism itself seemed calculated to further and fructify. For this reason, we are called upon to observe that it has

been the actual desire to live a naturalized life, emancipated from the aesthetical and religious, which has co-operated with the theoretical naturalization of our modern intellectual life. Ancient aestheticism did not float freely in the air of artistic and dialectical speculation, but exerted itself as the expression of the actual life of a people which believed and lived in the artistic. Mediaeval romanticism in religion was elaborated in the free, but came forth in response to those pietistic ideals which were actual felt in the heart of the thinker. In the same manner, it may be said that our modern naturalism, instead of arising in a spirit of complete disinterestedness, which has been the alleged glory of science, has proceeded hand in hand with the direct interests of an age which has been persuaded that nature was able to satisfy the wants of the human heart. If the principles of modern science had not been calculated to found and enhance the industrial ideal, would modern physics, chemistry, and biology have been so assiduously cultivated?

The position to which our thought thus drives us may be expressed by asserting that it is interest which guides the intellect; this proposition can do no harm, if we are careful to write the word "interest" so large that it shall not suffer itself to be confined to any one phase of human existence. The mind of man could not tolerate a system of thought which should assert that knowledge exists for the sake of revealing that which is beautifully good in the world, or for the sake of that which is truly good in the inner life of humanity; can it be any more indulgent with a naturalistic system which declares that knowledge is to be pursued with the aim of bringing to the light those facts and relations which have direct bearing upon the immediate life of man in nature? Ibsen's Julian, who felt unhappy in the "age of iron," turned away with reluctance

from Paganism and Christianity exclaiming, "The old beauty is no longer beautiful; the new truth is no longer true."¹² May we not assume then, that, with the change of interest from the industrial, as this cannot fail to come in time, the newer truth of scientism will no longer be true?

"We live in a scientific age." How thoroughly has this phrase eaten its way into the heart of the modern man! We live in an age where we no longer desire to perfect the exterior world through art, where we are no longer anxious to elevate the soul above nature, but where we are bent upon getting profit out of material existence. Hence, success and science go hand in hand, while older and worthier syntheses are discarded for this newer one, which has promised to be more satisfactory. At the beginning of the modern period, in the days of Bacon, man made a covenant with the world, the terms of which were such that, in exchange for spiritual goods, the world was to give material benefits, which should have the advantage of being perceptible to the senses and accessible to the will. Now we are in condition where we are asking whether nature has fulfilled her contract, whether the physical order has kept its promise. As a life ideal, "success" cannot be said to express any fundamental need of the human soul; but, under the mask of success, the permanent principle of human happiness was seeking expression. With the promises of the physical world, promises which included the satisfaction of the inquiring intellect and the striving will, man undertook the complete naturalization of his spiritual existence; so that now, with the glamor of naturalism passing away, we are forced to ask whether nature has yielded the harvest that man had expected to gather. When man seeks the truth and worth of life, the consolation

¹² *Caesar's Apostasy*, Act. II.

of both intellect and will, he cannot avoid the suspicion that the naturalization of his life was too great a price for the benefits which up to the present hour he has received. It is for this reason that individualism calls upon us to come to an understanding with life, in order that we decide whether modern life is not in vain. In some quarters, where realistic thought prevails, escape from the trying situation has been effected by the simple device of taking things as they are; in others, where man is idealistic, deliverance from despair has assumed the form of dilettantism; yet, these artifices cannot represent the ultimate attitude of the human mind, which must desire to behold the union of interior life and exterior existence. Thus, it becomes the duty of individualism to analyze the modern situation, in order that the seriousness of our condition may be appreciated and understood. At this point, then, we are forced to inquire what naturalism has really meant in human life, just as we are expected to consider how individualism has made its war upon it. Only as the outer condition and the inner need are comprehended may we hope to arrive at the principles of a higher synthesis of our human ideas and impulses.

2. THE AMBIGUOUS ELEVATION OF THE PHYSICAL

Modern thought, instead of beginning with the poetical, as ancient culture arose in connection with Homer, instead of proceeding upon the basis of religion, as mediaevalism streamed forth from the New Testament, had its origin in the science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Renaissance had found it possible to view humanity in the light of the aesthetical, and had laid down the principles of a humanism in which much of the truth and worth of life could be found; but the scientific interests of the time, with the new earth and new heavens which they involved, in-

duced the modern to abandon the intensive character of his limited thought for an extensive movement which expanded the meaning of human life over a field indefinitely vast. For this reason, the development of modern thought, instead of witnessing the parallel progress of the humanistic and naturistic, was conducted exclusively by the ideals of naturalism. When individualism reviews the strivings of this early modern period, it observes that the promised and intended naturalism was not always forthcoming in actual philosophic performance; for the humanistic could not fail to make its presence felt, even when it was not recognized as an integral factor in modern thought. The elevation of the physical world was thus an ambiguous one, since the naturalistic could not wholly rid itself of the humanistic, while other phases of the physical philosophy tended to result in a dualism of objective and subjective. When, at a later period, the inorganic conception of the world gave way to biological ideas, the same entrance of the humanistic was observed; for the biological served as an introduction to the psychological, whence the mind was justified of her children.

(1) *The Naturalistic and Humanistic*

The first, if not the most important, step taken by naturalism appears in the new astronomy, as a result of which the earth was taken from the center of the universe, and relegated to an insignificant position. With this astronomical change in point of view, the dignity of human life seemed to be in danger; if man's physical position was no longer central, his attitude toward the world, so it seemed, could hardly be esteemed lordly. Up to that time, man had placed his affair upon the earth; and, when the planet was degraded, man seemed to suffer with it. It may seem strange

that mediaevalism, which had assumed to find the sense and worth of human life in something interior and unique, should thus take to heart a change of view which concerned only the material world, and the earth at that; but the historical fact remains, for man found it difficult to accept in place of his geocentric view the new heliocentrism.

But the astronomical, with its interests devoted to the remote precincts of the universe, was not the only form of science which seemed to threaten the position of man in the universe; the new physics was no less militant. The new physics, with its faith in the mathematical and mechanical, tended to remove from man's view that supernaturalism which, though superior to him, seemed more akin to his inner nature than anything which the physical world could present. At the same time, the inner nature of man himself seemed to suffer from the same fate which had overtaken the Deity; the inner nature of man, with its supposedly independent states of consciousness and assumedly free acts of initiation, was submitted to the same mechanical interpretation to which the outer world had been forced to succumb. As astronomy had robbed man of his heaven, physics robbed him of his earth. The increase on the side of the extension of nature was marked by a decrease on the side of the intension of human life, for, as the world became larger, man became smaller; the truth of naturalism was the falsity of the anthropic. Under the auspices of naturalism, the world seemed for the first time to exist in its forms and to express itself in its forces, no longer for the sake of mankind, but for its own sake.

But, in the midst of this celebration of the naturalistic as the last word of truth, one must pause to consider how definitely and logically the thought of the seventeenth century was advancing a rival life-ideal, in

the form of a theory of human culture. The contrast between the two ideals, the natural and the cultural, becomes all the more striking when one observes further that it was in the mind of one and the same individual that the rival views had their birth; this was the man Bacon. Where one seeks to regard Bacon as the modern *par excellence*, in that he broke away from both antiquity and mediaevalism, one must not overlook the fact that Bacon is just as authoritative in the humanistic as in the naturistic; for, if he precipitated the problem of physical science, he did not fail to propose the problem of human culture: the *Advancement of Learning* is a modern work no less than the *Novum Organum*. For himself, Bacon refuses to accept the most important of the new naturalistic ideals, as the Copernican astronomy and the application of mathematics to physical problems;¹³ and his system of politics makes no room for the principle of *jus naturale*.¹⁴ Yet, in all his alleged modernness, Bacon did not see fit to reject the antique ideal of culture, whence he made the earliest modern life-ideal the same as the latest principle of antique culture, the Aristotelian "energy of contemplation."¹⁵ The idea of the world may have been clearer than that of man, but the humanistic was no less attractive or forceful.

When, as was the case with antiquity, knowledge gave pleasure to and bestowed dignity upon the human mind, when, in mediaevalism, knowledge pointed out the pathway to spiritual life, knowledge was now regarded as that which gives power. This power was naturally, not of man as though it were a revelation of his own will, but of nature. Bacon expressed this in his contention for a knowledge of facts, whereby the mind was

¹³ Bacon, *Nov. Org.*, lib. II, 5.

¹⁴ Cf. Lerminier, *Histoire du Droit*, Int., 113.

¹⁵ Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, I, VI.

exteriorized and rendered alien to itself. From that time on, it became the duty of the mind to elaborate data, rather than to refine its methods of thinking; to educe laws, rather than to produce arguments. The day of man had gone; the day of nature come. As a result of this new operation, the older syntheses, those systems which Comte sought to identify as the theological and metaphysical, gave way before endless analysis, the synoptic unity of which was expressed somewhat vaguely under the head of "nature." It was in this spirit of naturalistic sufficiency that the seventeenth century severed connection with all forms of tradition, and set up nature as the standard of thought and truth; hence arose, *religio naturalis* and *jus naturale*. The word "naturalist" occurred as early as 1588, in the writings of Bodin.¹⁸ It was, of course, the same world of perception without and the same thinking mind within; but the attitude of the mind toward the world and the aim of the mind itself had undergone radical change in the light of which modern naturalism arose in contrast to the scholastic and classical.

When individualism is called upon to read the history of the early naturalism, which sought to place the world in the position which man had been occupying, sought to transmute the anthropic into the physical, it does not fail to observe that, in spite of the extreme importance attached to the idea of nature, the idea of man was by no means as insignificant as a superficial view of the history might cause one to suppose. It must not be assumed that naturalism arose of its own force or for its own sake. The career of naturalism was ever marked by a decided humanism, so that one might question whether science naturalized the soul or the soul humanized science. Individualism is free to admit that there was a difference between the anthropomorphic

¹⁸ Lechler, *Geschichte d. Eng. Deismus*, 31.

and anthropological conceptions of scholasticism and the humanistic ideals of the Renaissance; but, since humanism and naturalism arose contemporaneously, it is false to assume that the modern view of the world drove man as such from that world. Where history appears to show that science and its naturalism arose in independence of the spiritual needs and inward ideals of the human mind, the analysis of the modern movement convinces us that, in naturalism, it was the same humanizing mind which was at work upon the problem of the world.

At its inception, naturalism was urged, not so much for the sake of nature itself, but largely on account of man who felt the desire to lead a new life. Hemmed in by the restrictions of mediaevalism, thwarted by the oppressive principles of an ecclesiastical existence, the modern movement arose in response to a demand for a freer, fuller conception of man's life in the world. At heart, the earliest form of scientism was only a humanism, while the motive which expressed itself according to the methods of naturalism was a desire for the emancipation of mankind. The various forms of liberation which took place in connection with the new astronomy and the new physics were but symptoms of this desire for a new world and a new life. In the particular instances of Galileo and Bruno, the new naturalism showed how humanistic it was, and the names of these men have passed into history, not so much as scientific investigators, but as heroes of a liberal humanity. As some sought relief from mediaevalism by a return to Paganism, others exemplified the same desire in their recourse to nature, so that the spirit of the times was so humanistic as to bear little resemblance to the positivism of the nineteenth century.

Far from rejoicing in freedom from human interest, even when the narrowness of the anthropic view had

disappeared, modern science carried out its theories of physics in connection with a theory of politics. Both nature and man had the opportunity to speak for themselves; the exponents of the new views rejoiced, here in a new view of the world, there in an equally new view of man. However distressed other views of life, the idealistic for example, may feel in the contemplation of the career which the modern man has been called upon to pursue, individualism cannot be dismayed at the annals of the naturalism which had so much that was humanistic about it. In the one instance of Hobbes, a materialistic view of the world did not prevent an egoistic conception of human life; even one may well wonder how the abject naturalism of this thinker made it possible for him to assume the independent existence of the human self. Apparently there was something in this materialistic view of the world which justified the rash emancipation of the self-asserting individual. The sanctity of mediaevalism and the fineness of Florentine humanism had been unable to place the human subject in the independent position in which he found himself in the ethics of Hobbes.

If it be thought that naturalism had the effect of removing man from the scene, it must not be overlooked that this new philosophy was hedonistic as well as egoistic. The world may not be conceived anthropologically as existing for the sake of man, but the new view of the world, far from taking away from the sense of enjoyment, placed the individual in a position which it had not been his to enjoy, even in the Garden of Epicurus. Whatever mediaevalism had done for the idea of man as idea, it had not seen fit to attribute to him that direct joy of life which modern naturalism so readily accorded him. Hedonism, however crude a form of an individualism which should evince the joy of life, was in strict accord with the naturalistic prin-

ciples of the early Enlightenment, so that the interest of man did not really suffer from the introduction of a movement which seemed to drive man from the world. When, therefore, individualism seeks to balance the losses and gains of naturalism, it is prone to feel that, while there was some loss of dignity and beauty, the new sense of life, with its ideals of freedom and progress, in some way compensated for that which had to be forfeited. If nature was capable of newer interpretations, so was man; if there could be a physical view of the universe, none the less could there be a psychological conception of man.

(2) *The Objective and Subjective*

The physical view of the world which once had been viewed aesthetically and spiritually, expressed itself in the form of a direct objectivity. With antiquity, the natural world had never succeeded in getting beyond the reach of the human mind. Before Socrates, Greek thought had indeed indulged in a naïve naturalism; but the superiority of the world to the mind could not be affirmed until the character and scope of the mind had had the opportunity to express themselves. When the perceptualism of Protagoras attempted to make the mind subservient to its immediate impressions, the overpowering logic of Socrates and Plato soon silenced it. In the case of Scholasticism, no attempt was made to emancipate nature, except at the close of the period, when the modern idea had begun to dawn. The visible world, *natura naturata*, enjoyed no separate existence, but was ever subordinate to the spiritual idea of *natura naturans*. But, with the coming of modern thought, the ideas of antiquity and the beliefs of mediaevalism were overcome by the independent objectivity of the natural order, which was a law unto itself. The idealized physics of Plato could not compare with the scien-

tific conception of physics as a science. With the discovery of the law of gravitation, it was no longer possible to regard the natural order in any other than a mechanical manner, whence mathematics took the place of logic and faith.

The analysis of the physical world thus produced facts, data, from which there could be no appeal to "ideas"; the synthesis which these data allowed, instead of being Aristotelian categories, were laws established by patient investigation and faithful experiment. Instead of anticipating nature or preparing the way for her by means of artificially prepared avenues of approach, the thinker of the new period let the world indicate its own paths. The accepted method was the *a posteriori* one; so that the mind, if it desired to participate in the objective order, was forced to follow the analogy of the physical world. Hobbes was about the first to adapt his thought to the new method of procedure; and, in his system, the internal was modeled upon the external. In this spirit, Hobbes bases his principles *de homine* upon the previously determined principles *de corpore*, while he looks upon the behaviour of the human body and human mind as nothing but so many cases of that mechanical causation which the physical world displays universally. Nor does he vary from this rule of letting the physical world furnish the criterion of truth, when he comes to the question concerning the actions of men, as these result in the establishment of the social order; the principles *de cive* are as mechanical as those of the physical world-order. In such an early system of naturalism, the supremacy of the objective world received its most complete recognition.

The more intimate analysis of man, as this appeared in the psychological conception of the time, resulted in the establishment of the sensationalistic psychology.

Hobbes' theory of perception, as this was expressed most completely in his analysis of visual sensation, so identifies sensation with stimulus that motion in the body which is seen results in the motion of the eye, while in both brain and nerve, as also in the heart, which was for him the seat of sensation, nothing more than motion can be found. With the development of sensationalism, there was made a consistent departure from the relentless materialism of the earlier thinker, although nothing was attributed to the mind except that which could be found in the physical object of its sensations. This belief in the sufficiency of sensationalism as a theory of perception expressed itself in characteristic fashion, when the one-time innate ideas of the mind were eliminated, and the content and behaviour of thought so analyzed as to cast all the credit upon the side of the exterior order.

Where the physical thought of that time so clung to the idealistic prejudice, it placed itself in a paradoxical position; for its allegiance to the older order was calculated to arouse conflict with the ideas taken from the newer one. In the case of the sensationalists, the breach with mediaevalism had been complete; but, with the Cartesian school, there was a survival of the mediaeval conception of the soul; and the endeavor to place this spiritual soul in the physical body involved an insoluble dualism. With Descartes, the attempt to combine the Augustinian idea of the soul and the modern conception of the body, as interpreted by Harvey, precipitated a conflict which Descartes could not overcome, and which made necessary the devices of the Occasionalists. Like Hobbes, Descartes accepts the physical view of the world and the human body, but prefers to cling to the traditional conception of the mind; and the peculiar plight of the mind is nowhere better portrayed than in the Cartesian system. The form of the older "soul"

was still there, but the substance was lost, the powers had dwindled to nothing; all that the mind could do was to witness that which proceeds automatically. But, where the mind as thought had lost its control of the exterior world, that world as a system of forces was to fail in its attempt to produce the inner states of consciousness; the complete materialism of Hobbes had given way before the relentless dualism of Descartes, so that the affairs of the self were as satisfactory and convincing as the affairs of the world.

Later attempts at the promulgation of the sensation-alistic doctrine, which should establish the complete control of the natural order, show how impossible it had been to submerge the human mind in the material. At the beginning of his doctrine of the mind, Locke was one with Hobbes; at the end, his position was practically the same as that of Descartes. Locke thus began by surrendering the mind to nature, as appeared from his assertion that nothing is innate, all is derived from the objective order; but the conclusion to the system of sensationalism found the empiricist admitting that mind could know nothing but ideas, the point at which the rationalist had begun. Moreover, the system of sensationalism made possible an idealism, which was as inimical to the physical as materialism had been toward the spiritual; where one had asserted the existence of nothing but matter, the other asserted the existence of nothing but mind. Materialism had plunged into dualism, and from this dualism an idealistic, or ideological view of the world had resulted. For this reason, it becomes difficult for the history of philosophy to see just how nature gained its alleged victory over the mind; if nothing exists but matter, nothing is known but mind.

The naturalization of the modern man seems, then, to have been a most ambiguous proceeding, since in its

endeavor to make mind assert nature, mind has been found asserting something more akin to its own character, the human self. It is a question whether scientism has been aware of the method it has been following, while it is equally to be wondered whether the mind was conscious of the calculated result of its own conduct in the establishment of thought as such. Naturalism may indeed complain that the study of the exterior world has not been a sincere undertaking, wherein no admixture of the humanistic should be found; while individualism may protest that the naïve deduction of the self, in the egoism and solipsism of the Enlightenment, was a conscious, voluntary act of the mind. Nevertheless, the claim that the modern ideal has been a naturistic one, that the modern aim has been the naturalization of humanity, is one which cannot be allowed without considerable qualification. Physical and humanistic systems grew up together, the one rejoicing in the emancipation of the world, the other happy in the thought that man had at last begun to exist.

In the elevation of the physical, as this took place in connection with the inorganic world, the ego was in a position where its dignity was conserved. With far less knowledge of man than one enjoys to-day, the humanist of the Enlightenment found it possible to elevate the self above the world, so that the history of the Enlightenment is not without its satisfactions when it is read by the individualist of the present. The human self was not long in adjusting itself to the new conditions; and, while the mechanical conception of the world may have seemed inimical to certain traditional ideas of man, there were new ideals which came forth to assert the independence of the self in the world. With the second development of naturalism, as this took place in connection with the organic world, the

situation was more threatening to the inner, independent life of the human self, although the history of the nineteenth century does not reveal the triumph of the natural over the spiritual. Like the elevation of the physical, the exaltation of the biological was not without its ambiguity, its contradiction.

3. THE ELEVATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL

The work of the latter part of the modern period, and that in which we are still living, was such as to present new problems for humanistic thought. At the same time, the history of the biological period fails to reveal the complete sway of the naturalistic, just as its history is not without inner contradiction. Where the mechanical metaphysics of the Enlightenment had elaborated a synthesis which ever tended to thrust man out of the world, and to render the view of life a dualism in which the body was surrendered to nature while the mind was left to itself, organic scientism has shown the tendency to draw man in the complete system of naturalistic evolution. The thinker of the earlier period, even when he could not recognize the reflection of his own soul in the mirror of the mechanical world, could still insist upon the independent existence of that soul, as a being of another kind; for the less the soul was like nature, the more it was like itself. With the theory of descent, however, the principle of life in the outer world is so like that in the inner world that the difference between the two forms of existence has become blurred, while the uniqueness and exceptional character of humanity has been all but lost to view. Thrust aside from mechanical nature, and with the feeling that the world no longer existed for him, the individual might still rejoice in the intrinsic character of the self, even when that self had lost its objectivity; but, drawn into

the world and forced to make friends with it, the individual has been placed in a position where the clear outline of his life has been lost to view.

(1) *Positivism and Humanism*

The biological view, instead of abiding by the statue-like notion of the human body, now regards that body as akin to lower forms of organic life, as indeed related to these according to the principles of descent. Not only the body, which had known the Egyptian bondage of physical naturalism, but the mind also was naturalized by the biological philosophy; the *Origin of Species* claims the one, the *Descent of Man* the other. For this reason, it seemed no longer possible to insist upon the truly humanistic, since the elaboration of the inner life, in the form of art, morality, and social existence, had been shown to be incident upon the principles of organic evolution. Everything, except the theory of evolution itself, was shown to have been implicit in the original organism.

In this perfection of the biological view, no room was left for either complaint or doubt; man was supposed to be satisfied with his lot. Under the auspices of physical naturalism, this was not the case; for there one found abundant opportunity to vent his spite upon the mechanical system which was laid upon his mind and heart. For this reason, the earlier period of modern thought was not wanting in systems of skepticism, like those of Montaigne and Hume. But, with the elevation of the organic in nature, man was supposed to find such a degree of truth and such a depth of satisfaction as to make of life nothing more or less than an optimistic belief in that which is. This came about in relation to the social, which accompanied the biological; and, when the spiritual with its inwardness was

denied man, the social with its vast and varied objectivity was supposed to satisfy his mind and to content his will. In nature and man, there was supposed to be enough for the sound mind and the healthy will. This exaggeration of immediate existence came about logically in connection with positivism, wherein the principles of all science both mechanical and organic are placed upon a firm basis. The difference between eighteenth-century skepticism and nineteenth-century positivism may be seen when one recalls the cynicism of the earlier thinker in the defeat of his intellect with the optimism of the later one in his spirit of resignation to the world as given in experience; where one had failed to find, the other had not thought to seek.

The theoretical assets of the positivist system were not equal, however, to the spiritual demands made upon them; and, where the positivist had flattered himself that, at last, he had found a scheme of thought perfectly adapted to mankind, the history of the nineteenth century reveals the spirit of radical discontent. It was possible for a spiritual thinker like Spinoza to accept the mechanical philosophy of his age, and to transform it into an idealistic theory of life where all was gain for the contemplative spirit of mankind. In the same manner, Leibnitz laid hold upon the same physical philosophy and reduced it to optimism. But, with a theory of life supposed to be adapted to the nature of man as a creature of earth, and one which was calculated to bring to him all the results of science and social existence, there was no lack of idealistic protest, as this appeared in philosophic pessimism and social strife. In the case of Schopenhauer, the struggle for existence, which he called the Will-to-Live, was looked upon with the greatest degree of despair, while the social instinct, which with Schopenhauer was derived directly from the participation of all individuals in the

one Will, yielded nothing but the painful sense of compassion. Nature had not been able to keep her word; society was bankrupt when it sought to redeem its promises to the individual. The earlier thinker had sought to prove only that his system was true; the later one endeavored to show that his was both true and good, and it was the goodness as much as the truth that the disinterested individual felt called upon to question. Had not positivism, in shutting out the view of the spiritual, demanded that man be happy in his earth-like humanity, this complaint could not have been forthcoming.

When individualism considers the positivist system, it feels constrained to suggest that it was not merely the cloud that was cast over the spiritual, but the extra light which was cast upon the natural which caused so much intellectual dissatisfaction. The trouble with the naturalistic was that it was too true; that is, that too great a measure of truth had been accorded to it. Furthermore, there was an air of finality about it, which seemed to violate the law of progress which positivism itself had sought to deduce. Having spoken of the theological and metaphysical as having had their day in the world, Comte felt free to assume that the coming of the scientific regime was the beginning of the end. With science once established, "the philosophical system of the moderns will be in fact complete, as there will be no phenomenon which does not naturally enter into some one of the five great categories. All our fundamental conceptions having become homogeneous, the Positivist state will be fully established. It can never again change its character, though it will be forever in course of development by additions of new knowledge."¹⁷ As Aristotle felt that his thought marked finality for the ancient, as well as for all the

¹⁷ *Positivist Philosophy*, tr. Martineau, 30.

world, as Aquinas assumed that he had spoken the last word for Christianity, so Comte assumes to speak eschatologically for the final, or modern, period of human thought.

But, far from shutting out the development of the humanistic, the positivist system made room for man in the sixth division of the system, although Comte determined to consider humanity, not in its free form, but in the light of social physics. At the same time, Comte tends to depart from the supremacy of his naturalism when he admits that the purpose of the positivist philosophy, instead of being that which is naturalistic and scientific, consists in the study of sociology, a term which he introduces in the second chapter of the book on *Social Physics*.¹⁸ Somewhat of the force of positivism is weakened by this frank admission that the aim of the work is not to give an account of the natural sciences; while the argument for the sufficiency and supremacy of the naturalistic loses more influence when it is asserted that "there can be no positive philosophy without a basis of social science, without which it could not be all-comprehensive."¹⁹ Indeed, the idea of the author of the new system was not to give a course of positive science, but a course of positive philosophy.

With the social treated in a philosophical manner, where thought meets thought, individualism cannot feel unduly alarmed at the pretensions of this most characteristic system of the nineteenth century, especially as that period witnessed the first genuine philosophy of individualism that the world had seen. Furthermore, if one accepts the fundamental principle of the evolutionary philosophy which followed upon the positivism of Comte, one is still in a position where he may uphold the fundamental principles of individualism. To show

¹⁸ *Positivist Philosophy*, tr. Martineau, 444.

¹⁹ *Ib.*, 31.

that humanity has had a past is to suggest that it has a future; and to consider the human species as the product of some natural force like that of natural selection does not forbid that this same species may turn upon nature, wrest her principle from her, and apply it to the interests of human life as such. As a matter of fact, the behaviour of the leading species more than suggests that just this thing has been done: man has trained his mind that it may enable him to work with an eye to the ultimate result he desires to achieve, while he has elaborated tools calculated to further the work of his will. For this reason, if evolution be the last word of scientism, it may be assumed that the secret of the naturalistic process was entrusted to the human species to be applied after the manner of man's own genius. Even when we assume that the social life and environment of man was also the product of evolution, the work of man as individual breaks the spell, and the creature escapes. In this manner, the principle of continuity outdoes itself; it produces a creature which finally superseded it.

(2) *Biology and Psychology*

As the purely naturistic view of philosophy could not dispense with the humanistic in the form of the social, so the completion of biology's work in the analysis of the functions of the human brain were destined to release humanistic and individualistic principles whose range was far from being limited by the circle of the organic. If consciousness as a modern idea could arise in connection with the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century, it became still easier for it to prove its independent existence when thought inclined itself more to the organic. At the same time, the psychologist of the nineteenth century was more in danger

from his biological friends than was the psychologist of the seventeenth century in danger from his mechanistic enemies. When the mechanical philosopher explained the whole of the universe upon the basis of matter and motion, he did no more than neglect consciousness, while the biological thinker of the later period sought such an explanation of consciousness as tended to explain the latter away. Yet, the career of modern physiological psychology has had to do with the actual content of consciousness rather than with its form, as this is to be worked in connection with theory, so that where there has been an access of material produced by observation and experiment, the form of the mind has been left untouched rather than violated by the science of psychology as such.

Yet, with all the importance of biological psychology in its development of the conscious content, the form of the mind was not wholly neglected, while the discussion of this latter, instead of confining itself to the abstractionism of the seventeenth century, had to do with the nature of mind as immediately felt within. In this manner, arose the intellectualism of Herbart and the voluntarism of Schopenhauer in the light of which we are now able to understand the character and conduct of the mind as never before. In the case of Schleiermacher, who sought to place the self upon the emotional nature of the mind, there was made the first, if not the most complete, attempt to construct the soul out of its own conscious material, instead of foisting upon the mind some extra "essence" or "reality" of which the mind was not conscious. All that goes on in the mind, all thinking, all willing, is to be understood, not as the activity of some inscrutable soul, but as the natural operation of feeling, in which the balance between cognition and conation is ever kept up. In such feeling, the unity and identity of the mind reveals its

manifold character in its impressions and impulses, in its thoughts and acts. Herbart was equally anxious to rid his psychology of the extra-metaphysical; and, as Schleiermacher had attempted to derive the whole unified content of consciousness from feeling, Herbart made a similar attempt in connection with thought, with the *Vorstellung*. Not to be outdone by such aestheticism and intellectualism, Schopenhauer sought to reduce all feeling and thinking to a primary willing, whence all three functions of consciousness had the opportunity to contribute to the theory of the self. When these attempts at the theory of the self are taken into account, it becomes difficult to understand how physiological psychology with its "brain" could have dismayed those who were interested in a more sufficient way of securing the unity of the self.

When psychology was poor, the individual was rich; now that psychology has grown rich, personality is awakening to its poverty. This situation, which has come about in the transmutation of mind and world, of self and society, is particularly annoying to individualism, which looks with dismay upon the vast accumulations of psychological science only to realize that the wealth is not for the ego which produced it. The property and glory which were destined for the self have been appropriated by the spinal cord. The furtive attempts at introspection found in such thinkers as Augustine and Descartes, aided by no science of consciousness, did not fail to evince the existence of the ego, while the elaborately organized systems of research peculiar to the genius of the nineteenth century have uncovered and exploited everything but the self. The introspective labors of mankind, like the industrial activities of the race, have had the melancholy effect of depriving humanity of that which it was intended to possess — the natural resources of the earth and the

spiritual resources of the soul. For this reason, individualism is called upon to rehabilitate the interior existence of the self, in order that it may make it possible for the ego to say, "I think," "I will," "I am."

The irrationalistic and immoralistic revolt offered a general, uncritical protest against the narrow synthesis offered in place of nature and humanity, and it was no difficult task for the Decadent to leap over the Tartar wall. Individualism, however, is capable of a more systematic development, in the course of which it will be called upon to introduce more analysis of the inner consciousness of the self. The present condition of things represents psychology at the apex of its influence. The greater psychologists have passed away, leaving their imitators to repeat and refine the original data. With the consciousness that the empirical field of ordinary, uncultivated consciousness has been more than sufficiently tilled, the most advanced psychologist now shows a disposition to depart from the habitual realm of investigation and thus look into the infra-introspective and supra-introspective. As a result, the psychology of the animal mind and the psychology of the religious and social forms of consciousness have arisen. Psychologism is thus getting beyond itself.

The contention of individualism, then, is to the effect that synthetic, expansive method having done its destined work, should no longer be allowed to hinder the development of a psychology which shall undertake to exploit the individual, in order that the individual may find his place in the world and assert his position in the social order. With the older individualists who kept pace with the psychologists, egoism was only a revolt, so that the nineteenth century witnessed a diremption between the under-personal and the over-personal study of the soul. Helmholtz and Stirner, Wundt and Nietzsche, Fouillée and Hello, serve to

represent the more striking features of this contrast. The psychologist has suffered for want of a goal; the individualist has been handicapped because of the insufficient ground on which his claim rested: here, it has been over-democratic; there, over-aristocratic. As a result, those who feel that human destiny is at stake, and who wish to know the spirit they are of, have been unable to find the instruction and nourishment of which they have so long stood in need. Why has it not been possible to make use of the material so generously offered by psychology? Why has the application of psychological methods produced only the petty and practical? The major concerns of human life—art, morality, religion—have been able to find so little which could be put to genuine application.

The individualist has three affirmations to make: "I think," "I will," "I exist." No longer does he assert that upon his perceiving thought does the existence of the world depend, that upon his will and its consent has society been brought into being, that upon the basis of his self-existence the major premise of spiritual life is based; the individualist desires the "I think," the "I will," and the "I am," for reasons of his own. In all this, the individualist does not plead for self-existence, for he is more likely to threaten after the manner of the egoist of the nineteenth century; the individualist is content to affirm his selfhood in the uniqueness of its inner states of consciousness and the integrity of its self-impelled volitions. The individual would live within and work from within; hence he must resent any further attempts to exteriorize his being as these have been carried on in scientific and social thinking.

In more than one way, the present age resembles the period of Sophistry among the ancients. The hurried generalization of the physical philosophers and the nar-

row synthesis which they cast about humanity was met by Anaxagoras and Gorgias in somewhat the same way that physical and social thinking have been opposed by egoists from Schelegel to Nietzsche. Can we deny that our age of individualism has repeated the maxim, Man is the measure of all things? Can we hide from ourselves the fact that our need, like theirs, is the need of a Socrates who shall give us the clue to the higher synthesis we need? We believe that the Romanticists were justified in declaring, Art for art's sake, just as we must sympathize with the Decadents in their claim for the independence of the individual; yet we must feel that there is a more perfect individualism than these Sophists were able to elaborate. Individualists are now placed in a position where they have nothing to assent to but the extremes of the egoistic movement upon which they look with both satisfaction and suspicion. How can one tolerate the Satanism of Baudelaire unless one observes in it the remote desire for the independence of the human self? By what depth of indulgence has Nietzsche been treated, and how is this to be explained unless we assume that his reader, feeling oppressed by the existing social conditions, suffers this immoralist to express some sense of the dissatisfaction that the reader himself has already felt? Now the popularity of the irrationalistico-immoralistic movement seems attributable to no other cause than the desire for an individualism which has long been thwarted by the culture of the age.

III. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF SCIENTISM

If science were nothing but science, the claim that it has not kept its word with man, that it has failed, that it does not satisfy, could not be preferred against it; but science is scientism, a doctrine of human life

based upon the observation of and experiment upon that which goes on in the material world. As a doctrine of life, scientism proposed to indicate the conditions under which real human life might be lived; this it did when it connected its doctrine of the physical with its ideal of the social, whence science and sociality have for a century gone hand in hand. The way was opened by the Positive Philosophy, and it has been faithfully followed by the exponents of the naturalistic school. In asserting that science is unequal to its task, individualism does somewhat more than was done by such anti-scientific leaders as Desjardins, Paulhan, Rod, and Vogüé; moreover, it finds it necessary to be more systematic than were such geniuses as Nietzsche and Villiers; individualism attempts to show that, not in religion alone, nor yet as a general protest, but as a system of life, the scientific fails to bring man into right relations with himself or the world. Individualism, with its dialectic of sensation, volition, and intellection, shows us that in art, in ethics, and in religion, the principles of scientism have been unconvincing and unsatisfactory, whence a higher synthesis of things natural and things human has become the demand of the hour.

I. THE SENSATIONAL INADEQUACY OF SCIENTISM

While the conflict in which science affected to engage its forces was usually understood as the "conflict between science and religion," there was, none the less, a conflict between science and art. Where the first conflict was carried on by science in such a manner that religion was ever placed on the defensive, and where religion finally sought to settle accounts with science, the second conflict was carried on in the name of art against science. To assure one's mind of the

militant attitude of aesthetics, one has only to remember the history of the romantic, decadent, and symbolist schools, where the principles of fixed objectivity so dear to science were habitually flouted, while the aesthete still found it possible to produce a view of life and the world. This it did, first, by means of extreme romanticism, then, by means of an equally extreme realism. In the case of the romantic element in modern aesthetics, little need be said to show how independent was the genius, and how far removed was his art from the calculations and demonstrations of scientism. With realism, even when a certain parallel with scientism might perhaps be drawn, there was still a certain mental audacity on the part of the artist, whence his ideas were prevented from falling within the fixed circle of scientific verity. It was with the exceptional, the morbid, that the realist had to do, while it is the aim of science to organize facts according to general principles. For this reason, Dostoïevsky, Ibsen, and Zola cannot be claimed by science, even when they belong to the "naturalistic" school of literature. Art elaborated its romanticism and realism in defiance of scientific truth rather than in accordance with its principles.

That which renders art free from the methods of scientific thought is, first of all, the principle of intuition. The limits of scientific logic appear in connection with the usual methods of induction and deduction which it finds convenient to employ; first the analysis, then the synthesis, in the process of which science exhausts its possibilities. In the case of aesthetic intuition, the method consists of neither the inductive nor the deductive, although, like science, art has to do with the phenomena of the perceptible world. In the employment of intuition, as a *cognitio tertii generis*, aesthetics is able to perceive the whole in the part, so that a single statue may stand for mankind, an isolated

landscape represent nature, a drama present the problem of human life as such. In the midst of this method of intuition, art reserves the right to indulge in that which to science would be irrationalism, which may reveal itself, as it did in Classicism, by means of the Dionysian, or may assume the form of the morbid, as it has done in the larger history of Romanticism. In the career of the nineteenth century art, where aesthetics has made war upon science, the development of the morbid has had the effect of showing how successful art may be, even when it ignores the accepted method of contemporaneous thinking. By means of the intuitive, then, art has ever been free from the dictation of any other form of mental life. In our own day, it is a significant fact that a scientist like Nordau, in his *Degeneration*, should find it necessary to condemn practically every form of literature which has been produced since 1850.

Not only does art oppose science in connection with the method of thought, where free intuition contemns exact calculation, but it exercises a certain creativeness which renders it still further independent of a science which can only follow the dictates of nature. When, therefore, we speak of science as that which has failed to satisfy the modern mind, we must not overlook the fact that, unlike religion, art has not felt the sense of want for whose consolation it looked in vain to science. With its inherent sense of fulness, art has continually gone beyond science, so that the complaint of insufficiency has not been directly voiced by the aesthetic mind. Art has recognized that science was insufficient as a life-ideal, but that has not prevented art from developing its own view of existence. The irrational factor of creativeness, so well realized in modern music, cannot fail to reveal the freedom with which the aesthetic mind has handled the things of the world. There

is nothing in the whole range of science that can explain the creative character of art; there has been nothing among the resources of science, which has so often checked faith, which has been able to prohibit artistic creation. Where art has held back, it has not been because it has felt the threat of science, but because it has been wanting in itself, because it has been injured by commercialism. During the history of the recent scientific movement, art may not have been at the highest peak of its genius, but no period of its history has found it enjoying a more perfect sense of freedom.

So imperative have been the demands of scientism, with such relentless critics of spiritual life as Comtè, Spencer, Darwin, and Haeckel behind it, that we have been led to experience an enduring distrust of ourselves when we have sought to construe the life of humanity as something independent in nature. The play within the play, the kingdom within the kingdom, has suffered violence from without. How could the conscious state, with its ideas and initiatives, be anything more than an eighteenth-century "copy" of external impression, or a nineteenth-century "correlate" of some physical process? How could we tolerate the impulse, except as we allowed it to be no more than the continuation of some exterior force? Assert the right of the mind to frame its own ideas and inaugurate its own volitions, and the result was sure to be an irrationalism; obey the dictates of scientism, and deny the validity of inner idea and impulse, then and then only could peace come to the mind. In the midst of this perplexity of the mind, aestheticism has sought to uphold the sanctity of the inner life, even where aestheticism has been forced to resort to extreme measures in its attempt to overcome complete objectivity. Aestheticism, indifferent as it has been to the demands of nature and social life, has shown itself unwilling to relinquish the supreme principle of

the joy of life; upon this it has insisted, and from this it has not been deterred by any distrust of decadence, so that it is in aestheticism that scientism has found its most vigorous opponent, in aestheticism that individualism has found its most heroic champion.

Where scientism has asserted that satisfaction and peace could come only as one submitted to the physical and social, aestheticism has elaborated a noble pessimism, which, when it reposed in passivism, still upheld the supremacy of the inner, conscious state; which, when it resorted to malignant activism and cruelty, still maintained the validity of the human initiative. If, to be rational, the mind was called upon to be "scientific," the command of aestheticism was, Be irrationalistic! If, in order to be moral, the will was expected to be "social," the exhortation of aestheticism was, Be immoralistic! Aestheticism has shown the individual what he has a right to expect from the world, what he has a right to demand of society; warned by scientism and inspired by aestheticism, the individual has been led to inquire what "being one's self" really means. At the same time, with the conflicting tendencies of scientism and aestheticism at work within the mind, the individual has been able to observe how rival views of the world may be developed; and, while the world of scientism may seem to be far more complete and consistent than an aesthetic cosmos could hope to be, it has the one grand disadvantage of being so systematic as to exclude the individual, who has thus turned to the more cloudy and chaotic world-order of the creative aesthetic consciousness. The individual may not have been able to find peace in the world, but he has found it possible to exist and express himself without forfeiting his character.

Upon the authority of aestheticism, the individual takes his stand in the world of nature, even when

scientism has sought to exercise complete sway over phenomenal existence. In distinction from scientific naturalism, which endeavors to bring about the immediate and uncritical acceptance of the impression, aestheticism has insisted that all sense-impressions be so relegated to the characteristic nature of the mind that the resulting soul-state should not fail to bear the stamp of humanity. Aestheticism, which has never released its hold upon the natural order, may seem to have been somewhat ideological when it suggested that there was something significant in the very act of receiving the impression; but the real motive of aestheticism was to prevent the mind from being driven out of itself by the incoming impression. Were it possible for the human mind to receive its impressions in a passive consenting manner, the result would be no more than a superior grade of animalistic perception in which no aesthetic sensitivity, no artistic spontaneity would have been possible. The mind of the individual is at once contemplative and creative; it receives impressions and reacts upon them as it will. If it cannot control the source of the impression and impulse, it can still exercise authority over them; if it cannot say what impressions and impulses shall come, it can determine the characteristic manner in which they shall be received. There is thus more than one way of entering into relations with the natural order, so that the presumption of science to be solitary in the field is without foundation; art as well as science can lead the mind about among the forms of the natural order; and it has been under the leadership of art that the individual has been able to find his place in the world.

Aestheticism does not spoil its plea of being an interpreter of nature when it frankly asserts that it has the welfare of the human soul at heart; nor can any criticism violate the principle of disinterestedness which

has been the foundation of all aesthetic contemplation. Scientism has assumed to take nature for what it was worth, and to exercise a mental vision in which no prejudice should veil the truth from its eyes. But the foregoing analysis of naturalism has shown us that, instead of being disinterested, scientism has never been able to conceal its desire to benefit mankind. This attempt to be a philosophy of life has shown itself in both a negative and a positive manner; first, it was the desire to deliver man from the mystical; then, it became the hope of establishing man in a social order, which should be the counterpart of the natural one; both Comte and Spencer seem to have been as much interested in man as in the world. Thus it appears that the veil of scientism is as closely woven as that of aestheticism, and the claim of disinterestedness turns out to be a pretence, a bit of deception. Scientism has demanded that the view of the world that man should entertain should come forth in response to certain mental motives according to which the spiritual should be denied that participation in the world which was reserved for the social. Aestheticism has not been naïve in its view of nature, although it can hardly be questioned that the aesthetic motive has been purer than the scientific one; aestheticism has insisted that the world should be regarded as the place of enjoyment, just as scientism has assumed that the world should be the place of human, social development; one has sought a garden, the other a field of activity. Now nature itself, as intuited by the animal mind, is neither one nor the other; and it has been in response to a direct humanism that both the scientific and the aesthetical have come into being to be judged according to their relative worth and sufficiency. When aestheticism asserts that science does not satisfy, it has no special complaint to offer; aestheticism simply affirms that science has not been equal to the task of interpreting the world to the human mind.

2. THE VOLITIONAL IMPOTENCE OF SCIENTISM

Where science has shown its inability to measure up to the demands of human sensitivity, whence aestheticism has had to reveal to the individual his more complete relation to the sensuous world, it has shown itself impotent to account for that human spontaneity of motive under the guidance of which man has sought to do his work in the world; for this reason, a supra-scientific ethics has had to assert its independence. It cannot be asserted that modern moralism has been quite as free and polemical as modern art, for where aestheticism suffered from no excessive scruples, the ethical consciousness has not ever been so willing to assert the independence of a moral life which should have no concern for the welfare of the social order. Still, it cannot be denied that, as aestheticism with a Baudelaire felt free to spurn the scientific organization of nature, the moralism of a Nietzsche has been just as ready to condemn the social organization of humanity. If modern moralism, with its constant tendency toward immoralism, has been less militant than aestheticism, it may be pointed out that the attitude of scientism toward the moral problem has not been altogether unfriendly, so that the moralist has often found in the scientist a certain amount of furtherance. That which moralism has to say in opposition to scientism is that scientism has been incomplete and unworthy, not that it has been threatening or destructive.

To consider the calculated effects of the new physics and the new biology, whereby the earth was dethroned and man relegated to the animal order, would seem to promise the dawning of a new and most destructive morality. Under the auspices of the elder view of the world and man, it was not difficult to impose upon humanity a peculiar sense of moral obligation, just as

it was quite possible to arouse within a certain sense of moral dignity. With the earth in a strategic position in nature and with man in a superior attitude, the august principles of conscience and duty could easily be promulgated; but, with both earth and humanity degraded, it is not so easy to understand how scientism could continue to uphold and enforce the old morale. At the beginnings of modern thought, some sense of freedom was suggested when Hobbes placed man in the destructive *status naturalis*; but the repudiation of this view of morality by both rigorists and hedonists closed all the doors of a naturalistic morality before the modern man was able to enter them. With the coming of the new biology, there was no attempt to indulge the freedom from spiritual life which scientism might have held out to humanity, while the emancipation of the intellect failed to bring about a corresponding emancipation of the will, so that scientism, which has been severe with human ideals, has been strangely tender toward human impulses. To study nature meant to love mankind.

Where science, to be true to its mission, should have been silent on the subject of ethics, it was soon heard echoing the fundamental principles of Christianity, so that, if it be asserted that science overcame religion in the latter's view of the world, it may be replied that religion overcame science in the latter's estimate of life. It was because he felt science to be aping religion in ethics that Nietzsche found it necessary to oppose both alike. "Where science is not the latest manifestation of the ascetic ideal, it is a subterfuge for every kind of discontent, unbelief, mental gnaw-worm, and bad conscience. They have acted in concert—the poor in spirit and the scientists—so I have called them the hectics of the spirit."²⁰ Darwin's famous chapter on

²⁰ *Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Haussemann, III. § 25.

Moral Sense reveals the eminent advocate of latter-day scientism bowing before the "short but imperious word ought."²¹ It matters not that he strives to interpret this forbidding word in the naturalistic manner which makes it appear as "the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct"; he has succumbed to one of the most characteristic principles of Christian ethics, while his psychology of remorse places him in the desert beside John the Baptist. Where scientism had the mental courage to indulge in agnosticism, it was wanting in the moral courage which should have led it to immoralism, so that the student of ethics, when he seeks the source of advanced moral ideals, is forced to turn from the scientist, who has not "arrived," to the artist who has made a law unto himself.

That which a moral theory is supposed to do may be understood when we consider the nature of action and the character of work. Now scientism has not settled accounts with the individual, who was supposed to be sufficiently aroused and contented with the expression of his social nature; and the social nature of man, while a phase of his total being, is not sufficiently central or commanding to guide the individual will. Genuine human action has its source in something deeper, its goal in something higher than anything which the congregative nature of the individual has ever revealed; so that in the attempt at self-expression and the desire for self-realization, the ego goes round the social or passes through it. It is true that such individualistic action may receive a social coloring, as when one interprets his ideals in the light of human needs; but from this it does not follow that the individual must wait for the social to arouse him to action, or rest content with the social sanction of that which he has done. The social is something incidental and

²¹ *Descent of Man*, Ch. III.

local; and, while it may ever accompany the course of individualistic action, it does not have the power to bound that action as its termini *a quo* or *ad quem*, as action passes from pole to pole. Where, as in traditional morality, action springs from conscience, scientism has sought to render this "conscience" social; and, where such action aims at the creation of a value, social scientism has endeavored to reduce this to utility. Now the most fundamental moral systems have been able to initiate action and provide for its results without the aid of the social sanction: Plato and Aristotle were fortunate enough to escape it; Spinoza and Kant never stooped to it; Nietzsche and Hello only despised it. With such moralists, the source and sanction of morality were devised in a manner wholly independent of the social ideal.

The career of social moralism did indeed find many ethical philosophies bowing before the authoritarian ideal of social sympathy; yet the progress of such amiable thinking was called upon to witness the rise and growth of a vigorous immoralism. The explanation of this strange situation, which indeed is not far to seek, should be a warning to all who endeavor to subsume human strivings under some limited and superficial ideal, while the complete failure of social morality should arouse our resolution never again to play with the human will. The conflict between social moralism and individualistic immoralism is to be understood in the light of two opposed notions inherent in the human will; these are the notions of strength and weakness. Social moralism has been based upon weakness, individualistic immoralism upon strength. The idea of strength was the secret of the Satanism of Milton and Blake in the Enlightenment, and it was the same idea which aroused the nihilism of Turgénieff and Dostoïevsky, the immoralism of Wagner and Nietzsche. Such

thinkers were anti-social, not because they opposed the ideal of society as such, but because that fond idea was clothed in soft raiment. Scientism proceeded upon the basis of human weakness when it premised the idea that the human mind was capable of carrying on its cognitions with the perceptible only; and it went from weakness to weakness when it further asserted that the human will could do no more than assert the needs of mankind. Individualism, however, was possessed of an aestheticism which shrank not from the morbid and mysterious, of an immoralism which did not hesitate to will all that is in man, even the egoistic and vicious. Scientism, by making its fatuous appeal to the social, was thus guilty of arousing the satanism of strength within the will of the individual.

To assert the insufficiency of scientism, then, it is only necessary to observe that man will assert himself, and that no bland suggestions of social responsibility will ever be sufficient to curb the might of the will within him. As art will create even when science cannot sanction its aesthetic ideals, so morality will exert itself in the assertion of the individual even when scientism may attempt to instill into the bad conscience of one who fears to be anti-social. When human conscience was believed to be the voice of God or the dictate of reason, it was with difficulty that the moralist could set up the idea of sin as his goal; but when conscience became social, it was by no means difficult for the individual to break down the feeble barriers which science sought to build about mankind. In the career of modern ethics, one may observe the progress of immoralism in the attempt to substitute rationalism for Theism, the social for the rational; but not until the social became the accepted sanction of morality was immoralism established as the creed of strength. Milton and Blake, it is true, did go so far as to oppose

the narrowness of a rationalistic morale, but they failed to systematize their immoralism in the way that modern satanists have done; at the same time, they seem to have had no influence upon the immoralism of the nineteenth century. In that period, it was the exaltation of the social ideal which led to the negation of morality, whence we are in a position to observe how ineffectual in the mind of an advanced individualist, the social sanction of morality may be.

3. THE INTELLECTUAL DISAPPOINTMENT OF SCIENTISM

Scientism has had more influence over ethics than over art, more influence over religion than over ethics; scientism ignored art, made peace with morality, and then sought to negate religion. The attitude of science toward religion and of religion toward science is one which we are just beginning to understand, now that the conflict has passed into history. First of all, individualism shows us that the opposition between the new view of the physical world and the older forms of culture, represented by art, ethics, and religion, while looked upon as the conflict of science with religion, was really a conflict between purely physical thinking and idealism; it was a three-cornered conflict, in which art opposed science, science opposed religion, while ethics divided itself into two camps, one submitting to science, the other opposing it by means of immoralism. Furthermore, the polemical attitude of science toward religion shows itself to have been of a twofold nature, inasmuch as science not only sought to negate religion, but attempted to provide a substitute for it in the form of a "religion of humanity," a "religion of science." First, it was a malicious enemy; then it became a dangerous friend.

To understand how such different things as science and religion could come into conflict, we must realize

that agreement lay at the heart of their disagreement, as the rival monarchs, Charles the Fifth and Francis the First agreed on one point: both wanted the city of Milan! Both science and religion agree upon one point: both want to interpret the world. The opposition of science to nature, when expressed in its most general terms, was the opposition of naturalism to supernaturalism, in connection with which science finds the hypothesis of an extra-mundane Being, who creates and governs the world for the sake of man, and whose operations are seen in miracles, while the knowledge of Him comes by means of revelations, an hypothesis which is not only useless but harmful. Science will have the world conducted in a purely physical fashion, while it will regard man in the light of the new biology, which makes man the product of natural evolution. With these changes in point of view, the ideas of God and the soul seem all but lost to religion; and, since religion has accustomed itself to regard God and the soul in connection with a cosmology which places the Deity outside the world, and assumes that man's position there is quite extraordinary, the ideas of spiritual life in both Deity and humanity seem lost to it. The field of conflict was thus the world; but the ideas at stake were those of the world's Creator and its peculiar creature, man.

Viewed in their respective fields, science and religion would seem to have nothing in common: science is supposed to follow science for its own sake, to pursue special forms of investigation, and to arrange their data in the most exact manner; religion is supposed to deal with the needs of human life, which it organizes upon a purely subjective basis. Science follows the leading of sense and thus studies the objective world; religion pursues things of the spirit, whence it seeks to elaborate a subjective order of existence. Yet, this state of things

was calculated to produce a sharp dualism in existence, or to lay extra emphasis on the dualism of things and values already there, so that both science and religion could not refrain from indulging in a synthesis of things natural and spiritual. Religion had long since extended its sway over the physical world, where it sought to dogmatize concerning the origin of the world and the destiny of the soul; for the ideas of God and the self were to religion something more than subjective sentiments. It was at this point that the real conflict between science and religion had its rise. Science was unwilling to admit the supernatural origin and government of the natural world, just as it seemed to find it impossible to regard the human soul as anything more than a combination of things material; science thus sought to substitute the idea of natural evolution in the course of which the human soul made its appearance in a manner far from extraordinary. In both Comte and Haeckel, this opposition to the dogmatic notions of God and the soul were the foci of the contention between science and religion.

Concerning the merits of science in its criticism of religious dogmatism, it cannot be denied that religion has had to learn that it cannot be rash in its attempt to transfer to the facts of experience the values which it has elaborated within the soul, even when it may still hold fast to these values as such. Science has taught religion that it must proceed soberly in its thinking, and in such a manner as to render its supernaturalism somewhat naturalistic, just as it has shown religion that the idea of mystery, upon which religion has placed such emphasis, should be relegated to the totality of the world rather than to special facts, as the origin of motion, the origin of life, and the origin of consciousness. With its system of values, religion should not seek to settle questions of physics, biology, or psychol-

ogy. Science had learned how to explain the particular, so that it was for religion to exercise its sway over the general; in the circle of the particular, where science was able to discover facts and to arrange them in order, no criticism of insufficiency could come from the camp of religion. Science has taught religion to entertain larger and more complex ideas, so that the physics of the seventeenth century and the physiology of the nineteenth have had the effect of making the ideas of God and the soul less and less the subject of hurried dogmatism. Thus it has been brought to the attention of religion that the idea of God cannot be entertained satisfactorily unless one view the world in the largesse of modern astronomy and physics, while the idea of the soul cannot be appreciated until one has settled accounts with the system of evolution. Science has indeed been the friend of religion in that science has presented it with newer and fuller ideas of the world and the soul.

If science had been content to remain mere science; there had been little complaint on the part of religion, even when religion found it difficult to adjust its system of spiritual values to the new worlds of matter and life. But, while in most cases the scientist was only the investigator and organizer of physical data, there were striking examples of the scientist as philosopher and religionist. The older form of the conflict between the two forms of culture busied itself with the destructive inferences which, coming from science, seemed to make against religious dogmatism; but now it appears that science sought to rival religion and thus to produce a religion of its own. For this reason, the conflict at hand had to do, first, with the *opposition* of science to religion, then, with the *substitution* of science for religion. The appreciation of this twofold situation has recently been given by Boutroux, in his *Science et Religion*; according to Boutroux, the ultimate aim of

Comte, Spencer, and Haeckel was to bring about a synthesis of science and religion, since religion did not fail to command their interest and respect.²² It was at this point that science, from having been the enemy of religion, turned to being its friend, and it was from such friendship that religion now prays for deliverance.

At the point where science lays hold of the religious problem as such, religion comes forward with its criticism that science does not satisfy, that science has not kept its promise. As long as science had to do with the physical world of facts, it was impossible for religion to present any claims of dissatisfaction; but when science entered the human world of values, and sought to account for and content human needs, the criticism could only be forthcoming. When science assumed the form of a frank atheism and materialism, when it regarded the physical world as all, religion could retreat within to the soul and still indulge its needs and seek its own values; but when science followed religion into the privacy of its spiritual life, and under the guise of friendship, expressed its own need of religious faith, the situation became altered, for value confronted value, where previously value had confronted the *factum brutum* of physics and biology. Religion could indeed point out that science itself seemed to stand in need of religion; but, while this need was recognized and duly credited, the satisfaction of it by the Religion of Science brought about the claim of scientific failure.

The synthesis of science and religion, as this was attempted under the name of the religion of science, received different forms of treatment in the hands of Comte, Spencer, and Haeckel; but the motive was ever the same. All three thinkers endeavored to unite the sensuous and spiritual in human life; all three sought to develop something more than physical principles as

²² *Science and Religion*, tr. Nield, 173.

they took up the question of human needs. With Comte was witnessed the synthesis of the natural and spiritual in the idea of humanity in which both the objective and subjective seem to unite. At first, this desire to supersede the purely scientific appeared in connection with the ethical idea of society, while the completion of Comte's doctrine found him exalting the religion of humanity in which one was supposed to find a substitute for the idea of God and belief in the immortality of the soul. With Spencer, the synthesis of science and religion found expression in the idea of the Unknowable; whereas, at first, the motive for introducing this notion was to remove religion from the field of science, the final form of the Synthetic Philosophy found its author striving to make positive use of the postulate as the basis of belief. In the case of Haeckel, Monism was supposed to unite science and religion; the assumption that the One is immanent in the world and the hypothesis that mind and matter ever pursue a parallelism there, seemed to Haeckel to do justice to the scientific conception of the world and the religious estimate of life. From the standpoint of the world, the principle of creation may be regarded as inhabiting the universe in a manner wholly in accord with the principles of naturalistic evolution, while the same pantheistic notion may be regarded as sufficient for the religious needs of man, who seeks in the world the True, the Beautiful, the Good. Starting with the monism of Spinoza, Haeckel thus strives to effect a synthesis of Goethe's idealism and Darwin's realism, although, as Boutroux points out, Haeckel compares rather than unites these thinkers.²³ For religion, there remains the question whether the ideals of Humanity, the Unknowable, and the One may be accepted as substitutes for the traditional notions of God and the self.

²³ *Science and Religion*, 158.

In analyzing the world, which religion, had ever received in a manner at once naïve and dogmatic, the work of science cannot be impugned, while it may also be pointed out that, as science has increased the field of knowledge, it has also tended to deepen the mystery of existence. In addition to this, science has applied its principles to the physical life of man in such a way as to make it more productive, while it has not failed to remove many a human ill; to this fact, economics and medicine cannot fail to bear witness. It may of course be pointed out, in opposition to this, that, in the instance of the production of wealth, the application of science to industry has been accompanied by the painfully unequal distribution of wealth, so that the workingman, who has often opposed the introduction of scientific machinery into the field of labor, might perhaps oppose the statement that science has been the means of rendering physical life more valuable. Yet it is a question whether the sins of a capitalism which has made this use of scientific principles can be laid to the door of science itself; at the same time, it is a warning against a hasty generalization concerning the benefits of scientific progress, which, from one cause or another, has been the actual means of industrial discontent. It is in connection with the problem of life-values that the claims of science have to be met; it is in the realm of the idealistic that we must raise the question whether science has satisfied mankind.

In discussing the question whether the religion of science can be entertained by the individual, we must consider what it is that man seeks when his religious consciousness has sway over him. Thus far, in order to distinguish religion from science, we have identified religion in a Ritschlian manner as an affair of values. Adopting this notion from Kant, Ritschl was not unmindful of what Schleiermacher had done to emancipate

the religious consciousness, even where he may not have seen fit to lay emphasis upon the latter's idea of need. Now, man elaborates values because he feels the need of these, so that the psychology of need and the ethics of worth are both at work upon the human will when man seeks the consolations of religion. But, in his need of spiritual values, man cannot be satisfied with the interpretation of worth as that which is socially useful, and it is doubtful whether science can supply man with anything superior to or more profound than the principle of utility. It is true that the idea of utility rises higher than that of mere fact, but it does not involve enough to constitute it an essential value for the religious consciousness. When, therefore, science holds out promises, science is unable to redeem these, except upon the basis of a utility which makes the life of the individual more satisfactory, the existence of the race more nearly human. Man's need of values, then, must be satisfied in some more substantial manner.

The place where, if nowhere else, science and religion must part company is to be found in connection with the idea of pessimism; for it is the recognition of a fundamental ill which has been the source of religion. Religion was born in pain; it makes its appeal to man's sense of sorrow and sin, so that the slight inspiration and amelioration of science cannot hope to supply religious satisfaction. The failure of science comes out most clearly in the midst of this pessimistic outlook upon life, where man is possessed of the feeling that he can do nothing worthy, where he further feels that life cannot bring him peace. Religion has rashly assumed the world to be the place of perfect order, but has made room for chaos and contradiction in the midst of which the whole creation seemed to groan as it waited for the redemption of man's body. In its strong pessimism, religion has, at times, been ready to consider the world

as though it were under the sway of some malignant power, as Dionysius, Satan, or the blind to Will-to-live, so that the artless optimism of a scientific faith which proceeds to postulate a supreme Humanity, a bland Unknowable, or a naïve One, has not gained the sympathy of those who felt that it was a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God. Thus, it has not been the idealizing of the world or the amelioration of man's condition therein that has appealed to religion as being fundamental and imperative; rather has it been the feeling that human self stood in need of complete redemption from the world.

In the naturalization of life, which has ignored art, lowered the tone of morality, and tainted religion, the individual has been no passive spectator; the individual has clung to its impressions, its initiatives, its strivings, which it has elaborated in a manner peculiar to itself. The individual of the Enlightenment came forth with its solipsism and Satanism; but it was the egoistic revolt of the nineteenth century which was to display the force of an aroused consciousness of selfhood. When once the importance of that egoism has been appreciated, it will be seen that the time has come for a higher synthesis of nature than scientism has been able to afford. Before this can be done, we must appreciate the degree to which anti-natural egoism has gone; and he who would observe the effect which an aroused art, morality, and religion can produce, must be prepared to witness the work of these in their excesses, as these appear in decadent aestheticism, pessimistic immoralism, and irrationalistic irreligion. To explain these extravagant tendencies, which are so firmly intrenched in the culture of the nineteenth century, one must not fail to recall with what contempt for the human self the ego was driven to the wall; then the violence of the individualistic revolt will be understood.

PART TWO

THE STRUGGLE FOR SELFHOOD

WITH the establishment of naturalism as a doctrine of life, the claims of humanism were found to be such that they could not be ignored; but the general recognition of human life as a fact cannot be accepted as a complete and detailed doctrine of individualism. On this account, it becomes necessary to inquire just what individualism is supposed to be; for, where modern thought has been most assiduous in seeking the forms and causes which obtain in nature, it has not been so ready to inquire what "being one's self" really means. The method of research which the course of nineteenth century individualism has followed, makes possible a threefold formulation of the individualistic problem upon the basis of sense, volition, and thought. The human self is an "I think," an "I will," an "I am"; for this reason, we must follow the dictates of an aestheticism which presents egoism as a fact of immediate existence, immoralism which asserts the right of the individualistic initiative, and irreligion, in which the affirmation of the self assumes its most strident form. In all three of these, the individualist must be prepared for the expression of egoism in an exaggerated form; and, should he be tempted to feel that his individualism, his doctrine, has been expressed morbidly or viciously, let him not forget how relentlessly scientism has sought to eliminate the human self from the world. Then the exaggerations of egoism, as these appear in art, ethics, and religion, will seem at once explicable and justifiable. The aesthetic self of antiquity and the religious soul of mediaevalism were easily overcome by the naturalistic influences of modern

thought; the egoism of the nineteenth century, however, may present a more determined attitude on the part of spiritual life. It is as an antidote for naturalism that we present the excessive egoism of the day.

The individualist, or egoist, of the present-day is quite different from the alleged egoist of the Enlightenment; then, in the earlier period, man was in the habit of taking himself for granted, an assumption which delivered him from the painful necessity of exerting the will-to-selfhood, just as it made it unnecessary for him to adopt an inimical attitude toward the social order. Hobbes was one thing; Stirner is another: call both "egoists" and they will be found to take their respective stands at opposite poles. In the earlier period, when selfhood was the grand assumption, the method of deducing selfhood from life consisted in making instinctive appeal to either the principle of rights or the principle of pleasure. Hobbes was involved in both the juristic and hedonistic methods of egoism; Rousseau had the good fortune to present the egoism of rights and pleasure in a more pleasing, more plausible manner. The egoism of the Enlightenment was held in by the Enlightenment's peculiar fondness for "reason," reason as the guide of intellect, reason as the motive for the will. As a result, the individualism of the earlier period of modern thought did not see fit or find it necessary to resort to those extreme measures of irrationalism which, in the age of culture which was to come, have had the effect of giving egoism a new form; that is, the only sincere form it has ever received. Draw about the striving ego the large circle of "reason," and it may not appear necessary to repudiate the concept under which the self is subsumed as a specimen under a species. But conceive of "reason" in the narrower and more definite forms of scientism and sociality whence thinking becomes exact and action altruistic, and the

robust ego is likely to revolt. This indeed has been the wilful fate of the ego in the age of culture; his irrationalism has assumed the form of anti-scientism, his immorality appears in the guise of anti-social ethics. By means of this revolt against the metaphysical and moral standards of the age, the egoist "arrived"; as *arrivist*, he takes his stand, not against nature as such, but against naturalism, as the shaping of nature in the school of scientism.

One may be able to come to something like an understanding with the genuine individualist if one keeps in mind that objective system of things and persons, called respectively science and society, which to the egoist seems to stand in the way of free inward existence and full self-expression. As a revolt against exteriorizing agencies, egoism is none the less a repugnance for the petty egoism of the earlier age; for the one, egoism has enmity; for the other it has no friendship. Thus, the individualism of the present age is unique; it is no more the old "egoism" than it is the old altruism. This unique egoism, ranging from Emerson and Stirner to Ibsen and Dostoïevsky, is forced to assume that the path to personality is more difficult than the path to social existence. "It is not easy to be human," says the Daughter of Indra in Strindberg's *The Dream Play*; ¹ when one realizes that to be human may mean to be individual, the task of life appears even more than difficult. In spite of the difficulty which makes individualism appear unusually forbidding, the egoistic philosophy of the nineteenth century did not fail to indicate certain definite methods calculated to lead to the individualistic goal. In the *Struggle for Selfhood*, the conflict between the naturalistic and the individualistic led to (1) The Struggle for the Joy of Life, which ended in Aestheticism; (2) The Struggle for the Worth of Life, which

¹ Tr. Björkman, 100.

culminated in Immoralism; and (3) The Struggle for the Truth of Life, whose result was Irrationalism and Irreligion.

I. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE JOY OF LIFE

Whereas the more consistent treatment of eudaemonistic egoism belongs by rights to the question concerning Selfhood in Society, the supremacy of the self over nature is to be shown by means of an analysis of consciousness according to which the freedom of soul-states will be found to depend upon the ego's ability to enjoy them. When the conscious state is inwardly enjoyed and duly appreciated, it becomes difficult for philosophy of life, if it be so desirous, to relegate the soul-state to the purely natural order; for this reason, individualism has not failed to make use of the joy of life as an argument against the domination of the self from without. Where naturalism looks upon every soul-state, that of joy included, as something for which the physical world is responsible, individualism calls attention to the fact that man's joys are his own, because he has made them his own. While man never disconnects his life from the natural order, he still has it within his power to withdraw from the world and thus relish the soul-state as that which belongs to his inner life. It is undeniable that the inner life may make use of volition and cognition to assert the independence of the self, yet the aesthetic appreciation of soul-states is not without value in preparing the way for such more conclusive convictions; at the same time, eudaemonism as a means of individualism is of intrinsic worth. "Are we that which is within us?" asks Stirner.² To this query individualism responds by saying, "No, we are not by nature that which is or goes on within us; but, by means of

² *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, 40.

inward enjoyment, we are able to become ourselves." Hence, the inward enjoyment of life is a superior and appropriate means of realizing life's implicit inwardness. Inward enjoyment, far from being something purely desiderative, is a dialectical matter according to which inward existence is found.

I. THE INWARD ENJOYMENT OF LIFE

In the attempt to secure the independence of the soul-state, decadent individualism made use of an aesthetic method which might seem to mask the individualistic issue and taint the truthfulness of its plea. That which the self seeks, far from being the light enjoyment of the soul-state as such, consists rather in the inward realization of this state as that which is characteristic of the inner life. Such eudaemonism, while not the supreme contention of the self for the self, is indicative of a condition without which the self could hardly be said to exist, so that the claim for the joy of life is much sterner than the ideal of private felicity might seem to show. Naturalism wishes its creature to be healthy and efficient; humanism protests that man must have been meant for joy, else why this capacity for happiness? Hedonism has made the progress of humanism slow and uncertain, since hedonism taking its stand upon the idea of pleasure, was in no position to effect a philosophy of life. Pleasure, which comes and goes like sensation, cannot arch over the life of the self, cannot supply beneath a ground for human existence; happiness shows its ability and right to serve as a life-ideal, inasmuch as happiness is an intellectual affair based upon judgment, from which the individual may conclude whether life is joyous or in vain. The distinction between the hedonic and eudaemonistic, their respective values and validities, appear when it is noted that sci-

entism is barely able to postulate pleasure as a life-ideal, while aestheticism makes no use of the hedonic principle at all. The contrast between the traditional ideal of pleasure and the individualistic ideal of joy may be more clearly seen when it is noted that pleasure is restricted to some phase of man's life, where joy is relegated to his life in its totality. Furthermore, pleasure is an experience which man shares with the higher animals, while joy is an experience purely human in its character. Eudaemonism thus postulates the ideal of the enjoyment of existence as such, for the experiencing of which a view of the world as a whole and a conception of life in its unity are essential principles. For this reason, the aesthetico-eudaemonistic ideal has the power to determine the destiny of humanity.

When happiness is placed upon its proper foundation in the life of the spiritual self, it becomes capable of acting as an interpreter of man's relation to the world, whence arises a eudaemonistic metaphysics. In scientism, the sole sense of satisfaction is limited to that agreeable feeling which comes from the perfect function of some organ, whereby pleasure acts in a biological manner to increase the sense of vitality and make activity more energetic and effectual. In the progress from hedonism to social evolution, pleasure lost what little sense of idealism it had been able to acquire; no longer is it pleasure, but benefit; no longer pain, but injury. When hedonism thus passed into the hands of biological ethics in order to become scientific, it surrendered its right to pose as a philosophy of life, so that the eudaemonistic claim, as this is put forward by aestheticism, represents the only argument upon which the joy of life may be presented. If, therefore, man has a destiny, the latter must be evinced upon eudaemonistic grounds, for science seems determined that man shall live without the consciousness of happiness.

The larger philosophies of the world have not disdained the support which may be drawn from eudaemonistic sources. As an example of such eudaemonistic wisdom, we can do no better than appeal to the *Khândogya-Upanishad* of Vedanta, wherein is found that root principle of Aryan idealism, the *Tat tvam asi*. The Vedantist, however, is not content with the formal enunciation of his idealism, as this finds expression in contemplation, whence he says, "That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou art it."³ The eudaemonistic is appended to the intellectualistic in the following manner: "He who desires the world of perfumes and of garlands, by his mere will, perfumes and garlands come to him, and having obtained the world of perfumes and garlands, he is happy." This eudaemonism is none the less applicable to the "world of friends," the "world of women," and the "world of song and music."⁴ Without this eudaemonistic postulate, it would seem impossible for the Vedantist to have elaborated his spiritual life-ideal.

The Aristotelian philosophy furnishes individualism with a similar argument, whence he may conclude that, since man is happy, he has a destiny in the world. In his endeavor to solve the problem of happiness, Aristotle found it necessary to abandon the hedonic for the eudaemonistic, while the eudaemonistic is itself supported by the intellectualistic. From pleasure in its instantaneous and sensuous form, Aristotle turns to the sense of continuity which comes from activity,⁵ while he concludes that the highest kind of energy is that of contemplation. "If from a living being you take away action . . . what remains but contemplation? . . .

³ *Op. cit.*, VI, 8, 7, etc.

⁴ *Ib.*, VIII, 2, 2.

⁵ *Ethics*, X, Ch. III-IV.

Happiness then is coextensive with this contemplative speculation, and in proportion as people have the act of contemplation, so far have they also the being happy." ⁶ Having made enjoyment and contemplation coextensive, the Aristotelian ethics indicates that, as happiness is based upon knowledge, so knowledge is incomplete apart from happiness, from which we may draw the conclusion that the power to contemplate the world-whole, after the manner of a Greek god, depends, not upon knowledge alone, but upon enjoyment also.

Such eudaemonism may be accepted as one of the means by which the individual may assure himself of his destiny in the world; so much enjoyment, so much genuine existence. The modern, who has been experimenting with the problem of living and thinking without entertaining a view of the world as a whole, has added to his cares by attempting the equally arduous task of living without happiness. Scientism has assumed that man is willing to forego both contemplation and enjoyment, so that the individual who believes in the inner life has been forced to turn to the aesthetic, where both vision and enjoyment are attributed to the human mind. For this reason, the truth and sufficiency of scientism can only be called in question by all those who believe that man was destined to be great, while they feel free to inquire why it is that the world and humanity seem less and less august the more and more the mind advances in the physical and psychological. We know more than the Greeks, but we see less; we have more perfect means of insight and enjoyment, but we have less intellectual satisfaction. Does the fault lie in the object of thought, whether man or the world, or does it lie in the inferiority of the motive and method which guide our investigations? Must we assume that the world is used up and that the mind is exhausted of

⁶ *Ib.*, Ch. VI.

all its resources, or may we not rather assume that we have gotten into the habit of assuming a low standard of thinking and living? Where Aristotle's ethics place man by the side of the gods, our ethics uses its biological methods to relate man to the lower animals. No wonder then that we have lost the sense of destiny which a eudaemonistic philosophy is ever ready to impart, and no wonder that the individualistic movement feels called upon to make use of extravagant methods in order to restate the claims of man's interior existence.

Does it not seem, then, that the day of psychology is either passed or passing? How long can human life endure the drab description of its inner soul-states? The individualist may be willing to admit that the Decadent has overshot the mark in his morbid attempt to evoke by artificial means and with factitious ideals those soul-states which are once or twice removed from the possibilities of the actual life of the self within; but is the scientist, with his naturalistic criteria, any nearer the truth of the inner life? Aestheticism, with its norm of art for art's sake, may have a certain morbidity about it; but scientism, with its maxim, science for science's sake, is no freer from this same morbidity. Somewhere between the aesthetic and the scientific, the essential character of the soul-state may be found; but just as long as our culture persists in employing the scientific as the sole means of securing insight into the inner life, just so long is aestheticism justified in upholding its exaggerated ideals of what that inner life may be thought to be: as a check to scientism, the validity of aestheticism cannot be impugned. Such aestheticism differs from mere hedonism in that aestheticism makes man the creator and ruler of his own soul-states, where psychological hedonism expects man to do no more than experience them. That which places the joy of life and the realization of life upon the same

spiritual plane is the truth that both are the result of striving on the part of the self, while both are due to that quickening of the intellect whereby the self and its joys are realized. Schlegel sought to give expression to a similar idea when he placed his Lucinde in a world of her own aesthetic creation as that which was *selbst-gedachten, selbstgebildeten*; ⁷ in such a self-world, one is able to experience essential joy, *Genuss einer schönen Gegenwart*.

Genuine introspection has the effect of showing that the mind is possessed of a characteristic content which can never be identified by marking the formal outline of that which scientific psychology is able to identify. Reposing in the midst of the opposed forces of cognition and conation, feeling shows itself to be not mere reception of impressions from without or reaction of impulses from within, but an essential experiencing of that which is inward and intimate. All that takes place in the experience of emotion is internal; for, while feeling may suggest some degree of objective expressionism, as this was the fashion with Romanticism, emotion involves no violation of that which is within. Consciousness thus makes possible an egoism of emotion; and it was this possibility which was realized by the romantic school. Earlier egoism, as this appeared in the Enlightenment, failed to develop the content of inner life, although in the mingled rationalism and Romanticism of Rousseau a genuine beginning was made.

The new egoism became aesthetical when Kant placed judgments of feeling upon the same plane as logical and moral propositions; as Kant himself was thus able to ground his own aesthetic as a science, the romanticists were enabled to urge aestheticism as a form of life-philosophy. The stolid self-seeking of the Hobbist ego stood out in unfavorable contrast to the cultivated

⁷ *Lucinde*, ed. Reclam, 61.

self-realization of Schlegel's "self," an ego which was above all else *selbstgebildet*. In place of material self-enjoyment, the aesthetic ego of Romanticism showed itself in *das rastlose Streben nach dem Neuen, Piquanten, und Frappanten*.⁸ Where selfhood had not been found in sense, it began to clothe itself in the form of aesthetics; the superiority of the emotional, however imperfect such a form of life may be, appeared in the tendency to internalize life and thrust it out toward a remote object.

Although naturalization of life has appeared to interact with the older theories, especially in the instance of hedonism, it is a mistake to suppose that much semblance of the original ideals remains. In certain respects, the principles of social evolution are as thoroughly opposed to the eudaemonistic as they are inimical to the rigoristic; and it may further be suggested that, where one follows the maxims of rationalistic morality, one is even nearer the social kingdom than is the man whose ideal is that of private happiness. Darwin was attracted by the "imperious word 'ought'," but he says nothing in favor of the joy of living. Thus it may be said that, however much the social and rigoristic thinkers differ in their speculative conception of mankind, they are well nigh agreed that the individual must pursue an ethic which shall forbid his seeking his own in the world. On the other hand, with all the speculative agreement of a hedonism which reposes in the sensuous nature of humanity and a social ideal couched in terms of naturalism, there is still a wide chasm between the life-ideals which the two empirical morales propose. Just as it is the artistic mind which protests against the encroachments and invasions of social thinking, so it is the eudaemonistic moralist who upholds the anti-social revolt. Here occurs a trans-moralization which renders the humanistic situation more than usually complex.

⁸ *Jugend Schriften*, ed. Minor, Bd. I, 95.

The egoistic revolt is thus a eudaemonistic revolt. To socialize and subdue the rigorist who never once thought to postulate his own happiness as the goal of his terrible moral striving, is an easy task compared with the attempt to ensnare the eudaemonist who looked upon the world as the place of joy rather than a scene of social service. Owing to this contradiction, some who were once affiliated with the rigoristic school have been forced to assume a eudaemonistic position in order to escape the trap prepared in the sight of the bird; but certain rigorists, despairing of life, and on the point of relinquishing their all to they knew not what, found in the cool social ideal an escape from the inner life which had seemed so terrible in its aspects. It was in this manner that Schopenhauer, whose system was all but one of Pan-Satanism, tended to effect a pathway out of life, not altogether by the "renunciation of the will-to-live," but by a system of sympathism, which was not unlike the more moderate principles of our omnipresent social system. "You cannot live; you have no place in the world; hence you must relinquish all," the rigorist seemed to say. "But, relinquish to what?" questioned the renunciationist. "To humanity," was the answer. Where the life-ideal is eudaemonistic, however, the individual is not so ready to relinquish because he has so much at stake.

The eudaemonistic character of the egoistic revolt appears repeatedly in the decadent drama, where so much is said about one's self. There are sterner methods of egoism to be sure; but the eudaemonistic method is usually the one appealed to when the revolting ego sets his face against society. With Ibsen, severe as was this moralist, the eudaemonistic appeal is ever forthcoming. In *Ghosts*, Mrs. Alving seeks to illuminate the terrific character of a social situation which cast her into the abyss of nihilism by explaining that her dis-

solute husband had not known joy, work, or comradeship, while her ill-starred son, Oswald, seeks in the *joie de vivre* redemption from the curse he had inherited.⁹ Where the Ibsenesque egoist seeks to spread his doctrine abroad, he can find no other means of ennobling human souls, as Rosmer fain would have done, except as he plants in them the ennoblement which comes from happiness.¹⁰ In the same manner, the sombre character of the play *John Gabriel Borkman* is lighted up with the eudaemonism of the hero's son, Erhart, who turns from work to joy, from personal responsibility to self-realization.

The impotence of duty and the power of joy further appear in the post-Ibsen drama of Hauptmann and Sudermann. The eudaemonism of Sudermann, far more marked than that of his master Ibsen, is likewise characterized by a more vivid spirit of revolution, so that one might say that the greater the eudaemonism, the greater the egoism. The hero in *Dame Care*, most dutiful and obedient as he was, failed of self-realization until, emancipating himself through crime, he found the joy of living. The Pastor in *Magda* fails to rise to the superb egoism of the heroine, not because he lacked strength and sincerity, but because he had no capacity for happiness. Thus he addresses himself to Magda, and says, "As you stood before me yesterday in your freshness, your natural strength, your — your greatness, I said to myself, 'That is what you might have been if at the right moment joy had entered into your life.'" ¹¹ Where Sudermann's later works are found to contain a free eudaemonism, which masks the strong egoistic features of his art, the interconnection of the two human ideals is never lost to view. Hauptmann, less versatile

⁹ *Ghosts*, Act III.

¹⁰ *Rosmersholm*, Act. II.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Act. III.

and wanting in the vigor of his colleague, has been as successful in his synthesis of pleasure and personality. In *The Sunken Bell*, the Bell Founder can perform his new work only as he feels new joy; there is strength in his arm only because love has poured itself like wine into his veins; pleasure has become power.¹²

To become that which is within, that is the most definite aim of eudaemonistic egoism. In contrast with such an intimate notion, the half-hearted egoism of the Enlightenment sinks into obscurity. Then, under the auspices of both rationalism and materialism, the individual said, "I am myself, and I love myself," but he said it with hesitation and shame. When nineteenth-century individualism awakens to the pathetic fact that the ego is not itself and does not enjoy its own inner existence, self-existence through self-enjoyment becomes the goal of all egoistic striving. At last it is seen that man cannot be himself by means of a mere "I am I" and "I love me"; nevertheless, the sense of self-enjoyment is looked to as a means of arriving at self-existence. The states of the soul must be saved from an impersonal scientific psychology which assumes no metaphysical responsibility for the human self; these soul-states are to be saved eudaemonistically, according to the presupposition that that which enjoys its inner being likewise possesses the existence of its inner being.

2. THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUL-STATES

Given a soul-state, whose existence cannot be doubted even by skepticism itself, it seems as though the *unum necessarium* consists in working outward toward the object of knowledge. Is it not equally necessary to work inward toward the subject of knowledge? The exteriorization of knowledge, upon which philosophy

¹² *Op. cit.*, Act. III.

insists, is an impulse which traces back to the seventeenth century when, sure of the self, the thinker was anxious to become equally sure of the world. The interiorization of the self is a movement peculiar to the nineteenth century, when the individualist, all too certain of the existence of the world, longed to attribute some kind or degree of reality to that which goes on within. The object has proved its existence beyond all possibility of doubt, so that now we are sure that things exist; but the subject has yet to prove its own existence, so that it may show that thoughts exist. For this reason, the soul-state must proceed outwards toward the world, while it must recede inwards toward the self; to be a mere state of consciousness which sheds light upon things is not sufficient; the soul-state must radiate in the other direction, and thus shed light upon the self. To continue the argument for objectivism is to carry coals to Newcastle; these coals might better be burned in their own fires of subjectivism, where they are needed.

How often must it be repeated that the eighteenth century has long since passed away, and with it the naïve egoism which did have the strength or the will to assert itself? How often must we remind ourselves that the nineteenth century came to place the self upon its real foundation, in joy and worth and truth? Beelzebub has cast out Beelzebub; the self of the Enlightenment cast out the Enlightenment's ego, so that the beginning of the nineteenth century saw man selfless, save as there remained the impulse toward selfhood, as this was felt by Fichte and, after him, by the individualistic school. Why, then, should one take his own soul-states in all their significance and preciousness and cast them to the objective order of things, as so many pearls before swine? Once it was said, All that is in the mind is mental, simply because it is in the mind;

now it is said, All that is in the mind is physical, a "psychosis" whose only meaning is to be found in its relation to the physical order. Give the Devil enough rope and he will hang himself; give the psychologist enough psychosis and he will strangle his own soul. From this peril of selflessness, Descartes cannot save us, for we are beyond that redemption which can come from a mere *cogito, ergo sum*; in place of the rationalistic, optimistic Descartes, the individualist appeals to other Gallic minds, to the Decadents and Symbolists, who see how pathetic is their selflessness, and who, like Samain and Retté, like Morice and Gustav Kahn, like Verhaeren and Rodenbach, insist upon the self within, when they refer to *mon âme* and *moi-même*. What had become of soul-states if the Decadents and Symbolists had not come to deliver the soul from psychology and sociology?

Psychology without a soul and sociology without a self, these are the delicious products of our scientism. In justice to these amiable forms of modern scientism, it may perhaps be suggested that the ardent devotee of psychosis and society had no sufficient conception of the self which he was so rashly casting out; the Enlightenment had done no more than the psychological self with the abstract soul of Descartes, while it had viewed the social self as though it were indeed the stark ego of Hobbes. Psychology and sociology was either unable or unwilling to realize that the ego of Fichte placed its selfhood upon something more forceful than a Cartesian "I think," or that the ego of Stirner was more like the real man than the self-loving ego of Hobbes. The victory of psychologico-sociological scientism was an easy one; such scientism conquered but the enfeebled ideas of a past age; when now the soul is the vigorous self-asserting thing of individualism and the self an equally militant ego in the social order, the psycho-

logical, sociological veto has little authority or power. Psychosis is far from being enough to satisfy the demands of the self which has the psychosis; the soul-state is itself possessed of a content which demands consistent treatment; the soul-state has essence, character, and inward meaning.

The individual insistence upon the inward enjoyment of life, far from being eudaemonistic, concerned itself with the very existence of the self. Here, perhaps, is another place where the earlier individualism is to be differentiated from the later form of the doctrine. Earlier egoism, which was individualistic in name only, interpreted pleasure in the purely hedonic sense of felt enjoyment; pleasure was thus the end of the individual's life. The egoism of the day, while not rigoristic, is not primarily concerned with the soul-state as that which gives enjoyment but as that which, by means of the enjoyment, gives assurance that there is, within the pleasurable experience, a self to which that experience belongs. The simple word "enjoy" has more than one meaning; to enjoy may mean taking pleasure in, or it may signify to possess. Where one form of egoism was content to regard enjoyment as that which meant pleasure, the other expression of the doctrine lays its emphasis upon the possession of that which is felt. When this distinction is applied to the soul-state, it is no longer the mere luxuriating in a pleasure which one may feel, but the possession of the soul-state which contains the pleasure; it is the "ownness," or *eigen-thum*, of Stirner. In connection with that which goes on within, the individual is not satisfied with the mere taking pleasure in, but the taking possession of, a soul-state: such is the basis of the individualist's plea for the soul state.

The individual desires to call his soul his own; according to scientism, this soul is so much psychosis

or so much sociality. For the possession of one's own soul-states, it is necessary to have something more than either consciousness or self-consciousness. Mere consciousness is so much psychosis, and, as such, it does not belong to the ego which experiences it; self-consciousness, while more promising, yields no more than the consciousness of the ego as that of one element among others. Although the first among equals, the self-conscious ego may exercise no right of eminent domain over that which goes on within him. Let it be said that these soul-states have to do with things which exist in the exterior order; let it further be claimed that the self must share them with others of his kind; and it may still be asserted that they have their own meaning for him whose they are and whom they serve. To suffer the intimate soul-state to exhaust itself physically upon things and socially upon others, without allowing it to sustain some genuine meaning to him who experiences it, is to indulge in bad introspection in the course of which no meaning of that soul-state is lost. Now, the desire to make man's soul-states physical and social, without allowing them to be personal, is the one thing which scientism has expressed; against this de-personalization, all individualism has protested.

The method which the individual employs in the possessive enjoyment of his soul-states is not the same as the psychological function of attention, yet that function may serve as an example of the manner in which the self secures its own states. When states of consciousness are nothing more than such psychic states, it is not difficult for the psychologist and sociologist to tear them from the self and attach them to the exterior order of physicality and sociality; but when the individual fixates these states by attending to them, he gives them the stamp of ownership, whence he speaks of them as his own. The changes which take place in conscious-

ness, instead of being like changes of wind and weather whose whence and whither are unknown and uncontrolled, are willed changes produced inwardly by the self-conscious and selective activity of the self. By means of such interior volition, or attention, the ego wills itself as self, wills its states as its own. Self-consciousness, instead of serving as the mere *ratio cognoscendi* of Cartesian psychology, is now felt to be the *ratio fiendi* of the self in its internal existence. The self makes its own conscious states, some cognitive, some volitional, others emotional.

The character of the conscious state which the self has thus evoked is that of inner independence. When nature and humanity are rightly conceived, there is nothing to forbid the existence and enjoyment of the inner state in its full freedom. It is true that he who retires within to himself is often led to dread lest he so lose contact with the outer world as to be threatened with solipsism, while he who retreats from the social order is placed in an egoistic position; indeed, some of the most pathetic of biographical items are to be found in instances of those who, rejoicing in a rich, concrete inner life, were unable to adjust that life to the outer world, so that they were thrown back upon a kind of fancied existence in their own thoughts. But, on the other hand, social history is more than full of examples where the budding individual, accepting as authoritarian the philosophy of an exteriorizing science, has been led to despair of any independent existence within, and has thus surrendered his selfhood to the world, there to exist as one among many other things, while he has relinquished his will to society to function with the other forces of the body politic. Since, therefore, individuality is the exception and society the rule, since nature is all but supreme where the individual exists only by courtesy, it is wiser to assert that measure of freedom

which comes from the conscious state, evoked as this is by the rare power of attention. Creatures may swarm in deeps which they do not possess; creatures may crawl upon an earth which gives them nought by habitat; birds may rise into an atmosphere of their own without feeling their superiority; but it is man, man in his individualism, who has the power to possess the world.

To say, "I think"—that is the first desire; that, the supreme duty of the individual. Upon his ability to overcome the aphasia which has inflicted itself upon him, depends his destiny as a spirit in the world. In order to exercise this right, Descartes had but to remove the mediaeval "world" and the mediaeval "God"; for us to accomplish the same result to-day, a more resolute act of thought becomes necessary. More difficult as our task appears to be, all the more resultful will become the accomplishment of it. We shall achieve an individualism unknown to the optimistic Enlightenment. The first positivistic synthesis which stood in the way of free, inner personality was that of monism; this synthesis has been transcended, so that the way for a new view of life is open to us. Monism was forbidding, if not fatal, because it aimed to attach, not only the spiritual to the material, but every expression of the spiritual to a corresponding physical state. In this manner, personality was subsumed under parallelism, and that to such a degree that there was conceived an exact proportion between the bodily and the mental; so much neurosis, so much psychosis. In the light of the parallelistic hypothesis, psychology sought to make its way through the labyrinth of consciousness; the outer took the place of inner, the brain ruled the self. To-day, however, while monism may still hold out attractions to the speculative thinker who desires to reduce all experience to some immediate unity, it fails to convince the psychologist of its practical worth as a working hypo-

thesis; and, since it was meant for the psychologist, the repudiation of it by him suggests that the complete rejection of it can do no harm to the study of consciousness as such. With the passing of monism, the possibility of a free, inner consciousness reappears, whence the individualist has the opportunity to reassert the independence of the conscious state which once was looked upon as nothing but the accompaniment of the physical state.

If the conscious state is in a position to assert its freedom, it may be well to inquire concerning what the "I think" denotes. With the Enlightenment, the "I think" indicated nothing but a form; with us to-day, it should receive a definite content. In order to save the conscious state from formal vacuity, it becomes necessary to invest it with an appropriate content; this can be done immediately and in a manner consistent with the nature of the self, if we are ready to superimpose upon consciousness in the naturistic sense of the term the humanistic idea of conscious culture. Consciousness does not exhaust its possibilities when it has made us aware of the presence of objects, or when further it has made it possible for us to react upon these; the "sensory" and "motor" are but the preliminaries to the conscious "I think" and "I will." In psychological "consciousness," we find but the raw material for the conscious state in its integrity; the inner life is not a nothing, nor is it a creation out of nothing. In the animal as also in the man of nature, the soul-state is only a possibility, a promise; in man as such, the possible state becomes real through the application of the self to its own affairs. The culture-consciousness, wherein soul-states are elaborated, expresses itself in a manner both intellectual and volitional, while it is further characterized by mental disciplines which cultivate the abstract and concrete. The formal

disciplines are found in logic and ethics; the more real ones, in art and religion.

Where consciousness has its roots in sensation, its function is not confined to the simple act of noticing the sensational qualities which appear when stimulus provokes sensation, nor is the activity of consciousness limited to the impulses which arise automatically in the motor system. The impression becomes idea; the impulse reappears in volition. Even then, the activity of the self, intent as is the mind in producing something characteristic and satisfying, does not rest in a mere thinking and willing; the self makes these intellectual and volitional states its own. Knowledge thus affords a view of the world as a whole, while action becomes the expression of the soul in its unity. Hence arise the "I think" and the "I will" of individualism. Logical norms and criteria, ethical standards and values are now brought into being as free mental states, at times alien to the world whence they sprang, at times antagonistic to it. In all this, the self exhibits its characteristic nature and its original form, while the conscious state has become detached from the habitual train of ideas. Give Plato the impression which means so little to Protagoras, and he turns it into an idea, while he lifts the mind out of the world; give Kant the impulse which meant so little to Hobbes, and he transmutes it into something autonomous and self-sufficient. The psychological becomes spiritual, the conscious cultural.

In the same manner, humanity delivers itself from the native flow of consciousness when it evokes artistic and religious motives. The sensations and feelings with which nature supplies us, are not left to themselves, but are raised above the rank of mere occurrences when the aesthetic consciousness, cleansing them of all immediate interest, constitutes them as disinterested judgments of beauty. Let some Barbizon artist view the landscape,

which in itself is but a congeries of sensations, and his genius presents to the beholder of his canvas a spiritual product whose significance is permanent. In like manner, the inward feelings and impulses of the soul, which seem to be only psychic and subjective, may become august and dignified when they are refined in the religious consciousness of a Tolstoi and a Huysmans. In only a lingering and accidental manner does the cultivated state of the religious consciousness betray its origin in the simple conscious state whence it originated. The inner, independent activity of the "I think" has accomplished that which with the mere creature were impossible; and, by means of this intro-activity, the content of the soul-state has become characteristic.

In which of the two instances, the conscious and the cultural, do we find man? The naturalistic thinker cannot accuse individualism of having introduced material of its own in the elaboration of the inner life, for the humanistic method consists in developing the given conscious state to its proper proportion. On the other hand, however, the humanist may accuse the naturalist of failing to observe the significance of the mental state which his analysis brought to light, just as the humanist may further point out that naturalism has been guilty of intolerance in forbidding the individualistic interpretation of consciousness. Where monism has had to lay down the cudgel, realism is now engaged in the work of forbidding the "I think." But the fact remains that humanity is possessed of independent soul-states whose adaptability to humanistic development cannot be questioned; and it is in the free development of such states that individualism reveals its right to exist. If individualism is forced to admit that the world does not exist for man, he is now in a position where he may assert that man does not exist for the world. If the ego does not possess the world, it does not fail to possess itself

in its "I think," its "I will," its "I am." At the same time, individualism does not really admit that it has lost its world; for the ego thinks the world, wills the world, and, like the world, has a peculiar sense of existence. To conclude in a contrary fashion is to repudiate human culture; and human culture seems to have passed the point where this repudiation is possible. To arrive at the sombre conclusion that man has no world, that man is not himself, is quite possible; nevertheless, such a conclusion would have to be drawn from more substantial premises than science has been able to supply.

3. THE RIGHTS OF AESTHETICISM

To assert the independence of soul-states, whereby the intrinsic qualities and values of the inner life are conserved, is to arouse a conflict with the spirit of psychology as this has long been brooding over modern philosophy. The question thus becomes a question as to the right to analyze the state which the individual desires to keep as his own. Much of our conscious content is freely open to investigation; our sensations in their qualitative and quantitative forms, our volitions in their normal behaviour, and our emotions in their characteristic expression, offer a field the right to analyze which we would not withhold. But the case stands otherwise with our exceptional moods, and it is upon these that the individualist places his affair. We have seen our ideas reduced to the routine of physiological psychology, and have marked the entrance of the social thinker as he sought to explain for us our ethical ideas; both the intellectual and ethical have thus become secularized. In the instances of the aesthetic and religious, however, we prefer to have the investigator pause; for, in these precincts, we feel that we have superior soul-states which, if they be analyzed at all, must be ex-

plained in a manner which shall adapt itself to the content at hand. May we not have something fine and sacred in our poor souls, or must we surrender our favorite moods to the prosaic methods of scientific psychology? Aesthetic joy in contemplating the fair and far-off seems to possess a character which forbids commonplace analysis, while religious awe, which seems to make man great, is even more thoroughly indisposed to submit to the academic classifications so readily forthcoming from the bold laboratories of contemporary soul-science. Something wild and romantic in our blood arises to resist the staid and rational advances of the analyst in his microscopic wisdom.

(1) *The Aesthetic and Analytic*

Between the analytic and aesthetic a painful but illuminating contrast exists; if the scientist condemns the artist, the artist has his condemnation for the scientist. The difference between the two methods of apprehending and evaluating the soul-state appears in direct connection with the question of content. It is true that scientific psychology takes notice of the "quality" of the conscious state, but such a method of qualitative analysis is not sufficient to evoke the characteristic in the human self. Because introspection has failed to include in its analysis that which to the individualist is the most characteristic phase of the inner life, aestheticism has found it necessary to resort to extreme measures in order to redeem the self from scientism. Romanticism saved the self from rationalism when romanticism postulated the purely subjective mental state; Decadence delivers the self when Decadence opposes the morbid mental state to the staid sensationism of a scientific psychology. When rationalistic and scientific psychology attempts to show that the conscious

states can hope to do no more than accompany the physical order and connection of stimuli, aestheticism makes use of introspection with the result of showing that there are mental states which disdain the guidance of the staid physical order and thus detach themselves from the exterior world of common causes. The aesthetist, far from submitting to the domination of the rational order, evokes such mental states as seem to him to have spiritual worth; the mental states are thus of his own choosing and making. With Milton and Blake, Satanism made possible a deliverance from the over-organized world of custom; with Hoffmann and Poe, an inward Satanism had the effect of delivering the mind from the scientific arrangements of psychology, whence the aesthetist was able to enjoy his inward consciousness in complete freedom from psycho-physical principles.

Apart from the extravagances of such aesthetes, it may be urged that the very principle of aesthetics is such as to bring deliverance to the mind which elsewhere is forced to feel the domination of the logical and ethical. Remove the logical domination of the concept, remove the ethical norm of interest, and the soul-state rejoices in the freedom of beauty and taste. In the case of Kant, who made this emancipation possible, it is usual to regard the deliverance of the soul from interest as though it pertained to sense alone; but, in the complete "disinterestedness" of the Kantian aesthetics, beauty is raised above both the moralic and the sensuous. By observing this distinction, Poe made Decadence possible; said he, "Just as the Intellect concerns itself with Truth, so Taste informs us of the beautiful, while the Moral Sense informs us of Duty."¹³ The connection of the beautiful with duty and truth is purely incidental, urges Poe, while the most appropriate tone of aesthetic expression is that of sadness; in thus

¹³ *The Poetic Principle, in loc.*

placing the beautiful upon the sad, Poe made possible the transition to Decadence. Kant had made art free when beauty became disinterested; Poe freed it again when he made it morbid. From Poe's beautiful sadness to Baudelaire's "*Sois belle et sois triste*" there is scarcely one step. Individualism appropriates this morbid aestheticism for the sole reason that individualism finds in it the supreme means of delivering the soul up to its self and its states of inward consciousness; for, where the rational and ethical, the sane and social suffer the individual to enjoy only such soul states as may participate in the world and mingle with the social order, the aesthetically morbid may belong to the self in its isolation and inwardness. From the philosophic point of view, the motive dominant in such art is indicated in the poem of Hood whose pathos is of singular service to Poe; this appears in the expression, "Anywhere, anywhere out of the world." The plunge into the morbid makes the escape from the world possible.

In descending to the depths of his own soul, the aesthete was doing no more than ransacking the interior soul of all humanity; can scientism accompany art through the labyrinth of soul-states? When Baudelaire frees himself from all metaphysical and moralistic responsibility, he still vows allegiance to art whose dominion over him appears in the formal perfection of his verses. Only as Baudelaire is regarded as one who determined to follow the free soul-state to the uttermost, may one tolerate his art; but, as an intrepid psychologist, his value for individualism is inestimable. When, as is the case to-day, we are submerged in the purely physical, the exceptional and horrid moods of Baudelaire have the effect of showing the individualist how wonderfully and terribly free from all exteriority is his soul within him. With its *impassibilité*, the art of Baudelaire may further be regarded as a means of

defending one's self from scientific encroachment from within. Internal and impassible, idealistic and splenetic, the individualism of Baudelaire may save one's soul-states for him, even where it can hardly save the soul itself. The various clusters of flowers called, "spleen and ideal, wine, revolt, death," constitute a diabolical content whose enclosing form is possessed of a perfection contrasting most vividly with the tumult within. If soul-states are not free in the art of Baudelaire, there is no freedom for them, and they must be relegated to the physical order. Where all *Les Fleurs du Mal* suggest perfect form, some, like *La Beauté* (XVIII) suggest the *impassibilité* for which decadence became famous, while it was through such impassibility that the individualistic Decadent was able to effect his escape from the exterior world. Others, like *Hymne à la Beauté* (XXII), reveal an indifference to both Hell and Heaven, Satan and God, Angel and Siren, intent as seems to be the author in his quest of the Infinite within the self. The poem *Confession* (XLVI) betrays *l'egoïsme humain*, while *Le Gout du Néant* (LXXXII) invites the avalanche of annihilation. This Decadent loves to watch the flight of joy from the heart, the flow of tears from the eyes, and the burden of sorrow afflict the breast, as his *Madrigal Triste* (XC) confesses; nor can he hide his *amour du difforme* (CVI). In the poem *Une Martyre* (CXXXV), he descends to the nethermost depths of the wretched cruelty which afflicted his own distressed soul, while his *Femmes Damnées* (CXXXVI) cannot atone for its infamy by seeking to regard these creatures as seekers after the Infinite — *chercheuses d'infini*. The progress of Baudelaire leads him to his *Litanies de Satan* (CXLV); these litanies consist of prayers for pity, while they praise the majesty of a being which, now vanquished, dreams in the profound silences of Hell.

In the midst of these extraordinary sentiments, the essence of individualism, while masked most horribly by the splenetic and perverse fantasies, cannot wholly be disguised. It is the self arrayed against the world; the inner life craving its silence and solitude in a world whose exteriority has been threatening the integrity of the soul. Those who glorify the external aggrandizement and material progress of the nineteenth century, and who make science and society supreme, are confronted by an art which refuses to abide by the results which such a metaphysics and morality have deduced. Baudelaire will not accept the world; on the contrary, he repudiates both nature and humanity, and arrays his spleen and ideal against all that is scientific and social. Like other Decadents, Baudelaire seems to have been alarmed at the narrow synthesis which the culture of the physical and social were so rapidly elaborating, so that his art has for individualism the value of an attempt to break through the narrow circle of positivism. In place of the productive life of action, he would place the *Impassibilité* of the soul; instead of the study of a living world with its free forms, he would substitute an "infinite palace" devoid of all life, and perfected with all the monotony of which metal and marble are capable; crystal cataracts, metal walls, columns instead of trees, nothing for the ear, but all for the eye, this world of the self, this artificial work of the will should be the true place of humanity.¹⁴

Perverse as was Baudelaire, fatal as had been the application of his ideas to the social order, the poet himself seems to have been wanting in anything polemical. Instead of suggesting practical nihilism, the poet was content to descend into his own soul, *descendre en soi-même*, there to enjoy the pleasure of art for its own sake, *pour le plaisir d'écrire un poème*.¹⁵ When this

¹⁴ *Rêve Parisien*, CXXVI.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, 22.

aesthetic subjectivism allied itself with the ideal of impassibility, it placed its author in a position where he was strangely, yet consistently, careless of any idea of social change or human progress. According to Gautier, "he had a perfect horror of philanthropists, progressivists, utilitarians, humanitarians, utopians, and all those who pretend to effect any change from the invariability of nature and the fatal order of society."¹⁶ Reposing in an autonomous beauty, Baudelaire was absolutely indifferent to the claims of naturalistic truth and social duty. *La poésie ne peut pas, sous peine de mort ou de déchéance, s'assimiler à la science ou à la morale.*¹⁷

Nevertheless, the free individualist is not as perverse as his attitude might indicate. The hero of the inner life is not unwilling himself to enlist under the banner of analysis, provided that banner be unfurled in a noble conflict. Thus it comes about that a distinction must be made between the psychologist and the psychologue, between the investigator who studies the conscious states as such, and he who views them in their proper setting in accordance with the methods those states demand. The psychologist is forced to assume that there is nothing extraordinary about the mental state which he identifies, while the psychologue is willing to grant that, in certain phases of the soul's life, he has a special case upon his hands. Where the psychologist is intent upon indicating the form, the psychologue is more anxious to interpret the content of the exceptional mental product; and where the academic enthusiast is determined to subordinate the rich inner mood to some rubric which has been found serviceable in the general study of the soul, the free psychologue is willing to let the superior soul-state dictate the terms of its surrender to science. The psychologist is prepared to handle the

¹⁶ *Rêve Parisien*, 19.

¹⁷ *Ib.*, 23

more common and masculine forms of the inner life; but, when he is confronted by the finer and more feminine characteristics, he is brought to the realization that his habitual methods are ill-adapted to the question at hand.

The insufficiency of psychologism will appear when one considers some of the most characteristic reactions of the human spirit, as these are found in the aesthetical and religious aspects of the mind. If the psychologist is privileged to analyze the artistic mind, has he hopes that his common methods will serve him in arriving at some satisfactory conclusion as to its real content? Where the psychologist feels competent to observe and experiment upon the usual consciousness of the average individual, does he rejoice in the same confidence when he is brought face to face with the exceptional state of the man of genius? In our own age, we have witnessed the peculiar conflict between the generalizing mind of science and the egoistic assertion of the aesthetic consciousness. Romanticism and scientism grew up together; like Jacob and Esau, they struggled even before birth. As a result, when the scientific mind has been called upon to explain the phenomena produced by genius flashing out beyond itself, he has been forced to characterize these appearances as some examples of the abnormal. It was in this spirit that Lombroso undertook to explain what is best in the human intellect by instituting a comparison between genius and insanity; in more recent years, Nordau has undertaken the same task with reference to romantic and post-romantic culture. In this manner, the Romantic school, the Decadents, and the Symbolists were placed in a field outside the psychology of the Bourgeoisie, while their attempts at self-assertion were identified as so many forms of "ego-mania." How stormy was the conflict between art and science in the nineteenth century, how unhappy

the difference of opinion between those who, with perfect sincerity, sought to explain man to himself and those who, in their own manner, attempted to express to man some of the personal possibilities of the vast humanity lurking within his soul! Which was right, scientist or artist? Which affords the more certain method of analysis, that of the psychologist or that of the psychologue?

To the credit of the investigator who relegated the romantic strain in humanity to the abnormal, it may be said that he recognized the insufficiency of his trite schemes of study; unable to play the part of both psychologist and psychologue, after the manner of such an investigator, as Paul Bourget, he dismissed the exceptional mental state as something, not superior, but inferior and imbecile. In order to explain, if possible, the ego's incapacity for social adaptation, Nordau appeals to such a work as Sollier's *Psychologie de l'Idiot et de l'Imbecile*.¹⁸ The attitude of Decadents toward the beautiful and ugly is explained by Nordau upon the biological basis of "chimiotaixia," or cellular attraction and repulsion, which is strangely lacking in the Decadent, who does not feel repelled by the repulsive.¹⁹ Unwilling to allow that Baudelaire, for example, disinterestedly simulated his Satanism for the sake of investigating the possibilities of the anti-natural and anti-social, Nordau resorts to clinical cases, as these were reported by Sazaret, *Etude sur le Simulation de la Folie*.²⁰

The examination of the artificial soul-states sought by Huysmans' Des Esseintes, in *A Rebours*, a book which is more consciously satirical than unconsciously pathological, Nordau illumines his scientific pages with a comparison between Des Esseintes and the cirripedia,

¹⁸ *Degeneration*, Eng. tr. 1896, 264, note.

¹⁹ *Ib.*, 282-284.

²⁰ *Ib.*, 295, note.

a sacculus "which lives in the condition of a parasite in the intestinal canal of certain crustacea."²¹ Nordau does not fail to perceive that, with the artist, "self-deliverance" is the direct cause of aesthetic creation, although his inherent sociality demands that he connect this with the thought that the artist is inspired also by the desire to act upon others. But, in defending art from the idea of imitation, which was indeed far removed from the aims of Romanticism, Nordau bases his aesthetics upon the results of observations made upon the disease called by the Russians, *myriachit*, in which inhibition forces the patient to imitate actions in others, even when these are disagreeable or pernicious.²² Upon the basis of pathological inhibition, Nordau concludes that the origin of art must be sought elsewhere. The factor of sympathy, which insures the objectification of the self-initiated aestheticism, is discussed in the same extra-psychological fashion. The rights of aestheticism are thus settled, not in the studio, but in the clinic.

(2) *Aestheticism as Individualism*

The expulsion of the self, as this was brought about in the Enlightenment with its regard for objective reason and exterior social morality, has had the effect of creating the desire to return to the self as something internal and free. With Romanticism, this desire expressed itself as eudaemonism, although the sense of joy carried with it the idea of liberation from all forms of exteriority. Without violation of the facts of history, it may safely be asserted that individualism is aesthetic individualism; for, while the development of Romanticism had the effect of producing immoralism and irrationalism, it was in direct connection with the aesthetical that the liberation of the ego had taken

²¹ *Degeneration*, 309, note.

²² *Ib.*, 323, note.

place. Ultimately, the definite forms of exterior existence were to assume the character of scientism and sociality; but before the positivistic organization of the exterior order was begun, the ideal of aesthetic individualism was well entrenched. That which scientism and sociality have been seeking consists in intellectual data and practical effects, that which can be perceived and that which can be done; with aesthetic individualism, the goal of both intellect and will consists of the immediate consciousness of self and the direct impulse toward self-expression. Since the scientific is consecrated either to the exterior in the form of physical data or such conscious states as can be linked with and explained by physical facts, the aesthetical is forced to concern itself with such soul-states as can be evoked with freedom from within; and since ethics has decided to follow the dictates of the social, the needs of individualism can be best appreciated and furthered by a view of life which abjures work in the social world in order that it may devote itself to the inner life, where private ideal is bound to mean more than social need.

While aestheticism tends ever to repose in the eudaemonistic as its sure ground, it does not fail to make use of another and perhaps superior ideal, that of formal perfection. If the intellectual significance seems to suffer and the moral intensity dwindle in this pursuit of form, the purely aesthetical can only gain by the immediate elevation of the beautiful. If this element of beauty is viewed in its complete subjectivity as an immediate effect produced in the soul, the cause of the elevation appears in the perfection of the work of art as such. In his *Philosophy of Composition*, Poe insists upon the aesthetic unity as that which is calculated to produce the sheer artistic effect desired, while this unity expresses itself in connection with pure tonal effect. In the midst of this poetic technic, the individualistic

element makes its presence felt in the fact that all poetic beauty depends upon the direct effect upon the soul. Were the principle of composition a moral or metaphysical one, the effect upon the self could be only derivative, since it would need to be conveyed to the self through the medium of the Good or the True; but so intrinsic is the soul-state, so sovereign is the self, that it is more appropriate to make the frank appeal to consciousness as such. In the case of Poe's poem, *The Raven*, the idea of a non-reasoning creature capable of speech serves to indicate symbolically the idea of verbal resonance in independence of all meaning; so superior is the aesthetical ideal that it cannot suffer itself to be sacrificed even to Truth. Poe having indicated the possibility of pure aestheticism, it remained for Baudelaire the Decadent and Verlaine the Symbolist to press on the extremes of the doctrine.

So obvious are the imperfections of such aestheticism that no word of criticism is needed to denote them; more important is it to inquire concerning the value which such aestheticism can have for individualism. The responsibilities of decadent aestheticism must be borne by the artists and aesthetes involved; at the same time, it may be suggested that the essential cause of the subjective movement is to be found in the extreme objectivity and mediocrity of the age in which aestheticism had its origin. Given a period of genuine artistic life and creativeness like that of ancient Athens or modern Florence, and the need of pure aestheticism could never be felt, while the artist could pursue his work under the naïve impression that he was simply imitating nature or glorifying the social order. The "nature" of such aesthetic periods might well serve as a model for the most superior art, while the aristocratic social order could equally well supply inspiration for the creative artist; but, with the coming of modern rationalism and

moralism, with the development of contemporary scientism and sociality, the artistic attempt to imitate nature and glorify society could do no more than produce absurd art, if any at all. For this reason, the art of the social and scientific nineteenth century was necessarily so anti-natural and anti-social as to appear as nothing more or less than an attack upon the True and the Good; indeed, the scientific 'true' and the social 'good' could not fail to come under the ban of aestheticism, which could only adhere to the intrinsic qualities and characteristics of the inner life in all freedom from the natural and social. The human self must persist in the midst of all progress that occurs in the world; and, while aestheticism is by no means wanting in distressing features, it has the merit of having been true to the principles of spiritual life as it understood them. To have scientific peace on earth and social good will among men is doubtless desirable; but, if such external benefits involve the loss of inwardness, better is it to have the confusion incident upon the paradoxes and contradictions of aesthetic individualism. In the midst of this painful conflict in contemporary thought, the possibility of a higher synthesis does not fail to appear, and to such a synthesis aesthetic individualism approximates.

To assert the rights of aesthetic decadence is only to assert the right of the self to exist as something free in its cognitions. Art is striving to free us from science; symbolism is attempting the stupendous task of liberating the soul from scientism. The sincere individualist, who feels that his inner life is at stake, is of course suspicious of an aesthetic which so gorgeously indulges its sense of freedom as to threaten the soul with debauchery; but the work of liberating humanity must be done, so that almost any means is acceptable. Only in the sense of an emancipation, then, can the

extremes of aestheticism be tolerated; and yet are the extremes of aesthetic sensualism, with the interests of the soul's inner life in the foreground, any worse than the extremes of scientific materialism, where the affairs of the self are thrust into the background? One method exaggerates the importance of the individual, the other so minimizes it as to render it null. While the individualist is likely to hesitate when it comes to assenting to the ideals of Decadence, he should be able to see that in this exaggerated aesthetic the chief aim has been to grant the soul the right of self-existence and self-expression. The "I think" in which the individualist is privileged to rejoice is hardly to be found in any other form of human culture; the artist serves us where the scientist refuses aid.

In the same manner, aestheticism has made it possible to give expression to the inner states of consciousness, where scientism can only wish the individual to keep the silence. The aim of scientism is to reduce man to the rank of a 'species,' and how valiantly did Darwin make war upon the spiritual life of his age; the aim of aestheticism is to raise humanity to an independent position, so that the exaggerations of Decadence are well meant and well timed. In the eyes of science, all that man can do is to carry out the purpose of nature, whence civilization and culture are supposed to assume a naturalistic character of which the Spencerian State may serve as the convenient type. But the expression of the inner life, as this comes through the improvisations of the free individual, is not to be relegated to an inferior order of existence. What can the culture of naturalism do for the ideals and strivings of the aesthetic individual, what promises of self-expressionism can it hold out? As ordinarily understood with scientism, "nature" cannot provide a place for the adequate objectification of the self-existent ego; at the same time,

the aesthetic ego cannot longer remain in its morbid subjectivity, whence arises the need of a higher than the scientific synthesis of the world in which the individual finds itself.

Meanwhile, the value of free aestheticism must not be overlooked, since in the exaggerated conscious state of the decadent the freedom from both nature and society manifests itself. Were there no aestheticism, it would be possible for the naturalistic thinker to insist upon that rigid parallelism which, while it may make smooth the path of mere speculation, forbids the existence and expression of the inner state as such. If this inner soul-state could be expressed as a superior mental condition whose spiritual character could not be questioned, the principles of individualism would be more consistent and more acceptable; but, wanting this superiority, the soul-state asserts its independence when it shows itself to be different from the usual mental condition which is so easily explained after the manner of psycho-physics. The self must be free; if this freedom cannot come to it in the form of the idealistic, it must enter in the form of the morbid and unusual. In the attempt to keep the inner life free from exterior intrusion, the decadent has performed a valuable work however questionable may have been the means of arriving at his goal.

II. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORTH OF LIFE

If the natural order, so fixed and forbidding in its rigorous physicality, makes no room for the free, interior joy of life, it will be found to be no less inimical to affirmation of worth on the part of the individual. Man cannot find joy within himself when his life is interpreted by science; man cannot secure worth from the world which is now in possession of science. In imme-

mediate response to its hasty metaphysics of the natural order, scientism has elaborated a world of forms and a world of functions; but in neither the statics nor the dynamics of the natural does the individual find the opportunity to get values out of the world. Scientism differs from humanism in that scientism regards all work as the exercise of functions, while humanistic individualism lays its emphasis upon the principle of creativeness, whereby the individual is able to perfect a work of his own. In opposition to the ideal of functioning, which is ever tainted by the thought that all such action is a merely automatic response to exterior excitement, the ideal of creating involves a certain amount of preliminary deliberation, in the light of which the ego considers whether this or that shall be done; indeed, egoism goes so far as to question whether action has the power to create the values which the human self feels called upon to seek. In every case where the worth of life is considered, the individualist demands that action shall spring from the "I will," in which alone may value be found. In this manner, the struggle for value consists in asserting the rights of an independent initiative, in default of which the evaluating ego is ready to repudiate the natural order, and set up the independent standard of immorality.

I. SELFHOOD IN WORTH

The essential principle in all human values is found in the ego's desire to go forth from the very depths of its interior self to the most essential and remote phases of reality. That which scientism allows is no more than immediate response to the more superficial aspects of the world, as these are recognized in the satisfaction of immediate wants. Now, such mere functioning is not evaluating, whence egoism turns away from naturalism

in order that the true self within may seek its proper possession in the world without. The cultivation of the things peculiar to immediate welfare, so dear to the utilitarian of all special schools, is in no sense the deliberate cultivation of values; for these true worths are concerned with that which has its source within the depths of man's nature while their goal lies over the horizon of immediacy. This distinction between the immediate and the remote, both within and without the self, is one which scientism cannot possibly make, since scientism has before it as its data and factors nothing but immediate impulses within and perceptible objects without. In such a double immediateness the worth of life cannot be found.

The value-problem arises when the individual in the consciousness of his inner life attempts to secure from the world about him certain benefits which the natural order is not allowed to supply. There was indeed a time in the history of humanity, although then the value-ideal was not recognized, when the human will drew from the depths of the world-order the *kalokagathia* so dear to the soul of classicism; but the advent of scientism had the effect of denying to the human will the superior benefits once enjoyed. In this manner, there has arisen a veritable struggle for life-values, a conflict in the course of which one is led to raise the question whether values do exist, and whether man has the right to secure them. The life of naturalism may permit of functional activity without further allowing work, just as it may promise utility where it does not grant worth, but the work of worth is that which for individualism is the one thing needful. The naturalistic conception of man, which regards the human being as one thing among others, and which looks upon the individual as a "specimen of the species," cannot construe the active life of man as that which is destined to yield value. When

life is regarded in the functional manner, the idea of work fails to evince that which is most characteristic of man, the internal and intellectual. According to naturism, intelligence is no more than an instrument finely adapted to handle the things and arrive at the ends which are peculiar to the exterior, perceptible life of the human species. It is admissible that man's active life may have begun in no other realm than that of immediate activity, just as it may further be pointed out that a certain nucleus of human activity is still to be found in that which is at once practical and perceptible; but to elaborate a philosophy of life out of these naturistic data is to overlook the most significant elements in man as worker and valuer. It is still possible to assume that the will may so internalize its activities as to proceed from the depths of the soul to the remoter borders of the world, and in the possibility of proceeding from the internal to the remote the worth of human life consists.

As examples of the work of worth, both art and morality reveal the fact that the human will is capable of this double movement of intension and extension. Common, functional activity with its hedonic and utilitarian consequences, fails to bring into play that which is at once characteristic of both man within and the world without. Indeed, naturalism cannot evoke the characteristic in the individual, even where it may claim to express that which is psychologically essential; naturalism thus fails to find a basis for morality. Where work is viewed in the light of its character, it is symbolized by the arrow which shoots beyond the bow rather than by the hammer which does not leave the hand. In its fullest meaning, action is doubly idealized, in that it springs from the idea within, while it is aimed at the idea without; the ego which makes such action manifest is conscious of who he is and of what he is doing.

In the so-called ethics of naturalism, as this may be found in the one-time ethics of Spencer, there is no trace of that introverted and individualized activity peculiar to genuine humanism. In true art and true morality, the supreme factor is the "I will" of individualism.

By its very nature, the human will has the power to establish values in the world. In many instances of action, the individual may be impelled by the incentive which promises some immediate benefit in the world of sense, just as it may be aroused by desires which speak for the immediate needs of conscious life within. But the essence of volition is found in an idea in the deliberate pursuit of which the stolid activity of the will stands out in strong outline against the warmer impulsion of desire. To will is to will; that is, to will is to strive after that which, in the individual's judgment, has worth for man. As scientism has no real morality, so it has no essential values; these are found in an order of life where the self as centre draws its own circle of limitation. The possibilities of the will are determined by the will itself in the light of that which has, or is judged to have, worth. An individualist may thus will an object of sensuous enjoyment after the manner of Sudermann, or he may will the naught in a manner peculiar to Stirner; in the case of either extreme, it is the individualized will in search of values which determines the volition. Scientism cannot understand that man is anxious to realize worth in the world; therefore scientism persists in seeking to settle accounts with the individual by proffering spurious satisfactions, like pleasures and utilities.

It is commonly assumed that the negations of scientism have had to do with ideas alone, as though the agnostic veto applied to the individual's purely speculative attempt to lay hold upon life. But scientism has

assumed the same forbidding attitude to the deeds of the will in the latter's attempt to lay hold of values in the world. Indeed, the circle of scientism has been drawn about both free ideas and free volitions. The history of individualism shows how man has willed the Beyond even when he has not always found it in his power to think the Beyond. In its more definite form the Will-to-the-Beyond has assumed the form of self-will, or the will-to-selfhood, so well known with Stirner, Wagner, and Nietzsche. Where Romanticism simply postulated the Beyond as an indefinite object of poetical sentiment, the individualism of the mid-nineteenth century made the Beyond a definite object of volition. Wagner's Siegfried, who was delightfully innocent of modern scientism, showed his ability to create values out of his own will—*Denn selbst muss der freie sich schaffen*.²³ In the same manner, Ibsen's "right man" of the "third empire" was to come into being as "the one who wills himself," just as Nietzsche's Zarathustra was the one who could say, "I will." What scientific conception of the world were capable of such intensity of individuation as to make possible or even permit such a self-valuation? In defiance of scientism, with its half-hearted conception of action, individualism has proceeded to create values in the world in the form of the willed worths of the human ego. To will the immediate and useful is by no means the same as to will the values which belong to the inner nature of the free ego. Agnostic scientism prefers that man should neither know God nor will the self; if individualism has not been alive to the exigencies of the divine problem, it has not failed to solve the human one.

The struggle for the worth of life has had the effect of developing an individualistic psychology wherein the ideal of worth has been relegated to the human will.

²³ *Walküre*, II Akt., II Sc.

Values are volitional values produced by the strength of the self-propelled will. In the single attribute of strength has the individualist sought to find the essence of the will; where the conflict over the Joy of Life was decided by the refinements of emotion, the conflict over values has centered in the idea of the ego's ability to reinforce its own motives. When, in the struggle for the worth of life, the individualist seeks to express selfhood through strength, one is not to assume that this new doctrine is equivalent to the elder maxim, Might makes right. However paradoxical it may appear, the stronger the individualist is within, the less inclined for destructive action does he appear to be. In his opposition to established law, Schlegel was purely aesthetical; the same may be said of the more dangerous Baudelaire. In the same spirit of passive resistance, did Stirner express himself: "Now, as my object is not the overthrow of an established order but my elevation above it, my purpose and deed are not a political or social but an egoistic purpose and deed."²⁴ There can be no doubt that there was perfect serenity in the midst of Emerson's intense non-conformity, while one can believe that even Nietzsche was free from any desire to revolutionize the world. Aye, in the most intense individualism and evaluation of Christ himself, there was no thought of outward insurrection. Strength, then, is internal strength, an arming and fortifying one's self within; such strength proceeds from the idea of self-value, while it contents itself with self-will.

To make one's self the goal of all one's volitions, as egoism has been doing, is to assert that the value of life is to be found in the individual. Nevertheless, in seeking the value of life within the self, the individualist does not exalt a petty, punctual egoism of self-love; for it has been the self as the seat of spiritual life

²⁴ *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, 421.

with its aesthetical, moral, and religious values rather than the private personality of an ego with its pleasures, which individualism has seen fit to uphold. When, as in the happy instance of antique culture, the outer world was not allowed to threaten the sanctity of the inner life, there was humanism without egoism, intellectualism without egoistic opposition; but, where modern life uses scientism to persecute the individual, a more militant humanism becomes necessary. In a world of culture where all tendencies worked outwardly for the exaltation of the physical, egoism becomes a necessary movement for the preservation of the human soul. When the view of nature becomes less scientific and more liberal, it is quite likely that egoism will retire from the field; but until scientism yields, it will be necessary for individualism to take upon itself the task of asserting the worth of human life as such. We must abide by Protagoras until Socrates is come.

While individualism has often been one with egoism, it has never lost sight of perfect humanism. But how is such humanism to be advanced? According to the common assumption, we may argue that, the more egoism there is, the less humanism; the more sociality, the more humanism. This, which is really the fallacy of composition, makes necessary the distinction between the intensive qualities of a concept and its purely quantitative extension. According to the principles of social thinking, "humanity" is a class-term the validity of which depends upon the assembling of individuals under one general head; according to individualism, "humanity" is an essence which can be discovered only by analyzing the individual in all the character of his inner existence. Modern democracy gave excessive width to the concept; modern sociality, with its biological prejudices, has added to this diffusion. As a philosophy of rights, which originally had no other aim than the ele-

mental welfare of the human species, such a humanism was just; but when this exteriorizing humanism is immediately turned into a philosophy of life, the quantitative, extensive principle does not obtain. Man as man may have within him an essential humanity which all morality must recognize; but, when this humanity is organized in the form of institution, and we are asked to believe that the old content may be found in the new form, the immoralistic idealist can only become skeptical.

With the individualist, humanity is an idea which signifies something more than a generalization elaborated to include all anthropoids under one head; humanity is essential and characteristic. In particular, the humanism of that individualism for which immoralism stands includes the superioristic in mankind; whence it is not the man eating and working, but the man thinking and creating which is set up as the standard. Social thought starts and terminates with the man as something given; individualism postulates the elevation of humanity which is ever coming about by means of human perfection. To enclose the given man in a circle of social conceptualism is not to arrive at humanity; this superior notion is elaborated only as humanity is considered as the subject of inward culture. Thus it is the cultural, rather than the natural in humanity, which has guided the immoralist in his assertion of the individual's supremacy, as also in his opposition to the fixed order in which only man external is made the subject of observation. As individualism regards culture as the Good, sociality can hardly do otherwise than view it as the bad, inasmuch as culture takes man's attention away from the immediate world with its practical problems, while it works also for the elevation of the superior above the inferior.

In contrast with the individualistic view which con-

siders the self as something connected quite loosely with the social order, contemporary moralism offers the conception of the self as a "cell in the social organism." When the essential issues of life are raised, which of the competing conceptions is likely to appear the more moral? If it seem immoralistic to consider the self in that independence which its unique nature demands, what ethical degradation is involved in the current social conception according to which the spiritual is absorbed in the social! When the question is placed upon the basis of value, what is there in the objectified social order which can compensate for the loss of personal worth which the social system demands? The social puts men together, but that is not to say that they belong together; furthermore, the social system puts men together, not for the sake of evoking in the individual that which is characteristic of his nature, but in order that more and more socialized work may be done. In thus assembling men industrially, sociality sacrifices a permanent value to a passing utility; the individual is not suffered to live within or to work from within, so that his humanity is lost to him. The genuine Inner of human life thus perishes with exteriorizing progress.

Immoralistic individualism has still another complaint against the exteriorizing system of the social moralism which springs from the naturalistic order; that complaint involves the Outer, the world in which the individual is supposed to live and work. With the assertion of the individual in all the privacy of his interior existence, it would seem as though the work of the immoralist were done; but immoralism has ever found it possible to provide the humanized self with an objective in the form of Humanity. When the essential meaning of humanity is considered, it is possible, aye necessary, to affirm that it is the individualistic rather than the social which has had the fate to organize the

idea of humanity. This individualistic conception of humanity depends upon sympathism. Upon the naturalistic basis of social ethics, the attempt to produce humanistic sentiment has resulted in nothing more convincing than "altruism." This modern thought, this sentiment, with which ancient humanism found it possible to dispense, has assumed the twin form of benevolence and conscience. From Cumberland to Smith, from Smith to the school of social ethics, this dual norm was maintained: the earlier period sought to justify it as an ideal; the later one has attempted to realize it as a principle of experience. Arguing that there is a natural principle of benevolence or sociality, which holds men together as a social unit, the school of social morality then attempted to transfigure this social sentiment as the ethical ideal of conscience.

In response to such moralization, immoralism urged that, since the bond which was assumed to assemble men on the planet was based upon the inferior principle of naturalism in the form of the herding instinct, the so-called moral sentiment could not be regarded as sufficiently sanctioned. It was in the repudiation of social conscience, the conscience of the species, that immoralism came into being and acquired its unhappy renown. Stendhal and Emerson anticipated it; Dostoïevsky and Nietzsche made of it an ethical system of hardness, if not of cruelty. The appeal to gregariousness was lost on such individualists; the conscience of the race failed to soften their victorious egoism. In connection with the history of immoralistic egoism, the special case of Dostoïevsky and Wagner may be cited with the aim of showing that in some instances the intrepid individualist found it expedient to abandon the severities of his doctrine and repose at last in the softer conceptions of sympathy and compunction. This may indeed be granted; but the retreat of the Russian novel-

ist and German musician was marked by an advance inward toward a complete compassionism rather than outward in the direction of altruism. In the case of Dostoïevsky, there is no suggestion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the sanction of morality; rather was it a sense of universal misery which led him to abandon his immoralistic egoism and seek refuge in the idea of divine compassion. The same may be urged in the case of Wagner, where the strident will-to-selfhood yielded to a soteriological sense of sympathy whose spiritual character was such as to involve intellectual illumination instead of human good feeling.

It is thus a spiritual humanism which lies behind the principles of immoralistic self-assertiveness. Indeed, in this sympathism, more Buddhistic and Slavonic than British as it is, there is a point where both phases of humanism, the cultural and the compassionate, meet; this is in the notion of insight. Aiming at insight, Hellenic humanism seeks the development of that which is superior and permanent in humanity; guided by such insight, Hindoo humanism proceeds to elaborate its system of sympathism. The dialectical character of such immoralistic humanism appears at once; no longer is it the naturalistic sense of a common animality, but the spiritual consciousness of essential unity which brings the sons of men together. When, therefore, the social moralist says, "man," he means something of a biological and anthropological nature; when the individualist pronounces the term, it signifies a spiritual communism whose roots descend into the essential nature of humanity whose place is the spiritual order. Furthermore, the immoralistic character of humanism is such as to involve profound pessimistic considerations, since it is the realization of the seriousness of man's condition in the universe which acts as the bond to draw men together.

In the struggle for the existence and preservation of human values, the contrasted ideals of egoistic strength and human sympathy meet in one common sense of interior life. If, as Anatole France has said, "only egoists really love women," it may be asserted that only individualists really love humanity. If egoism and altruism represent contradictory values, individualism and sympathism are suggestive of two sides of one and the same human affair. The individualist who, not contented with the self-life parcelled out to him by a differentiating natural order, takes selfhood into his own hands and thus wills his inner being, is in a position to appreciate the essential meaning of humanity; and this appreciation becomes the means of enlightening him as to meaning of another's life. To abandon egoism for the purpose of securing an altruistic standpoint is to extinguish the torch which is to light up the world of humanity as a whole. Naturalism, which knows nothing of humanity save that superficial aspect of it which appears in egoism and altruism, is thus in no position to indicate to mankind the value of human life in the world.

2. THE INDIVIDUALISTIC INITIATIVE

In the capacity of valuer, the ego endeavors to exercise that free initiative by means of which he shall put his will into the world; for this individualistic initiative, systematic metaphysics, whether rationalistic or positivistic, must make way. Where the individual in his quest of the real joy of life had demanded the privilege of receiving from the world the impressions which should become veritable soul-states, the elaboration of life-values finds the same individual asserting his right to react upon the world in a manner peculiar to his own will. Under what circumstances does the human ego really act, and what is the character of that

which we call a "deed"? In taking up the activistic phase of human life, individualism does not fall into the error of assuming that a theory is a necessary preliminary to life itself, even where individualism exercises the faint hope that a critical conception of life may have the effect of making life appear more genuine in its sense of joy, of worth, of truth. Life will go on of itself, while the inner life of man, although wanting in sincerity and strength, will ever possess something like soul-states, free initiatives, and ideals. But genuine and consistent action, like sincere feeling and thought, must find a sufficient ground, or an approximation to it. What, then, is really meant when one says, "I will"?

The individualistic "I will" takes up the question in the spirit of pessimism in obedience to which individualism is led to question the value of action as such. Non-individualistic systems, the whole legion of which seem equally possessed of the energistic spirit, always take action for granted; the inner life of feelings may be impossible and thought-ideals unattainable, but action can never be tainted by the skepticism which invades the passive precincts of man's nature. If life be a dream, then one may still have Calderon's belief that such a dream permits moral action; if knowledge be of no avail, one may still follow Voltaire and cultivate the garden; if agnosticism shuts out the view of spiritual reality, one may still exercise his will and with Comte take up his social duties undismayed. Those whose strict scientific conceptions tend to sever them from the far off sources of spiritual life are ever the ones who recommend a course of activity in life, when it is quite thinkable that such activity depends upon the acceptance of those remote ideals which the skeptical critics reject. As a result, systems of action and philosophies of work have ever placed the affair of action upon naught. For this reason, the individualistic "I will"

can find no support in the scientific view of things in the light of which man's life is limited by the naturalistic horizon; if thinking can proceed upon this basis, which is quite doubtful, it seems impossible for action to be carried on in the scientific spirit of immediacy.

The problem of action is made more perverse, more paradoxical, when it is observed that those who raise the human will above the restricted realm of scientific thinking are not the ones who commend activity for man. Stated broadly, they who have no right to believe in the free initiative, still recommend work; those who have come into possession of the limitless will, discountenance activity. Where Geulincx delivers the will from the meshes of the corporeal world and identifies it with the will of God, he refuses to conclude that man can therefore do everything, and asserts the proud negation, *nihil volo*. With the strong Satanism of Milton and Blake, belief in the supremacy of the will leads to nothing more than ideas and words. In the instances of Emerson and Stendhal, one observes how these strong immoralists were ever disinclined to make malicious use of the over-free will which they had discovered. The same practical passivism erected upon an energistic basis is none the less apparent in Stirner and Nietzsche, whose extravagant anarchism and atheism, instead of leading their authors to take up arms against earth and heaven, merely left them in a Dionysian condition wherein activity was purely internal and personal. In the case of Schopenhauer, the paradox is most strident, for where, in his speculative view of things, Schopenhauer concludes that the will can do all, the moral conclusion which follows is to the effect that the will should do nothing: where, by its very nature, the will is not only free but almighty,²⁵ the practical exercise of the individuated will can only lead to remorse,²⁶ while the just

²⁵ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 53.

²⁶ *Ib.*, § 65.

conclusion has to do with renunciation and the denial of the will-to-live.²⁷ In its special form, the dialectic of Schopenhauer is quite different from if not opposed to that of Geulincx; but, since both these activists relegate causality to the Supreme Being, whether God or the Will-to-Live, and since both alike suffer the individual to participate in this omnipotent will, both Geulincx and Schopenhauer may be said to proceed from the same metaphysical notion of all-willing to the same moral conclusion of no-willing.

If, therefore, in the career of voluntarism, they who have no metaphysical right to believe in action still recommend work, while they who know the secret of all-willing refuse to allow action, the problem of personal action, of individual initiative, becomes more than usually perplexing; indeed, the problem of action seems even more confusing than the question of thought. In the instances of Geulincx and Schopenhauer, where the dialectical profundity lies, the secret of the paradox seems to lurk in the special question of individualism; thus it is the "I act" which appears so appalling to them. With Geulincx, self-inspection leads to self-despection,²⁸ just as in the case of Schopenhauer it is the idea that the whole will-to-live is concealed with the individual's brain,²⁹ which forces the thinker to repudiate that personal omnipotence which seems to him so terrible. Scientific thinkers, whose skepticism screens from their eyes the august and fearful meaning of the human will, are very ready to recommend action because they have no means of knowing what the word "action" means. With the scientific thinker of modern times, the appeal to action as a way of solving the problem of life has never been more than a makeshift, a subterfuge, a sop to the wolves.

With voluntaristic thinkers the world over, the tend-

²⁷ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 68.

²⁸ *Ethica*, Tr. I, cap. II, sec. 2, § 2. ²⁹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 61.

ency to shrink from action the moment that action becomes possible has been the most pronounced, most perplexing tendency. For this reason, he who desires to know the meaning of the "I will," is bound to be disappointed when he searches the record of the voluntaristic philosophers, so that it seems almost impossible for the individualist of the present day to gather the rich harvest of activism, blighted as this was in the day of its fruitage. As soon as Tâoism had delivered man from the world, it imposed upon him the ideal of "doing-nothing"; Yoga, with its philosophy of work, was equally serious in its injunction to worklessness; Aristotelian morality, which started out boldly with the notion of energy as the most satisfactory thing in the life of man, came to the conclusion that after all it is the "energy of contemplation" which marks the summit of man's life in its ascent to godhead; Kantian morality, with its much-heralded freedom of the will, allowed the ethical ego one precious moment of autonomy and then delivered it to the mercies of the categorical imperative; Fichte's ego posits itself only to become passive in the absolutistic turn which this voluntarist gave to the human self. Hence, Geulincx and Schopenhauer seem to be no exception to the rule that, the more the self makes of itself, the less it becomes; the more the will is freed, the less liberty does it enjoy. Indeed, under the auspices of naturalism and determinism, where the world of sense is given over to the sons of men, there is more appreciable freedom of living than in idealistic and libertarian systems which grant all freedom in theory only to yield none in practice. Voluntarism, as this appears more vividly and concretely in Milton and Blake, in Stendhal and Stirner, in Wagner and Nietzsche, is a disappointment, an *In-Vain*, as Nietzsche called it.

In the failure to assert through action that will which

the voluntarist has affirmed in thought, the apostle of will has ever been under the shadow of a rationalistic philosophy which has long assumed the supremacy of humanity and reason. Because of its naïve assumptions, voluntarism has thus been led to treat the will as Abraham his only-begotten; can the individualistic angel stay the sword? At the moment when the will was idealized it was destined to become an object of sacrifice, an act in which appears the exquisite paradox of all voluntaristic systems. The thought that seems to have been uppermost in the mind of the voluntarist was to the effect that, although self-initiative was the dearest of voluntaristic ideals, the deliberate sacrifice of this principle might be even dearer, while life itself might proceed will-less, as Israel might somehow come into existence apart from Isaac. If much learning can make one mad, much reasoning make one irrational, much willing may perhaps make one will-less; from the extremes of assertion and denial, the will of individualism has been called upon to suffer. Much as individualism believes in the will, individualism does not delude itself into thinking that the effect of willing is so likely to be exaggerated by any initiative which the ego may express; to individualism, although the fate of the will in the world is a subject of limitless importance, the actual will of the individual is far from being the omnipotent will-to-live of Schopenhauer, nor does individualism find it possible to exercise the belief that the individual has such a wealth of willing at his command that he may either assert or deny the initiative within him. To have that initiative and to rejoice in its thrills are indeed the privileges which individualism sees fit to express, but the power to take one's life up or lay one's life down is a power to which individualism does not lay confident claim. Such idealistic supremacy is something which the individual of the day cannot assume.

Since individualism must admit that scientism has the upper hand, while the egoistic initiative has been forced into a position painfully secondary, individualism is not ready to indulge in the noble excesses of a renunciatory philosophy. Indeed, the individualist feels that, so slender is his hold on what he calls the will, he is in no position to consecrate the noble act of self-negation, even if he thought this might be wise and just. To assert or to deny the will ethically is to have complete possession of the will metaphysically, so that the average person does neither the one nor the other; the average person, whom individualism would convert to the doctrine of being one's self, lets the will merely slip through his hands, neither holding on nor letting go. Of the two tendencies, the realizing by means of self-assertion and the renouncing through self-negation, the self-assertorial seems the better one for the individualist, inasmuch as the forces of his world are all making for the materialized mass rather than for the punctuated form of individualized existence. Where the rationalistic presumption of man's supremacy may tend to produce self-negation, the realistic situation as appreciated by the egoist of the day warns the individual that he must assert himself. Hence the terrors of self-willing, as these showed themselves to Oriental and Pagan thinkers, to Geulincx and Schopenhauer, have little or no meaning to the individualist who feels no fear of thrusting the will out beyond the proper limits of his essential being. Scientism will take care of the negative side of man's volitions, so that individualism would better exercise concern for his individual welfare as the one who wills himself.

But it was not merely a superior conception of the world as a world of reason which persuaded the individualist to restrain his efforts of self-assertion; in company with this superior idea of the outer world

there went an inferior conception of the will which was to exert itself. From this twofold eighteenth-century prejudice, the superiority of reason and the inferiority of the self, one strives in vain to be free. Yet individualism realizes that, if the bright dream of reasonableness has not faded, the supremacy of pure thought has become obscured so that one may not count too much upon the possession of that which Cartesians and Kantians so confidently affirmed. But, where intellectualism has been waning, individualism has been waxing; whence, if the understanding is at a low ebb, the ego is coming to its flood tide. The ego of egoism, far removed from the alleged ego of rationalism, is now something more than a bit of rationality or sensuality; the ego of current individualism has become the supporter of the whole inner life with its ideals of beauty, worth, and truth. For this reason, individualism advances its first principle with the feeling that self-assertion means the assertion of those ideal interests for which the self stands, ideals of joy, value, and truth. Hence, the belief in the individualistic initiative really amounts to a belief in the affirmation of those things which are dear to the ego, soul-states, initiatives, and ideals. What once belonged to the objective world of reason has now become the possession of the subjective world of selfhood; and, with this new content, the ego's attempt at self-assertion can never again be confused with abstract self-cogitating or concrete self-loving.

With the new estimates which individualism has placed upon action, the situation is just the opposite of that which once obtained. Where once, with the superiority of intellect and the inferiority of will in mind, the Enlightenment said, Man is capable but not worthy of willing, the age of culture declares, Man is certainly worthy of willing, but it is a question whether he is capable of it. The will of Emerson and Ibsen,

of Wagner and Nietzsche, should have self-expression in the world; but is the world so constituted that such self-expression is possible? Is the metaphysics of volition on a par with the ethics of willing, so that self-expression shall find its place in the world of work? Suppose, then, one abandon the almost meaningless conception of action which obtained in the rationalistico-sensuous Enlightenment, and centre his attention upon the more sincere and characteristic notion of work as this has appeared in the age of culture; will it not appear as though the world should make room for such work; will it not appear further that the world, as organized by scientism, has made room for nothing more than the functional conception of activity? If we grant that the will has shown itself to be worthy, may we not assume that there is an appropriate realm in which this worth may display itself?

That such a realm of true volition is not to be found in the physical view of the world must appear to any one who will take the time to compare the ideals of individualism with the principles of scientific thinking. Because of the world's singular unfitness for the human ego, the human ego working for the first time in a self-conscious, self-willed manner, has made a world of its own, the world of immoralism of such unhappy repute. Before one can appreciate the gravity with which the individualist laid the foundations of his own world, the ideals which impelled him to abandon the world of scientism must be duly considered. The simple fact that some kind of action does express itself in some kind of a world-order is not the same as the serious ideal which assures one that genuine action should express itself in an appropriate cosmos. In the ancient world of things, there was indeed an objective realm, but it did not suffice to contain the Christian who had dreamed of things better and more spiritual; of such spiritual-

izing ego the world was unworthy. Now, because again the human self is surrounded by the physical order, it does not follow that he can find his home there. The primitive Christian promptly repudiated the cosmos which he found enveloping him, and for a while he went on his way worldless, cheered by the thought that inwardly he was possessed of something more worthy than the world-order had to offer him; but the time came when he too elaborated his own world-order, the world of spirit peculiar to Scholastic times. Will the new individual be so brave as to reject the cosmos of things physical which surrounds him; will he at last be able to find his own world?

That which the individual in the age of culture asks of the surrounding order is a true place, a place for his mind as well as a mere location for his body. The individual can indeed retreat to his inward self, as his aestheticism has led him to withdraw from the physical order so that he may have soul-states of his own in all their decadent aestheticism; perhaps, this same fate will be found to overtake him when, in the pursuit of a world which shall possess the freedom of individual initiative, he shall deem it fit to retire once more to the inward self where, in immoralistic manner, he shall use his initiative as a mere will-to-selfhood. The physical order does not permit action as such; on that point the individual can no longer remain in doubt. That which the physical order of ambitious scientism does allow and advise is something automatic rather than free, functional rather than creative. Under the auspices of scientism, which finds no place for the human initiative, the fact remains that creative work goes on in the realm of art, of moral ideals, of religious beliefs; but, while these are actually in the world of scientism, they are not of the world. Between the free creations of the human will, aesthetic, moral, and religious, and the

physical order, the worst of contradictions prevail. The recent history of culture has witnessed the rise and development of artistic, ethical, and religious ideas at once independent, self-contained, and intelligible; yet there is nothing in the actual history of thought, as this is represented by authoritarian scientism, to justify the elaboration of these ideals. Undoubtedly, there are also a scientific art, a scientific ethics, and a scientific religion, however contradictory is the relation of the adjective to the substantive; but who can doubt which of the two, the cultural or the scientific, is the true form of spiritual life? Even if one show such bad judgment as to prefer the scientific product to the cultural one, he cannot deny that the cultural one is none the less a fact with which he must settle; and this settlement with the freer creations of the human will can hardly be made after the genial manner of a scientism which attempts to call all non-scientific forms of culture "degenerate." It is the deviation from the scientific type, rather than the type itself, which persists in calling attention to itself as culture indeed; excluded from the orthodox realm of science, this spontaneous culture still exists and continues to expand its borders, to intensify its ideals.

The automatic and functional form of action, adopted by scientism for the sake of pursuing its evolutionary analogies of organic existence in general, does not for a moment explain the data presented by complete experience. Experience does indeed present many examples of automatic activities peculiar to general bodily movement, breathing, and special muscular movements of the hands. But these simple and obvious forms of activity are far removed from the free creations of the will in the form of action as action. Spencer's definition of conduct as "the aggregate of interdependent acts performed by an organism" is an example of the

candor which can pervade a scientism which has abandoned the idea that there is something extraordinary about the human species. It is true that scientism, with its social affiliations does attempt to explain the behavior of man; but scientific investigations and speculations in the realm of things humanistic have usually if not wholly confined themselves to anthropological data peculiar to primitive man. Granted that scientism explains the life and activity of primitive man, which itself is an open question, it is still more evident that such scientism has done no more by way of explaining the man of perfected culture than to call him degenerate. Where the Enlightenment studied nature apart from history, and the man of perfected culture and civilization was not disturbed, the affairs of the human self were not unsatisfactory; but where, with the coming of the nineteenth century, both nature and human history were made the twin objects of investigation, the naturalistic soon overcame the humanistic, which latter appears in no other light than that of anthropology. In the case of man as man, the scientific conception of conduct fails to suffice; not because man's conduct is of a marvellous character, but because it is marked by the initiative, the improvising, the creating, out of which the cultural products of art and religion have come. To view these cultural creations as functional processes, to regard artistic creations and moral performances as a part of the "aggregate of the interdependent acts of an organism," is to reduce scientism to an absurdity. The attempt to socialize science or to make sociality scientific has been the undoing of scientism; so that who can deny that Comte and Spencer have made scientism appear silly? Evidence to this effect should be found in the swarm of sociologists who have attempted the disastrous combination of the physical and humanistic.

That individualism should thus have become anti-

scientific and even anti-natural, as with the Decadents and Symbolists, should occasion no great alarm and still less surprise. Is the ego to remain silent when the prevailing type of intellectual life is such as to negate that which he feels to be most characteristic of his being? Individualism, which at times has rashly insisted upon the monstrous, the vicious, and the unnatural, is interested in nothing so much as that which may be called strictly human; and if an individualist in particular, repelled by scientism and rejoicing in the thought that there is something in him different from the purely anthropological, does overdo the affair with Baudelairean or Nietzschean exaggeration, all that one need gather from such a performance is the secure thought that the individualistic initiative is practically boundless and incalculable. Persuaded that human life has a value of its own, the individualist has insisted upon the inviolability of his own impulses; his volitional excesses in the direction of diabolism may be taken as exceptional means of proving the point in question.

3. THE DEMANDS OF IMMORALISM

In the struggle for the worth of life, the essential conflict appears when the contrast between the functional and initiatory is made. The individualist can find no value in any course of conduct which does not spring from a strong, self-impelled "I will," so that he is forced to turn aside from the genial paths of scientism and make his way alone. Where the desire for the inward joy of life, which could not be found in the drab hedonic pleasure-pain, made inevitable the recourse to a relentless aestheticism, the demand for value in life will be found to lead to a vigorous immoralism. The naturalistic conception of man could afford the ego nothing higher than an automatic response to the objective demands of the scientific arrangement of society,

whence the individualist took the matter in his own hands and thus sought to lay down the principles of life in a hypernomian immoralism. Such "immoralism" often appears to amount to no more than mere transgression, in thought if not in deed; but the essential principles of the immoralist are ever found in strength and inwardness, which strong assertion from within contrasts most strikingly with weak submission to that which is without. Where opposition enters into the ethical calculations of the immoralist, the non-conformity and disobedience involved are secondary to the principle of self-assertion; immoralism has no desire to recognize the alleged authority of those standards which are set up by scientific thinking, even when this recognition appears in the form of resistance. The supreme moment of individualism lies in the autonomous "I will."

In contrasting the ethical attitude of scientism with that of individualism, it would seem as though scientism, with its usual attitude of opposition to all idealism, would negate both the metaphysical and the moral ideals of orthodox thought; but this is not the case. Scientism, which was ready to remove ideals, has never found it expedient to efface the moral sanctions which followed from those spiritual ideals; scientism did make rigorous use of its agnostic theory for the purpose of removing the spiritual world from the natural order, but scientism did not care to do away with the influence which came from that spiritual world. The scientists have removed the Good One, but the good remains. In the Enlightenment, nothing seemed more important than the removal of the orthodox Deity; yet, where rationalism opposed theism, it was unwilling to set aside the ethics which had followed from theistic belief. At the climax of the rationalistic period, Kant was found dismissing the Deity but holding fast, and that with extraordinary vigor, to

the Deity's law of duty. If, therefore, the physical conceptions of religion were called upon to suffer at the hands of the rationalistic scientists, the ethical conceptions of religion were either left untouched or actually furthered. The intellectualistic courage of the modern has thus been accompanied by immoralistic cowardice.

In the later period of modern thought, at once naturalistic and cultural, scientism has been even more determined in saying "no" to the idealizing intellect while saying "yes" to the moralizing will. Scientism is thus innocent of immoralism. Why scientism should have performed a half-work only, is another question; yet there should be no doubt that scientism was content to destroy certain accepted forms of thinking, while it remained more than loyal to equally traditional forms of action. In the case of such authoritarian thinkers as Comte and Darwin, Haeckel and Spencer, the attitude of ferocity toward ideas spiritual is accompanied by an attitude of extreme mildness toward spiritual motives, such as obedience, sympathy, and good-behavior. For this reason, one can discover little difference in moral value between Christian ethics and the ethical ideals of scientism. What one had the right to expect of scientism, after scientism had made short work of the soul and the Deity, was the origination and elaboration of a morale of appropriate blindness and cruelty, so that those who look for great things from scientism have a right to claim that scientism is, when ethically considered, a great disappointment, if not a great deception. Comte fails to carry out in ethics the bold worldliness of his positivist physics; Darwin's bloody struggle for existence finds no place in his domestic ethics of "sociability"; Haeckel's animalism ends before he draws his ethical conclusions; Spencer's Unknowable allows him to perfect an ethics of which the physically knowable was quite innocent. This saintliness of scientism should

be noted down as one of the surprises, one of the disappointments of the nineteenth century.

Alas! the docility of the brave, the weakness of the strong. Did they imagine, Kant the finisher of the eighteenth century, Spencer that of the nineteenth, that they had done enough? Did they fear to destroy both God and godliness? Egoism cares nought for these historical enigmas; for egoism, while less pretentious and less inclined to promise, has done the work that all-vaunted scientism failed and feared to take up, the work of setting aside the moral law. Scientism, with its eighteenth-century abstractness and nineteenth-century concreteness, has always sighed for order, which was for it the first law of earth as once it had been the first law of heaven; scientism thus postulated a morality of reason, a morality of knowableness. In the latter period of scientism, this desire for order appears in the strange reverence for the "species," the only shred of rationality left in the de-idealized world of things. To the claims of the species, all must submit, hence the sociability of Darwinism, the sociality of Spencer's ethics. The human species thus became society, when it became easy to conclude that the moral is the social, the immoral the anti-social. Individualism has never felt excessive regard for any impersonal order, and it is still less likely to feel this awe when the moral order becomes the species or herd. The self is more than a specimen.

Whence this dread of the human self, this fear of the self when it indulges in an aesthetic withdrawal from the world to the inwardness of its soul-states, this hatred of the ego which proceeds from within outward toward its own "immoralistic" goal? Scientism must explain its own timidity; meanwhile, scientism must admit that, where it failed to indulge in an ethical assertiveness peculiar to its own principles, art went forward and postulated its own morale, where scientism abode

by spiritual ideals of life. In the name of Romanticism, both Schleiermacher and Schlegel sought to set aside the moralic restrictions of an ethics based upon the exteriority of scientific thinking. Was Schleiermacher an immoralist when he emancipated religion by saying, "Piety can never be an instinct craving for a mess of metaphysical and moral crumbs";³⁰ was he likewise an irrationalist? Schleiermacher was rather the individualist who sought in religion the free expression of the inner life apart from the restraints of morality. Schlegel was no more intense; perhaps he was less convincing. With Schlegel, all genuine morality was to be found in spontaneity: *Alle Originalität ist moralisch*;³¹ such morality must initiate its expression in opposition: *Die erste Regung der Sittlichkeit ist Opposition gegen die Gesetzmäßigkeit*.³² This attitude of opposition to the moral law as an established thing casts the romanticist back upon the self, the assertion of which leads to the individualistic doctrine of *Ironie*, the *Ironie* for which Schlegel was famous, *die Ironie der Ironie*.³³ But this romantic despair of the self was far from being one with the scientific fear of the ego; with Romanticism, the self was all, even when the self was nothing.

It would indeed sound strange were one to affirm that science lacked the strength which culture enjoyed and expressed; yet some such affirmation must be made. Perhaps the cultural affirmation of the will's inherent worth was made possible by the scientific perception that the human ego owes naught to the artificially organized world of institutions; yet the attitude of the artist of the nineteenth century was more naturalistic than scientific. The raw naturalism which science had treated with ethical evasion was destined to become the fundamental principle and leading motive of an art which

³⁰ *Discourses on Religion*, tr. Oman, II.

³¹ *Ideen*, 60 *Jugend Schriften*, ed. Minor.

³² *Athenacum*, 425.

³³ *Jugend Schriften*, II, 392.

should seek to set aside the limitations of exterior law. Did Stendhal and Emerson, did Dostoïevsky and Nietzsche, make use of the physics of scientism to destroy the ethics of scientism, and was such scientism the "fear and evasion of pessimism"? Scientism has no culture for the upbuilding of the human soul; hence scientism cannot further the soul in the latter's attempt at self-realization. It was art then which was to come to the relief of the self-asserting ego; and, where the scientific treatise could not avail, the romantic novel was made the medium of emancipation. Scientism has done nothing for the human atom; that atom has had to work out its own salvation by means of art. It was art which in its unique freedom taught the human self to make use of culture as a means of self-emancipation, and this culture was, alas! connected with crime.

In the self-valuing individual, culture and crime, or culture through crime, were the foci of that immoralism which individualists made use of in seeking the worth of life. So intimate is the connection between the cultural and the criminal that Nietzsche's dual derivation of the principles in question cannot fail to provide suggestions. According to the reasoning of this immoralist, both Semite and Aryan had the fate to establish the bond between self-development within and sin without. In the story of Eve, the serpent conveys the idea that the fruit of the precious tree, instead of affording mere passing pleasure, had the effect of awakening the mind to the knowledge of ethical distinctions which the Deity had reserved for Himself. Enlightenment and disobedience, culture and crime thus went hand in hand. In the Aryan mind, with the masculine myth of Prometheus, the secret of heaven was to be learned by sinful disobedience only; so that the sin of the Aryan man was one with the transgression of the Semitic woman.³⁴ It

³⁴ *The Birth of Tragedy*, tr. Haussman, § 9.

was in the aesthetic recognition of the blind will, the impetuous "I will," as a means of exceptional ethical enlightenment, that Nietzsche was led to seek in the Wagnerian opera the restoration of the "barbaric and titanic" as these had been felt by the ancients before the will was silenced by formal intellectualism. Where, in matters of superior ethics, science has been silent, art has been correspondingly eloquent.

Scientism has recognized the need of the individualistic "I will," and, where the demands of the human self have been observed, they have promptly been filled by the old hedonism in a more scientific form; "scientific hedonism" of Spencerian fame has been at once the worst and the best that scientism has had to offer. Then, in another vein, scientism showed its ability to imitate when Darwin took the eighteenth-century conscience of Butler and submitted it to scientific interpretation. For some reason which aesthetics must supply, the artistic consciousness of the nineteenth century could find no *joie de vivre* in the biological sense of beneficial pleasure, could feel no detent in the new biological conscience. Reduced to its final point of analysis, anti-scientific immoralism has placed its affair upon the ideal of strength, the inward strength of a self asserting "I will." Aesthetic Milton was aware of the possibilities of strength when he made his Satan say, "To be weak is to be miserable"; and Blake supplied the positive counterpart of such Satanism by adding, "Energy is eternal delight." When contemporary scientific ethics comes forward with its social, cud-chewing animal, it is probably unaware of the fact that the beast of prey has not been wholly exterminated. The scientific lion is thus found eating straw like the ox.

Strength was thus the categorical imperative of immoralistic individualism in its development from Milton to Nietzsche. In postulating such a principle as im-

perative for the self-asserting ego, immoralism never expressed itself in such a manner as to justify the identification of itself with mere immorality. What the immoralist does, is not to transgress the law but to repudiate the law, to rise above the common ethical distinction between good and bad. Where this "good" becomes equivalent to the social, the "bad" to the anti-social, the task of ethical elevation is not supposed to appear difficult; and, if the egoist is ever guilty of wrong, his is the sin of intellect rather than of will. Scientism has been all but able to cast the social net about those whose idealistic morality abounded in the sense of submission and tenderness; but the scientific net has been spread in vain in the sight of the artistic bird. Artistic morality with its prejudice for genuine values has not been inclined to exchange the self for the species, worth for utility, humanity for society; so that artistic morality is found just outside the gray scientific wall. The method of immoralism may have been severe, but it would seem as though no sincere believer in the true worth of life could regret the romantic revolt of the human ego. Perhaps something more than mere "strength" will be found necessary for investing morality with a content, but the emancipation of morality could hardly have been brought about in any other manner; to be hard, impassible, and destructive were moralic methods due to the exigencies of the case.

Romanticism had not been guilty of mere aestheticism with its ironical delight in mere soul-states and its harmless maxim of art for art's sake. In the midst of these aestheticisms, the sterner stuff of self-assertiveness had made its fibre felt. The English poetry of Milton and Blake had prepared the way; but, without reference to more classical immoralism, the romantic school proceeded to assert the "I will." Schlegel may have

seemed more eccentric than unethical, his Lucinde more startling than convincing. The realistic school was less declamatory; and, with its preference for action, it gave the new ego a will, and made him a self-propelled creature in the real world. At the same time, the living, active immoralist of realism was lacking in clearness, so that his motives were to be more inferred than observed. From Schlegel to Stendhal-Beyle, the aesthetic connection as seen by criticism must appear somewhat less clear than the ethical bond apparent to individualism. What Schlegel's character had felt, that Stendhal's hero did. Beylism is a philosophy of immoralism, is marked by the absence of all expected ideals; even if the reader of *beylisme* cannot find in the premises the subject and predicate which leap forth stark and strong in the conclusion, he has a right to believe that they are there. The title, *Red and Black*, symbolic of army and church, is suggestive of the ethical vigor and sternness of the immoralistic author. Owing to Beyle's habit of following a sort of Cartesian spiritual automatism, the aesthetic method assumes a pragmatic character, while the romantic is silenced by the realistic. As Maurice Hewlett said of Stendhal, in his preface to the translation of *La Chartreuse de Parma*, he was "a man of fire cloaked in ice." In other words, the individualism of Beyle, wanting in the enthusiasm of the Romantic school and not yet ripe for the cruelties of the Decadence, represents the individual as one who is impassible in his social relations; he is silent toward them because they make no appeal to his individuating consciousness. The egoistic asbestos with which Stendhal thus protects the individualism of his characters was destined, however, to assume a different form and function in later individualism; Baudelaire reassumes it in his ideal of *impassibilité*, whereby the ego is led to look with apathy upon the feelings and

needs of others; Nietzsche popularizes it in his maxim, "Be hard!"

The sclerotic character of selfhood, as it was indicated by Beyle, was apparently the place where individualistic immoralism had its beginning. And yet, had it not been for the development of the Decadence, it might safely be assumed that the indifference to the moral ideal, as this is shown in the delineation of the Duchess Gina's personality in *La Chartreuse*, would have meant no more than Prevost's Manon Lescaut, who has yet to be connected with the immoralistic movement. Manon failed to find a place among the individualists for the reason that she had none of the introspective equipment of Lucinde, while she was equally wanting in the will-to-selfhood so conspicuous in the Duchess Gina. Manon sinned, but did not find her selfhood in sin. Hence, while we may retrace the history of immoralistic individualism back to Beyle, we are not justified in pursuing a regressus which should leave us in the middle of the eighteenth century.

The immoralism of Stendhal consists, not so much in a direct opposition to the moral ideal, as in a cool analysis of motives as these spring from the will as such; with his admiration for Napoleon, a character which was destined to inspire the immoralism of Dostoevsky's Raskolnikow, Stendhal pursues the psychology of volition as if ethical norms had no existence. His philosophic aim was expressed in his own words, when he said, "I seek to recount with truth and clearness that which passes within my own heart."³⁵ With this ideal for himself as writer, Stendhal creates characters which are capable of the most intimate powers of introspection so far as their volitional states are concerned. This voluntaristic introspectiveness which, in such a novel as *La Chartreuse de Parma*, leads the character

³⁵ Bourget, *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, 271.

to consult with his own motives, involves constant use of such expressions as, "He said to himself," "she mused," "they said to themselves." They are not confined to the hero, as the criticism of Bourget would suggest, but all the characters, from the prince to the servant, indulge the introspection of the will; if it does not amount to obsession, as Bourget asserts,³⁶ it finds the author so engrossed with his desire to discover motives that he must make use of the *il se dit* some two hundred times. To act naturally and with strength, and to reflect clearly upon that which passes in the mind, seem to have taken the place of morality with Stendhal's Beylism. His own character that of warrior and lover, the poles of his philosophy are found to consist in the sense of power and pleasure; all that can restrain him is the inner lack of ability to arrive at his desired end, and this restraint has about it no sense of moral detention. But the immoralism of Stendhal had nothing obtrusive about it; a generation later, Dostoïevsky placed the self-asserting ego in a more polemical position, whence Nietzsche was able to develop his idea of the self as the strong one.

The Beylism of Stendhal, by no means as exaggerated as the Satanism of Baudelaire, has much of modern immoralism to its credit. To observe the peculiar character of Stendhal's ethics, one can do no better than contrast his methods with those of his contemporary Balzac, who enjoyed far more popularity in his day, and who is more likely to be esteemed a classic, even where Stendhal was far more subtle and significant. With Balzac, who took the world for granted without pausing to inquire concerning the final sources of human perversity, sin is a fact which we must accept and in the delineation of which the realistic writer may exercise his powers of description to the full. But Balzac

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, 279.

does not look upon the human self as setting the law aside in their own wicked sense of sinlessness; he never saw beyond an evil act. His Valerie Marneffe, who enjoys the distinction of being among the most complete of female offenders, never thought to negate the law which she so relentlessly violated; hence she is a sinner without being an immoralist. In the case of Vautrin, in *Old Goriot*, there is indeed some such suggestion of the immoralism known to the romantic Schlegel and the realistic Stendhal, for this would-be superman saw the possible distinction between moralistic submission and immoralistic nihilism. Said he to young Rastignac, "there are but two alternatives — stupid obedience or revolt." In addition to this Stendhalian distinction, Balzac's bad man gives the following advice: "Do you know how a man makes his way here? By brilliant genius or by skilful corruption. You must either cut your way through the masses of men like a cannon ball, or steal among them like a plague." Yet, in this ideal of selfhood in success, it is plain that Balzac, whose eighteenth-century ethics did not permit him to set his artistic seal of approval upon such a morale, is not in sympathy with the principle which the hero expresses; Balzac merely portrays that which his conservative philosophy cannot justify. Now Stendhal makes it plain that he sides with his sinners, who both transgress with their wills and negate with their intellects the law that seeks to thwart their impulses and ideas. For this reason, we may gather from Stendhal the immoralistic data and relations which, when developed by Balzac, are but materials which serve for the elaboration of a *comédie humaine*.

The first clear expression of immoralism as a form of individualism appears in Emerson, who, in advance of French Decadents and Russian Nihilists, placed the affair of the self upon the naught. In some phases of

his doctrine, Emerson is content to set the self in opposition to the State, as when he says, "Every actual State is corrupt; good men will not obey the laws too well";³⁷ and he further speaks of society as "this foul compromise, this vituperated Sodom."³⁸ But this rather anarchistic formulation of his individualistic doctrine does not prevent him from repudiating the moral law as well as the State. In this antinomianism, or "hypernomianism," as he calls it, he insists that, "Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to this or that; the only right is that which is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it."³⁹ When Emerson has observed that the darlings of nature are the great, the strong, the beautiful, he is ready for a more thoroughly immoralistic expression of his doctrine. Thus he says, "It is an esoteric doctrine of society that a little wickedness is good to make muscle";⁴⁰ as the social, so the individualistic, "There is no man who is not at some time indebted to his vices, as no plant that is not fed on manures."⁴¹ The whole tenor of Emersonian egoism is that of selfhood in strength, the strength which makes the self impassible and hard; while Emerson does not imitate either Milton or Blake, he pays such tribute to Satanism as to look upon himself as one who, under certain circumstances, might be called "The Devil's child."⁴²

Science is incapable of the individualistic hardness found in Stendhal and Emerson; at heart, science with all its attempts at intellectual severity is soft and obedient. With its scientific "sociability," Darwinism is a fine exemplification of the manner in which intellectual rigor may melt before the alleged claims of social morality; yet, did not Darwin perhaps long for somewhat of that saving hardness with which the egoist had learned

³⁷ *On Politics, in loc.*

³⁸ *On Self Reliance, in loc.*

⁴¹ *Considerations by the Way, in loc.*

³⁸ *On the Conservative, in loc.*

⁴⁰ *On Power, in loc.*

⁴² *Self Reliance, in loc.*

to deliver his soul? In spite of his sickness and science, Darwin was not unaware of the possible place which the human self might occupy and enjoy could that human ego feel himself free from the principle of Natural Selection which was so domineering in the world of organisms in general. In a letter to Asa Gray, written September 17th, 1861, Darwin said, "If man were made of brass or iron, and in no way connected with any other organism which had ever lived, I should perhaps be convinced (of design)." The fact that man by means of a superior morale might make himself of brass or iron, seems never to have occurred to this naturalist with his *tendresse*, but the aesthetic individualism of the mid-nineteenth century perfected this metallic morality for which Darwin's soul longed. One must thus turn from Darwin to Dostoïevsky for the severe philosophy of life which is to save the soul of the individual.

In placing the iron individual in the actual world of men and women, Dostoïevsky has the honor, if not also the responsibility, of making individualism something more than an idea; Stendhal and Emerson merely conjectured where Dostoïevsky actualized. Before Dostoïevsky took up his pen of iron, Turgénieff had prepared the way for egoism by creating a nihilistic atmosphere. As an individualistic doctrine, nihilism consisted in repudiating all authority, while the practice of the doctrine led to a forceful rejection of all established institutions; "we," said Turgénieff's Bazaroff, "act by force of that which we recognize as most useful. At the present time, the most useful thing of all is rejection—we reject."⁴³ Indulging in such sentiments, Bazaroff, the most perfect of Turgénieffian egoists, came to be known to his youthful disciples as a "bird of prey," although there was nothing in the

⁴³ *Fathers and Children*, tr. Hapgood, 38, 86.

actual conduct of the invalid, for such he was, as to justify such a departure from the realm of tame birds.

Dostoïevsky differs from Turgénieff and contrasts with Darwin in that he calls upon his hero to come out of the scientific order which has so benignly created man, and assume an attitude of opposition toward it. At the same time, the metallic morality of Dostoïevsky's Raskolnikow, far from being a mere impulse, was based upon a conception of life somewhat different in ethical significance from the Darwinian biology. Psychologically viewed, Raskolnikow was so impulsive as to be unable to connect his inner motive with the outer social act; but for this weakness his morale of action should atone. So imperative was the Individual in and behind the actual Raskolnikow that the latter can convey the volitions of the former in a manner purely spasmodic. "His chin quivered"; "he set his teeth"; "he shuddered"; "he fidgetted": such were the indications of the volitional states which the hero was to transmute into vigorous action.⁴⁴ Attribute some part of this quasi-voluntarism to the abnormality of the man, and the rest of it may be understood as temporary weakness due to the fact that the act to be performed demands too much contrast between ideals of individual worth and the norms of the social order. Mere naturalism or brute force will not carry him through to the end of the terrible deed he is planning, since the "terrible" struggle for existence is far from justifying egoistic self-assertion; in the philosophy of Dostoïevsky, the struggle for selfhood results in the elaboration of the maxim, "A cultured man has the right to commit crime"; in all this, nothing is said about the scientific man. With no special antipathy to scientism, Dostoïevsky attempts a bit of anthropology quite alien to anything in Darwinism. Upon the basis of this im-

⁴⁴ Cf. M. De Vogüé, *Russian Novelists*, 187.

moralistic biology, Raskolnikow is allowed to commit his "crime," although the nihilism of Dostoïevsky's art is such as to lead to the conclusion, "There is no crime."

So important is the rationale of the culture-criminal, that its *ipsissima verba* deserve exact repetition and careful consideration:

Men are divided into ordinary and extraordinary men. The former must live in a state of obedience, and have no right to break the law, inasmuch as they are nothing more than ordinary men; the latter have a right to commit every kind of crime, and to break every law, from the fact that they are extraordinary men. . . . All legislators and rulers of men, commencing with the earliest down to Lycurgus, Solon, Mahomet, Napoleon, etc., have one and all been criminals, for, while giving new laws, they have naturally broken through older ones which had been faithfully observed by society and transmitted by its progenitors. These men most certainly never hesitated to shed blood, as soon as they saw the advantage of doing so. It may even be remarked that nearly all these benefactors of humanity have been terribly bloodthirsty. . . .

Nature divides men into two categories: the first an inferior one, comprising ordinary men, the kind whose material function it is to reproduce specimens like themselves; the other, a superior one, comprising men who have the gift or power to make a new word, thought, or deed, felt. . . . To the first belong in a general way, conservatives, men of order, who live in a state of obedience and love it. . . . The next class, however, consists exclusively of men who break the law, or strive, according to their capacity or power, to do so. . . . The first group is always predominant in the present; the second, however, is master of the future. One class keeps up the world by increasing its inhabitants, the other arouses humanity and makes it act. Both have absolutely the same right to exist, yea, even to the day of the New Jerusalem.⁴⁵

While, in all this, the general idea of criminal resistance and repudiation of the established order stands in the foreground, the morale of Dostoïevsky, doing away with crime and upholding culture as it does, tempers itself to the extent of limiting such cultured criminality to the superior man, while even he, instead of pursuing his own interests alone, is supposed to usher in a better day. As reformer, Dostoïevsky offers severe contrast

⁴⁵ *Crime and Punishment*, Part III, Ch. V.

to most other egoists, Stendhal, Emerson, Baudelaire, Stirner, Nietzsche; yet it must not be overlooked that, with Raskolnikow, the "Day of the New Jerusalem" was never anything more than a sentiment, for it was the present which claimed him as its own. Moreover, Dostoievsky's immoralist was unable to abide by the metallic rigor of his original resolution; so that finally one sees him confessing that, instead of being the man of bronze who can affirm the act of his will, he is but flesh and blood after all.⁴⁶

The career of subsequent immoralism is significant of the same opposition to that same social order to whose relief chivalrous scientism has so lately come and that in true Quixotic fashion. Ibsen was not quite himself when, in 1863, he wrote *The Pretenders*, in which Skule has his "great king's-thought" to carry through. Where the Pretender fails to seize his throne, others are more intrepid, if not more successful. These true Ibsenesque egos win the victory over the private intellect where perhaps they are unable to overcome the public will. According to Nora Helmer of *Doll's House*, a woman's first duty is toward herself as a human being, while she should seek to discover which is right, society or the self. According to Helen Alving, who fought her Ghosts, all morality is so machine-sewn that the whole affair unravels with the untying of a single knot, while law and order are responsible for all the mischief in the world. Hilda Wangel, the *immoraliste* who criticized the Master Builder, has no patience with "sickly conscience," and prefers the "ideals of a ruffian"; herself a "light-haired little devil," she is almost, but not altogether, ready to seize the tower of selfhood. As there is in Ibsen no place for scientific morality in which the ego is but a specimen of the species, so later immoralism has the same lesson for the searcher after

⁴⁶ *Crime and Punishment*, Part III, Ch. VI.

ideals. According to Schiller, man is only completely man when he plays; according to Sudermann, one is only one's self when one sins. Such was the case with Paul Meyerhoeffer in *Dame Care*, with Regina in *Cat's Bridge*, with Magda in *Die Heimat*. "We must sin if we wish to grow"; so concludes Magda, whose musical culture, like that of Evelyn Inness, came only through sexual crime. With all self-asserting egos, it is the belief in life's worth which leads to the immoralistic program; it is culture which permits crime. With all this dissonance, Wilde chimed in to make the solution of the music still more difficult. "One can fancy an intense personality created out of sin," says he.⁴⁷ Later, Wilde preferred to consider culture alone rather than crime alone as the true means of self-realization; thus he says, "Crime, which under certain circumstances may seem to have created individualism, must take cognizance of other people, and interfere with them."⁴⁸ Culture is thus more individualistic than crime; hence it is better for individuating purposes.

To state the cause of immoralism is not to explain it, to explain is not to justify. Yet, in stating the fact that a century of immoralism insisted upon the worth of the self even when that simple assertion was to involve non-scientific culture and anti-scientific crime, is to explain that these methods were deemed necessary for a self surrounded by the narrow synthesis in which the individual was but a specimen of the species; the justification must be more general. If it be assumed that the human self shall be environed by a world-order framed upon certain ideas drawn as conclusions from the study of nature, it does not follow that contemporary scientific conclusions are the most suitable ones. The ego may indeed be destined to repose in solitariness; but, if we assume that the human self must have

⁴⁷ *Intentions*, 88.

⁴⁸ *Soul of Man Under Socialism*, in loc.

some kind of world, it is to be hoped that a more liberal study of the natural order will effect a higher synthesis in the light of which the self may find its home in the natural order. Where scientism is not sufficient unto the needs of the self, it may still be shown that the self may find its place in that which is greater than scientism: namely, Nature.

III. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRUTH OF LIFE

In considering the final form of the struggle for selfhood, it might seem as though the principle of truth left room for none of the dispute attendant upon the more plastic notions of joy and worth. Where we may have such joys as we will and elaborate such values as we chose, we are not permitted to frame truths of selfhood, because truth has a certain rigidity about it. Toward truth, our attitude should be one of obeisance; for, where we may perhaps assume mastery over joys and values, it is truth which rules us. Were we speaking of absolute truth, this would indeed be the case, just as the presence of absolute joy or absolute worth might be regarded as something commanding perfect submission on our part; but, since our concern is with truth as applied to life, we feel that we have here somewhat the same freedom enjoyed by individualistic aesthetics and ethics. By means of certain adjectival truths, we speak of scientific truth and religious truth, so that we are justified in making use of the expression, "individualistic truth," or the truth of the self. It is with the adjectival qualification that we have to do, so that one cannot say that, inasmuch as scientific truth has been established in this or that manner, we cannot hope to establish an individualistic truth in opposition to it. Yet, it is fair to assume that truth may be as friendly to one form of culture as to another; whence there is no reason to feel that the goddess of truth,

having expressed a preference for scientism, will spurn the advances of individualism. Thus, the position of individualism in this third question is not unlike its position in connection with the other two; where individualism sought for the joy of life in soul-states, for the worth of life in independent initiatives, it may proceed to search for the truth of life in the self-assertion of the human ego.

I. THE TRUTH OF SELFHOOD

As is the case with almost all the phases of individualism, one must look back with pathos to the Enlightenment, when, with the self in its possession, the age was unaware of wealth, and promptly squandered it upon the world and the social order. The individualism of the day, far from rejoicing in the self-knowledge of Descartes, cannot claim to have even a Socratic hold upon the self. But, if the self is not known, it does not follow that individualism has been forced to abandon its claim that the self will be found true, nor must one draw the lamentable corollary that, since the world is known, therefore one must accept the world as the truth. Descartes was sure of the self but was doubtful about the physical order; Stirner is sure of the objective order, but cannot be so easily convinced of the self. Yet Stirner is the better individualist of the two; in comparison with him, Descartes is almost nothing. In its most essential form, self-truth consists in the right to affirm the self as such; where the joy of life permits the individualistic "I think," and the worth of life the "I will," the truth of life allows the individualistic "I am." This principle of individualism is not one with the primitive *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes; indeed, the truth of individualism is better expressed by the judgment in its converted form: I am; therefore I

think. The self has its states; it puts forth its volitions; it is its self.

(1) *The Passion for Predication*

In the consideration of truth, one is disposed to feel that the question at hand is exceptional, so that the determination of joy by the senses and value by the will does not justify the free deduction of truth by the ego as such. This feeling of reverence toward the true, this shudder in its presence, is wholesome indeed and not illogical; but it is beset by a peculiar danger for the individualist. While the individualist is spending his precious time adoring truth in the abstract, some less devout person takes possession of the sources of knowledge whence the ego is forced to draw water, not from the springs, but from the wells of truth as these have been dug by certain investigators. In looking at truth in its superb limitlessness, the individual fails to observe that some special form of human culture has been erecting a truth-wall well inside the horizon of knowledge. In this manner, the vast life-truth has been enclosed within the wall of the ancient State or the mediaeval Church, modern Reason or modern Science. The result has been to endow, if not to fetter, truth by the application of limiting adjectives, so that truth has at times been, not truth *eo ipso*, but classic truth which to Aristotle seemed final, scholastic truth which brought the mind of Aquinas to the omega of truth's alphabet, rationalistic truth which had the last word for Voltaire, scientific truth with which Comte and Spencer sought to end all speculation in the world. All except the last of these adjectives has worn off in the wear and tear of life, so that one cannot help believing that the fate of the adjective "scientific" will be parallel to that of the other qualifying predicates. In the midst of these fluctuating truths, one factor seemed constant; it was

the "I think" of individualism. From the adjectival point of view, Aristotle differed from Voltaire, Aquinas from Spencer; yet, in all four types of thinking, the presence of the thinking self was invariable.

When individualism struggles for the truth of life, it struggles against the truth of life as this is formulated in a special manner, and the special truth-mode which individualism opposes to-day is the scientific one. Ancient truth had its opponents as one sees in the history of the Stoics; Mediaeval truth was fought by nominalism; the truth of the Enlightenment was negated by Hume; and may not the truth of scientism be opposed by individualism? It has ever been the exterior generalization which has come in for its share of the conflict; and, in the resistance to the scientific synthesis, this conflict is now going on in the field of individualism. Far from being truth as such, classic and scholastic, rationalistic and scientific truth has been a mixture of principles, opinions, and terms. Terms, or words, which would seem to be the least formidable, are often the greatest foes of progress toward a higher synthesis; next come opinions, which are furthered by authority; last of all, principles, which, while the most difficult to withstand, are often the first to give ground. Individualism, however, is most anxious to offset the influence of words and opinions whose domination is little suspected until one conjures with a term like "theology," "reason," "science." How can these august expressions signify anything but august truth itself? If the ultimate cannot be found without upon the horizon, may it be found within in the "I am" of the thinker?

The actual pursuit of truth has always been conducted under the auspices of a peculiarly human passion, the passion for predication. Given a subject, like some physical fact or psychic phenomenon, and the human mind will not rest until it has set up some sort of con-

nection between these and some other fact or phenomenon. This is very largely as it should be, and one can hardly provide for the progress of knowledge apart from the persistent predication of the restless, imaginative intellect. Physical phenomena shall be connected with psychical ones: such was the dictum of the primitive mind. Psychical phenomena shall be explained in the light of physical predicates: that is the dictum of the contemporary mind. Where both popular and sober thinking has always exercised with freedom the right of predication, definite periods have exhibited their favorite types of predication. The classic mind sought to explain all details of physical and social existence by direct reference to the type; hence the Ideas of Plato and the syllogisms of Aristotle. The scholastic mind, not oblivious of ancient logic, sought in the doctrines of the Church the predicates of physical reality, even when physical reality might well have disdained such an august explanation. The Enlightenment thrust upon all things the single predicate of reason; it might be nature with its seismic disturbances so irrational, it might be man's religion with its interesting fantasies, yet all must be rational before it could be true. Our own age is no less free from this mania for the predicate; only now we seem to prefer the observed rather than the idealized, the believed, or the rationalized. Every judgment of truth, therefore, must have a scientific predicate, otherwise it is not truth at all. Predication, we may say, is just and necessary, but special predication may lead to error. Suppose that nature and humanity refuse to come into the cage of the ideal, the credible, the rational, the scientific; what can be done with the creature in whose sight the net is spread in vain?

When relentless predication applies itself to the human ego, the result is unsatisfactory for both the logical and the personal factors involved in the transaction. The

ancients predicated in such a manner as to leave out of consideration the human self. Socrates was intolerant toward the egoism of Protagoras, so that Greek thought established an ideal system from which there was no escape except by means of the nihilistic apathy of the Stoic who, unwilling to abide by the generalization, simply withdrew to the shadows of such inner selfhood as he could find. Scholastic vigor of predication soon reduced the world of things and persons to order, but the individual was called upon to renounce all that was most peculiar to him in order that the conceptual circle might be perfect. Was the Enlightenment more human; did it allot to each individual his own world? The Enlightenment effaced egoism as effectually as the classic and scholastic systems had done. Our contemporary science has been no more liberal; its concepts have been as drastic as ancient ideals, as grim as mediaeval walls. Truth has been allowed all things except the self, and it is the self which is conspicuous for its enjoyment and appreciation of the true. Molecules, atoms, and cells do not suffer when they are not recognized; individuals languish when they are not allowed the sunlight of truth. Can it be wondered at, then, that the ego has sought self-deliverance by means of nominalism, irrationalism, irreligion; and can it be doubted that these forms of negation had at heart the interests of a superior form of affirmation?

The conceptualizing method of authoritarian thinking has its advantages in that it makes it possible for the thinker to view the whole world without the arduous, dangerous journey from place to place; conceptualism simplifies mental travel by drawing imaginary circles of latitude and longitude. But the method of conceptual reasoning is in itself suspicious, because such reasoning is forced to omit details, and these details, when peculiar to man, may be of special, immutable interest. Con-

ceptualism is forced to emphasize the abstract, the general; when that which is true for all is true for none. Nor is anything gained when induction takes the place of deduction. It is true that induction seems to make overtures to the individual; but this is all in the seeming, since the manifest aim of induction is to arrange the individual things in line where deductive reasoning placed them within a circle. Enclosed or aligned, the fate of the human self is the same; selfhood is lost by one method as readily as by the other. Where other concepts, wrought out by either deduction or induction, may not complain, the elaboration of the concept "Man" has the misfortune to omit the most human of characteristics, selfhood.

Furthermore, all attempts at conceptualizing and predicating are necessarily beset with a misleading optimism. How does the thinker know that the *facta bruta* will submit to his amiable generalization? Is an intellectual rule within, a real law without? At the beginning of thought in the western world, even when it was then that thought was most optimistic, the presence of possible pessimism was never lost to view or left out of the calculation. The brighter the light of the intellect, the deeper the shadow of irrationality. Through strength and skill, the Greeks wrought an idealism by rescuing reason from the domination of unreason. It was, as Neitzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* pointed out, the living conflict between the chaotic and contradictory of the Dionysian and the form-loving Appollonian. Greek poetry and Greek philosophy joined arms in subduing the barbaric in Greek life. Where classicism had its Dionysius, scholasticism had its Devil, with his power to pervert the mind. If, therefore, these ages insisted upon the "truth" as they saw it, the reason for such insistence may be found in the feeling that what has been wrought in the face of such diabolical

unreason should not be surrendered, should not perhaps be questioned. Alas! for modern scientism, which is so strangely wanting in helpful diabolism, so wanting in the "friendly foe" of stubborn unreason. Yet, is the spirit of unreason any less real to-day than it was in the days of Plato and Aquinas? Science now dreams its dream of pure truth, but its optimism may be its undoing. If Dionysius and the Devil are gone, unreason still remains, and it has been the duty of individualism to play its disconcerting part in the program; for it has been individualism which has resisted the scientific generalization, individualism in the form of a Satanism peculiar to Milton and Blake, Emerson and Stirner, the Decadents and Symbolists. Will individualistic pessimism succeed in awakening science from its dogmatic slumber?

(2) *Humanistic Criteria of Truth*

The individualistic claim that the relation of the self to truth is exceptional is based quite largely upon the thought that the criteria of truth are largely of an individualistic character. Truth itself may be more than the standards by which man judges truth; moreover, the question of truth may involve certain grand criteria which have no special concern with the "I am" of individualism. Thus, when knowledge avows that truth means the correspondence of thought with thing, or the coherence of thought with thought, the ego can hardly be regarded as anything more than the point where correspondence and coherence bring their two factors together. Yet, the thought that it is the ego which has the capacity to unite thought and thing, thought and thought, should encourage the individualist to insist upon the importance of the individual in the whole truth-problem. Over and above these major standards of truth, there are certain criteria which have ever

served to corroborate the truth or falsity of this or that idea. These criteria are of a personal character; they have to do with the humanistic fact that truth, instead of being merely "true," is possessed of concomitant characteristics which involve the individual's sense of joy, of worth, of worship. For this reason, truth is far from being a formal affair whose validity depends altogether upon demonstration; truth is possessed of a reality whereby the individual as individual is able to gather, not only verity, but joy, worth, and adoration. Could truth be truth and yet leave the mind unsatisfied in its desires? Can truth end in a *quod erat demonstrandum* and not communicate something calculated to please the senses, add worth to the will, or command the devotion of the mind? Real, living truth has ever been supposed to supply just such humanistic demands.

Far from appearing stark and cold, truth comes warm and clothed; its most apparent characteristic is the eudaemonistic one in virtue of which truth affords the heart joy. The arguments which are forthcoming to establish the intimate relationship between truth and joy may be found, first of all, in the inversion of an ethical judgment to the effect that the highest joy is found in the possession of truth. In the assertion of this sense of satisfaction which comes from beholding the true, Aristotle has been the most insistent; yet other forms of philosophy have gone to declare that the perception of truth saves the soul, gives consolation to the mind, or satisfies the desires of the human heart. Man cannot be happy without the consciousness of truth, so that it becomes possible to say, happiness is truth. Now, to convert this proposition *mutatis mutandis* is to assert that where there is genuine joy there is also truth, for truth cannot conduct us to happiness unless happiness be allowed to reciprocate and lead us back to truth. In joy, therefore, appears one of the criteria of the true.

To construct what might thus be called a eudaemonistic epistemology upon the basis of this thought is far from the intent of individualism, especially as individualism realizes how prone to illusion is the yearning heart of mankind. Nevertheless, individualism, in its desire to find the truth of life as well as the truth of things, is not ready to consent to a formalistic system which constructs truth out of purely impersonal elements when truth itself seems to constitute such a life-interest for man. It is as a criterion of truth rather than truth itself which individualism seeks in the sense of joy, whence individualism asserts that truth is known to the mind, not simply because truth seems clear, but because it has the capacity to yield a sense of joy. Where that joy of intellect is felt, the truth of mind is all but proved. Not only the *Upanishads*, to which reference was made in speaking of *The Inward Enjoyment of Life*, have seen fit to refer to the convincing connection between enjoying and knowing, but the *Gospels* and *Epistles* as well have looked upon truth as a palimpsest on which, as upon parchment, the original message of truth was written over an additional communication relative to the humanistic sense in which that truth made its appeal. The truth of the Gospel was very largely made up of its ability to communicate joy; thus did the Gospel become a veritable evangelium. St. John speaks more dialectically when he declares, We know because we love; it was thus the *agapé* which made up the *ratio cognoscendi* of the disciples' faith. Where humanistic pragmatism has sought to adopt such a eudaemonistic epistemology, it has prejudiced its cause by failing to observe that happiness is only a criterion of truth, while this happiness instead of being the fantastic feeling of that which "makes a difference to some one," is looked upon critically and disinterestedly as the normal appetite of the human soul at large. An

unrestricted eudaemonism in knowledge can never free itself from the danger of illusion.

Critical individualism is none the less convinced that where truth imparts joy, truth is none the less an affair of value. Those who, like Ritschl, have laid so much emphasis upon the value-judgment, have been guilty of regarding the sense of worth as though it were something extraordinary; moreover, these apostles of the *Werturtheil* have never been able to overcome the Kantian prejudice to the effect that the moral principle of value comes at the death of the mental principle of knowledge as thought. Individualism has shown a disposition to look upon worth as the natural accompaniment of truth, rather than its rival. Thus it is not because the idea lacked truth that it was endowed with worth; it is endowed with worth because it has truth. When viewed as a criterion of truth, value has the effect of showing how ideas, instead of reposing in the calm intellect, take up their work in the active world of will, where they "work" because they are true, not that they are true because they work. False ideas often work and that in a manner quite perennial, as is the case with the divine right of kings, the infallibility of popes, and the natural right of mankind. Pragmatism, which has grown like Jonah's gourd, has not taken care to watch the worm destined to destroy that which has grown up so wantonly.

The danger incident upon connecting truth with the idea of worth appears in the tendency toward negation, the negation of ideals when these do not seem to serve the valuational interests of the human will. The spirit of negation, *der Geist der stets verneint*, is one with which individualism is all too familiar; yet, individualism has worked consciously toward the negation of the alleged ideals of rationalism, as one can see from a reading of individualists from Blake to Nietzsche. In

its work of negation, individualism differs from pragmatism which merely falls short of the idea which individualism surmounts: instead of lagging behind, individualism forges ahead undismayed by the prospect of destroying that which is dear to itself. The motive for such destruction appears in the idea that the old generalization will not suffice for the truth of life; and, without any prospect of supplying a higher synthesis, the individual shows himself ready to resort to irrationalism, provided that that seems better fitted to conserve the ideal of life's worth. The connection between knowledge and value is akin to the bond between virtue and value; where a contrite ethics refuses to lower virtue to the realm of mere utility, it is none the less persuaded that the essence of morality cannot be conserved in an analytical judgment which insists that virtue is virtue; such a constructive ethics thus advances to the idea that virtue has worth. In the same manner, individualism insists that truth is not merely truth but worth also, so that the validity of ideas, established in their own intellectualistic way, may be corroborated by showing that these ideas have a value.

Truth, which is joyful and valuable, is none the less worshipful; individualism, with its unhappy tendency toward the irrationalistic negation of knowledge, never loses sight of the fact that by its very nature truth is divine. Thus, instead of exhausting itself in satisfying the logical function of judgment in the human understanding, truth is possessed of such wealth and versatility as to be able to satisfy the sense of enjoyment and the feeling of disinterested appreciation, while it further extends its sway by commanding the full assent of the worshipful heart as a whole. In the career of individualism, where many a fine paradox and ardent contradiction has had its place, truth has never been lowered to a level below that occupied by the ego itself. Usually

exalted above the ego as his heaven, sometimes made parallel with the ego itself, truth has never been regarded as a mere means, an instrument. In worshipfulness, then, appears the third criterion of truthfulness; let the supreme idea be the world or Godhead, reason or humanity, the exponent of the idea has ever been its devotee. Just how scientism is to supply the mind with these criteria is another thing, for scientism makes no room for aesthetic joyfulness or moral worth; still less does scientism provide the mind with an idea capable of commanding the adoration of the soul. Scientism is thus wanting in all forms of and all tendencies toward a culture under the auspices of which the complete human intellect may realize itself as that which is akin to the truth which it adores.

Individualism from Protagoras to Ibsen has never failed to seek that truth which should have the power to contain man, the ability to content his spirit. Where individualism has assumed a militant form, its polemic has been directed against the merely theoretical representation of the truth rather than against truth itself. At heart, individualism has been possessed of that organic conception of truth-culture peculiar to the Grecian and Germanic mind; the dilettante spirit, which fails to establish the bond between thought and life, has been foreign to individualism, which has sought to establish truth, not merely for the sake of things and ideas, but for its own sake, since it is by means of truth that the human ego is able to affirm itself as real in the world.

2. THE AFFIRMATION OF THE SELF

It is by means of truth that the individual is able to affirm his own inner being; the supreme text upon which all fundamental egoism is based is found in the words, "I am the truth"; in a manner most strident, Stirner, who suffered from the slavery of Hegelianism, pro-

ceeded to say, "I raise myself above truths and their power; as I am supersensual, so I am supertrue."⁴⁹ The spirit of individualism reposes somewhere between the divine utterance and the diabolical assertion; at any rate, there can be no genuine individualism when truth is allowed to invest the things of the world and the members of society in general, as is the happy fate of things and persons under the auspices of scientism, without at the same time and in a more intimate manner investing the human ego as a self-conscious and self-willed "I am." Is the self sub-true; is it to occupy a logical position where truth arches far above its head without allowing the ego to participate in its essence? Stirner goes too far where scientism does not go far enough; the balance is found in a conception of selfhood which unifies the self and the true. In the synthesis of the self and the true, the very essence of all spiritual religion may be found. It is peculiar to the genius of religion to arouse the soul to a sense of individual existence and to inspire it with the desire to affirm its intrinsic character in the world. Where scientism surveys man under the form of nature, religion regards him as a detached creature whose aim is alien to his genesis; roaming at large as he does, man enjoys an implicit freedom, while he further shows himself to be in a way superfluous. Nature does not need him as it needs the beast, and if he is to live his life as human, it must be in an exceptional manner. Of all earth's creatures, man is the only one able to say, "I am."

In order to gather the individualistic fruits of religion, one must observe that, contrary to the traditional idea, religion has its source in the attempt on the part of the soul to affirm itself in opposition to the world. The theological idea of religion is formal, secondary; when it insists that religion has to do with the speculative

⁴⁹ *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, 463.

affirmation of Godhead, it fails to advise us why man undertakes such an extraordinary program. The humanistic view of religion is inaugurated by the activistic tendency to quit the world and go forth in search of something more complete and satisfying. Where the theological conception proceeds to mark God plus, the humanistic tendency is to mark the world minus. In all this, it may seem that the individualistic attitude is too nihilistic to be true and valuable, but the fact remains that human faith has asserted itself by means of negation, but not in such a manner as to render impossible the postulating of a theistic ideal. World-negation, then, seems to afford us the most original principle of religion, while it is further possible to assert that, with this nihilistic motive at work, religion has sometimes found it unnecessary to advance to the theistic postulate. In Tâoism, the world is set at nought in both thought and deed, but the divine is neglected; in Buddhism, the negation of the world is more intense, the neglect of Deity more pronounced. Here it must be observed that, with the failure to evince the idea of Godhead, these religions are equally lax in asserting the existence of selfhood, content as they are to rid the mind of the idea of the world. Only the preliminary step is taken; the principles of selfhood and Godhead thus fail to receive adequate expression.

In spite of this lapse on the part of such religions as Tâoism and Buddhism, it cannot be denied that a world-religion, instead of theologizing, takes up its work in a humanistic fashion, even when the negation of the world, instead of serving simply as a means of asserting the self, brings the religious operation to a conclusion. Man feels that the world is against him, so that only by a vigorous withdrawal from its solid walls may he be himself indeed. Humanity in its internal character is the postulate which, at the beginning, religion has at

heart. When the independent existence and characteristic life of the self are established, it becomes possible for the religionist to add the postulates of worldhood and Godhead, but the prior claim is advanced by the self for the self. Religion, like art and morality, is based upon the inner independence of the human self; its lesson is the "I am." In our own age, when the religionist, unaware of the possibilities of selfhood as a vehicle of spiritual life, has given pathetic demonstration of the vanity with which any form of inner life may seek to advance its intrinsic claims by an appeal to exteriority, contemporary religion is now busy exhausting itself in the smug endeavor to be "scientific" and "social," as if, by aping the age, it could come to its own so far afeld from its proper place in the world. As a result, irreligion, with its antipathy to science and society, is giving a more consistent, though less happy, demonstration of the self and its independence. Religion sprang from the human self and has ever had the affairs of self in its keeping. When intellectual activities were in their incipency, as in the days of Vedanta and Christianity, it was not difficult for the religionist to isolate the soul and place it in its proper position, but with the development of scientific philosophy, the task of self-assertion is far more difficult. But does it follow that the religious principle of the "I exist" is any less convincing?

The world has grown beyond man and that to such a degree that man feels divorced from existence; no longer can he find his place or determine his fate. Worse still, man is so situated that, insecure as he is in the world without, he is no longer sure of his position within himself. The mystical Vedantist rejoiced in selfhood to such a degree that he felt justified in identifying the world with the self; the modern religionist on the contrary is in such straits that he can hardly identify

the inner life with the self. No longer is it that which goes on without, no longer does he feel that he is that which goes on within. For this reason, the problem of religion, when this is adequately conceived, consists in re-establishing the relation between the inner life which has been so vigorously introspected by psychology, with the ego as the sovereign of consciousness. In this endeavor, no help may be expected from scientific psychology, which is pledged to the nervous system rather than to the ego; help must come from the ego itself, from the ego with its various forms of culture. In the career of religious thought, it has been the fate of the devotee to entertain a conception of self-truth which the self in its temporal capacity was unable to absorb; so that, the moment the individual flowered in the form of the Self, it promptly withered in the strong sunlight. In forms at once intellectualistic and voluntaristic, the human self has had the opportunity to identify itself with truth, only to repudiate selfhood the moment that selfhood became perfect. Vedanta came to the place where it could say of reality, "It is the true, it is the self, and thou art it";⁵⁰ Schopenhauerianism arrived at the point where the individuated will was one with the whole will-to-live:⁵¹ then, both oriental intellectualism and occidental voluntarism indulged in a destructive pessimism in the shades of which the individual ego was obscured in the impersonal, nameless All. So vast, so august is the true that it cannot safely be relegated to the mere individual.

At heart religious, individualism cannot endure this fatal generalization, so that where the truth of spirit may be expressed in religion, as the truth of matter is expressed in scientism, the truth of life has often turned for salvation to irreligion. To interpret such irreligion as a movement devoted to the establishment of life-truth

⁵⁰ *Khândogya Upanishad*, VI, 8, 7. ⁵¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 63.

is by no means easy, although the advanced individualist cannot help feeling that his egoism is somehow preserved in the midst of all the contradictions of the irreligionists. Religion itself is often irreligion at its inception; the affirmation of the new implies the negation of the old. Thus it was with Moses and his cult of Jahvism, although in this instance the new religion was contrasted with an old one in the form of a conflict between inimical races. In the instance of Buddhism, progress toward a more complete and more personal view of life was brought about by an atheistic movement whence Buddhism was distinguished from the authorized Brahminism. Nothing less can be said of primitive Christianity, which arose in the moment of a negation which spared not the Hebrew law nor the Hellenic world. When the truth of life was viewed from the standpoint of the old order, the new life-truth was destined to advance its ideals by means of an insurrectional movement whose tenets were only one remove from atheism and anarchy. The motive for such quasi-irreligion is an individualistic one; it is the idea of saving life-truth from cramping formulations of that truth.

The same attempt to arrive at truth as the super-true is to be observed in connection with philosophy of religion, in which the dialectical meaning of religion exhibits itself. Modern religious thought, whose history has been a trying one, had the fate to initiate its career in the form of a polemical philosophy of rights. Where rights led to revolution in one quarter, they inclined toward religion in another. In Deism, one observes how religion may assume the form of irreligion, and while the deistic movement was usually petty in its polemics, the larger history of the movement does not fail to show how the religious spirit may make use of the principle of rights with the aim of revealing the method by which the soul asserts itself. Rationalistic in method, Deism

sprang from a juristic motive, so that, in the Enlightenment, rights and religion went hand in hand. Established upon an atheistic basis by Grotius, the philosophy of rights was not long in asserting a principle of freedom according to which the individual had *ni dieu ni maître*. Spinoza and Locke both stepped aside from the natural course of their respective philosophies for the purpose of asserting the freedom of human faith, which they did in complete accord with the principle of rights. From the opposed poles of rationalism and empiricism, Spinoza and Locke came together for the purpose of asserting the right of the individual to exercise free religion; the result was all but irreligion. If it was rights for Spinoza; it was aesthetics for Schleiermacher. Upon the authority of aesthetics, Schleiermacher declared religion free from metaphysics and morality, a conclusion which had the effect of developing a philosophy of religion but one remove from a philosophy of irreligion. Where essential argument is involved, there is no difference between the romantic religion of Schleiermacher and the decadent irreligion of Baudelaire. Where primitive Christianity had repudiated things Hellenic and laws Judaic, Schleiermacher and Baudelaire found it possible to set aside the metaphysics of things and the morality of laws. In all forms of religious irreligion, it is the assertion of the self which is paramount.

When the religious assertion of the self passes over into irreligion, the motive for the unhappy transition is found in the desire to conserve the truth of life in the form of an "I am." Both religion and irreligion are ideal; both reject the world of scientism. Irreligion strives to transcend religion for no other reason than that religion fails to assert the independence of the human self. That for which irreligion contends is the ideal which religion itself has not the courage to ad-

vance, the independence of the inner life. Like Siegfried, the enemy of the gods, irreligion fights for that ideal which Wotan, the religious one, had not the strength of will to affirm. Baudelaire and Huysmans, to say nothing of Milton and Blake, uphold the cause of Satan, because they deem it impossible to find truth in the traditional idea of God. Had religion been faithful to its original impulse to affirm the self within man, there had been no need of pessimistic irreligion; had Schleiermacher been heard, there had been no ear for the voice of Baudelaire. Unfortunately, religion succumbed to a "scientific" conception of man, according to which the inner individual is nothing, whereupon irreligion came forward to guard the individual against the anthropological notion of human existence. One may join Comte and thus pass from religion to philosophy and from philosophy to science, or he may take Feuerbach as his guide and proceed from God to reason, from reason to man. But the positivistic conception of man is no better than the rationalistic conception of reason or the scholastic idea of God. The idea, "Man," is no more real than the earlier ideas of God and Reason; the anthropological ideal of scientism is an abstraction far removed from the living man of individualism. Man seems destined ever to make himself the measure of all things, for which reason it becomes urgent to discover what is essential to man, in order that the metron may be just and sufficient. Under the auspices of anthropomorphism, man was regarded as individual and valuational; with anthropologism, the social and utilitarian prevails. Where theology suffered the man spiritual to regard the world as though it supplied a place for the display of human values, biology has looked to the world to explain the origin of life and the immediate utilities which are involved in animal existence. What has been gained by this transfer from

theology to biology? The socialized conception of man may be as oppressive as was the religious view of humanity; naturalism may be as intolerable as scholasticism. In order to escape from the narrowness of such scientizing naturalism, it has been necessary for the irreligious individualist to break through the limited circle of existence which has been cast about mankind.

The service of irreligion consists in its transgression, in its tendency to break through the limiting circle. In a certain suggestive manner, it may be pointed out that the philosophy of irreligion is almost identical with nominalism; but, where nominalism consists in the assertion of the particular as particular, irreligion asserts the particular as individualistic and personal. It was by means of individualistic nominalism that the Sophist delivered man from the toils of the purely physical philosophy which had obtained among the Greeks, just as it was through the same destructive dialectic that late scholastic thought freed itself from the domination of ecclesiasticism. When modern thought felt itself emancipated from the realism incident upon the idea of God, it proceeded to circumscribe itself with the realism of reason; in this manner, "natural religion" became as oppressive to the individual as supernatural religion had been. To cast off the yoke of reason was only to assume another oppression in the form of society, as this conception was perfected by the socializing positivists, so that it is in opposition to the realism of "Society" that egoistic irreligion is now contending. The irreligionist is thus the anti-social thinker, the speculative anarchist of the day.

The ease and submissiveness with which "advanced" scientific thought has bent beneath this new yoke is surprising; both bows of the clumsy instrument are now operative; here, the intellect is so fettered that no sentiment may be approved unless it show itself to be social;

there, the will submits to a philosophy which furthers no impulse unless it be useful and productive. Within the mind, the circle of scientism is so tightly drawn that the stream of consciousness must pass through canals; all conscious states must be standardized. Without, the free-born impulses must run on tracks, whereas their natural tendency is to move spontaneously with noble irresponsibility. Against the inward domination of the intellect, aestheticism has been a sturdy protest, while the exterior lordship of the social regime has been as stoutly opposed by immoralism. Irreligion now comes in to sanction these assertions of "I think" and "I will," while irreligion itself consists of a unified "I am." Where aestheticism indulged in the morbid, immoralism in the vicious, irreligion makes use of the nihilistic, the repudiation of everything external.

In the character of nominalism, irreligion tends to postulate the notion that free individualism cannot be conceived of as having boundaries. Irreligion thus lays all emphasis upon the centrifugal impulse, none upon the centripetal. Yet, at heart, that which irreligion has been asserting consists in no more than a proposition to the effect that the alleged boundary is not genuine, that the circumscribing line is not properly drawn. The intellectual life of humanity seems to consist of a perpetual drawing and erasing of limiting circles, with certain moments of rest between the movements which now enclose and then release the human spirit. Irreligion is lodged in the will, whence proceeds without cessation the living, striving self-affirmation of the soul; established religion is of the intellect with its constant tendency to set limits in the form of premises and postulates. Which shall rule, which be final in authority?

While philosophy may not be able to solve the antinomy of will and intellect, it may assure itself that each stands in need of the other. Certainly the intellect with

its circle-drawing tendency stands in need of the ever-radiating impulse which lives in the creative will; otherwise there were nothing to circumscribe. On the other hand, the will with its irreligion does not fail to need the limiting intellect, if for no other purpose than to supply the will with an object of resistance. But, in a more perfect manner, the intellect directs the will; and it is guidance rather than limitation which the intellect should offer the will. Irreligion, in its constant repudiation of intellectual limitation, thus assumes the form of irrationalism, whereby confusion enters in to make new ideas and new impulses possible. Far from being purely privative, irrationalism consists of a living force to which the various forms of life and culture are indebted. The special service rendered by individualistic irrationalism reveals itself in the egoistic repudiation of the scientific and social of contemporary thought; that scientism and sociality now have the upper hand cannot be denied, but that their reign is no period of peace is equally undeniable. Where theory, as expressed scientifically and socially cries, Peace! peace! irrationalism tells us that there is no peace. The victory of scientism over nature, the swift subjugation of humanity at the hands of sociality, cannot hide from our eyes the fact that irrationalistic pessimism is a conflagration scarcely under control, so that the future of life and thought is not likely to witness a continuance of the optimistic regime peculiar to scientifico-social positivism.

Neither the scientific nor the social has been capable of willing anything that might be called irreligion; indeed, it might even be suggested that, in the manifest desire of the scientific thinker to reduce both things and men to a system of orderly relations, the religious ideals of peace and good-will were availing themselves of novel modes of expression. Every form of advanced spiritual religion takes upon itself the task of subduing

the stubbornness of facts, whether they be natural or social; and it is this spirit of subduing which so often shows itself in the scientific desire to reduce all phenomena to laws. The spirit of irreligion appears in the relentless attempt to break into all generalizations in order that chaos and irrationality, as these linger in the will, may be saved from the fatal generalization. Taken by itself as an irrationalistic and pessimistic view of life and the world, irreligion cannot hope to be more than a critical, destructive movement in the progress of which that which is superficial may either be destroyed or may give way to a superior synthesis in human life. Individualism has embraced irreligion because irreligion is anxious to apply the acid test to a form of spiritual life whose baseness is suspected; hence, the severe views of such individualists as Blake and Baudelaire, Emerson and Nietzsche, Ibsen and Wagner. Everywhere irreligion reveals its longing, not merely to break down the established thought-order, but to subject life to that expansion and renovation which shall make possible a higher synthesis.

3. THE CLAIMS OF IRRELIGION

Where the struggle for the joy of life demanded aestheticism for the liberation of its soul-states, and the struggle for the worth of life involved immoralism as the means for the establishment of the free initiative, the struggle for the truth of life is forced to call in irreligion in order to support the affirmation of the self as an "I am." Whether Deism or diabolism, whether rationalism or irrationalism, irreligion has always been inspired by the hope of emancipating the self from all oppressive forms of exteriority. In neither case does one find a free, unprejudiced treatment of religion as such; rather is it a polemical movement directed against authority visible or invisible. Such was the case with

Spinoza, with Blake, with Baudelaire; each of these thinkers sought to place before his mind an idea which, instead of being relegated to some impersonal realm, should make its direct appeal to the worshipful soul. Irreligion thus became a kind of worship. Like aestheticism and immoralism, irreligion was coincident with individualism: Is life internal; is it free; is it true? The answer to this triple question came in the form of individualism. The individualist as irrationalist and irreligionist, forced to seek the truth of life *fuori le mura*, felt impelled to urge his thought to the extremes of Satanism and diabolism, even when his logic was at heart little more than that of nominalism. The ideal, no longer to be found in the exterior order, was sought within; and, when the ideal failed to clothe itself in noble forms, it was given over to the anarchism of Stirner, the "spleen" of Baudelaire. Yet, in the midst of these spiritual excesses, the longing for a truth which should become the soul was not lacking.

The particular method pursued by the irrationalist, far from consisting in the assertion of groundless ideas, had to do with the complete transmutation of accepted notions: predicate took the place of subject, species that of genus, while the false assumed the prerogative of the true. The individualist was possessed of the idea that the progress of history had had the effect of turning things upside down, whence the effort of the irrationalist to revert them to their true position. When one observes the unhappy and unworthy position of reason and selfhood in contemporary science, one can hardly believe that the irrationalists were wholly wrong. Strindberg expresses this figuratively when, in *The Dream Play*, certain of his characters say, "Do you know what I see in this mirror? The world turned the right way! Yes indeed, for naturally we see it upside down. How did it come to be turned the wrong way? When the

copy was taken— You have said it! The copy—I have always had the feeling that it was a spoiled copy. And when I began to recall the original images, I grew dissatisfied with everything. But men call it soreheadedness, looking at the world through the Devil's eyes, and other such things.”⁵² With such a *posterior prius*, or the world inverted, before him, Strindberg can suggest little or nothing to improve the situation. In such pessimism, he is on a plane with Ibsen and Thomas Hardy; yet, with such minds, there is not a complete sense of helplessness, still less lack of courage. The irrationalists are willing to consider things as they are, even when the face of reality appears grotesque and distorted, even when the truth of life seems to repose in the malign visage of irreligion, in its transmutation of true and false.

First in order among the methods of irrationalism appears that of mysticism, a genial way of asserting the soul, a method according to which the sharp contrast between the interior self and the exterior orders of nature and humanity was avoided. The mysticism of Schleiermacher's *Religionsphilosophie* served to mask the irrationalistic severity of his dialectic; yet, in Schleiermacher's repudiation of the metaphysical and the moralistic, as found in the second of his *Discourses on Religion*, the essence of the irreligious is to be found. Passing so easily from the old rationalistic synthesis of things in the world and individuals in humanity to the new romantic synthesis of the same things and persons in a superior world-order, Schleiermacher did not find it necessary to lay any special emphasis upon the sharp, individualistic contrast between them. How often does he protest that he has no intention of separating religion from science and morality, and yet the very genius of his philosophic consists in nothing else. “True sci-

⁵² *Op. cit.*, tr. Björkman, prologue.

ence," as he calls it, "is one with religion"; this may well be, but, for Schleiermacher, "science" was a romantic affair peculiar to the genius of Schelling's *Philosophy of Nature*. With a noble conception of the exterior world before his eyes, Schleiermacher was able to reunite the temporarily isolated self of religious feeling with a romantic conception of both nature and humanity, so that the earlier portion of the memorable *Second Discourse* easily unites with the later part, which is given up to a contemplation of the naturalistic and humanistic orders. Others have been less fortunate in their calculations, as also in their literary reputations; and yet they have done no more than did Schleiermacher when he analyzed the mind of the religious man and contrasted this with the appearance of the exterior order.

The career of nineteenth-century irreligion was marked by an ever-increasing intensification of the individual and an equally pronounced naturalization of the world, whence the genial ego and poetical world of Schleiermacher were sundered. The synthesis lost, irreligious individualism could do no more than insist upon the sanctity of the "I am." There was mysticism, not only in Schleiermacher, but also in Poe, as the latter's rather vapid philosophical essay, *Eureka*, with its norm of intuition, attests. But Poe advances beyond pure mysticism, just as he repudiates the didactic in poetry, and thus says of taste, "with the intellect or with conscience it has only collateral relations. Unless incidentally, it has no concern whatever either with duty or with truth."⁵³ Schleiermacher may have been well nigh as strident, yet Schleiermacher bids adieu to the good and the true for a while only, while Poe is severing the connection forever. Abandoning the optimism of truth and goodness, Poe's pessimism turns toward sadness and melancholy,⁵⁴ the concrete realization of which

⁵³ *The Poetic Principle*, in loc. ⁵⁴ *Philosophy of Composition*, in loc.

becomes manifest in his tales of terror, with all their morbid psychology. With the masters of the Decadence which was to follow, this pessimism became downright irreligion; and although the decadents did not exercise a conscious philosophy of history, their ideals had the effect of combining the romanticism of Schleiermacher with the pessimism of Poe.

Having been of aid to individualism in asserting *The Rights of Aestheticism*,⁵⁵ Baudelaire contributed to the individualistic movement toward irreligion in that his aestheticism was capable of a mystical interpretation. There was mysticism in Blake's Satanism; but the Satanism of Blake was healthy, robust, and strong, where the Satanism of Baudelaire was morbid, weak, and impassible. If Baudelaire constantly reverts to the most repulsive and distressing features of actual life, he is never the realist, but ever the splenetic idealist. In his eyes, virgins and demons, monsters and martyrs, saints and satyrs, had one common calling: to scorn the real and seek the infinite.⁵⁶ From this fearful idealism, nothing can drive the poet, not even the vision of flies hovering about a putrid corpse now infected with maggots.⁵⁷ In the presence of his morbid sense of beauty, Baudelaire lost sight of the most fundamental distinctions, good and bad, Abel and Cain, God and Satan; the sense of beauty was all that linked him with the most precious of his ideas, that of humanity, *l'humanité vaste*. Perhaps the error of Baudelaire consisted in his attempt to get out of humanity more than there is in it, in his desire to extend the borders of humanity out beyond their proper limits until they included here the bestial, there the diabolical. In his return to his innermost soul, *rentrant dans son âme*, Baudelaire went far beyond the limits of scientific introspection, which finds too little where he finds too much. Yet one cannot deny

⁵⁵ Cf. *supra*.

⁵⁶ *Femmes Damnées, Fleurs du Mal*, CXXXVI.

⁵⁷ *Ib.*, XXX.

that his morbid mysticism has its own value in establishing the independence of the soul's inner life.

To keep the soul and to sustain the soul's relations with both nature and humanity is the ideal toward which religion should approximate; of the two, the inward and the outward, the inner affirmation of the soul is more important than the outward expression of the soul's life in the natural and humanistic orders. Where Blake and Schleiermacher, both of them proceeding upon an irrationalistic basis, were able to maintain something like the outward relationships of the self with the world, Baudelaire and Wagner felt forced to violate the principles of objective scientism when they made their attempts to assert the self as something intrinsic. The history of Wagner's Siegfried serves to show how an irreligionist like Wagner can violate the principles of scientific justice for the sake of placing his individual upon an independent foundation. Wagner's anti-naturalism shows itself all too clearly in the birth of Siegfried, whose parents were brother and sister; shocking to the moralistic Fricka, such incest is likely enough to prove equally offensive to contemporary science with its eugenics and race-culture. Yet the effects of such anti-naturalism seem to have been fortunate in that Siegfried was of all men an ideal of *mens sana in corpore sano*. Wagner's beau-ideal of the old order, the would-be natural and moral Wotan, is forced to admit the superiority and supremacy of the irreligionist who stands out in strange contrast to the order of things which has been proved by scientific demonstration. Without fear, Siegfried is equally wanting in malice, so that he is fitted to play his part as enemy-friend, who opposes one order of things with the idea of establishing a better one. This friendly foe, *der freundliche Feind*, fights for Wotan in the act of fighting against him; Siegfried wills what Wotan desires, and thus, in becoming the opponent

of the real Wotan, he becomes the friend of Wotan's ideals.⁵⁸ Wagner's mystic irreligion is at once better and worse than that of Baudelaire: it is better because it is healthier; worse, since it is more militant. Yet both mystics agree in their attempt to safe-guard the human self from all exterior encroachments; Baudelaire goes deeper into the morbid regions of the self, while Wagner goes farther outward in opposition to the established order. Their bitterest foe is, not religion, science; religion can comprehend the spirit of such irreligion where science is forced to dismiss it as irrational and dangerous.

Where mysticism withdraws from the demonstrable order of things, irrationalism assumes a more threatening attitude whence irrationalism opposes the scientific generalization called "truth." Nineteenth-century religion, while insisting upon the freedom of the inner life, sought to maintain the usual connection between the self within and the established order without; where, as in the memorable instance of Schleiermacher, religion could hardly abide by the older synthesis, it sought to re-relate the self to a world-order formulated in the spirit of a higher synthesis. Schleiermacher's ideas of nature and humanity, conceptions more liberal than those of scientism and sociality, show how a romanticist could save himself from irrationalism. Others, like Emerson and Stirner, have been less fortunate; these irrationalists have found it necessary to negate all ostensible formulations of the world without, in order that they might safe-guard the self within. With Emerson and Stirner, the obvious method of the irrationalist was that of nominalism, whence a mediaeval method of thought was turned against the advanced ideas of modern thinking. At heart, nominalistic thinking is a protest against the attempt to include the particular in the general, a

⁵⁸ *Die Walküre*, II Akt, II Sc.

protest against the subordination of the personal individual to the impersonal state. Generalization proceeds smoothly as long as the rationalist confines his attention to things sub-human, and no protest arises when stars become mere heavenly bodies, oaks mere trees, lions only animals; but, when egos are subsumed under the concept man, or state, individualism must rise and protest against the fatal generalization. Thus it was with Stirner and Emerson, the one finding himself confronted by a Hegelian generalization, the other threatened by philosophic concepts in general. With all the varied forms of their common protest, these irrationalists have but one argument, the nominalistic.

The irrationalism of Emerson resists all generalizations; that of Stirner opposes itself to the realm of things peculiar to ancient thought and the realm of ideas incident upon modern thinking. To all appearances, Stirner assumes the attitude of one who opposes truth; yet, when *the* truth is the truth of selfhood, he is ready to make truth his own. In this manner, Stirner answers Pilate's question, for he declares that truth is, not in things, not in ideas, but in the self. "If," says he, "the things of the world have once become vain, the thoughts of the spirit must also become vain."⁵⁹ In the midst of this relinquishment of both things and thoughts, the truths of ancient and modern, the ego may still possess his own self in which the truth is to be found. In his essay, *Nominalist and Realist*, Emerson does not fail to appreciate that which impelled mediaeval realism to perfect its generalizations; but that which is meat to the idea is poison to the individual. Hence, Emerson's nominalism counsels the individual to "insist upon imperfection" and to "embroil the confusion." The idea at hand is that the individual shall surrender his differentia and thus submit to the generalization;

⁵⁹ *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, 478.

the motive, while ostensibly individualistic, is none the less favorable to the idea which seeks to surround the individual in those limiting circles so dear to the logician. In this spirit, Emerson expressed the desire that "the universe might be kept open in all directions." It is at this point that Emerson tends to differ from Stirner; for, where Stirner opposes all formulations of truth, where Stirner would have truth consist of the egoistic point rather than any conceptualistic circumference, Emerson seems to express the hope that there may be a generalization fit to contain even the free self. Both, however, agree in discarding any system which raises truth above the individual; for his own part, Stirner out-Hegels Hegel in that Stirner turns about and raises the self above truth.

Far from being a scholastic discussion, the irrationalism of Emerson and Stirner was a determined effort to raise the self above all definite formulations of life. To set the self in opposition to the world, one must have supreme confidence in that self while he must have also a correspondingly inferior conception of all forms of establishment. The "true" of scientism must become the false of individualism, and vice versa; the reasoning is correct, but there is all the difference in the world between the two kinds of premises employed: here, it is said, All that is in harmony with the general idea is true; there, it is affirmed, All that is in agreement with the individual is true. Emerson at once decided in favor of the individualistic formulation of the true, whence he refused to regard the ego as but a "bastard and interloper in the world which existed for him." With Stirner, this egoistic truth, often expressed in terms of immoralism and diabolism, finds its clearest declaration when Stirner refuses to allow that the individual can conform to the concept Man; and when he asks the question, "Who is man?" Stirner can only respond,

"I am." In the minds of both these irrationalists, the "I am" is the supreme truth, yet they differ between themselves in their attitude toward it. Where Emerson is so optimistic as to assume that the individual really exists, Stirner's pessimism leads him to lament that the self does not yet exist, so that the "I am" is only an ideal. Where man is egoist, his egoism is not of his own volition, since man spends all his strength in elaborating a concept to which he can subordinate himself; as an "involuntary egoist," man is not really himself; even Stirner cannot truthfully affirm his own selfhood, whence he says, "I am as little my heart as I am my sweetheart."⁶⁰

The truth of the individual is superior to the truth of all generalizations, such as State and Church, Reason and Mankind. Emerson feels that "the world is governed too much," while he demands that the State keep its hands off the "Kingdom of the me." Stirner was no less determined in his antipathy to the objective order, so that we hear him complaining that reason "puts the individual in irons by the thought of humanity."⁶¹ Relief from such tyranny of the "true" must come from the irrationalist himself; if he negate the premises, no conclusion can be drawn. According to Emersonianism, private wisdom and private goodness are superior to the organization of the true and the good. The essay on *Politics*, has this additional bit of individualism: "To educate the wise man, the State appears; and, with the appearance of the wise man, the State expires." Yet, in his egoistic reading of history, Emerson cannot "call to mind a single human being who has steadily denied the authority of the laws on the simple ground of his own moral nature." Now, both Emerson and Stirner afford unusually fair examples of just such a non-conformist.

⁶⁰ *The Ego*, 40.

⁶¹ *Ib.*, 137.

The contrast between these two similar types of irrationalism and irreligion appears when one attempts to sum up the ultimate meaning of their respective messages. Stirner would tolerate no conceptualism whatever, but persisted in making the ego the supreme object of truth and worship; at the same time, Stirner contented himself with the mere elevation of himself above the established order, so that his deed was ever an egoistic and, we may say, a harmless one. An "insurgent," Stirner insists that he was not a "revolutionist."⁶² But, while mild in will, Stirner is so ferocious as to forbid any attempt to subordinate the truth of the me to any so-called higher idea, so that his position is most definitely that of the irrationalist who will not sanction the use of the Socratic concept. For his part, Emerson was more militant in things volitional, less so in things intellectual. When he speaks of the State, Emerson's utterances are thoroughly anarchistic, while he deems all State-philosophy hopelessly conservative. Society means to Emerson a "foul compromise and vituperated Sodom"; on the other hand, "a state of war or anarchy is so far valuable in that it puts every man on trial."⁶³ When, however, the intellect Emersonian attempts to settle accounts with the world of things, it cannot place the affair of the individual upon the naught of Stirner, but promptly subordinates the ego to the Over Soul. In this manner, Emerson sought relief in the mysticism which had meant so much to Schleiermacher. Yet both Emerson and Stirner as irrationalists are able to agree in affirming that the given order of things in the worlds of nature and humanity cannot be found to contain man as ego.

Where the "religion of science" was formerly opposed by mysticism and irrationalism, it has now come under the ban of symbolism, where it encounters the

⁶² *The Ego*, 422-423.

⁶³ *The Conservative*, in *loc.*

opposition of Verlaine and Villiers de L'Isle Adam. Symbolism may lack the ability to frame its principles after the manner of either irrationalism or mysticism, but where it loses on the positive side, it gains in its negative attitude toward scientism. In this way, symbolism has become a philosophy of humanistic values in the light of which it asserts, "science will not suffice." Now, to assert the insufficiency of science is the next thing to asserting science's falsity; further more, symbolism asserts that it has been the popularization of science which has led to the undoing which science is destined to undergo in the future. From a more carefully assumed point of view, the truth implicit in symbolism may be stated as follows: Scientism, or the direct application of the principles of physical science to the needs of the human mind, fails to suffice for the answering of most pertinent questions about the world as a whole, fails again when it seeks to assuage the most poignant needs of intimate human life. That which is destined to prove its destruction is its own direct application of the physical to the social, whence the inferiority of scientism as a philosophy and religion cannot fail to become apparent. Popular science as such may hardly be said to have attempted the solution of the life-problem; but social scientism has attempted just this thing, as the history of Positivism from Comte to Spencer is sure to point out. Is it not such social scientism which has been challenged by the symbolist philosophers, Paulhan, Rod, Desjardins, and Morice? The poet of symbolism has presented the claims of the human soul; its philosopher has shown that such needs cannot be satisfied by social scientism.

According to Morice, the thought of the nineteenth century, beginning with *l'esprit mystique* of Chateaubriand and *l'esprit scientifique* of Goethe, followed the streams of romanticism and naturalism until it found

a triune synthesis in Villiers, Verlaine, and Mallarmé, where it framed the proper reaction against the "insolent and desolate negations of scientific literature."⁶⁴ When one desires to know just how the scientific spirit will be relegated to its proper place, the philosophy of symbolism seeks to show that art will take its stand upon science, there to find a solid foundation for its upward striving intuitions.⁶⁵ The pretensions of science, or scientism as we should say, appear in the calm denial of mystery which has accompanied the calculating mind; in its analysis, scientism witnesses its own dissolution, whence the way for a higher synthesis is prepared.

In the attempt to elaborate a higher synthesis, which is the only just aim of an individualism which has spent enough time in its anti-natural, anti-social operations, it must be borne in mind that there is a difference between science as such, where observed fact and demonstrable relation cannot be questioned, and scientism, which attempts to deduce a life-ideal from the organized data peculiar to the inorganic and organic worlds. The fundamental principles of physics, chemistry, and biology may be perfected without any philosophical or poetical interference or criticism; but when the scientist attempts to dictate human emotions and volitions, he has transgressed his limits, and must endure the rebuke which is forthcoming from humanism. "Science will not suffice" ; that motto of advanced individualism is to be taken in its humanistic sense; for, as a matter of fact, science must suffice for the explanation of those data which are given in the experience of both the physical and psychological; the insufficiency appears when this science, or scientism, attempts to solve problems of human life, in both the individual and society.

According to the symbolist philosophy of Morice, it

⁶⁴ *La Littérature de Tout à L'Heure*, 177.

⁶⁵ *Ib.*, 203.

is the popularization of science which leads to its disintegration.⁶⁶ From the analysis of the present situation, we have been led to the conclusion that it has been the socialization of science that is leading to the decline of the scientific regime. The thinker of the Enlightenment who was confronted by the enormous ideas of the new physics was able to pursue his philosophy of life undismayed, because the science of that time was confined to its proper limits in the physical world. The idealism of Kant, with its superior ethics, found nothing disconcerting in the physical conceptions of the world, while Kant himself loaned his name and influence to the problems of astronomy. Similar was it in the case of Goethe, who maintained a superior philosophy of life in sympathy with the scientific notions of his day. But, when, as in the case of Comte, scientism is pursued, not for its own sake, but with the confessed aim of dictating a doctrine of life inimical to the spiritual interests of the human self, the repudiation of such scientism is sure to come about.

Only as we observe how arrogant popular scientism has become are we able to comprehend the antipathy which contemporary thought entertains for it. In the history of the nineteenth century, the conflict between the naturalistic and the humanistic was carried in connection with science and religion; and, because religion clung to an absurd cosmology, science was able to create the impression that, in negating this, it was negating all mysticism, all belief in interior existence. Neither by scientism nor by religion was it observed that art was taking up the defence of the inner life, so that the real conflict of that period was the conflict between art and science. The Renaissance was able to pursue the scientific and the aesthetical without a suspicion of any conflict between the twin domains, as appears most

⁶⁶ *La Littérature de Tout à L'Heure*, 5-6.

strikingly in the case of Lionardo da Vinci. In the nineteenth century, where the interest in science has been comparable to that of the fifteenth, but where there has been no comparable development in the realm of art, the time-spirit was called upon to witness the rash ascendancy of the scientific spirit, whence the extremes to which aesthetic individualism was forced to go. If religion had had no antiquated cosmology to defend, and had not held its picture of the phenomenal world dearer than its sense of inner life, the conflict between science and religion would not have resulted in the victory for science. Even worse did this situation become when religion sought to evince the harmony of the two views, the naturalistic and the spiritual; for, in so doing, religion tended to lose its hold upon the essential principles of faith. The bathos of religion appears to-day in the surrender of the spiritual to the social, a second victory for scientism.

Art has the advantage over religion, inasmuch as art has never had a special cosmology to defend; it is not with the forms of the visible world that art has to do, but with the aesthetical value which may be attributed to them. At the same time, art has never assumed any great responsibility for the social order, so that, in its independence of both the physical and the social, art has been able to intensify the interests of interior life as such. Science has filled the mind with ideas, things natural and social, and that without thinking to inquire concerning the values which might be attached to these. In this manner, the idea of beauty in nature has been all but lost, while the sense of worth, which can be determined only as one centers his attention upon the individual, has suffered from neglect. Not in the special doctrine of symbolism, as this is portrayed artistically by Villiers, and analyzed philosophically by Morice, but in the universal principle of art, is the higher synthesis

of nature and humanity to be found. Now, Morice's ideal, *Tout l'homme pour tout l'art*, carries him beyond mere symbolism, with its triumvirate of Villiers, Verlaine, and Mallarmé.⁹⁷ Itself, Symbolism tended to uphold the sacerdotal rather than the irrationalistic; nevertheless, Symbolism was as far removed from the scientific conception of nature as the earlier forms of irreligion had been.

With the climax of irreligion, the *Struggle for Selfhood* comes to a conclusion. Called forth in opposition to a conception of nature which forbade the independence of soul-states, free initiatives, and self-affirmed ideals, the struggle for selfhood exerted itself in the elaboration of the joy, worth, and truth of life. Under more optimistic auspices, such individualism might have come to its conclusion without indulging in those polemics which involved the joy of life as exaggerated aestheticism, the worth of life as immoralism, and the truth of life as irrationalism and irreligion; under the conditions imposed by the authoritarian thought of the age, the pessimistic conclusion seemed to be necessary, so that individualism did not hesitate to draw it. Had science been science and not scientism, had science contented itself with the rational comprehension of the natural order, there had been no excuse for such attitudes as were indicated by aestheticism, immoralism, and irreligion; but, when scientism sought to thrust upon the human spirit an authoritarian conception of life as something purely natural and social, the inward revolution peculiar to individualism could not be avoided. Many phases of such individualism might be regretted were it not for the fact that they, although offensive in the extreme, are still nearer the meaning of man's life than the accepted truths of scientism can ever hope to be. The red and yellow of Baudelaire and Verlaine are more pleasing than the drab of Comte and Spencer.

⁹⁷ *Littérature de Tout à L'Heure*, 269.

BOOK TWO
THE GOAL OF LIFE IN SOCIETY

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AS the modern attempt on the part of scientism to naturalize human life produced an intolerable condition in the realm of things speculative, it must now be asked whether the modern socialization of life is destined to be more promising. Both movements go hand in hand in our modern thinking; the earlier period of modern thought established a union of physics and politics, while the later one repeated this performance when it connected the physical with the social. As a result, individualism has had to assert the self in opposition to the fixedness of the inorganic world and to rescue it from the relentless flux of modern biological scientism. Perhaps individualism, with its struggle for the joy, worth, and truth of life, has not been able to witness the defeat of scientism at the hands of selfhood; but it has been able to point out that the scientific generalization has been unable to draw a circle about the self with its deep content and strong affirmation, as it was able to do with less independent forms of nature. The conflict with the physical, forms but one half of the general struggle for the independence of the self, so that the career of individualism is marked by a parallel form of strife in connection with which the self is called upon to adjust its nature and character to that social philosophy which accompanied the physico-scientific movement. In the attempt to think his own thoughts, the individual must observe how scientism tends to dominate the whole realm of intellectual life; to do his own deeds, the same individual must not fail to observe how sociality presumes to exercise authority in the realm of activity. As we must keep reminding

ourselves, the culture of the age is such as to insist upon the following propositions: truth is that which is scientific; worth or goodness is that which is social.

The attitude of individualistic logic has not been such as to further the prejudice that all thinking about the world must be elaborated and expressed after the manner of scientific thinking. It is undeniable that polemical egoism has been unwilling and unable to establish any sort of cosmic philosophy, although it has not failed to assert the intrinsic essence and character of man's spiritual life in general. When now individualism encounters the social, individualism will be found to assume an inimical attitude toward the attempt to construct all human goodness in the spirit of sociality. As soon as individualism becomes aware of the socialization of life, even before it is clearly conscious of this amiable tendency of the modern mind, it attempts a counter assertion in behalf of man's inner life. The social synthesis appears to be a poor vehicle for conveying the essential meaning of human striving and suffering. As in its conflict with the naturalistic synthesis in the world of things, individualism carries on its warfare with the social synthesis in the world of persons by discussing, (1) *The Socialization of Life* and (2) *The Repudiation of Society*.

PART ONE

THE SOCIALIZATION OF LIFE

THE naturalization of human life was brought about by modern physics and biology, according to which the earth was adjusted to the universe and man to the earth. No longer is there a privileged planet in the universe, no longer a privileged being in the earth; the form of human life has become scientific, its content social. With the naturalization and socialization of man's life, the powers of thinking and doing have been taken from the individual as such and relegated to the world at large. The result is that the self cannot continue to say, "I think" and "I will," but "thought goes on within the brain" and "work is done through the will." For a while—that is, during the Enlightenment—the individual was able to keep abreast of the exterior order by reposing in a speculative solipsism and a practical egoism; indeed, the quasi-individualism of that time was such as to persuade man that his simple "I think" and "I will" were of such power as to place the self in ascendancy over the world; but such a naïve assumption was not destined to endure. No longer can the individual assert that his thought establishes the universe, for it is doubtful whether his thought can even establish the self as thinker; no longer can the ego presume that its will makes the social order, for it is problematic whether the will is able to assert even the self. The method adopted by individualism when individualism became a genuine doctrine, was a destructive rather than a constructive method; and, from being a tyrant, the self became a mere insurrecto. Under the auspices of sociality, the human self, no longer sovereign, became a solitaire whose sole life-

satisfaction was to be found in the enjoyment of a life-content in no wise related to the exterior order of either things or persons. The insertion of the individual is thus the starting-point of essential individualism.

I. THE TRANSVALUATION OF SELF AND SOCIETY

Just as the naturalization of human life was inaugurated by the complete transmutation of mind and world, so the socialization of life was brought about by an equally decisive transvaluation of self and society. With no fixed notion of either ancient State or mediaeval Church, the modern elaborated the looser ideal of Society, which latter was now inferior, then superior, to the self. Although calm thinking might lead to the supposition that the ideas of self and society were reciprocal, the vigorous ethics of modern life has persisted in pitting one against the other, so that no sense of consistency, no feeling of peace, is possible. If one is content to be purely social, he will feel no disturbances from the ego within; if he is capable of individualistic retirement, such as one has witnessed in our recent Symbolists, he may assume that the social order is nothing to him; but, if one feels that he must believe in both the self and society, he will be at a loss to comprehend how the synthesis of the two may be brought about. The supreme error in the ethics of the Enlightenment consisted in the assertion that, in the logic of life, the self is prior, the state secondary; the present age may be just as faulty in its assumption that it is the social which holds the position of moral priority. That which individualism feels forced to observe and to emphasize is the melancholy fact of the transvaluation of the self and society as this took place at the close of the Enlightenment.

I. SELFHOOD IN SELFISHNESS

When the Enlightenment encountered the ego, it submitted it to an ethical treatment the exact parallel of the metaphysical office to which the logician had assigned it. As Descartes used the inviolate "I think" to establish the world of things, Hobbes employed the egoistic "I will" to establish the society of persons. Neither thinker was willing to rejoice in the solitary character of the punctual ego; had there been less anxiety about nature and society, the situation in philosophy had been different to-day. The anthropology of both Descartes and Hobbes, elaborated with the characteristic swiftness of early modern thought, was sadly in error. When the speculative thinker analyzed man, he found within his mind nothing but a solitary thinking of one's own thoughts; when the practical philosopher made his study *de homine*, he could discover nothing but the impulse toward self-assertion, the will-to-selfhood which seems so difficult for the egoist of to-day. In the seventeenth century, it was assumed that practical life may assume nothing but the ego; if the social order is to come in, its entrance depends upon the attitude of the self-centered ego. The thought that the social order is most thoroughly in control so that selfhood can come into being only after the most strenuous and destructive kinds of self-assertion, seems never to have occurred to these naïve moralists. In contradistinction from the ideals of the Enlightenment, we are able to see, and quite pathetically, that one has no more need to urge man to be social than he has reason to bid the wind to blow or the tide to rise. The evolutionary character of our thought is such as to prepare a social place for man before he makes his appearance upon the planet, since evolution marks the presence of the social in lower than human forms of animal life. With her epic interests, nature has been careful to make

arrangement for the organization of life upon earth, whence the might of the gregarious tendency. Upon such a desperately social planet as ours, all attempts to enhance sociality as such are unnecessary. The little nucleus of pure selfishness, which seemed to Hobbes as the dominant feature of human life, has not the power to withstand the universal and ceaseless tendency on the part of men to congregate in such a manner as to perfect socialized life and socialized labor.

Like the speculative thought of the Enlightenment, the practical philosophy of the period found the ego so easily that the need of the will-to-selfhood was never called into play. The individualism of that day arrived by following the line of least resistance, while the ethical effort of philosophy was all but exhausted in making out a case for the social instinct. To-day, when the social is in the saddle, we look with amazement at the seriousness and vigor with which the seventeenth-century moralist sought to evince the existence of what is so obvious as the social instinct. Then, however, it was feared that the selfishness of man might drive from the world all possibility of benevolence. In Grotius' philosophy of rights, the problem of the individual and his relation to society receives its first systematic presentation. Before Grotius, Machiavelli and More, Bodin and Gentilis, had recognized the presence of the problem, but it remained for the author of *The Rights of War and Peace* (1625) to make it basal. Now Grotius' conception of man and society was elaborated so readily that both individualist and social thinker may complain that his ideal fails to receive sufficient consideration. The ego was not so ripe for the fruit-basket of the state, while the social organism, as we affect to call it to-day, was poorly developed in the conception of society by mutual agreement. But, where Grotius did not see fit to indulge the anarchistic ideal in his world of social

men, he was radical in his suggestion that the state may be conceived of in an atheistic manner. With a hesitation which was to be expected, Grotius thus declares that *jus naturale* would hold, even under the supposition "that there is no God — *non esse deum*." ¹

Grotius' extreme confidence in the rationality and morality of man, whereby he neglects the anarchistic while not shunning the atheistic postulate, is shown in the social idealism with which he colors his human heroes. Man is the quiet and orderly animal to whom society is native—*homini proprium sociale*; for he is possessed of a social appetite, while the special gift of language, which in the mind of Grotius has the single motive of communication, further fits him for social life.² Nature has thus made men kinsmen; hence *jus naturale*, which might be supposed to isolate and mutually antagonize men, makes the perfecting of society an easy task.

But the progress of the modern philosophy of rights was not at all in accord with this optimism, as the pessimism of Hobbes and the attempted reconciliation of Grotius and Hobbes by Puffendorf was destined to show. The egoistic nature of man and the severity of the social contract necessary for the assembling of such self-centered individuals, thus place the social philosophy of the Enlightenment in a position where it became necessary to look deeper into the sources of human action. Hobbes differed from Grotius, not only upon the grounds that he was a Scotist who believed that moral laws spring from the will, where Grotius in his Thomism had found them fixed and finished in the intellect, but in the more modern interpretation, which led Hobbes to assume a position materialistic and egoistic. With the removal of reason, as this was followed from the materialistic hypothesis, the man of Hobbes was enclosed within his own

¹ *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, Proleg., § 11.

² *Ib.*, 6-7.

private being, a victim of the baser and more violent tendencies of his nature. Social life, so foreign to a creature which cannot see beyond its own immediate feelings, was to be brought about, not naturally and serenely, but by means of a principle of force calculated to offset the native force of selfishness within the individual will. Yet, in our desire to discover the extent and degree to which the egoistic principle took root in the Enlightenment, we must not attribute to the individual of Hobbes any more moment than we are ready to attach to the social principle in Grotius. Hobbes' description of the ego in his own world can afford only a pathetic contrast to the analysis of the self as one now finds it in the writings of Stirner and Baudelaire, of Nietzsche and Wilde; for there is little in the *Leviathan* to suggest the presence of the Nietzschean "Blond Beast" in the world. One thus marvels that such an improbable ego should have aroused the terrible forces of altruism which made British morality famous, a blind altruism which did not cease with the coming of Mill, but persisted to the end of the nineteenth century until the death of Sidgwick. The founder of the pseudo-egoistic philosophy was possessed of a peculiar philosophy of history in accordance with which mankind was conceived to have passed from the free *status naturalis* to the fixed *status civilis*. With such notions in mind, Hobbes looks upon nature as the disintegrating, self-conscious reason as the synthesizing force. "It may seem strange to some man who has not well weighed these things," says he, "that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another."³ Yet all that Hobbes can allow to the natural synthesis of men in nature is the sense of wonder that anything else should be the case.

When one realizes how synthetic is the force of nature,

³ *Leviathan*, Ch. XIV.

which latter constantly organizes things in groups, one finds it difficult to understand how the Enlightenment struggled to prove the existence of the social sentiment, and how, when it was in psychological possession of this obvious factor, it still continued to insist that the social creature become more and more social. One may perhaps exercise some sympathy for Cumberland and Shaftesbury, Hume and Adam Smith, who lived at a time when scientism had not emphasized the sociality inherent in its conception of nature; but one is far from agreeing with Mill, whose unnecessary and obviously fallacious argument for society was phrased as follows: "Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons:"⁴ Sidgwick's predicament is equally pathetic. Alarmed at the gap in Mill's argument, and with a wistful glance in the direction of universal happiness so far away, Sidgwick casts aside his poor utilitarianism to embrace the theory of an opposed intuitionism as he assumes the validity of rational benevolence as an "intuition."⁵ Thus was the all-obvious social tendency, common to animals and men, reduced to "demonstration." Alas! poor Stirner.

With the advent of the social philosophy of Comte, the balance of power changed from the ego to society. No longer was it necessary to rise in the defence of the vast, omnipotent social order; on the contrary, it was noted that something must be done for the self. To-day, when the social ideal is at the apex, we see how difficult it is to account for and justify the inner independence of the human self. From the Leviathan of the social mind no corner of the ego is free; all privacy, all individuality is apparently lost in the resistless rush of the objective, social tendency. Our ideas are circled by the opinions and prejudices of the race;

⁴ *Utilitarianism*, Ch. IV.

⁵ *Methods of Ethics*, Bk. III, Ch. XIII.

our ideals have lost their centrifugal impulse from within, and must await the beck of the social organism. The readiness with which the moral mind stepped into this trap is paralleled only by the dread of egoism which caused British ethics to elaborate its gigantic system of utilitarianism. To match it, we have the absurd social philosophy of the day. Then, the anti-egoistic ideal was developed in desperation; now, the social principle is indulged with smug satisfaction. The social has become popular, which in itself is a most suspicious circumstance; and there is nothing which has been left untouched by its tentacles, nothing human which its omnivorous appetite would not devour.

If the social thought of the day were content to confine itself to the exterior phases of our humanity, we could offer no lasting lament; but the influence of this realistic method of reasoning is internal and invidious. The weak conscience has succumbed to such a degree that to suggest the possibly anti-social character of any initiative is sufficient to produce a benumbing compunction. Earth has become the herding planet, and it is not impossible that astronomy will gain a glimpse of the group system in operation upon Mars. Because of this extra-socialization of human life, the position of egoism is just the opposite of that which it occupied in the Enlightenment, where it was disowned as soon as recognized. As a result, egoism is on the defensive; armed within against the objective forces of the social order, it expresses itself with a vigor which, it must be confessed, is as misleading as it is unworthy. Where we can offer the explanation that only by such savage self-assertion can the ego hope to keep its place in life, we cannot add to this psychological argument an ethical one which shall justify the extremes of Stirner, Nietzsche, and Wilde. We keep them in mind while we are seeking the ego's place in society, but it is only

in a casual manner that we can follow their arguments. This much remains as established in the philosophy of humanity: that man is not by nature an ego, but a social being; he becomes an ego only by means of the will-to-selfhood. No longer dare we take the ego for granted; the ego must be brought into being from within by the individual. The recognition of this is necessary to egoists and altruists alike.

The career of egoism and altruism, as this has been recorded in ethical history, is filled with that which is both pathetic and provoking. How has it been possible for human thinking to align its ideals and lay down its maxims, when so little comprehension of humanity was attained? Why has ethics encased us human beings in its rigid forms and inflicted us with its ideals when no attention was paid to anthropology? Both of our modern periods, that of Enlightenment and that of culture, have indulged the most erroneous notions concerning the place of the self in society, although our own period of thought has not failed to drop some hint as to the soul's method of escape from the social snare. Where, in the earlier epoch, the ideal consisted in passing from the self to society, the more advanced ideal cheers us with the thought that the self should free man from the social. Then the question was, How shall we socialize man? Now we are asking, How shall we individualize the social mass? Not that the latter question is ever frankly proposed by our social thinker, but that he has made the social so commonplace, so obnoxious, that the enlightened egoist has no trouble in observing what he should do. Where man was thoroughly individualized, it was but natural that moral thinking should search for some path to the social order; but when the social method became paramount, it became necessary for the individual to assert his selfhood. Now it may seem strange that the modern egoist can survey the course

of the elder individualism with little or no satisfaction, but the fact remains that the genealogy of the superman does not trace back to the ego of Hobbes' system. The older individualism was insincere, incomplete, involuntary; the newer egoism is straightforward, systematic, and relentless. Man must assert himself, must will himself.

In our dismay, as we witness the expulsion of the ego from his own world, we turn from scientific to social thought, with the hope that, by considering the individual in the atmosphere of humanism rather than in the drab world of scientism, we may catch some glimpse of the self. Here, the situation is even more distressing, for the reason that, where scientific thought merely neglects the self, social thinking arrays its arguments against self-existence and self-expression. Where science can find no explanation for the ego, social thought refuses to grant it justification. The self does not exist; such is the testimony of the one. The self has no right to think of existing; that is the conclusion of the other. The earth has been mapped out in such a manner as to lead to the conclusion that, since so much of its surface is covered by the seas of society, the firm land of selfhood has no existence at all. Individuality is expelled because it is unsocial; genius is condemned as pathological. The explanation of this unhappy situation may be attributed to certain leading considerations which the social thinker has had in mind. In his life-ideal, the social thinker has viewed man from the economic standpoint as the creature that must be housed, clothed, and fed; the thought that man must none the less have culture and inner life, has been overlooked in the description of his life in the world. At the same time, the modern apostle of humanity has surrendered to the democratic ideal, which is based upon the principle of likeness rather than that of difference in humanity. Now the

individual is "different." For this reason, the social generalization, which described man in its formal manner, cannot accommodate a phase of humanity in which the generic and confessional are lost to view in the specific and differential. By its very nature, social thought is pledged to the mass, not the ego; the result follows rapidly, is established rigidly.

Some justification for the anti-individualistic tendency in social thought may be found in the failure of egoism to explain what it means by "being one's self." It is only in recent decades that the need of such an explanation has been felt. Up to the present time, humanity has had examples of individualism, but these have not always been genuine and straightforward. There has been an egoism which in many ways has been but a spurious individualism, the product of exterior rather than interior forces. The ancient aristocracy of mind and the mediaeval sense of a superiority based upon religion may have escaped the taint of spuriousness; but it was wanting in the internal sense of individualism of which, to-day, we are so conscious, which we praise so highly. The aesthetic supremacy of humanity in the Renaissance is perhaps the nearest approach to conscious, self-directed individualism that history has furnished; it was not wanting in excellence, nor was it lacking in the egoism which the earlier ages confessed. In modern times, aristocracy has failed to achieve individualism for the reason that it has been founded upon exteriority. French aristocracy, instead of basing itself upon the principles of intellectualism which were then at hand, contented itself with the externals of human life, so that the result was a sort of dandyism, so great was the emphasis laid upon the manners. In the nineteenth century, when democracy became the rule, the aristocracy that grew up was economic, the lowest type that the world has seen. Those who to-day are feared

and lauded are those whose possessions are the greatest, not those who culture, piety, and manners are the finest. Our modern "egos" do indeed have somewhat of the power and noble insolence which ever characterize the individual, but they are wanting in superior self-consciousness which is born of the sense of mental and moral supremacy. Their "personality" is an accretion, not a growth; it is built around them, not produced from within by them. Commerce has supplanted culture to the degree of making personality self-effacing, so that the capitalist does not dream how he, in more ways than one, has approached to the ideal of the superman.

Now, to be a superman, one must first of all be conscious of his superiority. Furthermore, he must be possessed of an originality which, instead of recognizing the law that he breaks, refuses to grant the law the recognition of either intellect or will. He who in his egoism postulates an esoteric principle of thinking and acting must be possessed of a peculiar dialectical power in the light of which he is able to conceive of both a lower and higher standard of life; but such an ancient method of reasoning is far beyond the ability of the capitalist to formulate. On the contrary, it has been lack of consciousness, not the excess of it, which has had the effect of elaborating the "personality" of the financier; he has been unaware of both himself and society in the activities of an exteriorizing will. Individualism, therefore, has not had sufficient material to work upon, whence it has been natural for social thinking to overlook the claims to self-existence which are implicit in the ego. Before the overwhelming social consideration, the slender forces of individualism as such have been powerless, so that the chief hope of individualism consists in the *reductio ad absurdum* to which the social argument must lead.

Relief from the social is no more readily forthcoming

in the more restricted field of ethical thought. Such is the situation here that one is led to feel that his position is shameful when he seeks to call himself an "egoist." Both the feeling of personal pleasure and the private moral sense have succumbed to the invincible social argument. The eudaemonistic ideal of egoism was the first to appear and the first to yield. In the history of modern ethics, there is scarcely to be found a genuine argument for the enjoyment of life as this is understood by the individual. Hobbes was never proud of his position, while Mandeville was not able to convince men of his sincerity. It may even be said that Butler, in his *Sermons on Human Nature*, was the only English thinker of the Enlightenment to exalt self-love, which he qualifies with the adjectives "cool" and "reasonable."⁶ Butler, however, proposes an egoism whose final form was moralistic rather than hedonistic; and his brave egoism is but the preparation for his more characteristic ideal of conscience. Indeed, where Butler tends to identify the two, the resulting synthesis consists of a moral attitude in which conscience is thoroughly supreme. But, even in the attempt to elaborate an ethical egoism, the thought of the day, as this was expressed by Adam Smith, showed a tendency to socialize both conscience and self-love. Since his day, we have witnessed the absolute socialization of the moral sense, so that, in both his desires and his moral strivings, man has been forced to guide his actions by an external social norm. If morality has gained, individuality has lost; and we are now confronted by a social absolutism thorough and relentless. Thus, as we review the earlier period of modern thought, and seek also to come to understanding with the present, we can only conclude that the human ego has been banished from the world of nature and humanity.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Sermon. I.

2. SELFHOOD IN STRENGTH

As the transmutation of mind and world witnessed the development of a constructive solipsism, according to which the self, instead of serving the general purposes of cosmic knowledge, sought a victorious view of its own independent being, so the moralic change from the self to society was to witness the deduction of a polemical egoism, whose definite form is comparable to the Satanism of the nineteenth century. With the elaboration of the intellect in the form of rational rights and rational religion, there was developed a suspicion that the understanding was not sufficient to the full needs of human life, whence came the emancipation of the irrational will. This irrationalism, as we must style it, was taken up by Milton in the seventeenth, by William Blake in the eighteenth century. In its definite literary form, the individualistic irrationalism of these poets can hardly be distinguished from the diabolism of Baudelaire and Nietzsche; but, since the thought of the Enlightenment was so thoroughly pledged to the moralic and the rationalistic, Milton was admired for qualities other than his Satanism, while Blake, except so far as his work as an engraver was concerned, was all but neglected. When, to-day, individualism is forced to observe the manner in which the self-active ego attempts to emancipate itself from the confines of the socializing, naturalizing intellect, it cannot justly overlook the qualities of strength as these appear in the Blake and Milton.

The theological principles upon which *Paradise Lost* was founded were such as to make the diabolical necessary to the divine, while it further exalts human disobedience as a factor in the progress of humanity. Banished from Heaven to reign in Hell, Satan abandons his attack upon the celestial world, but only as he is inspired by the hope of gaining supremacy over a third order of existence, the created world, where mankind

dwells. Milton begins his glorification of Satanism when he makes the Deity admit the success of Satan in perverting the human will; and he further advances the cause of Satan by suggesting that, in the mind of God who has a strange admiration for Satanism, passive obedience is of no value in comparison with that free use of intellect and will, which, with both man and Satan, was to lead to such vicious consequences; active disobedience, then, is preferable to obedience.⁷ As for the Miltonesque Satan, the humanism and modernism of this seventeenth century hero appear when self-skepticism and bad conscience inflict themselves upon him who has Hell within him, while the escape from such compunction and sense of weakness is made possible only by such a nihilistic act as turns the moralic into the immoralism of the famous Satanic maxim, Evil be thou my good!⁸ Nothing in Stendhal, Baudelaire, Nietzsche, or Wilde is superior to this.

The superiority of Satanism as an ideal for humanity appears when the angelic Raphael attempts to cast celestial dust in Adam's eyes when the latter desires information concerning the astronomical features of the newly created world. However natural it may be to inquire concerning the nature of the universe, argues Raphael, obedience is better than knowledge, so that Adam would better confine his curiosity to those things which concern his own being in its lowliness.⁹ Indeed, Raphael seems to have anticipated somewhat of the Humanism of an English Oxford and an American Cambridge of to-day, since he seeks to base all knowledge upon the utilitarian and hedonic; at the same time, his moralism bids him warn Adam lest passion carry him astray.¹⁰ The extra-intellectual wisdom of Satan, who seems quite Dionysian in his character, appears in the fact that he, like Raphael, appeals to

⁷ *Paradise Lost*, Bk. III. ⁸ *Ib.*, Bk. IV. ⁹ *Ib.*, Bk. VIII. ¹⁰ *Ib.*

the brain with its innate desire for knowledge. Milton makes his hero all but real and humanistic when he attributes to him a peculiarly amoristic sensibility when he beholds Eve, whose beauty has the power to abstract him from his innate badness, and render him for the time "stupidly good."¹¹

In the account of the temptation, Milton has a fine opportunity to anticipate Strindberg by indulging in an oblique attack upon feminism. In her desire to go forth alone in tending the garden, we have about the earliest attempt on the part of literature to represent the revolt of woman; trusting in the innocence which to Satan is less formidable than the "high intellectual" of Adam, it is Eve separate who introduces the fall of mankind.¹² After the manner of the modern immoralist, Milton leads his Satan so to minimize sin as to instill into Eve's mind such ideals as are found in the hearts of the *immoralistes* of the Decadence. When Eve insists upon being guided by the rationalism of the Enlightenment, Satan suggests that sin is but a "petty trespass," while disobedience suggests "dauntless virtue."¹³ If earth felt the wound of this feminist sin, it was with "blithe countenance" that Eve related how she had eaten of the "fallacious fruit." In expatiating upon the entrance of sin into the world, which he does without sign of regret, Milton was content to place evil somewhere near the good, while, without wholly obliterating the boundary line between the two, he tends to blur the immortal distinction, and thus rises to a position not much inferior to that Nietzschean height which is "beyond good and evil."

As the superman of the nineteenth century was anticipated by Milton in his Satan, so the current class-distinction between the superior and inferior, with their respective "master-morality" and "slave-morality,"

¹¹ *Paradise Lost*, Bk. IX.¹² *Ib.*¹³ *Ib.*

was made by Mandeville, in the *Fable of the Bees*, 1723. With Mandeville, this distinction was not made in a manner quite comparable to the morale of Nietzsche, in *The Genealogy of Morals*; at the same time, one cannot believe that Mandeville was possessed of that moral sincerity which cannot be overlooked in Nietzsche, even when one fails to sympathize with his particular conception of goodness. With Mandeville, the distinction between "low-minded people" and "high-spirited creatures" was not made by either class concerned, but by a third order of men, the wise men and law-givers, who found it expedient to arrange mankind into such contrasted groups. In this manner, the superior men, in distinction from the master-moralists of Nietzsche, were the men of self-denial and public-spiritedness while the inferior ones were the selfish ones, who preferred voluptuousness to self-restraint. When, however, Mandeville attempted to show how "the savage man was (or at least might have been) broke," he suggested that the first principles of morality were broached by skilful politicians, who exalted the nobility of the superior men; thus, those actions which were esteemed useful were called by the name of virtue, the injurious ones were styled "vice."¹⁴

In the elaboration of the doctrine, selfhood through strength, no thinker of the Enlightenment, and perhaps no individualist of the nineteenth century, was superior to William Blake. In paying his respects to the author of *Paradise Lost*, Blake said, "The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God, and at liberty when of devils and hell, is because he was a true poet, and of the devil's party without knowing it."¹⁵ Fragmentary and paradoxical as are the utterances of Blake, they can be understood in the age of Nietzsche, and that so thoroughly that the continued reading of

¹⁴ Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*, 2nd ed., 1723, Ch. I.

¹⁵ *Prophetic Books*, Voice of the Devil.

Nietzsche becomes unnecessary. Blake was the first to effect the "transvaluation of all values"; that is, Blake saw his way clear to effect the transposition of "good" and "evil." From the traditional point of view, "good" was regarded as that which is rational and passive, "evil" active and energistic; in Blake's mind, the denotation should so be reversed that irrational energy should constitute the new good, while passive reason should be styled bad. In a more definite manner, Blake would relegate the new good to the body, while the new bad should be regarded as having its seat in reason, a conception as antithetic to the ideals of the Enlightenment as one could possibly imagine.

Having made his transmutation of good and bad, Blake proceeds to bestow certain characteristics upon the new goodness of strength, which he likens to the "pride of the peacock," the "lust of the goat," the "wrath of the lion," and the "nakedness of woman." In this spirit, Blake devised certain maxims of the new morale, such as, "The tigers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction," and "One law for the lion and the ox is oppression," while his thought everywhere upholds "energy" and "excess."¹⁶ While Blake's prose writings lay more stress upon the idea of strength than upon that of selfhood, his poems do not fail to make mention of the latter, whence he speaks of, "My selfhood, Satan armed in gold,"¹⁷ while his highly mystical poem *The Mental Traveller* seems to indicate the various phases of the struggle between the self and society. While he indulges in the mysticism and sensualism peculiar to the *Décadence* of the nineteenth century, Blake's chief emphasis was laid upon the principle of strength, in which lies apparently the only explanation and justification of his frank immoralism.

¹⁶ *Prophetic Books*, Proverbs of Hell.

¹⁷ *Jerusalem*.

II. THE PRACTICAL SOCIALIZATION OF LIFE

The naturalization of mankind was brought about by modern physics and biology, according to which the earth was adjusted to the universe with its single system of natural laws, while man was then relegated to earth according to a single principle of physico-social evolution. There is no longer a privileged planet in the universe, no longer a privileged person upon the planet; all life has become scientific and social. For a while, the modern man asserted an individualism in the solipsism and egoism of the Enlightenment; here it was asserted that, since all perception and conception come from the mind, the mind is thus supreme; there, since all action springs from the will, the active individual is in control of the social situation. If man will have a purely physical world, it is only because his mind so dictates; if he will have a social order, it is simply because he consents to the "social contract." Now, with the naturalization and socialization of life, the powers of thinking and doing have been taken from man, who henceforth must say, "I do not think, but thought goes on within my brain; I do not will, but work streams through my hand." If individualism did not actually feel the implications of positivism, it did not fail to place the ego of to-day in a position where he may take a stand against the naturalizing and socializing influences of human life; unfortunately, this stand was a severe one; it involved the irrationalistic in its anti-scientism, the immoralistic in its anti-social attitude. If the individual refuses to be subsumed under the premises, it is difficult to see how he can be forced to the scientifico-social conclusion; the only unhappy feature about the individualist's attitude is its apparent impossibility.

Unless contemporary thought is brought to the full realization of all that is included in the innocent word

"social," it will not be likely to give credence to the rash ideals of decadent individualism: in the days of Baudelaire, these ideals were far from plausible; with Nietzsche, who has been no less bitter, the case is otherwise, for Nietzsche was in a position to feel the force of the oppressive social ideal. In themselves, decadence, pessimism, and skepticism cannot command approval; but, as replies to sociality, they are not impossible conceptions of the worth and truth of a human life which persists in self-assertion. Before the advance of the social ideal, both the intellect and the will soon succumbed; man thus accepted the fact that his life, his work, were altogether social.

I. THE SOCIALIZATION OF WORK

The socialization of work, with its practical corollaries for life, is one of the most vivid ideas in the history of modern industrialism. Thus arose a practical synthesis of the issues of life in response to which wills that had once worked in independence now began to intertwine so that all sense of individuating impulse has long since passed away. In the treatment of this problem by the political Socialist, the socialization of work comes in for approval and disapproval at the same time. Socialism bows before the necessity of socialized industry, and confines its criticism of the tendency to pointing out that, where labor is socially expended, the rewards for that labor are not socially, but individualistically distributed. It is not in the social production, but in the non-social distribution, of wealth that the difficulty arises. At the same time, when Socialism carries on its criticism of the existing conditions and present-day methods of capital, it seems to find it necessary to criticize individualism. But, in the case of the latter question, what is meant by "individualism"? Who is the "individual"?

In order to save individualism from Socialism, if indeed this can be done, it is well to make a distinction between a doctrine of individualism according to which a man is what he has, and a different formulation of the principle of personal life in the world, according to which a man is what he is; one is the "individual" of commerce, the other the individual of culture. Now, while Socialism is of course opposed to the individual of commerce, it does not follow that it is opposed to the individual of culture. "You must confess," says *The Communist Manifesto*, "that by 'individual' you mean no other person than the Bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must indeed be swept out of the way, and made impossible. Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation."¹⁸ Socialism, which seems to interpret the "products of society" as though they included both material and spiritual goods, further declares itself in favor of culture. "Just as to the Bourgeois, the disappearance of class-property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class-culture is to him the disappearance of all culture."¹⁹

Socialism thus fails to present antagonism to an individualism which seeks selfhood in culture; nevertheless, Socialism accepts the scientific socialization of life with a readiness which with individualism is not forthcoming. Can man be himself in work when that work is from now on ever destined to be a socialized one? If he relinquish his sense of selfhood in his labor, can he retrieve it when he receives the reward of that labor? Is the essential principle in selfhood the expression of character by means of action, or the realization of char-

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, Authorized tr., 37-38.

¹⁹ *Ib.*, 38.

acter from the objective results of that action? In individualism, one finds a dual protest; if man comes not into his own after he has labored, he goes not forth into his own when he works. If socialized labor is the last word of human work, individualism must take the stand that, as a means of self-realization, work must be given up, even when physical existence will ever depend upon human toil. Life may be wrong, although that is not likely to be the case; individualism can do nothing else than assert that man must devise some way of being himself in the midst of his work, or else free himself from that work. To appreciate such a paradox, one must come to an understanding with the situation in which work has become so socialized that individual initiative and personal effort have been lost.

The outer socialization of the individual is expressed directly in mechanized industry; when the worker lays hold of the machine, the machine lays hold of him. The outcome of the duel is the victory of the machine, not of the man. To the individualist, who has been taught, who has taught himself, to believe that selfhood is found in such spiritual goods as truth, worth, and beauty, the situation presented by industrial activity is hopeless, for there the life-content is nothing but labor, from which the beautiful, the worthy, and the truthful have long since fled. When, therefore, Socialism protests that the worker has no property, no tools, the individualist protests that the worker has no culture, no character. Knowledge of his work and fidelity to work he may still possess; but such knowledge and such character, however useful in an age of industrialism, are not true in the eyes of individualism. When one considers the worker, one feels that sympathism should force the world to give him material goods to the very full of food, clothing, and shelter; but when one looks again, one cannot refrain from another kind of sympathism

which insists that the laborer be allowed to have ideas and motives of his own.

As a result of the industrial conditions, men have been herded from without and oppressed from within. To look back from the omnipotent socialization of working humanity, from which all thinking humanism has departed, to the ethical systems which considered life as inherently individual, is to wonder how mankind could have been so blind to his own condition in the world. Then, when ethical thought was ignorant of the social idea, all possible ethical effort was expended in the direction of persuading the "isolated" individual to come into the social order; the advantages of the "social contract," the duty of benevolence, the beauties of "altruism" were emphasized in the endeavor to induce the sheep to flock, the bees to swarm. As late as the utilitarianism of Sidgwick, this plea for socialization was continued. But what is the actual condition of man but a crowded one, what is the condition of his mind but a socially conscious one, what the impulse of his will but an outward-going effort which causes him to give? In explanation of the ethics of "altruism," it may be pointed out that, since the industrial conditions had not yet been sufficiently advanced to produce the complete socialization of contemporary thought, the moralist may be excused for his error when he insisted that the individual do that which he must do, while it may further be suggested that the ethical thinker of the old order was seeking to enjoin a more genuine altruism in accordance with which man was asked to give cheerfully of that which he did indeed seem to possess.

With the drab truth of industrialism before our eyes, we realize that the call to altruism is a mockery, just as we must suspect that those who still assume the altruistic ideal, in the light of which they exhort the individual to engage in social service, do so with a purpose; these

social "altruists," who insist upon the worth and truth of otherness, are apparently trying to cast a glory over the melancholy situation, as if they would persuade man that what he must do is that which he ought to do. With the change from relative isolation, which ever seemed threatened with an egoism due to the tendency on the part of the individual to rejoice in the privacy of his interior life, to almost complete socialization, altruism assumes a selfish form, while egoism as a doctrine seems to be better calculated to help the other, to help him be himself. The problem of life, then, instead of involving a means of placing the self in the social order, consists in finding a way of escape for that individual.

The outer socialization of life through work has had the effect of tearing man's will from him; when work was manual, the fatality of labor was not felt, but when work became the operation of machinery, the world-work of the individual came to an end. As the naturalization of man involved an interpretation of life in terms of natural facts, so the socialization of man has been due to the application of natural forces to the work man had previously sought to perform as his own work. Physical science made necessary a new interpretation of man's mind; the same physical science, as applied to steam and electricity, gives a new complexion to man's will. Pure psychology once confronted the question whether man is an automaton; applied psychology finds the man of industry assuming the rôle of the automaton which earlier thought had sought through speculation to deny. Industry has made man automatic, for the worker must imitate his machine; industry has made man dependent upon others, since he can work in co-operation only. This industrial organization of life has made for the enhancement of the product, not for the enhancement of the personal producer. Man cannot stand alone

in noble isolation; he must work in connection with the physically organized machines and socially organized laborers; the physical and the social have thus become the mill-stones of modern industry. Just as there has come from physico-social organization a great economic good, so the outcome of the affair may bring about an equally great ethical good; but, at the present time, it must be seen that the economic benefit has far outstripped the ethical benefit, the naturalistic has overawed the humanistic. Meanwhile, the claims of individualism, to the effect that man should have his own life and do his own work, are to be neglected only at great spiritual peril. Better assume the paradoxical idea that there should be no work, than conclude that there should be no humanity. But it may appear that human life has about it such a degree of truth and worth that the individual may find it possible to say, "I am," "I do."

Just as industrialism holds out to man the supposed advantages of physical and social work, so it employs its moralizing powers to render man contented and faithful. The socialization of life thus ends in such a bay as the "ethics of industrialism," as this crowns Spencer's system of *Synthetic Philosophy*. The glories of the ancient military regime pass away leaving the individual unarmed against his industrial foe. Where, under the old system, there was a militaristic "code of enmity," industrialism comes in with the "code of amity."²⁰ But is industrialism any less cruel than was militarism? Then, men were forced to fight; now they are forced to work. Is there sufficient humanistic character in the code of industrialism? It is true that industrialism has made, as it were, a great world of humanity, if we may accept the inter-dependence of individual and individual, of race and race, as equiva-

²⁰ *Data of Ethics*, Ch. VIII.

lent to that humanistic order; it is true also that industrialism has seemingly created a world of work, if we may assume that the proportions and character of such a world are to be found in economic activity. But have the worth and truth of life been conserved in this social synthesis?

The actual effects of industrialism may be appreciated when one remembers what conservative Capitalism has had to offer in the way of a proposed Socialism. The critic of Socialism has found it necessary to point out that the socialization of both the production and the distribution of wealth would result in a condition of mankind where individuality would be lost, individual initiative destroyed, private property abolished, the worker living in barracks. It may be that Socialism, which proposes to build upon the ruins of Capitalism, would indeed involve such a distressing condition of human affairs; if so, Socialism would have to meet the opposition of the individual. But, in contemplating the actual condition of the socialized man of the day, do we not find that our industrial life has already lodged us in some such condition? Viewed from the standpoint of the living and life-loving individual, industrialism seems so to have socialized life that private existence has become well nigh impossible.

The removal of the individual has accompanied the progress of socialized work, so that it is only in the extreme form of aesthetic personality that the ego may still be found. The individual of industrialism, basing his claim to selfhood upon his possessions, is in no sense the human individual as such. When, further, it is suggested that the coming of Socialism will mark the departure of the family, it must not be forgotten that, in large measure, the family-idea has succumbed to the influence of industrialism. Socialism might indeed complete the work of industrialism and thus disestablish the

family as such, but the actual and probably unconscious abolition of the family has already begun. Human beings do not dwell in barracks, but the tenements of the laboring class are not many removes from this condition of things. The institution of private property has not been legally abolished, but in the actual condition of things, wherein a small minority are in possession of a large majority of material goods, the property-idea has become nominal. If one fears that individual initiative would pass with the coming of a completely, instead of a partially, socialized life, he must not overlook the fact that, where socialized work with machinery is the method of production, the individual initiative has largely lapsed. Under the auspices of industrialism, the individualistic "I am," "I will," have been neglected.

The industrial ideal which had its origin in the socialization of work, might perhaps represent a view of life which should prevail because of its sheer force; but to accept it as a fact, as many may choose to do, is not to accept it as interpretation of human existence and human character in the world. For those who cling to the ideal of an interior, self-directed life for mankind, and who can see no way out of the industrial situation, the most likely course is that of pessimism. Indeed, the decadent skepticism and pessimism which are soon to be examined seem to have this very motive as their source; with no place for the individual in the social order, such anti-social cynicism has been no uncommon attitude on the part of the aesthetic individualist. At the same time, individualism has to thank social industrialism for the way in which it has emphasized and objectified the inherent sociality of our contemporary culture; at last we observe most clearly how, in the actual exteriorization of life, the theory of life as social may assume a most definite outline. No longer need we puzzle over

utilitarian adjustments of the individual to society, since the individual is firmly embedded in that society, as a "stone among stones"; no longer need we strive with utilitarianism as it seeks to show how man passed from the purely hedonic within to the moralic without, in the conscious deduction of "common-sense morality." We see now that man is social, that man is moral, for it has been the fate of life to socialize and moralize him. In place of the utilitarian "demonstration" of the altruistic nature of man, we are confronted by an objective, direct altruism in the form of complete sociality. In place of the derivative moralism, due to the forgotten idealization of utilities, we see man rendered moralic by means of convention. Thus, it is no longer possible to proceed from the naïve individual, and then seek to derive sociality and morality; for the social and the conventional seize his consciousness before he has had the opportunity to say, "I am," or "I will."

2. THE SOCIALIZATION OF MORALITY

The foregoing discussion of *The Socialization of Life* was carried on for the purpose of showing that the social principle, instead of representing an ideal toward which the sympathistic should strive, is the actual situation which confronts every one who thinks he has a place in the world, a special need of existence. Thus, we hope to see most clearly that, having passed from the relativistic and utilitarian ideal of life to the actual condition of sociality and industry, we need no longer have anxiety for the welfare of the altruistic and moralistic ideals which the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sought so earnestly, and so blindly, to establish. Utilitarianism has passed into history, and its history is one which we can now read with open eyes. One may be able to understand how Hobbes could assume egoism and relativism, and then seek to show how the

social and moral attitude was brought about by means of contract; but one cannot so easily comprehend why Mill should have sought to prove the altruistic and the moralistic, when Comte had shown that these things were among the last to stand in need of demonstration. Still more surprising was the attempt of Sidgwick to graft the social and moral upon a utilitarian system so loath to receive it. At last we realize that human life is a socialized, legalized affair, so that we need spend no time in search of proofs which should show that man is thus social and conventional.

(1) *The Social Source of Morality*

The "proof" of altruism, which exhausted all the resources of the utilitarian, is now seen to be worthless as a conclusion, since the major premise, Man seeks his own happiness, has been seen to be false. Perhaps the blindness of the utilitarian, who sought to show that the social was useful to the individual, would not have been suffered had not the utilitarian been bent upon working out his theory of life upon purely hedonic grounds. With the static conception of nature, and the concomitant idea that the work of the world was a finished one, it was quite natural that the moralist of the Enlightenment should regard the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the sole motives of the human will; but, with the dynamic view of the natural and social worlds, ethics was called upon to take into account the fact that the first demand in life is life itself, existence rather than the enjoyment of existence. The work of the social order must be done, the affairs of society be arranged, so that to premise the greatest happiness of the greatest number is to overlook the truth that the individuals who make up society must first assure themselves of existence. Again, so far as the individual himself is concerned, it is no longer possible to apply

the hedonic ideal to one who, finding no selfhood in mere self-love, has a finer and more serious task in his effort to be himself and express himself. What social thinker of the nineteenth century treated society after the manner of the "greatest happiness" theory? What individualist was content to express the meaning of selfhood after the manner of seventeenth-century "selfishness"? Apart from any hedonic considerations, men have been found to be living together in a manner so unified that only the analogy of the organism seems capable of representing this social solidarity. In the same manner, individualism has deduced such characteristic qualities of selfhood that no traditional conception of self-love can longer hope to interpret the sense of life as this is felt within.

Society, itself organic to man as man, has been brought together so perfectly, so compactly, by socialized work that all attempts to "prove" the social are useless and misleading. The key to the difficulty seems to be found in the false anthropology of Hobbes, in accordance with which the non-social, non-moral ego was the point of departure. Had the age been able to ignore this error, the false impression would not have been given. As it was, Grotius had made the social nature of man the starting-point of his system, while the earliest reply to Hobbes, that of Cumberland in his *De Legibus Naturae*, 1672, had not failed to seek and to find evidences of man's social nature.²¹ Furthermore, Shaftesbury, in his *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, 1699, ignored the Hobbist ego, and relegated man to a complete "system," which included the human, the animal, and the vegetable,²² while his psychology of man was such as to make room for "natural public affections, natural private affections, unnatural affections."²³ With Hume, it was sympathy from which

²¹ *Op. cit.*, cap. 2.

²² *Op. cit.*, II, 2, 1.

²³ *Ib.*, I, 2, 3.

morality was to be derived, the source of the social and the moral.²⁴ Why these forerunners of Comte were not esteemed authentic is one of the mysteries of the English Enlightenment. At the same time, it was the detained thought of the nineteenth century, the associational utilitarianism of Mill, which placed upon our ethics the unnecessary burden of proving the obvious, the social nature of mankind. One may place the dogmatic egoism of Hobbes side by side with the utilitarian "demonstration," and one will find that the original statement is as false as the final solution. It must not be overlooked that Mill viewed Comte's morals with "the strongest objections," before he tried to show that, since each desires his own happiness, the general happiness is desirable.²⁵ Nevertheless, we cannot fail to conclude in favor of Comte.

The whole machinery of relativism, associationism, utilitarianism, breaks down from its own weight. Comte's conception of the innate sociality of man depends upon an unprejudiced view of man as man. In speaking of the social state, as viewed by utilitarians and positivists, Comte says, "It is evident that the social state would never have existed, if its rise had depended upon the conviction of its individual utility, because the benefit could never have been anticipated by individuals of any degree of ability, but could only manifest itself after the social evolution had proceeded up to a certain point. There are even sophists who at this day deny the utility, without being pronounced mad; and the spontaneous sociability of human nature, independent of all personal calculation, and often in opposition to the strongest individual interests, is admitted, as of course, by those who have paid no great attention to the true biological theory of our intellectual and moral nature."²⁶ Comte

²⁴ *Treatise of Human Nature*, III, III, I.

²⁵ *Utilitarianism*, Chs. III, IV.

²⁶ *Positive Philosophy*, tr. Martineau, Bk. VI, Ch. V, 498-499.

is frank, not only in his avowal of the perfect sociality of man's moral life, but in his rejection of every suggestion of the ego; in this attitude, he takes a stand which is perfectly consistent from the standpoint of systematic philosophy. What right had the materialism of Hobbes or the associationism of Mill to make the egoistic assumption? Why should it be thought that the removal of all spirituality from the world should result in regarding man as self-centered and self-seeking, except that traditional thought felt that both the materialistic and egoistic hypotheses were equally ignoble? In truth, that which removes the spiritual from the world removes the self with it, so that modern egoism failed to find any just foundation until Butler placed "reasonable self-love" upon the basis of the complete rationality of the world as a whole.

As our examination of the Enlightenment's "egoism" sought to show, individualism finds no ground for its doctrine in the hedonistic ethics of that period, finds scarcely a trace of it in the egoism of the Cartesian school. Only in the case of the Satanism and solipsism of the Enlightenment does individualism see any suggestion of that sense of selfhood and self-expression which it regards as the foci of the individualistic doctrine. In the instance of Comte, the candid rejection of the self is of great value in clearing up the situation; from Comte's attitude, we learn how impossible it is for the scientific view of the world to entertain the idea of the ego as such, so that the social source of morality results in being the sole hope of the positivistic thinker. When, therefore, Comte premised the absolute spontaneity of the social principle, and thus forbade any egoistic calculations concerning the personal advantages of the social state, he had prepared the way for the socialization of life by the scientific removal of the human self. Thus, the conclusion to

his naturalism, as represented by the last chapter of the last science to be examined, consists in the negation of the "I." Having followed the course of nature through the mathematical, astronomical, physical, chemical, and biological, he brings his investigation to a close by substituting the brain for the "I."²⁷ From the negations of biology, he is ready to pass to the affirmations of "social physics."

With the feeling that psychology has too thoroughly intellectualized man, even though his own system of positivism really deepens this prejudice, Comte uses his favorite idea of "spontaneity" to evince the spontaneous activism of the human brain, whereby he is able to lower man from the rational to the biological order. This makes it possible for him to repudiate the theological "soul" and the philosophical "I." From the positivist point of view, human nature, far from being a unified affair, is essentially multiple, since its powers tend to urge it in different directions, whence the preservation of equilibrium becomes unusually difficult. "Thus the famous theory of the I is essentially without a scientific object, since it is destined to represent a purely fictitious state."²⁸ This synthetic unity, as philosophy has sought to style the self, is, with Comte, more like a synergy, possessed by all forms of animal life. From the synergistic point of view, Comte is in a position to assert that, instead of man's being the sole possessor of the I, selfhood belongs to animals alike, while in some cases man has less sense of selfhood than that enjoyed by other vertebrates. "No doubt a cat, or any other vertebrated animal, without knowing how to say, 'I,' is not in the habit of taking itself for another. Moreover, it is probable that among the superior animals the sense of personality is still more marked than in man, on account of their more isolated life."²⁹

²⁷ *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. V, Ch. VI.

²⁸ *Ib.*, 385.

²⁹ *Ib.*

In this attempt to eliminate the individual, Comte in his absurdities is not guilty of inconsistency; given the naturalistic premises, the conclusion that man has no "I am" is sure to follow, although one cannot see how the principle of isolation could have the effect of producing in the lower animal a higher sense of selfhood than is found in man. Comte's theory of the "self," while appearing to confine itself to mere consciousness, or cerebral activity, presses on to the realm of humanism, where the positivist is called upon to explain the culture of the self by means of education and legislation, the influence of which he feels unable to deny. Comte makes his escape from this predicament in a manner most suggestive to the individualist; positivism does regard law as making possible man's reasonable liberty, education as providing for improvement; but it denies the rights of an ideology which seeks to convert "all men into so many Socrates,' Homers, or Archimedes'." ³⁰ Now it is the converting of raw humanity into so many egos of the type mentioned which forms the individualistic idea; meanwhile, it is incumbent upon positivism to show how such egos have made their appearance in the world, where positivistic laws of being and action are supposed to be consecrated to the purely biological and social.

The development of the positivistic method, as this appears in Spencer, shows how the evolutionary theory made it possible for the moralist to make use of a regressus and a progressus unknown to Comte. In pursuing, not merely the biological, but the full system of biological evolution, Spencer finds it possible to consider conduct as that which passes from purely physical motion to that which is perfect in its individualistico-social character. In the lowest view of conduct, we find the expression of the evolutionary law, whence

³⁰ *Positive Philosophy*, 390-391.

matter begins its passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; from the highest view-point, we gain a view of the "behaviour of the completely adapted man in the completely evolved society."³¹ Indeed, Spencer's "ultimate man," as one who has lived to see the passing of self-sacrifice, is not altogether unlike the individualist's ego, who has been known to be cruel and hard. Whether Spencer had the philosophic right to introduce such a self into his system is another question; and we can only feel that he has borrowed this ego from either the theological or metaphysical temple whose doors Comte was supposed to have closed.

When individualism surveys the socialization of ethics, whereby all hedonism and utilitarianism were left stranded, it asks itself whether there may not be something in the discarded idea of a human "aggregate" seeking its "greatest happiness" which may be of value in the individualistic view of life. It was the eighteenth-centuryism which, clinging to utilitarianism, was swept away by the advance of positivism; and, as an ideal of the Enlightenment, the happiness of the self cannot be regarded as sound. Yet, without making use of the impossible ideas of the political aggregate or the utilitarian sense of happiness, individualism may register its protest against the bland ideal of the health of the social organism, inasmuch as that bovine ideal ignores the inner life of man, wherein the joy of living is such an important consideration. It seems now that the eudaemonistic ideal, which has been rejected by positivism, may become an integral part of individualism, and the history of individualism shows how important to the doctrine of selfhood this idea of personal felicity can be.

Individualism, then, distinguishes itself from positivism when individualism insists upon the self and the joy of existence: positivism has no place for the self;

³¹ *Data of Ethics*, § 104.

and, were it forced to admit the existence of the "I," it would have nothing eudaemonistic for it in the social state. This lack of individualism and lack of eudaemonism must be fully appreciated by those who would understand the strivings of the modern individualist; and when these strivings appear vicious, one must again remember that individualism, in its conflict with positivism, has been justified in resorting to the most extreme measures, aestheticism, immoralism, irreligion, in order to convince the world that the self exists, *et ego in Arcadia*. Individualism, when left to itself, may indeed advance to the irrational and vicious, to the decadence of aestheticism, the diabolism of an immoralistic ideal; but better this exaggerated, uncontrolled ego than no ego at all, and it is at the elimination of the ego that scientifico-social thought has been aiming. It has been the fate of the human self to have been placed in the egoistic position, although it must be admitted that individualism was not slow to accept the office to which society had appointed it. One does not rashly withdraw from the world to assume an anti-social position; but, when continuance in the world means self-negation, the individualist takes the step outward.

When science, having made its beginnings first with the physical and then with the biological, turned its attention toward the social ideal of human life, it placed idealistic people in a peculiar position. If these idealists desired to inherit the inner life with its religious possibilities, they would be forced to adopt the extravagant egoism of the decadent school, wherein selfhood was not wholly distinguishable from the Satanism of Blake and Baudelaire; now, idealism was unwilling to pay such a price. On the other hand, did these spiritually minded ones feel that they must abide by the principles of Christian charity, they found themselves so situated that they must take the scientist as the Posi-

tivist priest, and thus identify love and benevolence with the gregarious tendency observable alike in beasts and human beings. The strange synthesis of Christian and scientific ethics, in both of which the humanitarian is so influential, is easy to recognize, not so easy to explain. One might indeed expect science, which had been so rigorous in its treatment of the religious conception of the spiritual world, to have carried its warfare over into the practical also, and to have inaugurated as radical a conception of life as of the world. For some reason, science did nothing of the kind, but rather adopted a morale the fundamental principles of which are parallel to those of Christianity. As a result, the atheistic scientist of the nineteenth century found it possible to postulate an ethics which tended to place Darwin and Huxley by the side of their ecclesiastical opponents. In this atheism, there is a peculiar note of tenderness, a peculiar yearning for humanity, and one is not sure that science and religion are so mutually opposed; on the other hand, the atheism which saves the humanitarian seems better to the average thinker than a Satanism which aspires to save the individual.

(2) *The Social Sanction of Morality*

The moral docility of science, which led Nietzsche to place both scientist and religionist in the same class of the poor in spirit, must not hide the fact that, even where scientific morality was not vicious, it was mediocre, inferior. At the same time, the scientific socialization of morality was such as to weaken the force of the moral sanction, that is, among those who were possessed of the "robust conscience"; we shall not grieve over our social sins, reasoned these stout hearts, and compunction in the character of mere compassion shall not torment him who has resolved to "be hard." Where conscience is not so thoroughly explicable, it is not so

easy to repudiate it or to withstand its sting, so that the terrors of conscience have with Shakespeare a tragic influence which is lost to Ibsen. The modern protagonist, whether an Ibsenesque Skule, in *The Pretenders*, or a Nora, in *Doll's House*, is confronted by no other conscience than the social conscience; and, if he or she be healthy of mind, the social sanction will be unable to overcome the egoistic impulse. As Beata, in Sudermann's *The Joy of Living*, said, "It is not *your* conscience, but the conscience of the *race*."³² In presenting morality with the conscience of the race, science has been good and bad at once; science has assumed the cloak of righteousness, but has not been able to supply the living body of moral sanction.

The case of conscience is so significant in the socialization of the moral life that the reminiscence of it can be only instructive. In *The Descent of Man*, it found its most authoritative statement. Darwin placed himself in a position where he was able to read Adam Smith and Butler at the same time; imperious conscience at once assumed the form of a persistent instinct. This persistent instinct appears as sociability, in which we have an example of the way that nature cares for the species at the expense of the individual. Awakened in man, where the social instinct assumes the moralic form par excellence, this enduring instinct is not absent from other species: monkeys, for example, are found in the altruistic position of removing external parasites and other irritants from the fur of those afflicted; and the compassionate act is performed "conscientiously."³³ The psychological principle at work in both animal and man is expressed by saying that the more enduring social instinct conquers the less persistent individualistic instinct. In the case of the human species, that which effects the change from the sub-moral to the moral is

³² *Op. cit.*, tr. Wharton, Act. IV.

³³ *Descent of Man*, 1873, I, 72.

found in the superiority of intellect, in which latter memory and ideation are more highly developed. Hence, the beast or bird can be cruel, because memory fails to present to its mind the image of the young which the creature has neglected; but, with man, the idea of others is more persistent than the idea of self, hence the submission to the principle of conscience. In Darwin's mind, the "bad man" is he who, wanting in sympathy, is not overcome with conscience after the anti-social deed has been done.³⁴ Now it is at this point that individualism has felt called upon to repudiate the scientific conscience; individualism arose instinctively as an anti-social, anti-scientific revolt, before the positivist formulation of the scientifico-social was in the saddle, ready to ride mankind. Polemical individualism may have been both irrationalistic and immoralistic, but it never sinned against the self.

From conscience to duty, the path is plain; conscience and duty are but twin expressions of the total moral consciousness. The academic difference between the pair may be understood when one makes the simple distinction between the intellect and the will: conscience is the awareness of the moral fact; duty the affirmation of the good, the negation of the bad. Now the old "duty" was imposed rationally by the individual, who swung the yoke over his own shoulders; the new "duty" has been placed upon the individual by society. The social duty thus assumes the form of responsibility, a sense aroused by the fact that, since man actually lives in society, man must assume the burdens of the social order. Even with the rigorous Kant, there was a suggestion of the social, when the Categorical Imperative was thought to impose a maxim of conduct fit to become a universal law. Expressed in the social form, the Categorical Imperative bids the individual act

³⁴ *Descent of Man*, 1873, I, 88.

with the weight of all mankind upon his shoulders; where the rational Imperative chastised with whips, the social Imperative chastises with scorpions. Individualism, which arose before the social morale was in power, was thus armed before its opponent appeared upon the field.

It is in connection with the strictly moral that the conflict between the individual and society assumes its most interesting and most acute form; man is naturally susceptible to ethical influence, so that when the social argument passes on from the scientific attempt to explain primitive conduct to the equally scientific attempt to dictate motives and emotions, it becomes difficult for the individualist to continue his conflict. At the same time, the history of individualism does not fail to reveal the fact that, having asserted the independence of the true and the good, the individual has found it possible to arm himself against the scientific law of the good. The tenderness of scientific ethics with its inordinate concern for the species has been met by the cruelty of aesthetic ethics, in which the inner life of the individual is the only imperative. Where the new ethics commands, "Be social," individualism continues to command, "Be thyself." At present, sociality seems to find no way of recognizing the sanctity of the individualistic imperative, nor does the individual find it in his heart to assent to the social sanction. Spencer thought to find a way out of the conflict by pointing to the coming of an Absolute Ethics, under the auspices of which the conflicting claims of egoism and altruism would be mutually reconciled; and Nietzsche sought to find a social place for the egoistic superman by prophesying the coming of a race of such individuals. But, if philosophy is sufficiently futuristic to solve the problems of present-day thought, it is none the less necessary for us to realize how deeply both the social and individual have

entered the blood; more perfectly aware of the social, as this has objectified itself in institutional ethics, we are no less conscious of the individualistic, as this appears in the culture-consciousness of the day.

In the career of modern ethics, the problems of source and sanction have been so confused and blended that it has not been until of late that the desired separation of the two has received adequate treatment, if indeed the present-day method may be called adequate. At first, the question of source was not raised for its own sake as a question of anthropology and psychology, but was pursued casually for the purpose of establishing a moral principle. This was the case with Hobbes, who sought to lay down the principles and enjoin the methods of relativism by showing, as he seemed to think, that morality sprang up naturally from a non-moral source. The non-moral condition of mankind was felt to have been one of primitive egoism, so that the elaboration of a social conception of character made necessary that abrupt and artificial passage from nature to society which Hobbes celebrates in his theory of social contract. It was thus because he wished to evince the sanctity of the social that he attempted to show that man had actually made the transition from the egoistic to the social. The good became that which man had actually done.

The opponents of Hobbes, especially those who, like Cudworth and Clarke, sought to overthrow his ethics of relativism, were as poorly equipped with anthropological data and methods as he had been; hence they were in no position to throw light upon the question, How did the moral life begin? The absolutism which set itself in defiance of the Hobbist relativism was strangely calm in the presence of that idea of self-love which Hobbes had made central to his own system. Cudworth and Clarke were absolutists, but not altruists; they felt no

shock in the idea of egoism, for it was only the relativism of virtue and vice which aroused them. But the assertion that virtue and vice are eternally in character and that the distinction between them is equally free from temporalistic taint, did little to fortify the ethical consciousness against the tide of social morality which had begun to rise. Hobbes may not have given a true account of the passage from mere pleasure-pain to sheer virtue-vice, but his absolutistic opponents had shot over the mark when they sought to relegate morality to eternity. The source of morality was still to be found.

The Enlightenment was blind to history, and it was only as its rationalism passed away that the idea of progress became a category in the speculative mind. It is true that Vico's *Scienza Nuova* (1725) was possessed of more penetration than the average work of that period; true also that Turgot's *Les Progrès successifs de l'esprit humain* (1750) was not wanting in historical sense. But these works were not so influential as the traditional documents of the eighteenth century, where the static ideals of rationalism obtained. The nineteenth century, however, was as thoroughly committed to time as the earlier had been consecrated to eternity; so that the question concerning the origin of morality has not wanted for psychological treatment, even when one might complain that the genetic interest had often been allowed to mask the moral ideal. Two attempts to disclose the source of "good" and "bad" have been made: the utilitarian, and the social evolutionary. The difference between these may be comprehended by observing that, where the utilitarian did not proceed in the spirit of a sufficient anthropology, it had the advantage of concluding with some sort of an explanation of what it called "common-sense morality." On the other hand, the evolutionist has been more successful in securing a conception of the primitive mind,

less successful, however, in conveying that to an age which still sees something intrinsic in morality. Mill thus advanced from utility to virtue; Spencer was able to advance from nothing more than one degree of interest to another, passing under the remote ideals of virtue and vice as such.

It must not be forgotten that the Enlightenment was possessed of a dogmatism shared by both rigorist and hedonist; for, where a Cudworth would have nothing but virtue and vice at the poles of his moralic sphere, Bentham was equally opposed to the admission of anything but pleasure and pain, so that he sought to banish the moralic "ought" from the dictionary of ethics.³⁵ On the hedonistic side, this was far from representing the attitude of Mill, who, while he suffered virtue to enter the moral court only after utility had demonstrated its right to be there, did not hesitate to accord to independent virtue a place by the side of utility itself. With Mill, then, virtue was viewed as secondary in origin, while it was esteemed as primary in point of ground. Mill premised a supreme utility, and then sought to admit the minor premise of virtue, by looking upon the latter as something outwardly moralic, but inwardly utilitarian: virtue is a past utility; virtue is a forgotten utility. As one passes from the love of money for its purchasing power to the love of money for its own sake, so man passes from virtue as that which is useful to virtue which exists for its own sake. By association, then, virtue acquired a moralic character, the change from the utility to the virtue coming about by the obsolescence of the useful as motive.³⁶ In reply to this argument in favor of the utilitarian origin of morality, Nietzsche insisted that the utility of the original act cannot be conceived of as lapsing, while the forgetting of the utility would have been equally im-

³⁵ *Deontology*, 1834, 31-32.

³⁶ *Utilitarianism*, Ch. IV.

possible.³⁷ Begin with the utilitarian, and you end with the utilitarian.

The individualistic theory of moral progress, which Nietzsche upholds, seems to be of weight more upon the side of the ground of moral as superioristic, less upon the side of its origin as that which was peculiar to the aristocrat of primitive times. Nietzsche's argument is almost altogether philological, while it does not fail to involve etymologies which seem scarcely plausible. First, it is insisted that the ability to name things and the prerogative of defining belonged to the superior man rather than to the people. With the power of definition in the hands of the superior person, it is not hard to assume that the superior man would call "good" that which was peculiar and most precious to him as one of high spirit and superior social situation. "Bad" would stand for the attributes of inferior people who in being simple (*schlicht*) were likewise bad (*schlecht*). In particular, the lower races having usually been those of dark skin, it seemed possible to Nietzsche to establish a connection between bad (*malus*) and black (*melas*). Where Nietzsche could have continued these analogies and could thus have connected good (*bonus*) with fair (bonnie), he chose to interpret *bonus* as coming from *duonus*, in which is found the idea of the duelling man, the man of contention, the warrior.³⁸ The upshot of the Nietzschean contention is that morality was handed down from above as a privilege to be enjoyed by the common people, not thrust up from below as the rights of those who are inferior.

In seeking to adjust one's self to such a difference of opinion, it is well to remember that, in considering the past, it is quite difficult to avoid using the present as the method of approach. In this manner, Mill attributes to the primitive man the same economic wisdom which,

³⁷ *Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Hausman, § 3.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, § 5.

in modern times, was impressed upon man by the careful reasoning of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and likewise Mill himself. In the same fashion, Nietzsche seeks to account for the sentiments of the primitive individual by drawing an analogy between his mind and that of an aristocratic Pole like himself. Now, as a matter of fact, was the primitive man a Mill or a Nietzsche? We know of course that he was neither one nor the other, so that, if he was utilitarian, it was in his own way; if he was aristocratic, it was after the manner of his own character. If it be said that, whereas the aristocratic ideal by virtue of its very superiority was impossible with the primitive man, while the very commonness of utility would have fitted utility for assuming the position of moral principle, it may be questioned whether utility, however inferior it may be as an ideal, is such an easy idea for the mind to perfect. In addition to the economic theorists who have given a meaning to work and value, the present age has witnessed the rise of economic practitioners, who, in the capacity of "social engineers," are striving to get the maximum of value out of both world and work. Was the primitive man any more "efficient" than "ideal"?

If, as may well be the case, we are in ignorance concerning the ideas and motives of the man of nature, we are in no position to assert that the origin of morality then was as utilitarian as the outcome of it seems to be to-day. What the primitive man actually did is one thing; what he assumed to be doing is somewhat different. Conduct may be utilitarian where the sanction of conduct, as in the case of the Hebrew Law, may be ideal. Can we assert that the primitive man did only useful things when the man of perfected civilization is still annoyed to find that much of his effort is far removed from the efficiency so earnestly sought? In the midst of this doubt which we feel when we strive

to explain primitive conduct in the light of the perfections of an economic age like our own, we are confronted by the fact that out of the primitive consciousness there came the ideals of art and worship which have come down to us in such forms as, for example, the *Rik Veda*. Utility is there too; but the primitive man seems to have had a better knowledge of the sky than of the earth, and to have been devoted to his ideas in a manner unknown among the practical motives of his life. In those early days, when the forces of nature and the phenomena of mind had not been subjected to physics or psychology, the ideal was as likely a path as the real.

III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE SOCIAL

Social philosophy has been able to make headway in modern culture for the reason that modern thought and modern life, freed from the formalism of the classic world and emancipated from the restrictions of scholasticism, have seen fit to indulge the passion for the actual in the heterogeneity of detail. At the present hour, it would seem to be impossible to estimate the number of actual facts which have been brought to light by physical and social science. Both nature and humanity have been subjected to microscopic examination in the course of which the data of science have accumulated to a degree far beyond the power of the investigator to comprehend. New sciences have been created and the old so subdivided that the new part is much greater than the old whole, whence nature assumes a form of infinite complexity. In the humanistic field, the past has been extended far beyond the old limits of historicity; and, to all this new realm of anthropology, the old history has been done over in such a manner as to render the life of man on earth an affair of indescribable manifoldness. The effect of such a culture of the naturistic and the

social has been to create the impression that scientism and sociality contain enough in the way of idea and ideal to satisfy the intellect and will of the individual. If the satisfaction of man's spiritual nature were wholly a question of quantity, then the extensiveness of modern culture would be more than sufficient for the needs of human life; but, where the needs of the human soul, as these expressed themselves in the past, were of such a character that the immediacies of nature and society did not forestall the enlightenment and furtherance of art, morality, and religion, these needs are such that no increase of the same kind of scientific knowledge is able to supply them. Thus, as individualism judges scientism to be insufficient, it must regard sociality as inadequate.

I. LACK OF LIFE-CONTENT IN SOCIALITY

By its very nature, thinking is bound to be a formal proceeding on the part of the human mind. Where one busies himself with mathematics and logic, he does not fail to recognize the barren nature of the thinking which his work involves; but when he turns to the field of experience, he persuades himself that thinking has now acquired a new nature, far different in kind from that which it possessed when its work was avowedly abstract. But such is not the case: the content is there indeed; but the method of handling is no freer from formalism than that which was operative in the less realistic realm. In themselves, the principles of science are as wanting in content as those of Aristotle's logic; and Spencer's definition of evolution, which he would apply alike to nature and society, is as abstract as the worst product of scholasticism. In the special field of social science, the propositions advanced in connection with such subjects as "man," "life," and "morality" are so far removed from the actual life-content of these subjects that no one can recognize in himself that which he

reads upon the page of the sociological work, whence he imagines that the author must be speaking of some one else, or some other species of men.

The formalism which makes sociality so inadequate appears at once in connection with that which social science calls, "the self." Such a punctual ego has no existence in human life, but is simply a factor, x or y , m or n , introduced into the calculation. In the realm of physical science, there is no lack of this punctual thinking, but here the abuse of the object in question can make no great difference to the thing; moreover, physical science is ever in a position to descend from the species in general to the specimen in particular, from the law to an example of its obedience. With social science, however, the highly general principle is not shaped in such a manner that its broad lines are able to converge and meet in the special point indicated by the term "self," so that the self as such has never been the subject of social investigation. To this scruple exercised by those who fail to find human life in social science, it may be replied that social thought is interested in the species rather than in the individual; but even so the individual's participation in the whole should not cause him to forsake that which is most characteristic of his life-content.

Social science has not been able to supply ethics with anything like a definition of the self, except where the social thinker has been allowed to make use of a negative method in the light of which he describes the self in social terms made privative. It must be admitted that the common method of subordination which makes logic appear so simple, is a method which social thinking must pursue with great difficulty. This fact is in the very nature of the case. Suppose that the logical problem consists in relating man to society or to humanity; although the issue in question would seem to be nothing

more than the logic of subordination, the nature of the proposed problem is such as to forbid the free use of this formal method. To relate "dog" to "animality" is to subordinate the specimen to the species, an operation which takes place in such a manner that the subsumed specimen, although it be still an animal, seems to enjoy a kind of existence in independence of the general notion. In the case of the attempted subordination of "the individual" to "humanity" or to "society," there is, so to speak, no appreciable distance between the species and the thing in particular. Indeed, the case in question is akin to that in geometry, where it is necessary to turn from the conceptual to the intuitive in order to show the relation between the triangle in particular, which participates immediately in general space, and space as a universal to which the idea of triangle belongs. As a matter of fact, the idea of "belonging" to a logically superior class, while it applies in the case of oak and tree, dog and animal, has little or no meaning in the instances of individual and humanity, triangle and space. In a certain sense, spatiality is implicit in triangle, while humanity is equally implicit in individuality, since the application of spatiality and humanity is at once intensive and extensive. As a result of this unique situation, social science has not been able to supply the idea of selfhood with any characteristic content.

To obviate the purely punctual treatment of the ego, philosophy is forced to avoid the common methods of subordination, and thus connect the individual with the species. In no generalization whatsoever does the universal have any meaning apart from the particulars which belong to it, even when the scholastic spirit may seek to endow the universal with extra stability. But, with humanity and individual, the connection between general and particular is even less flexible, since there

is a sense in which the individual is humanity and humanity the individual. The aesthetic interpretation of humanity has been such as to afford an intense realization of this logical situation, even when art has not always been ready or able to reveal its secret. Art has proceeded upon the assumption that its intensive particulars have the power to convey the significance of the general to which they might be attached. In this manner, the landscape becomes all nature, the statue humanity, the character mankind, the romance human life. No amount of social logic has been able to indicate the intimate union of the self and society, the individual and humanity, and that because social logic has not been able to see that the relation of the particular to the general, far from being conceptual, is more likely of an intuitive nature.

The inadequacy of the social is one with the insufficiency of the scientific; and, as we have witnessed how polemical individualism sought by an appeal to the inward sense of joy, worth, and truth to invest the scientific "self" with a content, we shall see presently how the same individual, finding no real life-place in the social order, will proceed to interpret his life as the place of those same joys, worths, and truths. There is a life-content to the individual's life; and, if this has not been indicated by sociality, it has not wanted for aesthetic expression. Indeed, the whole individualistic movement from Romanticism to Symbolism and Naturalism has been an attempt to supply the inner life of humanity with a meaning which analytical science has been unable to furnish. In general, it may be said that aestheticism has had its failures too, but these have never been for want of appreciation as far as the human self has been concerned. Aestheticism has afforded the self a rich content even when this content, humanistic, cultural, and eudaemonistic, has not always been en-

closed in thought-forms calculated to provide a contour for the soul-stuff which art has had to contribute. To delineate a suitable form for the humanistic material found in the self is one of the problems of future individualism, which must likewise be careful to entertain a more critical conception of the social order which it has felt free to despise. It is possible for the self to have genuine life-content; and, if social thinking is in no position to supply this, then social thinking must be deemed inadequate. Man is possessed of genuine art, morality, and religion; and no enthusiasm for social generalizations and hypotheses gives one the right to ignore them.

As social thinking has been unable to invest the self with any significant or valuable content, so it has been equally at a loss to make society appear human. Receiving much of its impetus from the new conception of the species which Darwinism contributed, social science has often, if not habitually, allowed itself to pursue an uncritical argument from continuity. To move along in one's speculations guided by a continuous principle is indeed a temptation; and just as long as the facts in the case accompany and justify the speculation *seriatim*, criticism should seek to find no fault. Herder and Hegel, Comte and Spencer, thus make a fine display of ratiocination when they pursue their several systems upward from the physical order to the social or spiritual one; but individualism cannot rest calmly while the phenomena of the interior life are arranged after the manner of things in the natural order. It is perhaps to be presumed that, if the world is a unity, the things of the spirit will harmonize with the things of the world; but, from this general expectation, no one has the right to assume further, if he discover a principle applicable to the natural order, that just this same principle is dominant in the world of persons.

The physical conception of society fails to account for the intensive content in which we recognize the character of man as one who has lived and worked in human history; at the same time, such physical sociality takes no account of the fact that man as man has asserted his humanity by opposing himself to the natural order, as also to the immediately given social one. In this opposition to the given in both nature and society, one finds the essential principle of progress. If one seek to regard history as the tacit acceptance of that which is given without, he is able to do no more than account for one period of history; how that period came to be and how humanity managed to emerge from it to another is beyond the comprehension of him who fails to observe how prone is man to react upon the world-order in which he finds himself. That the individual is confronted by a given physico-social order is not to be doubted, but that he will accept this as final is far from his disposition; it is of the very genius of humanity to react upon the world without, and this reaction can find no explanation in the system of social physics.

The natural result of a purely social conception of humanity is to yield no more than a sketchy view of human life, incident upon the fact that sociality consists of nothing more than a mere frame-work which is innocent of the significant and precious content it is supposed to contain. To make sure of this superficiality of social humanity, one has only to look into the pages of some authoritarian work in which the social view of art, morality, or religion, comes up for scientific treatment. What the work says may be true; but the importance of the propositions advanced is another question entirely. The question of scientific accuracy is one thing; that of practical sufficiency, another. To fill out the framework of sociality, which may for the sake of argument be assumed to be true, it is necessary to em-

phasize the culture-content of human life: man's condition as human being, in distinction from that of the animal, is not a given but an acquired one; and the acquisition in question is most clearly understood in connection with a culture-concept which shall include the ethical and religious as well as the aesthetical. The life of humanity as lived, consists of an inward development with which the outward condition sustains only incidental relations. At the same time, the building of the inner life of humanity is a genuine building in the spirit of which the spirit of humanity constantly affirms its intrinsic character. Turning from the Immediate, humanity sets its attention upon the Remote; given an exterior situation, humanity exerts itself to interiorize the most essential phases of its life. Now, the social conception of humanity fails to deal adequately with those things which are most essential to the life of man as such.

A punctual ego in the sketchy social order is indicative of a life-situation far removed from the actual conditions which confront the individual in his human life; both the social self and the social order are seriously lacking in that sense of humanity which belongs to them. The lack of humanism, which makes sociality so inadequate, is felt, not only in the realm of idea, but in connection with life-motive. He who accepts the social interpretation of life is thus in danger of doing something more than to entertain superficial notions of human life; he is in danger of casting what should be ethical motives into lines of action purely exteriorizing in effect. Suppose that the socialization of life were to become so complete that all practical problems of social life were deemed solved; would the goal of life be then reached? Would it not be better to assume that, with the perfection of exterior life in the social order, the beginning of the task had just been reached? As a matter of fact,

mankind long ago decided that, however important the solution of exterior social questions might be, it was not advisable for the genius of humanity to wait for such amelioration before the creative work of the inner life was inaugurated; hence the history of humanity has often presented the spectacle of an inner life wholly elevated above the exterior conditions of human existence, while the general tendency of humanity seems to have been to perfect the inner in independence and even defiance of the outer. A perfect individual in a perfect social order were indeed desirable; but mankind has decided that, if perfection must be divided, it is better to raise the inward perfection of life above the outer perfection of the social order.

The social ideal as practical, lacks creativeness as much as the social idea as scientific has been found to lack content. If, under the auspices of current social ethics, man is supposed to undertake adjustment and amelioration in the immediate order of life, it is still possible to assert that the old sense of creativeness is none the less necessary. Individualism has not failed to recognize this, although individualism has been satisfied with a purely inward creativeness which involved no more than the elaboration of man's subjective existence. In the spirit of creativeness, nineteenth-century individualism was strangely indifferent to the exterior order, whence the sharp anti-natural and anti-social tendencies of the school. But the creation of life-joy, life-worth, and life-truth is likely to involve something more constructive than the egoistic will-to-selfhood could produce; at the same time, it can hardly be doubted that aesthetic individualism was just in its insistence upon the creative, even when the material at hand among these romantic individualists was drawn as by necessity from their own souls. One may long to possess in his life such an objectivity as was witnessed in the case of

Goethe; but, when the creative impulse is not powerful enough to evoke an exterior condition consonant with the ideal within, it is best to maintain the interior affirmation, even when there is little hope of seeing its objective realization. In some instances, as with Emerson, the perfect organization of the inner life is practically equivalent to the creation of an objectivity; in others, the elaboration of the inner life ended in a pessimism of the noblest kind. To be wanting in objectivity may be painful, as the case of most individualists can attest; but to be wanting in that creativeness which is peculiar to the human self is fatal, and it is just this fatality which constantly threatens the life of humanity to-day.

When life is taken up and interpreted by social thought, the lack of creativeness further appears in the painful want of life-character, whence the sons of men should be brought together in the spirit of mutual understanding. After it was fully appreciated that the effort to synthesize men by means of artificial contract was in vain, there arose a tendency to delegate all the social responsibility to the hands of nature whose reputation for organizing was well established by the biological. Cells unite to form tissue, while tissue clothes the organism in a perfect unity; such single organisms, instead of being left to themselves, are smoothly assembled in appropriate groups, which have both the forms and the functions of the whole. The natural synthesis of organisms which one finds in the animal order is now regarded as the supreme principle of organization in the humanistic realm, whence results the exaggerated belief in the powers of sociality. The reason why such natural sociality, dependent as it is upon the principle of species, fails, is because the creature in question is possessed of something more than that which the animal order is able to display; this more-than-natural is found in the inwardness of life which includes the extra-sensitivity and

extra-spontaneity of the individual. If man lived in the world of immediacy only, if he did not constantly appeal to his inward sense of humanity, the resort to the species for both idea and impulse might be sufficient; but it is characteristic of man to unfold and develop within his own consciousness the impressions that he acquires from the exterior, so that the result of his relation to nature is not to be found upon the surface of his consciousness. In the same manner, the individual's spontaneity is such as to urge the impulse onward until it has reached the region of those remote interests which are recognized in both civilization and culture, as a result of which tendency, man is no longer to be found in the more obvious phases of his natural being. Thus, to internalize the impression and to remove the impulse from its original source are among the most characteristic forms of human conduct. Now, is the biologico-social synthesis sufficient for the organization of such internalized and removed creatures?

When viewed from the individualistic standpoint, human life seems conspicuously unfitted for such a superficial synthesis, and that because a mere gathering of individuals is far removed from the idea of that humanity which the individual feels within and which he endeavors to promote without. If it be granted that the congregative work of nature is done so perfectly that no more synthetic activity is needed, ethics must still insist that the work of humanizing men, far from being ended, is only just begun, since the character of the humanistic synthesis is, in no sense, an affair of being together in time and space, or a sharing of the immediate benefits and duties which exterior life presents. If further it be assumed that nature in synthesizing specimens of the human species has likewise provided for the social sentiment requisite for the actual realization of the social, it may still be pointed out that the

creating and developing of human love is an affair which depends upon something characteristically human; such synthetic love is postulated as an ideal, not accepted as a fact of experience. Because human life must experience things in its own way, man has always refused to abide by the simple and immediate results of natural organization, sufficient as this may be with other species, and has gone on to elaborate characteristic forms of conduct whose aim has been to perfect that which nature has only begun. In this spirit, art has set about creating the human as a genuine idea, while religion has worked upon man with the aim of having him take up the responsibilities of love as a genuine motive. It is true that nature does not dissociate and disintegrate; but it is none the less true that the naturalistic synthesis, whose presence is undeniable, is far from constituting a bond sufficient to unite the sons of men in a characteristic unity. In general, it may be said that the content of human life falls between the two stools of punctual personality and schematic society.

2. LACK OF LIFE-CHARACTER IN SOCIALITY

Social philosophy brings men together from without, and fails to attribute content to human life; in the same manner, such social science fails to color human life with that moral tone which is easily recognized in the history of mankind. If social thought were purely observational as it habitually assumes to be, if it were not a most determined philosophy replete with democratic prejudices, the ethical situation to-day might be vastly different from the spectacle of downright sociality. But the social thinker has old scores to settle and new ambitions to gratify, and it is sincere human life which is called upon to bear the brunt of this dispute. In general, it has been the fate of social science to correct the errors of the Enlightenment, and this fate has often been

a happy one. Where the Enlightenment proceeded from the individual as its *terminus a quo* and proposed to perfect the social order by means of utilitarian adjustment, social thinking was able to point out that such a process was a *posterior prius*, since it is with the social itself that the beginning must be made. On the other hand, the Enlightenment, proceeding from the natural life of man, sought to show how morality like sociality had arisen from the same kind of utilitarian calculus; the accepted order then was from the individual to the social, from the natural to the moral. One half of this error has been corrected by the scientifico-social thinker; but how has the other half of the argument fared?

Scientific and social thinking has shown us that society is not a derivative notion; but has social thinking gone on to show further that morality likewise is as little derivative and as thoroughly spontaneous as the social? Instead of completing its work, social philosophy has tacitly assented to one half of the rationalistic program, and that to the effect that morality is an idea derived from the useful, even when the idea of utility had no effect in producing the social order. In this manner, social thought is one half utilitarian, and if utilitarianism be wrong, the natural conclusion must follow. With such a utilitarian as Mill, the ethical problem was frankly the dual one of explaining the social and justifying the moral; one he found in the political order, the other in what English ethics calls "common-sense morality." We know now that the social order is given with man, so that a pre-social condition of man is not to be credited. But we are not so ready to assert that the ethical condition is likewise a given datum, so that we do not need to premise a pre-moral condition of mankind. Thus far, our contention is a purely formal one, which consists in suggesting that, as our thought has seen fit to revise one phase of rationalism, it should be as scru-

pulous in dealing with the other; but such a form of argumentation is not necessarily convincing, whence it may be that social philosophy, however imperfect it may be, is not necessarily inconsistent with itself. The crux of the contention is found in the fact that, where social thought admits and premises the existence of the social as such, it does not make the same admission in the case of the moral. For the social thinker, there is no pure morality, or morality apart from social existence, so that the social thinker does not feel called upon to explain the existence of a thing when he has not previously admitted the fact of existence. In connection with pure morality, there is no need of an argument *quid juris*, since there is no argument *quid facti*.

Expressed with perfect frankness, the social argument is to the effect that there is no free morality. As a result, social thought is consistent in neglecting that utilitarian argument in the light of which the moral is derived from the useful, for the reason that, with sociality, what was useful at the beginning is useful now. In a certain sense, there is no utilitarianism, no relativism about the social contention, because there is moralic other to which the socially useful is to be related. In this sense, social thought is absolutistic; where the autonomous moralist contends, "Morality for the sake of morality," the social thinker urges, "Society for the sake of society." The result of this ethical situation is that one should not attempt to criticize the means by which the social thinker seeks to effect the transition from the social to the moral, since this transition is not for a moment attempted; rather must one criticize the attempt of the scientifico-social moralist to make sociality the end of human life. Because the social thinker does thus attempt to survey human life under the form of the social, individualism is forced to contend that such a morale fails to express the inward character of human life as lived by mankind.

Let it be admitted, then, that morality is not a derivative product, but a kind of thing in itself; the only question remaining will be one of characteristic content. The thought of the day, even when the influence of the evolutionary is never overlooked, is such as to suggest the abandonment of the one-time philosophy of history which sought to derive all higher things from lower ones, especially inferior ones of a different kind. Are we not now in a position where, instead of indulging in these transmutations, we premise at the beginning just what we find now? The study of humanity does not reveal the presence of any pre-artistic period from which art was derived, of any pre-religious period which was responsible for the later derivation of human faith; in the same manner, our current conception of history does not call upon us to premise a pre-social period here or a pre-moral epoch there. This is not a reactionary point, but merely an attempt to deal justly with the forms of life which lie at hand. As man has always been social and artistic and religious, so man has always possessed that which may be called, "moral," whatever such a term may be taken to signify. Thus, the spontaneity of the moral may be placed along side the idea of spontaneity as this appears in society as such, the artistic and religious in particular.

With the passing of the psycho-genetic problem of how morality came to be what it is, there has arisen a movement calculated to work upon the actual character of the moral; with the question of morality's source an overcome standpoint, all interest now centers in the attempt to evaluate morality as a social affair and that alone. The line of moral descent is one and continuous, so that the whole question is one concerning the character of this continuous morale. To-day, the ethical ideal appears concretely in the form of "middle-class morality." Nietzsche's distinction between "master

morality" and "slave morality" tends to obscure from our eye the fact that the actual life of man to-day is carried on with Philistine principles as its sanction. Where the social order was purely bi-partite and thus consisted of master and slave, the Nietzschean distinction might have had meaning; but, with the tri-partition of society into worker, bourgeois, and aristocrat, and with the elevation of the bourgeoisie, the old distinction loses weight. The middle-class person has entered the scene, which he has colored in a manner both economic and ethical; the "pathos of distance" has been lost to view in the middle distance of the bourgeois landscape. As the result of this, the time-honored conflict between master and slave has given way to a situation marked by general fermentation among all those who make up life in its mediocrity. If there is any real conflict, this is found in the opposition which the middle-class person encounters on both sides of his social being, which is threatened now by the physical needs of the worker and now by the ideals of the artist. Indeed, instead of there being a conflict between the extremes of society, where the slave might be thought to array his rude powers against the finer weapons of the aristocrat, the social situation reveals the fact that artisan and artist are not far from unity of opinion in the matter of the life-ideal, while the unanimity of their views has become more perfect in their common antipathy to the property-holding middle-class.

The development of individualism, while it expressed as its chief concern the welfare of the superior man in a social order where exterior well-being was the sole rule, was not carried on without an eye to the spiritual condition of the laboring class. Indeed, one might go so far as to assert that, in the instance of the modern drama, the opposition to middle-class ideals was carried on so thoroughly that this special fine art could be found

to represent the claims of the laborer, even when the avowed purpose of the literary movement was idealistic and aristocratic. If this be not the case, how will one explain the romantic drama of Victor Hugo, the decadent theatre of Ibsen, the avowedly social plays of Hauptmann? Strindberg cannot keep his class-conflict motive, passing back and forth as it does from the high to the low, from the low to the high, from involving the middle-class situation; Bernard Shaw does not attempt to. The literary impulse, then, is in opposition to nothing so much as to the Bourgeoisie. To observe the perfection with which the middle-class has aligned its moral ideal, one can do no better than review the history of nineteenth-century drama.

But what is there about middle-class morality that permits of exact formulation? Wherein does it invite individualistic opposition? The present social situation without and within is responsible for this strange moral creature, the "good man" of the day. In the socialization of life and the socialization of character, all the issues of human existence were assembled in such a manner as to make a compromising ideal of mediocrity a matter of necessity. Thus, in a general fashion, when all men were either found to have been living, or were forced by industry to live one common life, the ideal of an ordinary morality was soon forthcoming. If one live to oneself in aesthetic or religious retreat, it is not necessary to align a code of conduct open to and binding upon all. When each man had his own work and, to a certain degree, lived his own life, a universal morality was nothing more than an overarching blue of moral dignity; in this sky, one might read his duty for himself. Now, assemble men in life and work, through history bring past and present together, place all the sons of men upon the same limited earth, and the result is not far to seek: all will needs have the same moral life.

This moral life must not be too high or too low; it must be an average morality, whence the derivation of the morale of the middle class.

The workings of this mediocre morale appear more distinctly when one reviews the history of modern ethics, and observes how the extremes of ethical thought were forced to something like a mutual understanding. Where hedonism had grown up as a philosophy of human enjoyment, where rigorism was no less free from any social suggestion, the Epicurean and Stoic each went his own way. There was indeed no little conflict between these classic schools, nor was there absent from their extremes a kind of community, which appeared in their ultimate ideals. Epicureanism postulated an *ataraxy*, Stoicism an *apathy*; but this surprising unanimity, while it fused ideal with ideal, made no room for the social; the opponents came to an agreement independently. Modern thought, in casting about for its morality, could do no better than adopt the ethics of these ancient schools, whence the rise of hedonism and rigorism. Now, from the beginning, hedonism showed a reluctance to re-enter the Garden of Epicurus, where the sole life-ideal was one of enjoyment; hedonism thought it better to "cultivate the garden." In the same way, intuitionist rigorism, instead of taking its stand by Stoic Porch, thought to make morality more active, more practical. Hedonism repugned the egoism involved in the idea of enjoyment, and set up the ideal of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," while rigorism, led astray at the outset by Hobbes, began to construe the chief duty as that of benevolence. It was in connection with the idea of benevolence that Cumberland began the attack upon the egoism and relativism of Hobbes. There were some rigorists who withstood the temptation to make duty a matter of benevolence, prominent among whom was Butler, with his ideal of

"cool self-love," and Kant, who regarded sympathy as something "pathological." But, whether the avowed rigorist himself asserted the supremacy of benevolence, he placed his theory in such a position that it was not difficult for the middle-class moralist to make the ideal his own.

The place where the opposed schools themselves came to an agreement was found in their insistence, here, upon sympathy, there, upon conscience; now, compassion and compunction are not very different, hence the hedonist and intuitionist had become so mellowed that they promptly fell from the tree when Philistinism shook the branches. With the hedonist, there was no longer an enjoyment which he could keep within his own breast; with the rigorist, naught of the self-styled duty remained. For both hedonist and rigorist there remained but one duty, that of social concern. For this reason, the student of ethics, who really enjoyed the extremes of a modern morality which, until the days of a Sidgwick and a Martineau, had managed to keep clear of the social tendency, can no longer take pleasure in the one-time battle of moral wits, for all is now social and inferior; the individualistic, which made it possible for Martineau to win the battle for conscience, the egoistic which drove Sidgwick to, and indeed beyond, the possibilities of his traditional hedonism, is now snugly ensconced in the social, so that rigorous saint and hedonist statesman toil side by side in their social service.

Middle-class morality thus differs from the free morality of earlier ethics in that middle-class morality is without individualism, without idealism. No longer are there any joys, no longer any duties; no sorrow, no sin; all has become "social service." The battle for life-inferiority has been fought and won; alas! the conflict was carried on in the night, in the silence; it was blood-

less, smokeless. All are in the net except the decadent egoists, who maintain their independence at the expense of being anti-social, anti-scientific. The reply of individualism to the socialization of life will be found to be complementary to the three-tongued retort to the scientism which sought the complete naturalization of human existence. There, it was aestheticism, immoralism, and irrationalism; here it will be decadence, pessimism, skepticism. Whatever may have been the original source of these life-ideals, whether in direct opposition to the social or after the manner of a free individualism rejoicing in its own strength, it cannot be overlooked that present-day individualism makes use of the decadent, pessimistic, and skeptical in order to cast off the oppressive yoke of the social ideal. In all this, there is a certain value which the opposition has for the individualist; for now, instead of a passive sense of joy, worth, and truth, he must engender in his own veins and nerves a clear and convincing sense of the inherent sense of the joyful, the worthwhile, and the truthful in this his own human life.

Finally, the loss of character in human life expresses itself in the form of a conflict between inferiorism and superiorism. From the social point of view, life is necessarily an affair of inferiority; given ideals, and the whole social argument goes to pieces. On the other hand, when one strives to uphold the idea that life is superior, he encounters all the disadvantages which have ever followed the notion of aristocracy in human existence. But the contention of individualism is to the effect that it is life itself, not any one individual or any class of men, which is superior; individualism advances the plain but difficult proposition that man is great. It is true that this can be doubted and denied, but the doubt and denial involved in such a human pretension cannot justly come from the social quarter, where there

is no attempt to try the spirits of humanity to see whether they be superior or not. Individualism has been more than honest in raising the question whether man's life is such as to justify the attributes "great," "superior," "fine"; indeed, it is individualism which proposes just such an investigation when it raises eudaimonistic, ethical, and religious issues. Having witnessed the individualistic struggle for the joy, worth, and truth of life in the natural order, we must further observe how this philosophy of life considers society as the place of such joyousness, value, and truthfulness.

PART TWO

THE REPUDIATION OF SOCIALITY

THE easy victory of sociality over the individual, wherein the one-time egoism of the Enlightenment succumbed to the morale of the "altruistically" social and the "morally" conventional, has placed the aesthetico-intellectual individual in a peculiar position. The new ego is now recognized most distinctly in his anti-social character; he does not fail to possess or to enjoy a living content of cultured inner life, but the expression of his personality is more often found in that polemical attitude which places him in opposition to the social order. That the polemical is not the primary characteristic of the self, which is consecrated to the inner life as such, will appear when the repudiation of society by the self is made an object of direct analysis; that the self should have a world, is a contention which the final and constructive portion of this study will need to consider. In order to make clear the attitude of the self toward society, we can do no better than consider what such a society of individuals might be supposed to be; then the impossibilities of the present order and the promises of a future one will appear most clearly. In the attempt to relate the self to the social order, individualism looks upon that order as something so like the individual as to be at once joyful, worthful, and truthful. But, where the individual, in premising his social order, fails to find society the place of joys, or the place of values, or the place of truths, he is forced to resort to decadence, to pessimism, to skepticism. In analyzing these three anti-social attitudes, it will appear that, in the first instance, decadence assumes a subjective character in accordance with which

the individual is simply morbid; from this he passes to the anti-social. In the world of values, the individual is primarily an inward nihilist whose negations have to do with his own private sense of values; from this he advances to social pessimism. In connection with the world of truths, the ego begins by assuming an individualistic dilettantism, then concludes by resorting to social skepticism. In order to observe the contrast between individual and society, it is necessary to consider the manner in which the individual estimates human joy, human value, human truth.

I. LIFE THE PLACE OF JOYS

Just as scientism has no genuine rationale of joy, so sociality fails to provide a morale for the life of inward enjoyment; and just as individualism was called upon to deliver the independent soul-state, so it is now necessitated to redeem the eudaemonistic content of such soul-states in the form of a living sense of joy in life. In order to perfect the argument for the joy of life, it becomes necessary, first of all, to understand just what happiness is supposed to mean to humanity. In the larger sense, the whole question of happiness focuses in the competitive ideals of possession of happiness as a state of mind and the pursuit of happiness by means of the will's activities. Instead of indulging in an ethical comparison of these contrary ideals, individualism has been made to feel that the elder ideal of happiness as a possession of the desired object has been forced to make way for the more modern conception of happiness in the form of energy and function; energistic eudaemonism is thus the source which is to be tapped by him who would comprehend the eudaemonistic problem. With ancient classicism, the happiness of possession was the accepted notion; where Aristotle, the most perfect of classic eudaemonists, seems to base happiness upon

energy, his ethics will be found to temper this energy by moderation and to bring to perfect rest in godlike contemplation of the world. The modern classicism of the eighteenth century had a similar message for man; for the ethics of this period expressed the idea that man, by summing up his various special pleasures, might enjoy the possession of them as a whole. Now the classic possession of joy is lost to the modern individual; and, if he is able to resume the ideal, it will be, not by virtue of a mere having of happiness, but by means of the acquisition of joy through some form of work. Joy must be willed; then, joy must become the object of direct consciousness. But, by means of what kind of willing does the consciousness of joy come into being?

I. HUMANITY AND HAPPINESS

Where there is no deliberate morale of happiness, there is no possibility of establishing any essential connection between happiness and life. To take happiness for granted, and then seek to measure the worth of life upon the basis of joy's presence or joy's absence, is fatal to a serious life-philosophy. As a matter of mere actuality, it may be said that the individual man may go through life accompanied by habitual satisfaction and yet not really live as a human being. On the other hand, so distinct are life and happiness, one might even do his work in the world and realize life's values without leading what is considered a happy life. Life is not itself enjoyment; so that to enjoy is not to live, while to live is not to enjoy. This paradoxical condition of things, which ever baffles the moralist whose ideals are framed according to the plan of eighteenth-century hedonism, tends to clear up when one realizes that, instead of being confined to the idea of happiness, human life has at its disposal other possibilities in the form of life's worth and truth. The joy of life should

indeed take its place beside the sense of worth and truth, but the joy of life should not be allowed to encroach upon these other precincts and thus make human existence appear a mere matter of enjoyment. When the joy of life is properly related to the sense of worth and truth, the joy of life becomes a plausible ideal; when the sense of joy is isolated, the proof that it is all is a proof that it is naught. Yet it is not with eighteenth-century hedonism that one has now to do, since this bland doctrine has been swallowed up in such amiable notions as the struggle for existence and the health of the social organism. For this reason, individualism must first rescue happiness, and then establish it upon a proper foundation of eudaemonism.

The sense of happiness is of great importance to individualism, not only in the establishing of joy itself, but in the attempt to show that life is possessed of worth and truth. Take away the joy of living, and you do more than eliminate so much happiness from human existence; you threaten life's sense of worth and truth as well. If life have no joy, can it be said to have value, or truth? Now, to establish the living sense of joy, individualism must do more than assume happiness for man; individualism must elaborate the sense of joy by means of those volitional and intellectual forces which make happiness something willed and something thought. Social thought is in no position to supply mankind with a sense of joy. Social thinking may come to the conclusion that the human self does exist just as it may strive to supply the individual with the means of existence; but, when it comes to deducing and furthering the inward sense of joy in life, social thought makes poor work of eudaemonism. To perfect the social concept, Man, social thinking has had to make use of such generalization that the resulting idea of humanity applies to all and yet to none. It is to individualism, therefore,

that one must appeal if one would learn aught concerning the joy of life.

(1) *Happiness as Willed*

In asserting that joy is something which must be willed, individualism tends to assume that happiness is imperative for life; this assumption is due to the fact that individualism, although it may admit that life can go on even when life is not pleasant, cannot admit likewise that life can be perfect when life is wanting in joy. Where the social ideal is satisfied when it has put the individual in a position where he may serve the State, individualism cannot rest content until it has so placed the ego that the ego may draw some benefit from life. If, in its decadent forms, individualism may persuade the individual to get too much out of life, social thinking places the self in a moral situation where he cannot draw enough out of existence. Viewed in a natural manner, the social order may be thought of as the place where the joys of life are to be found and realized. Where the joy of life fails to find a social form, the endeavor to realize the joy of existence tends ever to assume the character of decadence, and from this both the individual and society suffer. In spite of the risk of constituting joy as an anti-social decadence, it must be affirmed that happiness must come into being as a conscious creation. Neither nature with its physical resources nor society with its perfected means of existence can supply that which man is destined to will for himself as his own. The failure to recognize this has led to much error in the treatment of eudaemonism.

The creation of human happiness, to which all art is instinctively devoted, is a necessity with a creature whom nature can produce but cannot contain. Even when, as in antiquity, man was of the opinion that the function of art was to imitate nature, it was still insisted that

nature as such is not sufficient for man, who must create his own joys if he is to have them. When romantic art reveals to us the spiritual character of beauty and joy, it more than convinces us that our human happiness, instead of consisting of something given in the world of things, is an ideal which is to be realized by man only after a conscious search and a deliberate effort. This necessity of a created happiness is due to the fact that the inner life of man, rather than consisting of a series of conscious states following upon one another as a mere train of ideas, is made up of a unified whole of the individual as one who thinks, and wills, and is. For this reason, happiness must come from within as a complete creation whose separate elements may come from nature, but whose form and character depend upon the independent activity of the human self. The naturalistic view of the inner life as a series of associated states may account for pleasure, but it cannot measure up to the demands of the eudaemonistic standard or the aesthetic ideal.

Not only is emotion by nature internal, but its inner character has something dynamic about it, so that when one would will himself, as indeed the would-be egoist must do, he finds that joy is the primary condition of creative work. The traditional method of handling eudaemonism has prejudiced us with the thought that enjoyment is to be treated teleologically; happiness forms the need which we are seeking, the goal toward which we strive. Even the forbidding morale of Kant did not forbid the entrance of joy, provided that joy were delayed until, having toiled under the yoke of the Categorical Imperative, the moralistic pilgrim found himself at his journey's end. But the egoistic usage of the eudaemonistic ideal differs from this more staid conception in that egoism demands joy now as the condition of genuine work. It was not for happiness as

the result of labor, but for happiness in labor, that Faust struggled, while it was for the sake of exercising, and not simply enjoying, happiness that Candide cultivated the garden. Pleasure is power; the very physiology of the feeling is sufficient to show this. Under the influence of the pleasurable, the muscles thicken, the veins swell, the lungs increase in capacity. The biology of the feeling further advises us that pleasure increases vitality and raises the tide of life to its tone of excess. Where one works during the experience of pain, he creates by means of pleasure; in the one case, it is the will minus, in the other, the will plus. Hence we find the Romanticist praising the pleasurable, not because of its enjoyable, but on account of its energistic character.

If joy comes through work, creativeness comes from joy. Eudaemonists have usually been found to exalt activity as a means of happiness, but the converse is none the less true; activity comes through happiness. We cultivate the garden in order to find joy; but it is by means of joy that we are able to cultivate the garden. In the instance of the artistic will-to-create, the prime requisite is the sense of superabundance, which brings into being that which is new and worthy. Without this sense of joy in life, art would never have evinced its characteristic phenomenon of ideal excitement, whose essential nature appears in the play-activity so well known in aesthetic thought. For the usual work of the world an ordinary frame of mind is sufficient to effect the end desired in the production of the useful; but for the creation of the beautiful, the gift that the genius has bestowed upon humanity, the play activity of pleasure is made necessary. It was in this spirit that Schiller made Romanticism possible; "Man is only completely man when he plays."¹ Schlegel furthers this ideal of play-pleasure when he attributes the greatness of Grecian

¹ *Werke*, ed. Hempel, Bd. XV, 392.

poetry to a *Genuss vollständig und selbstgenugsam*.² Now the supreme difference between the hedonism of Rationalism and the eudaemonism of Romanticism cannot fail to appear, while the justification of selfhood in the joy of living is not so far from completion. Happiness now appears as something inward and spiritual, while its character, no longer viewed as something man would greedily seize from the world but rather as something he would generously create within, is more thoroughly appreciated.

In the art of Wagner, the argument for eudaemonistic egoism is not presented with the same simplicity, inasmuch as the author of *Der Ring des Nibelungen* indulges in pessimism. The joy of living thus expresses itself in contrast to the idea of world-sorrow, while happiness is that which is to be sought. In the contrast between the attempts at self-realization as these are carried on by the god Wotan and the man Siegfried, the argument against the godhead of the one and the contention in favor of the supremacy of the other rests almost wholly upon eudaemonistic grounds. Wotan is not fitted for the position which he assumes, not because he is unholy, but because he is unhappy; his aim in life is not directed toward the realization of himself as moralist, for he habitually shows himself to be a character with whom the ethical appeal was not in vain, as when he rejects the advice of the joyous Brünhilde only to espouse the righteous cause of Fricka. Wotan suffers from restraint and sadness, which dual malady he confesses to his favorite Valkyrie as soon as he has given the oath to protect Siegmund's foe: "*Ich unfreiester aller . . . Der trauerigste bin ich von Allen*"³ Like his father, Wotan, Siegmund is not disturbed at the thought that his enemy can accuse him of unholiness, for he is thoroughly absorbed with self-accusation of

² *Über die Griechen u. Römer*, 133.

³ *Walküre*, II Akt, II Sc.

sadness: "*Wehwalt muss ich mich nennen.*"⁴ Both father and son, equipped with all the arms of conflict, fail in their battle for no other reason than that they are unhappy. Wotan can provide the needed sword, but the internal weapon of joyousness he cannot furnish.

In his attempt to delineate the character of the superman, Siegfried, Wagner does not find it is his mind to instill into the veins of the youth a quantum of joy that should outweigh the sense of sorrow from which both Wotan and Siegmund were oppressed; instead of the eudaemonistic, therefore, he makes use of the ideal of freedom. Alien and inimical to the gods, "*fremd dem Gotte, entgegen dem Gott,*" Siegfried was fated to fight for the cause of the gods, whereby he becomes greater than the gods, because he was possessed of more freedom, "*der freier als ich, der Gott.*"⁵ In the development of the character of Siegfried, Wagner seems to confine his attention to the ideal of fearlessness, even where the sense of joyousness is ever implied by the character and work of the hero. Fearlessness in his flesh, joyousness in his blood, Siegfried thus becomes the means of redeeming godhead from care.

In the elaboration of the ideal individual as the superman, the necessity of life-joyousness has shown itself to be indispensable to the egoist. Nietzsche repudiated both weakness and sorrow at one stroke; although himself a man of sorrows, Nietzsche never gave recognition to the sorrow which sought to claim him as its own. His was a feverish eudaemonism, a violent will to enjoyment, while his most relentless criticisms were directed against an ascetic morality which set up misery, *Elend* or alienation from the self, as its ideal. In the midst of this was the thought that pain signifies negation, joy affirmation, although Nietzsche had nothing in common with an evolutionary ethics which strives to

⁴ *Ib.*, I Akt, II Sc.

⁵ *Ib.*, II Akt, II Sc.; III Akt, III Sc.

connect sense-pleasure with life-advancing, sense-pain with life-hindering tendencies. The spirit of Nietzschean eudaemonism was echoed by Hauptmann in *The Sunken Bell*, where Heinrich was led to fail because his work, while accomplished with skill and fidelity, was not the work of joy. It was in "nameless agony" that he had toiled; but he was no master, because he was not happy. But, when Heinrich set himself to the tasks of a super-man, he achieved the victory through joy; hence he was able to say, "Now, I am both happy and a master."⁶

In the midst of the emancipation of the aesthetical, the individual did not fail to come into his kingdom; "art for art's sake" conveyed the corollary, "art for the artist's sake." By means of such logic, it appears that the individual who has the ideal of aesthetic enjoyment is thereby afforded a means of isolating himself from both the world and society, as these are constructed in rationalistic and moralistic forms. No longer need the mind remain imprisoned in the fixed forms of rational thought; no longer need the will abide by the established norms of conduct; but both intellect and will may go forth in search of a free world, a free humanity. With Romanticism, this freedom was postulated as an ideal; with Decadence, it became revolution; with Symbolism, it advanced upon the strongholds of scientism and social thought. As a result, the individualism of the present finds the ego setting himself in opposition to hard and fast lines with which science has encircled mankind. Where religion, suffering under the oppression of agnosticism which forbade belief in any Beyond-Science, was possessed of a morale which forbade it to attack scientism upon the ethico-social side, art has been doubly free, in that art has admitted obligation to neither the metaphysical nor the moral. Indeed, the failure of religion to redeem the spiritual life of humanity is to

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Act III.

be attributed to no other cause than religion's unwillingness to negate the social morality which science appended to its positivistic theory of thought. Religion was free in intellect, but not in will; art emancipated itself from the domination of both intellectualistic scientism and voluntaristic social thought. Where religion has wished to be free, science has willed to be free, and where religion could not harden its heart against the seductive ideal of social sympathy, art has indulged in the *impassibilité* of Baudelaire, as it had adopted the maxim to which Nietzsche afterwards gave expression, "Be hard!"

In the dialectics of human happiness, three elemental functions of the mind offer themselves as so many bases for eudaemonism; these are, sense, will, and intellect. The common endeavor to found happiness upon a series of agreeable experiences has always been fraught with contradiction and perplexity; but, since happiness seems imperative and since no other than sensuous means of enjoyment seem promising, the eudaemonistic philosophy of life has often been led to place its cause in the hands of hedonism. Hedonism has responded to this by attempting to endow the passing pleasure with something more than merely temporary enjoyment, whence the elaboration of the hedonic calculus and the hedonic law. Where the hedonic calculus attempts to introduce a mathematical principle of connection among pleasures, the hedonic law has sought to make the bond of union something physical. In both theories, it is recognized that the isolated pleasures cannot offer support to that which is so continuous as life. Pleasures which come and go present themselves in the form of a broken line whose discontinuity cannot act as a vehicle to convey life to its desired end. In itself, life is a totality, while the pleasures of life are so many periodic units. When hedonism attempts its synthesis of pleasures in the form

of a sum, it finds that these periodic and temporary experiences do not respond to the calculating effort of the mind, while the biological attempt at summarization has the effect of forcing the feeling of pleasure down below the surface of consciousness. In the one case, pleasure becomes no more than an element in a mental process; in the other, it is none other than a sign of physical well-being. On this account, the hedonist, who believes in pleasure as such, may well protest that the sense of his doctrine is lost to him in the midst of the mathematical and biological.

Among those who have sought to find a basis for human happiness, it is significant that the hedonic joy of sense has never received any substantial recognition; happiness was premised as something obtaining in either intellect or will, in some sense of truth or worth. Granted that conscious life has its origin in sensitivity, the only question for the hedonist concerned itself with the development of that sensitivity, whether as a life of action or a life of thought. Where ancient optimism took up the problem, it was concluded by Aristotle that happiness is equivalent to the full functioning of the mind, to activity rather than to passivity. With the pessimism of modern thought, activity was again appealed to by the eudaemonist; only, with the modern, activity was regarded as a means assuaging the inherent sorrow of life as life. In opposition to passivistic hedonism, this view of the problem has the advantage of pointing out that happiness must be conceived of after the manner of action and work, although from this it does not follow that such work is the prerogative of the practical will alone.

The argument against happiness as a willed happiness, even when the activism involved can hardly be questioned, lies in the fact that such activism is advanced, not as a pure means of producing positive joy, but as

an anodyne calculated to neutralize the distressing effects of sorrow. With Voltaire and Goethe, the apparent invalidity of the intellect as a means of producing happiness was the negative basis upon which the joy of work was postulated. Such was the case likewise with Flaubert and Turgénieff, who indeed were more concerned with negation of intellect as a means of inward enjoyment than with the assertion of will as the positive method of arriving at the all-desired end. The natural result of such eudaemonism is such as to advance the idea of stupefaction rather than that of satisfaction; life thus becomes, not that which is to be realized, but that from which the self must escape, and it is as a door of egress that activity is proposed. Nevertheless, however imperfect the energistic argument may have been in the hands of its advocates, it seems difficult to invalidate the fact that human happiness is so dependent upon the human will that such happiness must be willed and created.

When work is advanced as an ideal means of arriving at the joy of life, it should not be forgotten that work contains other elements besides the eudaemonistic one. While it may always be suggested that work means joy, the fact remains that work has about it that which is instinctive within and necessary without, so that work can hardly be regarded as man's chosen means of securing happiness in life. The will belongs to biology and economics; and, since it is not the exclusive property of the free ego, its eudaemonistic character is far from being pure. Whatever may have been said of work in the past, the organization of work under the auspices of modern industrialism is such as to make the eudaemonistic argument exceedingly weak. Where the free individual doing his own work may present the picture of something like the joy of life, the enslaved worker laboring for others is an argument against the happiness

of activity. In place of joy, labor sets up necessity as its goal; and it is only in a furtive manner that happiness creeps into the usual activity of the laborer. In spite of this actual hindrance which confronts him who would regard happiness as that which is found in activity, eudaemonism is still in a position to assert that the genius of joy is found in some form of activity. Man may be man when he works or when he plays; at any rate, it is some kind and measure of activity which produce joy, for joy is ever that which the will creates. In the case of art, where the will acts purely and from spontaneous motives, the essence of joy in life appears as nowhere else. As a form of activity, art has in it the factors desired; namely, activity and freedom.

Individualism proceeds to its ideal of happiness by making a clear distinction between the will within and work without. Where the attempt to find happiness in work so involves the idea of preoccupation with the objective world and weariness of life within, the ideal of happiness a willed condition of mind is forced to turn to art as the type of true individual action. Not all can be artists where all can be workers, yet the art-ideal may be instructive where the work-ideal is misleading. Art upholds the idea of work only in so far as work can bear the stamp of the inner life, only as far as the individual can call it his own; at the same time, art as work is perfected, not for the work's sake, but in behalf of the active individual seeking self-expression. If happiness were a gift which man receives from the world, all that the joy of life would demand would consist in the ability to receive the given; but happiness shows itself to be a willed condition of things; it comes into being as a creation of the human mind. In the social order, the rule of action is that of work, whence it becomes well nigh impossible for the social order to organize itself into a place of happiness for

mankind. This situation is made more than usually paradoxical by the further fact that, in the last one hundred years, man has advanced most marvelously in the direction of knowledge both of man and of the world, as psychological and physical science can attest; and yet this power over both the self and the world has not had the effect of producing a corresponding degree of life-joy; indeed, the period in question has been marked by pessimism and nihilism. The will to joy has been misdirected, so that the social order which results is far from being the place of happiness.

(2) *The Consciousness of Happiness*

The sense of happiness which is created by the will must further reveal itself as that of which the individual is conscious. Happiness consists of an inner existence for which the mind of the individual is responsible. Moreover, he who would be happy must have capacity for joy, and this is to be developed after the manner of aesthetics. In the minds of hedonists, who are marvelously ill adapted to speak on the subject of happiness, what individualism seeks to call joy is confused with something biological or psychological; aesthetic enjoyment is thus reduced to the idea of the satisfaction of bodily wants and the functioning of physiological forces, or it is turned into the shallow by-water of immediate pleasure. Individualism, however, realizing that the joy of life is something unique, attempts to instill a spirit of appreciation in the light of which humanity may be able to contemplate and react upon the world with appropriate satisfaction. Owing to the fact that the joy of life is usually confined to the gifted and finely equipped personality, individualism finds it necessary to advance the idea that happiness must be accorded a place in the social life of man.

The habitual conception of the social order exhausts

itself with the ideas of existence and work; society is viewed as the place where one lives and labors. But, with the development of art, as with the emphasis which is to be laid on the aesthetic side of man's nature, the idea of society as the place of joy comes into more prominence. Those who are skilful in framing the practical plan of a state are the ones to whom we must look for the realization of this idea; they must decide whether with capitalism or socialism man is likely to receive the greatest opportunity for that development of his inner life which shall make the state a place of enjoyment. As now viewed, enjoyment and aesthetic entertainment are confined to what is called "leisure," in connection with leisure classes and leisure times for those who are the workers. Idealistic individualism, while surrendering the practical arrangement of these social affairs to professional social thinkers, seeks to safeguard the life-ideal of joy. In the eyes of individualism, it is a mistake to relegate happiness to leisure; indeed, individualism refuses to admit that life should have leisure. Happiness, instead of being confined to the exceptional phases of human life, is something which should be consonant with life itself; for it is a mistake to divide men into the classes of those who work and those who play, just as it is false to the individual to divide his time into hours of toil and hours of enjoyment.

In our hedonic hurry, in which we have assumed that we have the idea of happiness and lack only the practical means or the opportunity of realizing this, we have indulged in a false psychology. In accordance with the usual conception of human life, we have been assuming that man must be taught to labor and inspired to toil diligently; and, when we have come to the question of enjoyment, we have presumed that that was a question which would take care of itself. Almost the contrary

is the rule. Man, who has so much of the animalistic about him, easily adapts himself to the motor conditions of life in connection with which his work in the world is to be performed, so that to teach and to stimulate the will is by no means as necessary as one might imagine. On the other hand, nature does not prepare man for the inward enjoyment of his life, whence it becomes necessary for humanity to devote itself to the creation of conscious enjoyment. As society has been far more successful in creating than in distributing wealth, so it has done more toward solving the problem of work than of happiness; society has centered its attention upon labor rather than leisure, so that genuine happiness is now far removed from the existence of the individual.

Humanity must be taught to enjoy the world in which it exists. To assume that man recognizes happiness when he sees it, and to conclude that all he needs is to find the path to his eudaemonistic goal, is to oppose the facts of experience. The ground of happiness is as mysterious as the ground of duty and truth; all three phases of man's life are so interdependent that to misconstrue one is to be misled concerning the others. The scope of human happiness is capable of such extension, the ground of it worthy of such deepening that one may find in the complete idea of enjoyment much that might seem to belong to the moral and metaphysical. Instead of operating apart from the feeling of joy, instead of postulating joy as the end of activity, the study of human work makes it necessary for us to assert that happiness is one of the essentials of work itself. We need not resort to biological considerations, and thus suggest that the tonic effects of pleasure as these are evinced by veins and muscles tend to connect energy with enjoyment; in a freer fashion we may assert that happiness is the condition requisite for superior work. It is artistic enjoyment which furthers artistic

endeavor; it is the joy of life which conditions the work of life. When happiness is thus understood as one of the essentials of fine activity, the importance of life-enjoyment will receive more recognition than is now accorded to it.

In a similar manner, the feeling of joy serves as a criterion of truth. According to rationalism, truth is a formal matter whose essential nature is to be determined by the exacting conditions of the understanding; individualistic intellectualism, however, sees in truth something more than abstract agreement of concept and concept. Where realism and pragmatism have sought to widen the sphere of truth by giving it more sensational and volitional content, they have not been careful to observe that eudaemonism claims a share of the intellectual labor of the mind, just as it demands a portion of truth's benefits. Truth exists, not alone for the understanding, but for the whole consciousness of man, and it is by means of truth that man is able to enjoy the world in which he is placed. Truth is indeed insight, but it is something more than this; it is appreciation, the aesthetic realization of the end of life. Such a eudaemonistic epistemology, while quite foreign to the methods of both realism and idealism, is not without its place in the larger plan of knowledge. If truth does not feel the need of the sense of happiness, the feeling of happiness can hardly be engendered and furthered apart from the sense of truth. This is not to assert that the supreme office of truth consists in pleasing the intellect; nevertheless, it seems impossible to assert that the office of truth has to do with nothing more than demonstration. Truth convinces, but does not fail to please; it involves both demonstration and delight. That which happiness borrows from truth it repays when it serves as one of the criteria of verity; thus viewed, truth is known to the mind as that which, in addition to working more intellectual effects, satisfies the mind.

The mental danger which must attend such eudaemonism appears in the tendency of the over-solicitous self to isolate and contemplate only those ideas which seem joyful, so that the intellectual eudaemonist is ever on the brink of illusion. When the real world fails to supply the mind with enjoyable ideas, the eudaemonist is tempted to evoke notions of his own devising; and when the actual world of work fails to appoint the self to acceptable tasks, the individual is persuaded to busy himself with ideal activities whose genuineness and worth are often open to question. In this connection arises the ideal of art for its own sake; here also appears the ideal of happiness for its own sake, apart from sure basis which that happiness should have in the exterior order. Such happiness is thus in danger of hallucination. Where the activist may become so absorbed in work as to lose all sense of the inner life, the eudaemonist may so surrender himself to his soul-states as to lose the frank meaning of life. In the midst of this peril, the individualist contents himself with the general principle that happiness should be a mental condition of which the self is directly conscious; and it is only where the tendency of the social order persists in thrusting the individual out beyond himself that the morbid retreat to the inner life becomes, as it were, necessary.

It is thus the failure of life to provide the individual with a place for enjoyment that has brought about the extra-eudaemonism peculiar to the individualism of the Decadent school. In his despair of finding joy in the social order, the individual has turned to himself with the hope of evoking within as self-conscious states that sense of life-joy which the organized world fails to supply. Unlike the ancient State and mediaeval Church, modern Society with all its exterior benefits has failed to supply the inner self with inspiration or enjoyment.

The perfection of the exterior order has been at the expense of interior life; and, in seeking the happiness of all, we have arrived at the happiness of none. The anti-social attitude of the individualist, while it tends to reveal itself in a negative manner as an opposition to established forms, is really an appeal for the inward realization of life as this comes, in part, from the inherent sense of life-joy. In itself, such Decadence may not be acceptable; but to criticize its methods is not to impugn its motives, which consist in a genuine desire to effect the inward realization of the self as that which has a worth of its own. Before a more acceptable life-ideal is to be formed, it becomes necessary to consider to what extent the sense of social dissatisfaction has led the modern individualist to postulate his own life as the end of all things; then, a higher synthesis of selfhood and society may appear.

2. THE INDIVIDUAL AS DECADENT

Since the joy of life, instead of being a gift from nature, is a goal toward which the individual must strive, and the attainment of which involves the superiorities of both intellect and will, the individual is in no mood to relinquish this acquired standpoint when the weight of social thinking and social living is brought to bear upon him. If happiness were a mere thing given by nature or provided by society, the contention for individualistic enjoyment could not be made so convincingly; but this happiness is the individual's own work, a work of internal art, so that no claims of mediocrity may argue against it with validity. To explain Decadence is easier than to justify it, but if one be disposed to frown upon the morbid and militant in human self-enjoyment, he must not overlook the fact that such Decadence is the direct product of our socialized civilization. The individualist has done nothing

worse than accept it as an expression of his inner life, as a means by which this inner life might be furthered. The original form of Decadence was purely aesthetical, having its roots in the depth of Romanticism; the more militant form of the cult, wherein Decadence became anti-social, was derivative and secondary. This is due to the fact that pure individualism seeks to ignore the social; when such inward individualism assumes an attitude toward the exterior order of persons, it does so with less consistency than when it confines its attention to itself.

(1) *The Aesthetic Form of Decadence*

As early as Schiller, the emancipation of the aesthetic ego was recognized as something necessary to the free development of the self. Indeed, one might also say that the first principles of the Kantian aesthetics had no other outcome, inasmuch as the *Critique of Judgment* was unable to elaborate the first principle of beauty without raising the aesthetical above the standards of truth and duty. In his search for the "*disinterested*," as that aesthetic pleasure which repudiates the interests of both sense and morality, Kant was practically anticipating the Decadence of Baudelaire, which placed taste above the demands of *la Vérité* and *le Devoir*.⁷ Where Kant had applied his logic to the aesthetic idea as such, Schiller sought to deduce the fundamental principle of art as creative; this was done in connection with the idea of play, *Spieltrieb*. Upon this basis of free, internal activity, Schiller concludes that the truth of human life is found in the ideal of play — *Der Mensch soll mit der Schönheit nur spielen, und er soll nur mit der Schönheit spielen*.⁸ Where the moral demands duty, the social order work, the aesthetic order insists upon play; the place where the strain is felt to-day appears

⁷ *Les Fleurs du Mal*, 1868, 23.

⁸ *Werke*, Hempel, XV, 392.

less in connection with the ideal of duty, more with reference to the norm of utility. The aesthete, the Decadent, cannot submit to the utilitarian ideal, lest he lose the intrinsic meaning of his inner life. With the Romanticist, whose part in the elaboration of the individualistic ideal has already been recognized, Decadence showed itself in the ideal of subjective *Ironie*, as also in the striving after the striking, the piquant, and the remote; such tendencies were calculated to render man more and more individualistic, less and less social; more and more humanistic, less and less social.

The aesthetic interpretation of Decadence should not be allowed to obscure the essential eudaemonism of the doctrine, even when certain objective features of the cult may seem to render it indifferent to this inner trait. According to Gautier, the meaning of Decadence resolved itself into a question of Latin literature, where such a Decadent as Baudelaire expressed a preference for such authors as Apuleius and Petronius, rather than for Vergil and Cicero; the Latin thus exalted by the Decadent also tended to be less Roman and more Byzantine, less Pagan and more Christian. The expressed reason for this strange choice appears in the fact that the language in its decadence has become mature, ingenious, complicated, wise, and full of nuances. Furthermore, it was the speckled, greenish elements of decomposition peculiar to late Roman and early Byzantine literature which made its appeal to Baudelaire; the deliquescence of ancient art thus made possible the Decadence of the modern. The internal character of this mature literature, with its superstitions and phantoms, with its obscurities and monstrous dreams, made its appeal to the Decadent, who found in these anti-natural tendencies the possibility of interiorizing his individual life. Given natural notions and healthy ideals, and the intellect will stream outward in the pur-

suit of the exterior object; involve the soul with the complications of its own nature, and it will find in the self abundant opportunity for its *culte du moi*. Now it was the love of the bizarre which Gautier employed in his explanation of the Decadence of Baudelaire.⁹

In the mind of Baudelaire himself, the decadent ideal expressed itself in connection with the principle of form, whence his art sought to compensate for its lack of the truthful and moral by a perfection of its own. This perfection, no longer a derivative perfection due to the subordination of the beautiful to the moralic or metaphysical, showed itself in the exactitude of the form which poetic composition followed, whence, not only the whole poem but the stanza, not only the stanza but the line, not merely the line but the word, should be perfect in itself. Only as poetic art was perfect in and through itself, one might imagine him to argue, could it afford to sever connection with the one-time assistance of the ethical and logical. At the same time, far from asserting that poetry could not elevate mankind morally, or that it could not enlighten the mind, Baudelaire went on to assert that such moral and mental benefits were essentially the result of perfect poetics; the distinction between the poetic here and the mento-moral there was found in the idea that poetry benefits the true and the good incidentally, for the endeavor to make art submit to and serve morality and truth could only diminish the force of poetry.¹⁰

The aesthetic quality of Decadence expressed itself more uniquely when Baudelaire made use of the expression, *l'autonomie absolue de l'art*.¹¹ The Kantian conception of aesthetics as disinterested pleasure is here extended in both directions, so that it shall include also disinterested pain; the aesthetical was thus the complete emancipation of the emotional process; it was equally

⁹ *Les Fleurs du Mal*, 17-18.

¹⁰ *Fleurs du Mal*, 23.

¹¹ *Ib.*, 21.

disposed to the joyous and the sad, the beautiful and the ugly. It is true that the aestheticism of Baudelaire was inclined to emphasize the sad rather than the ugly, but the actual pursuit of his poetic themes did not fail to place the ugly by the side of the beautiful. Thus, in his *Hymne à la Beauté*, the poet is so anxious to gain insight into the inward infinite of his soul that he cares not whether the vision be from Heaven or Hell, whether it involve beauty alone or the monstrous and hideous.¹² The categorical imperative of aesthetic Decadence expresses itself in Baudelaire's famous, *Sois belle, et sois triste*;¹³ yet one cannot help asking why this command might not have read, *Sois laide, et sois triste*: ugliness seems to form the more appropriate partner for sadness, as the poet himself must have felt; for he adds that tears add as much to the countenance as the river to the landscape, and that the storm refreshes the flower. Moreover, in his choice of themes, where cats and vermin become objects of poetic treatment, the poet seems inclined to exalt the ugly with the beautiful; in this, the absolute autonomy of art is realized perfectly.

The psychology of the aesthetic Decadence expresses a desire on the part of the poet to come to a full understanding with his own soul. Decadent disinterestedness, whereby the artist repudiates goodness and truth and stands indifferently between beauty and ugliness, was evidently prompted by the desire to cut loose from the buoys of the soul in order that one might thus sink to the depths of one's uttermost self. At the time when Decadence was at its height, the psychology of the unconscious was in no such condition of perfection as it is now; and, in the abandonment of the usual criteria of consciousness, the moral will and the logical intellect, as these had been the guides of the Socratic "Know Thyself," Baudelaire was but seeking a kind and degree

¹² *Fleurs du Mal*, XXII.

¹³ *Ib.*, XC.

of *suignosis* which should reveal, not only the superficial and usual, but the profound and extraordinary. To have followed a scientific and social standard would have been to defeat the psychological enterprise, so that the Decadent has no other course than the aesthetic analysis of his own consciousness. How far such a method of interior living can remove one from the social order, appears in Huysmans and Wilde; from the ultimate results of Baudelairean aesthetic Decadence to the anti-social Decadence, the transition was immediate and plain.

(2) *The Anti-Social Character of Decadence*

The aesthetic interpretation of Decadence has the effect of revealing the struggle for an inner life, not so much in opposition to as in neglect of society; nevertheless, the more militant form of the doctrine could not be avoided. Added to the analysis of Gautier, made in 1863, came the interpretation of Paul Bourget, in his *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, 1883; in the instance of Bourget, the analysis of Decadence is chiefly upon the basis of the social. "By the word Decadence," says he, "one denotes that state of society which produces too large a number of individuals who are unfitted for the work of common life."¹⁴ Following the principles of social biology and social evolution, Bourget looks upon the individual as a social cell, whose functioning in particular makes possible the functioning of the social organism in general. In the case of the individual, this self-functioning, carried on for the benefit of the whole organism, has about it the unhappy feature of causing the individual cell to express its energy in subordination to the energy of the social organism. When the individual, cellular energy becomes independent, the tendency which is brought about is that of anarchy. Now it is the social organism itself, rather

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, 24.

than the mere individual, which produces such anarchy; for development and decadence follow one and the same law. That is to say, while society is perfecting itself through culture and civilization, it is overdoing its work; whence the cultured, civilized individual makes his escape from the social organism which produced and perfected him. Such was the situation in the rise and fall of the Roman Empire.

Like Baudelaire himself, Bourget seems "impassible" in the face of such destructive Decadence; better the decadent defeat of Athens than the violent triumph of Macedonia.¹⁵ With his horror of progress and utopianism, Baudelaire found it impossible to turn Decadence into progress; yet, this is not necessarily the attitude of all Decadents, still less is it the attitude of all individualists. In the case of Wilde, who adopted the decadent ideals of Baudelaire and Huysmans, it was possible for the aesthetic individualist to raise himself above the passivistic condition into which aestheticism had thrown him, and turn from decadence to development, as this ideal appears in his *The Soul of Man under Socialism*. The same may be said of Nietzsche, who was more Baudelairean than he was willing to confess, so persistently did he strive to appear original. While Nietzsche had little of that Decadence which leads to passivism, he was an anti-social Decadent, who repudiated the conventional social morality of the day. Yet, while the *Übermensch*, the *Surhomme* of Baudelaire, was usually regarded in the light of isolation, the supreme question of Nietzsche was, What kind of man is to succeed the man of contemporary civilization? With such Decadents as Wilde and Nietzsche, there is somewhat more than a criticism of the present, more than a laudation of the Hellenic past; there is the promise of the future. Bourget seems to dread the futuristic consideration be-

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, 28.

cause, in history, declining civilizations have been followed in the name of progress by periods of brutality; but, in the case of our conscious, our willed Decadence, does it follow that the barbaric and brutal will efface our present civilization?

In considering such a possibility, the futurist would defend his argument by calling attention to the fact that our Decadence, far from being an affair thoroughly social, is more definitely confined to a certain class of individuals. In the mind of Nordau, the situation seems to assume a character according to which the socialized mass of men with their scientific education is sound; Decadence is limited to a part of the cultured class. While we as individualists may not be so ready to admit the social security of the mass, we are pleased to admit that Decadence appears as something specific and temporary, while it has about it the definite mark of that individualism which the author of *Degeneration* called "Ego-mania"; now such an amiable madness is not likely to become universal. As far as the barbaric is concerned, we may gather from Nietzsche that it is the isolated superman who is to elaborate such a character for himself, not that the present is to be followed by barbarism as an epoch. Nietzsche welcomed the suggestion of the titanic and barbaric, not as this appeared in mankind as a whole, but as it forced itself through our civilization in such instances as that of Wagner's opera, where Siegfried stood out in contrast to the impersonal men of his day and generation. It is thus an individualized, not a socialized, Decadence which presents the problem for contemporary thought, while instead of the tendency to become more robust and barbaric, the most marked social tendencies incline toward the mild and rational.

Because of the individualism of Decadence, in the light of which the self is willed as an object in itself,

individualism is inclined to accord limited, qualified approval to the movement which has tended to rescue the inner life of a socialized mankind. Baudelaire was malignant, but was Darwin of greater value to the spiritual life of humanity? Nietzsche had been a scourge to an age unprepared for a violent individualism, but was the agnosticism of Spencer any more acceptable? May we not thus regard Decadence as the antidote for the vicious naturalism and sociality of the last generation, and may we not find in such Decadence as much as we thought to find in evolution? If we were ready to sink beneath good and evil, should we hesitate to rise beyond good and evil? If man allowed evolution to relate him to the ape, could he not look in the other direction and thus permit the Decadent to point out his affinity for the superman? Evolution itself is not so surrendered to the massive and generic that it cannot make room for the individualistic in animal existence; for, as Darwin observed, "Individual differences are of the highest importance for us, for they are often inherited, as must be familiar to every one; and they thus afford materials for natural selection to work upon."¹⁶ The decadent individual was certainly a deviation from the social type, so that in him there may be the possibility of a future man who will have the advantage of self-knowledge and a comprehension of the world in which he finds himself. In seeking to align a goal for mankind, individualism does not hesitate to postulate an individual as an "I am" and "I will," while it is dismayed at discovering how stolidly social thought aims at a congregation of well-fed, socially satisfied bipeds, whose life is almost altogether one of immediacy and exteriority.

Where historical Decadence could express this liberation of the inner life in no more serious manner than by postulating a creature who "plays" or who "poet-

¹⁶ *Origin of Species*, Ch. II.

izes," individualism sees in Decadence the possibility of employing the emancipation of humanity from the scientific and the social to the end of creating a being who comprehends the world, while he enjoys the happiness which this enlightenment brings, and pursues his intelligible endeavor. In deviating from the social type, the individualist sets up the ideal of man as one who knows who he is and what he is doing; industrial occupation and social service have no other effect than the perpetuation of a social machine which produces unintelligible results, whose work makes for a wearisome exteriority wholly alien to the free, internal life of man as such. Genuine thinking, genuine doing are thus the prerogatives of the "man" whom society would include within its realm; but, when this "man" is once socialized, his spontaneous thinking and doing are fatally limited. Against such a dwarfing of man, Decadence is a strong protest, however extreme may be the individualism which it proposes, however perverse the content of inner life which it would ascribe to man. Man cannot lose the meaning of life for the sake of making himself efficient; man dare not forego the enjoyment of his inward existence for the purpose of increasing his usefulness. Only as man is ego can he really serve the social order in which he finds himself; only as he says, "I am," can he say, "Society is."

That which society denies the individual is that participation in the world where he is supposed to work; man is in, but is not of, the order which surrounds him. Social life is exterior, energistic, not interior and intelligible. The method by which participation becomes possible to the free individual living and working within the social order, is of a twofold character: it consists of enjoyment and insight. Man does not suffer merely because he does not possess property, nor does he have happiness merely because he can call a certain amount

of goods his own. Happiness and misery are internal and personal in their character. To participate in the social order by means of the enjoyment of existence is an idea which makes necessary a more complete philosophy of eudaemonism than the ideal of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" can convey, while it is even farther removed from the more "scientific" conception of "social health." Such social ideals might indicate a certain degree of contentment due to external welfare, but they do not penetrate to the depths of the individual's nature. The sense of happiness in the light of which man participates in his social world involves self-consciousness within and a complete view of the social world in which one seeks his life-enjoyment; man may be free from pain, may find entertainment in life, but his happiness is a positive condition in which he as himself enjoys his existence. Social thought has attempted to construe happiness as something external in the form of the means of enjoyment; egoistic thinking, in its despair of finding happiness in the world, has attempted to place enjoyment in the individual as one separated from the world. Both forms of hedonism have failed to present the eudaemonistic problem; both have failed to satisfy the human soul. Happiness is neither objective nor subjective; it consists in the free participation of the individual in his human world, which otherwise will remain an obstacle to his self-expression.

Owing to our hedonistic prejudices, according to which some are in favor of pleasure as the life-goal while others are opposed to it, the ideal of human happiness has been lost to view. Instead of regarding happiness as the complete enjoyment of the unified self, both hedonism and rigorism have considered it as the mere functioning of man's emotional nature. Furthermore, happiness has been regarded in a static manner as something given in the world or found in the mind.

Eudaemonism, however, looks upon happiness as a spontaneous form of activity manifested by the soul in its endeavor to overcome obstacles. Thus understood, happiness is equivalent to an inward sense of power which completes itself in the sense of overcoming. To exist as ego and to express the meaning of the inner life is to have happiness as such. To be immediately at home in the social order may impart a sense of ataraxy, while to strive within when there is no opportunity of finding self-expression without is the delicious sense of suffering of which only the man of genius is capable. A fully organized soul sustaining representative relations with the world without, presents the perfect type of the happy man, a type which unfortunately has few examples to corroborate it.

Granting that man may be great, as perhaps we are not forced to assume, it may be said that such life-greatness consists in the experience of a happiness which makes man one with the world. Egoism is to be understood as an effort to construct life under the form of a greatness which is impossible as long as the individual is submerged in the social order. Religion is perhaps the most stupendous attempt to attribute to the soul the idea of greatness which both the natural and the social are constrained to deny. Art is only another means of laying claim to that sense of life-greatness which the uncultivated existence of the social man dares not boast. Over and above all the necessary pettiness of life, which is due to the existence of man in nature and his work in the world, there is a presentiment of grandeur which becomes plausible only as the aesthetic character of life receives due emphasis. Culture is thus the general atmosphere in which the ideal of human greatness can thrive. Social existence, which to the average man seems the goal of life, is but a means to the aesthetic end. Eudaemonism, as this is sought in life, is the eudaemonism of aesthetic culture.

II. LIFE THE PLACE OF VALUES

Will the social order be found to do more for man as the creator of values than it did for man as the creature of joys; or, having flayed with whips, will it now flay with scorpions? Where human sensitivity led the individual to look for the social objectification of life's joy, his sense of spontaneity now leads him to appeal to the social order for the conservation of individual values. From the social standpoint, the demand for life-values seems more plausible than the demand for life-joys; for such is the common conception of the State that society is par excellence the realm of human values. The idea of worth seems more mediocre than that of either joy or truth, so that the social order can appear to be the realm of values where it is not at the same time the realm of joy and truth. Yet it may appear that the individualistic sense of worth is something so akin to the ideals of joy and truth that the State shall become as little the home of values as it was found to be the home of human joys. Society has a way of casting the ego about from place to place, whether in the caste-system of Brahmanism, the class-notion of Platonism, or the modern class-arrangement of society, that individualism may be led to doubt the validity of the State as the conserver of human values. It may be that the social order is speaking of values as though they were more like objective things than like states of the human will, in which case the fate of human value will perhaps turn out to be in no wise different from that of human joy. Thus, there may be as little room for a Nietzsche as there was for a Baudelaire. To investigate the situation, one must subject the concept of worth to analysis.

I. THE HUMANISTIC NATURE OF VALUE

In his persistent endeavor to construe his life as great, man has made use of one moral ideal after another, as

the conditions of culture varied. Where for a considerable period of time the ideal of the good obtained and served further to express the goal of human life, the lack of initiative peculiar to such a static notion effected a change to the modern ideal of duty. Where the good was fixed and limited, duty has become dynamic and endless, whence there has arisen a desire to possess a moral ideal which, while not solid like the ancient good, should be less fluid than the modern duty. That concept of life which seems to be clay instead of either marble or water, is found in the plastic notion of value. Metaphysically considered, value represents neither that which is eternally complete nor that which must remain forever incomplete; in this mingling of the eternal and the temporal, the concept value shows its likeness to human nature as such. For the more perfect comprehension of the value-principle, it were well to observe how, as a doctrine of desire, value teaches the individual how to receive from the world, and how, as a doctrine of volition, the same principle shows man how he can put his will into the world.

(1) *Value and Desire*

In the attempt to look upon man as great, philosophy of life must needs settle accounts with that most characteristic of human tendencies known as desire. Where a severely spiritual conception of life's greatness, as this appears in the Buddhistic religion, feels constrained to negate desire, the looser and less religious view ever tends to affirm desire as that which is natural and worthy. Somewhere between the mere negation and sheer affirmation of desire will the worth and greatness of life be found: the relation between desire and value, inasmuch as each helps the other to attain to intelligibility and security. If it were not for desire, the idea of value would be almost without content, while the

presence of value in desire redeems desire from psychological contradiction. It may be possible to gain some insight into the character of value by making simple appeal to pleasure; but so passive is pleasure, so temporary, that the flow of life must depend upon some more constant life-principle, such as is found in desire. Again, it might be possible to view value in terms of volition; but the resort to sheer volition, while it may account for action as such, fails to color such action with the character of worth. For these reasons, it seems better to consider value as something desiderative.

The analysis of desire is sure to disappoint him who persists in a purely hedonic interpretation of this combination of impulse and feeling. Desire is not feeling alone, not willing alone, but a fusion of the two. On this account, one's desires may be directed toward that which is pleasurable, a form of desire which tends to emphasize the affective phase of the desiderative; yet, this is not to indulge in the hedonic assertion that man always desires pleasure. At the other extreme of the desiderative series, one discovers that desire may direct its forces toward that which is painful, a psychological phenomenon which is sure to puzzle the naïve hedonist. Then, as a mean between these extremes, desire may so merge feeling into volition that the desired object shall be neutral as to both pain and pleasure. In these three phases of desire, where pleasure is marked plus, minus, and plus or minus, some extra-hedonic principle is obviously at work; this principle is that of value. The individual desires a pleasurable object, not merely because it is pleasurable, but because the pleasure involved is the sign of that object's worth. When, at the other extreme, the individual is found desiring a painful object, the rationale of the desire is found in the fact that the object is judged to have value for him who, in spite of pain, makes it the object of his volition. In the

principle of value, then, desire finds the basis which is lacking in all hedonic attempts to ground the desiderative.

The service which the principle of value grants to desire is reciprocated by desire when one makes the attempt to supply value with a content; ethics has helped psychology, and psychology shall help ethics. To view value as something desiderative, it becomes necessary to cast the general principle of value into the form of a judgment, wherein value becomes the predicate without which the moral idea would end in a circular form of argument. But, in making of value a value-judgment, the raw, psychological material is called upon to assume a quasi-idealistic character, whence mere desire is transformed into that which is judged desirable. With the imperfection of the individual, the insistence upon that which is judged desirable may often appear rigoristic, as though one were to command that which in itself is good for or desirable for man. Such idealization and such an imperative, however, are due to the irrational character of the individual rather than to any imperfection in the ethical principle as such; and it is further to be said that, had we to deal with man as truly human, the natural desires of the heart would lead to nothing else than that which, in a purely moralic manner, is called rectitude or duty. The valuable is thus the desirable; and, while the empirical individual has not the reasonableness necessary for the instinctive pursuit of such a desiderative value, it is possible to judge that such is at heart the intuitive choice of the humanity within the individual.

While the valuable as the desiderative does not make human life perfect and joyous, the principle of desiderative value has the effect of removing from one's mind the contradictions incident upon a conservatively autonomous moral judgment, in the pale light of which it

is asserted that "right is right." Of this identical judgment there can be no doubt, but the practical sufficiency of the ideal involved occasions a certain amount of practical skepticism. Has the right no worth? Is morality all in vain? When the anxious moralist casts about for some predicate to take the place of the formal "right," he considers with dismay how insufficient is such a predicate as "useful," how unconvincing is the attribute "pleasurable"; then it is that the predicate value comes to satisfy both the logical demands for a synthetic judgment and the ethical needs of a predicate which shall have sufficient moral dignity to place itself alongside the right, or virtue. Thus completed, the ethical judgment stands, "Virtue is that which has value."

In such a predicate as value, the ground of moral judgment appears to be found; more than this, which is quite formal in its character, is the thought that the predicate "value" is able to supply the moral will with a sufficient motive for obeying the dictates of the moral law, for that law is but the expression of that which has intrinsic worth for man. To will the moral simply for the sake of so willing is something which is so lacking in humanism as to engender practical skepticism; such morality asks too much of man. To will morality because such willing brings pleasure, apart from the reckless optimism involved therein, seems unworthy of the individual, who feels that such a morale asks too little. But to will such virtues as seem to contain so many values is a course of morality which should satisfy both the ardent humanist and the rigorous moralist. At the same time, the pursuit of that which has worth tends to further the individualistic assumption that man is great. Toward this idea of greatness, or worth, the natural order is necessarily neutral; in nature there can be no idea of greatness save, perhaps, that of limitlessness and power, but the purely spatial and dynamic

cannot have a value for the human species. It is in the humanistic order, then, that the problem of value is to be discussed, so that the conflict over the conservation of value has to do with the social situation in which the individual finds himself. Instead of being a world of values, a place of worth, society is the place where human affairs as such are transacted. In the midst of this, man must still be regarded as the valuing being, a unique species in the natural order of creation.

For the furtherance of the value-ideal, humanity has at its side the forces of art and religion, while the inferior valuations of the mediocre life find their expression in ethics and economics. Art is of vast moment in the elaboration of the value-ideal, inasmuch as the aesthetic consciousness arouses spontaneous activities in the artist while it does not fail to create ideal desires in the beholder of the artist's work. It is undeniable that, feeling its independence of the social standard, art may indulge the excesses of the Roccoco and the Romantic; but these aberrations have the advantage of revealing the free creativeness of the human spirit. Where society has been genuine, these extremes have been avoided, so that they are as much to the discredit of the social as of the individualistic. In a similar manner, religion has ever affirmed the supremacy of the human spirit; and, while it has not shunned social service, it has never created the illusion that its divine ideals came into being for the sole purpose of smoothing the path of civilization. Like art, religion has had its spiritual excesses, whence its history is marked by the presence of the sacerdotal and superstitious, whose existence is so obnoxious to the utilitarian mind. In all this, it has been the peculiar vocation of the aesthetic and religious to conserve the unique sense of worth which it is the destiny of mankind to enjoy; and, without the tendency to appreciate and to worship, it had been difficult for man to have kept his human values.

With the ethical and economic forms of human consciousness, wherein the ideas of man as worker have ever obtained, the sense of value has not fared so well. Both of these forms of human culture have pledged themselves to the social, rather than to the individualistic, whereby the interior feeling for life has been threatened. It is quite true that man is by nature active, that man has a work in the world; but the question is, What is the nature of the task that he is supposed to perform? The categorical imperative of ethics and economics is, Man shall act; the aesthetic imperative is, Man shall play. Which is right, Kant or Schiller? In which mood do we find man as such, in the moralistic, or the artistic? The economic consciousness, which is so insistent to-day, is more inimical to individualism than the ethical ever was; now it is declared that the value of life consists, not in work alone, but in a kind of work which has as its end an immediate object and a direct result.

According to individualism, it is the calling of man to get value out of the world. The perceptual activity of the poet, or "maker," the intuitive conduct of the seer, and the assimilative consciousness of man as human, give us examples of the manner according to which the human *valeur* works upon the world. Even from the purely economic point of view, where "value" assumes a specifically material form, the same spiritual activity is suggested; hence the picture of the "labor process" as depicted by Marx: "Living labor must seize upon things and rouse them from their death-sleep, change them from mere possible use-values into real and effective ones. Bathed in the fire of labor, appropriated as part and parcel of labor's organism, and, as it were, made alive for the performance of their functions in the process, they are in truth consumed, but consumed with a purpose, as elementary constituents

of new use-values."¹⁷ The conditions under which values are most perfectly realizable are for the economist to determine; here, where we are in position to judge concerning the merits of capitalism and socialism, we must content ourselves with the idealistic assertion that no social system can hope to represent humanity or satisfy its desires, unless that system keep in mind the valuational principle which lies at the foundation of human life in the world.

(2) *Values as Volitional*

The art of getting value out of the world appears, then, to be nothing more than putting the human will into the world; for this reason, value is as volitional as it is humanistic. To the credit of individualism, it must be said that the idea of the world of values was deduced in connection with the idea of man as an individual, for only as man premised an ego within was he able to postulate a value without. The august sense of this relation of man to world has never received a more striking or more convincing representation than it received in the supreme sentence of Christianity: What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Here, the world and the self are placed in opposition, just as thought and thing were set tête-à-tête in the logic of Platonism; but, here in Christianity, it was the inner will in its attempt to get values out of the world which was set in opposition to the world-whole. Christianity does not seem to oppose the individual's attempt to overcome the world; all that Christianity insists upon is that, in getting worth out of things, the individual must not forfeit his unique self. At any rate, the idea of gaining the world, of securing the world's value, must be attributed to the genius of the Christian religion, where outer worth and inner individuality are set upon opposite sides of the whole science of things.

¹⁷ *Capital*, tr. Moore and Aveling, 162-163.

In the attempt to assign to the will a work in the world, individualism has settled upon the idea of worth as that which expresses the essence of the individual's world-work. But can this volitional benefit be enjoyed by the thinker unless he continue to assume the place of the intellect in the world of forms, whence springs the idea of truth? In the career of recent Humanism, this confusion between value and truth has placed thought in a position where, instead of indulging in the temperately humanistic idea that truth *has* value, it fain would assert that truth *is* value. The exaggerations of humanism, as these appear in Dewey and Schiller, may perhaps be explained when one recalls how the elder rationalism made the mere verity of the true the sole object of its pursuit, the sole conclusion to its arguments. Individualism, which finds the full sense of inner life to consist of joy, worth, and truth, is free from the formal rationalism which, in asserting that truth was simply true, failed to observe that truth was also joyful and worthwhile; but this does justify the humanist in his counter assertion that in being thus joyful and worthwhile, true is no longer true.

To assert, however, that the world of truths is not independent of the world of values, is not to admit that the world of values can take the place of the world of truths. Lotze, who did not fail to indicate practically all that is to be found in current Humanism, was so impressed with the fact that the basis of metaphysics is to be found in ethics, that he felt it his duty to free the subordinated world of values from the world of forms; yet, the valuational philosophy of Lotze involves no such sacrifice of intellect as its humanistic child seems so ready to make. Now, to realize the important work of the will in the elaboration of the worth-world, it is necessary to observe that even the newly emancipated will of voluntarism and Humanism has its limits; the

will is not unlike the "master" spoken of by Goethe; it shows itself only within "limitations." Individualism asserts these limitations to be those of value; and, if the will can affirm values, and can affirm them so successfully that there shall be no dread of nihilism, it may congratulate itself, and may further rejoice in the fact that it was the world of values alone, not the world of truths also, which was allotted to it as its share of work in the world.

In the process of getting value from the world, man develops his value-making will as well as the material upon which his activities are concentrated. Not a little of this humanistic development of man finds expression in another selection from *Capital*:

Man opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway.¹⁸

This humanistic activity carries with it the idea of value, since man acts in response to conscious desire, while the method of his work is characterized by the application of intellect to activity. Thus the end sought and the means employed are man's own; they transcend nature in the way that man's own being is destined to transcend the material order, and thus establish the kingdom of value upon the earth. Apart from this idea of man as valuer and society as the place of values, man's life in the world were a mere plant-like existence in which the natural forces of earth should find only one among many forms of expression; but with the idea of man as self-centered worker, the inner life takes on a unique character, while the human world becomes a specific creation of the human will. The world itself cannot be esteemed the place of value; the place of value is a realm which

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, 156-157.

man has created of his own powers and for his own purposes. Where the individual thinks to see the possibility of elaborating values in life, he is justified in assuming an optimistic life-ideal; where, however, he sees no outlet for his inward energy, where social life appears to afford no opportunity for self-expression, his attitude is justly pessimistic. Now the argument against pessimism is one which is offered by the will; pessimism is passivistic, if not nihilistic.

Over and above these economic values which represent so characteristically the work of the will in the world, there are ethical worths which have sprung from the will of mankind. Humanism expects man to will all, the speculative and the practical, the truths of logic and the ideals of ethics; being that which man has made, and still is making. But the willing of values into being, the attempt to give character as well as to find essence in the world, presents a task which only individualism knows how to appreciate. Individualism is not reluctant to appoint the will to the office of valuer in the world, even when individualism knows that the most determined, the most intelligent acts of the will find it difficult to escape a nihilism which seems to be inherent in them. The work of the will as moral valuer appears in connection with sense and intellect, as also with reference to the will itself. With sense, man wills his happiness, and individualism knows full well that happiness, instead of being a given somewhat to be found in the world, is a creation of the improvising will of the self. The work of the will appears again in an operation whereby ideas in the abstract are turned into living ideals. At the same time, the will wills itself.

The volitional value which the will attributes to sense has in it the very essence of eudaemonism; between the self as that which desires to enjoy life as such and sense which seems to promise this happiness, the will spans a

bridge. In such volitional eudaemonism, one of the chief characteristics of the world of values is found. In the attempt to find enjoyment in life, the self may be tempted to follow an ancient hedonism according to which happiness is sought in the passing pleasure of the moment; such was the method of the Cyrenaic. Or the ego, distrustful of the momentary, periodic pleasure, may attempt the intellectual summation of such pleasure in the form of the hedonic calculus. Now the history of hedonism has shown us that neither in the single pleasure of sense nor in the summed-up pleasure of a manifold of pleasant experiences is happiness as such to be found. For this reason, eudaemonism has found it expedient to turn to the will, whence happiness has come to be regarded as a willed happiness, a creation of the ego's own. In such willed or created happiness, the work of valuation has found a characteristic expression; the life of man as social has thus assumed, in idea at least, the form of a place of joys. Now these joys are more than feelings appreciated by the senses; they are the overcome standpoints of the active, creative will; they are, therefore, examples of the social life of man as a world of values.

Volitional values as produced by the action of the will upon the intellect assume the character of ideals, or intellectual values of humanity. In the system of Plato, where the elaboration of a world of Ideas was the end sought by the thinker, the conceptual work of the understanding was ever accompanied by the valuational work of the will, although Platonism was far from presenting a just balance of the intellectualistic and voluntaristic. The Ideas are mentally complete for the intellect, morally perfect for the will; they stand for the truth and worth of life. In our social thinking, we make the evaluating of ideas a most difficult thing, since we seek to decide all moral valuations by means of con-

vention; nevertheless, the will still has authority to take the ideas of the intellect and characterize them according to the principle of worth. At any rate, this is the psychology of value, so far as the intellect is concerned; value is the idea as willed, and in the act of willing, the idea receives the attribute of worth, as in the act of thinking it receives the quality of truth.

As the will affirms sense and thus creates happiness, as it asserts the idea and thus creates worth, so it asserts itself as such, and thus makes the work of valuation a complete one. While the position in which an assertion places one may seem absurd, the study of nihilism which must follow this view of the value-problem will show us that the pessimistic act of negation arises, not merely when the individual fails to find joy in life, whence he tends to become a eudaemonistic pessimist, not merely when his intellect fails to assert truth in the world, whence his pessimism becomes cosmic; pessimistic negation concerns itself with nothing so much as the assertion of the will as such. When man cannot will his volitions, he becomes pessimist, nihilist. For this reason, it becomes necessary to emphasize the fact that the view of society as a world of values, depending as this does upon the volition of sense and intellect, is further dependent upon the assertion of volition as such. In order that life may have worth, man must will; if man refrain from willing, if he assume nihilism and thus negate the will, the worth of life is gone. The worth of life cannot be postulated as a solid somewhat independent of the affirming intellect of man; the worth of life is a willed worth, a created worth, and it is dependent upon the will as will, not merely the will as it expresses itself through sensation and ideation.

In this capacity of valuer, man comes upon the social scene, where all worths are organized according to custom, where values obtain, not *φύσει*, but *θέσει*; worths

are not unlike the "ghosts" of Ibsenism, the inherited values which cannot be discarded by contemporary man; society itself is not altogether different from the *Spuk* so thoroughly reviled by Stirner. On this account, it becomes necessary for individualism to observe the manner in which man has repudiated his own values, how from having the will to create them, he has advanced to the will to destroy them. This appears in nihilism and pessimism, whose secret is found in the uncertainty of the will.

When values are regarded as so many idealized desires, it becomes possible for the individual to come to some conclusion concerning the ultimate issues of life in the world. Does human life make for success or failure? This question, so time-honored and so baffling, takes on a new form when one re-casts the principles of life upon the basis of value. Where one's ethics is hedonic, he must prove that man's life, if it is to be esteemed successful, must be a happy one, a conclusion which even the most optimistic are unwilling to draw. Where one's ethics is rigoristic, he must conclude that the success of life depends upon one's ability to show that man is good, a conclusion which moralic pessimism is ever ready to set aside. But, where one's ethics is that of the value-judgment, his only question is this, Has man been able to get value out of his life? To this third interrogative, the answer need not be in the same negative which beset eudaemonism and moralism, since man is and ever has been securing values where he has not been able either to gather pleasures or to elaborate virtues. Man has of course enjoyed some happiness just as he has performed a certain amount of duty, but in comparison with the vast values known to his art, his morality, and his religion, these hedonic and moralic claims seem quite insignificant. As a hedonist, man has not been a success; as a moralist,

he has been even more of a failure; but as humanist, or valuer, man has achieved a success with which other ethical triumphs cannot for a moment compare. Where the historical mementos of both pleasure and virtue are scarce to be found, the memory of human values justifies the assumption that man has conserved value in life; for which reason, the history of humanity, rather than a history of pleasure or a history of virtue, is the history of human values.

2. THE INDIVIDUAL AS PESSIMIST

In order to clear itself of the charge of complete, unqualified anti-sociality, individualism sets up such ideals of society as seem to promise an exterior life for a humanity wherein the one thing needful is interior existence. Where this interiority is conceived eudaemonistically, society becomes the place of joys, and where society fails to assume such a character, individualism becomes Decadence. In connection with the present topic, where the will of the individual seeks self-expression, the social order is regarded ideally as a world of values; but, once the real social order is so far this ideal, the individual is driven to the position of pessimism. At heart, this social pessimism is dependent upon the thought that man has no work in the world, no opportunity to express that which is most characteristic about him. When such pessimistic suspicion invades the will, the individual resorts to a pessimism which, at first, assumes the character of nihilism, then becomes more threatening as a doctrine of destructive pessimism as such.

(1) *Pessimism as Nihilism*

It is individualism as such which reveals the pathos of a human life in which the ideals of interior existence cannot adjust themselves to the actual conditions of the

exterior order. This dualism of inner and outer may be attributed as the cause of such a tragedy as that of the *Antigone* of Sophocles; but that which was lacking there was the definitely personal element in the character of the ancient heroine, who was fated to feel the contrast between an inner law and an outer statute. In the case of Flaubert's Emma Bovary, it is the personal within and the social without which arouse the conflict, which involve the nihilism of the author. In the case of Flaubert, both Bourget¹⁹ and Huneker assert that it was the disproportion between inner life and outer existence which led to the intellectual nihilism of the philosophic litterateur. The point at which this nihilism is felt is the will; the intellectual nihilist finds it most easy to think, but correspondingly difficult to initiate action.

According to Bourget's interpretation of Flaubert's nihilism, the cause of the malady is to be found in the fatigue, the exhaustion of our civilization, where there is not sufficient vigor to call forth the energy of the soul within. Yet the nihilism peculiar to Flaubert is none the less attributable to the feebleness of the inward will, which has exhausted itself in passive thinking. Man seems almost Faust-like in the intellectual isolation from the world, while his volitional feebleness is due, not to age alone, but to lack of volitional exercise. From the social standpoint, it may be urged, as is done by Bourget, that the richness of the intellect is the poverty of the will; for the abundance of interests incident upon the variety of points of view results in the impotence of man's volitional nature. Bourget's own nihilism appears in his attitude toward the human intellect, which he seems to regard as a faculty more destructive than constructive, while he looks upon man as one who "plays with thought, as an infant plays

¹⁹ *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, 139.

with poison.”²⁰ This abuse of the brain appears to him to be the great malady of the day: its effect is felt by the will, which is enfeebled by too much thought.

In connection with the Bovaryism of Flaubert, it is a question whether one may interpret that term, or develop that philosophy, after the manner of intellectual nihilism; nevertheless, there are not wanting in the history of Madame Bovary certain traits of character which submit to the interpretation of a nihilism due to an excess of interior sentiment. The intellect may indeed be guilty of isolating the individual from the world, but from this it does not follow that the individual should abandon his intellect for the sake of social life; just as reasonable, and more worthy, is it to assume that social life should be conceived and conducted in such a way as to make possible the participation of the individual with the richness of his interior, intellectual existence.

In the deduction of his Bovaryism, Flaubert does not fail to emphasize the fact that Emma Bovary's inner life had been built up upon the foundation of romantic books; she lived in the society of Mary Stuart, Joan of Arc, Eloise, Agnes Sorel, the beautiful Ferronière, and the like. In her eudaemonism, Emma sought to find out in life what the literary terms, “felicity, passion, rapture,” might mean.²¹ To her inability to harmonize the romantic dream within with the realistic world without, the author attributes her failure in life. “Busy” reading her novels, Emma brought down upon her head the following bit of criticism: “She needs to be forced to occupy herself with some manual work. If she were obliged to live like so many others, to earn her own living, she would not have these vapors, that come to her from a lot of ideas she stuffs into her head,

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, 154.

²¹ *Madame Bovary*, Pt. I, V.

and from the idleness in which she lives." ²² According to Bourget, this abuse of the brain was the one theme with Flaubert. Saint Anthony had thought too deeply about his Christ; Bouvard and Pécuchet had thought too much about their theories; Madame Bovary had thought too much, *a trop pensé*, about her happiness. ²³

Flaubert seeks an equilibrium when he introduces into the work the all-practical Homais, the most symmetrical character in the book. Homais' advice to Emma's lover, Leon, who had complained against life, is all but comparable to Voltaire's, One must cultivate the garden: "If I were you, I would have a lathe." ²⁴ The conflict between the two ideals of life, the internal and romantic, the external and practical, is brought before the heroine when she attends the famous agricultural show. While the speaker of the day glorifies the external interests of humanity in agriculture, commerce, industry, Emma's lover hints at the individual's ability to "overcome everything," its tormenting dreams, its expanding horizons, its beautiful passions. In the heart of the *egoïste*, the conflict of inner and outer assumes at the same time the form of a duel between private and conventional morality, the superior ideals of the sky, the stupid principles of earth. ²⁵ It was in this desire to witness and enjoy the realization of her felicitic dream that Madame Bovary succumbed to sin.

Thought, which, to the classic thinker as to the rationalist of modern times, was the constructive principle of reality, is thus regarded as the destructive agency, as that which produces the naught; unlike Plato, Aquinas, and Spinoza, Flaubert cannot be persuaded that man lives in his mind. This intellectual nihilism of Flaubert, this *sacrificio dell' intelletto*, seems to be due to the artist's feeling that the more the intellect expends the

²² *Madame Bovary*, Pt. II, VII.

²³ *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, 154-155.

²⁴ *Madame Bovary*, Pt. II, VI.

²⁵ *Ib.*, Pt. II, VII.

energy of the soul, the less will the soul have for the will; so that, in the last analysis, Flaubert is making his appeal for voluntarism. It was Madame Bovary's surrender to sentiment, her repudiation of domestic responsibility, and her final rejection of the moral law of the will, which involved her in the negation which at last demanded the negation of her own life. In our generation, this intellectual nihilism shows itself in Nietzsche, who will allow nothing in science or religion, in art or ethics, to prevent him from upholding a relentless Dionysianism, a supreme, "Be hard!"

In the case of Flaubert's confrere, Turgénieff, individualism finds a more clear and convincing contention against the aesthetics of the intellect, as also a more definite expression of nihilism, a word which was coined by the author of *Fathers and Children*.²⁶ Unlike Madame Bovary, the typical nihilist of Turgénieff is conscious of both his inner, aesthetical life and the activistic impulses which tend to lead him to his work in the exterior order. Such is the case with Nezhdánoff, whose inner life had been developed to the pitch of artistic perfection; convinced that he has a mission in the social order, the youth seeks to neutralize the aesthetical by the practical. Rejoicing in the sufficiency of an interior sense of culture, he is confronted with the importance of "serving the earth";²⁷ when, however, he desires to consecrate his powers to the cause of social betterment, he becomes skeptical, and calls himself, "accursed aesthetic."²⁸ In this mood, he feels a certain *folie du doute*, in the midst of which he exclaims, "Oh, Hamlet, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, how am I to emerge from thy shadow?"²⁹ So far as his own personality is concerned, it is necessary for him to "simplify himself";³⁰ but here was the place where

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hapgood, V, 38. ²⁷ *Virgin Soil*, tr. Hapgood, VIII, 94.

²⁸ *Ib.*, XVIII, 197.

²⁹ *Ib.*, 198.

³⁰ *Ib.*, Pt. II, 67.

it was "difficult for the aesthetic to come in contact with real life," for, in his most complex character as the Russian Hamlet, the hero had placed himself in the position, not of a simplified, but of a "superfluous man."³¹ The conflict between aesthetic superfluity and social simplicity finally assumes the form of a battle between two men in the heart of the hero; as he bids farewell to his beloved, he confesses what his condition had been: "I did not know how to simplify myself; the only thing that was left was to erase myself altogether."³²

This definite presentation of the nihilistic problem is but a phase of the complete doctrine of Turgénieff; his conception of life, expressed analytically in his essay, *Hamlet and Don Quixote*, views humanity as made up of the contrasted types of contemplators and activists, and seeks to neutralize the excesses of the former, which idealizes without being able to realize the practical significance of its sentiments. Unable to advance from the thought to the deed, the contemplator seeks refuge in nihilism. Such an impossible contemplator was Turgénieff's Rudin, his Lavrétsky, in *A Nest of Nobles*, his Litvínoff, in *Smoke*, although the latter, confused by the smoke of modern civilization, tends to come to an understanding with life when he abandons his dilettantism, and takes up his work in the field. Far from sympathizing with this nihilism, and even farther from Flaubert's despair over it, Turgénieff believes it possible for the man of thought to escape the destructive consequences of his ideas, and take his place in the exterior order. This faith expressed itself in connection with his favorite character, Bazároff, in *Fathers and Children*; having created the term "nihilist," and having given himself up to that contemplationism wherein one "lies on earth to gaze at heaven," Bazároff was all but

³¹ *Ib.*, 109.

³² *Ib.*, 208.

able to adjust himself to the world of common people, while the closing days of his life made it possible for him to feel the reality of progress, and the coming of that "loyal time" when there should be a new epoch in the history of his country.³³

In the case of both of these intellectual nihilists, whose literary work was contemporary with the Decadence, it was possible to regard the Hamlet-like intellect as having run far in advance of the Quixotic will; but the utilitarianism which followed their epoch, places us in a position where we cannot afford to discountenance the claims of the free intellect in its contemplation, even when one must lie idly upon the earth in order to view the heavens. The passivistic nihilism, which seeks to persuade us that we were meant to view the field, rather than toil in it, is not our present foe; for we are so energized in our intellects, according to the principles of a psychology that affects to find in the work of the will the same value that once was found in the operation of the intellect, that we are persuaded that it is the will which to-day acts as the great destructive agency of human life. Where once thought was all, now action has become supreme; so that, instead of rejecting the intellectual nihilism of fifty years ago, it is wiser to seek the re-establishment of a view which made man more the *homo sapiens*, less the diligent laborer. Hence, the readjustment of the individual to the world and humanity, in considering the lesson taught by the "superfluous" men of the older generation, must seek to elevate this idea of social superfluity to that of genuine, human superiority.

(2) *The Pessimism of Will*

The difference between individualistic nihilism of the type of Flaubert and Turgénieff and personal pessimism

³³ *Op. cit.*, 321-322.

seems to lie in the following distinction: Where the nihilist is persuaded that there is a work for the will in the world, and thinks that it is because of his personal unfitness for it that he must assume the attitude of negation, the pessimist views the problem from the exterior point of view, whence he concludes that the world is as unfit for the will as the will for the world. The nihilist complains, "I can do nothing"; the pessimist feels that, however much he can do, all action will be in vain. The value of subjective nihilism and objective pessimism, while only a relative value, lies in the fact that it calls the individual's attention to the breach between him who would realize his inner life and the world wherein he is supposed to work; and if the nihilistic pessimist assures us that between the two, the intelligent individual and the exterior world, there is no possible commerce, individualism is warned that the reunion of the self and the world can come about only as newer and more sufficient conceptions of both subject and object are entertained and rendered authentic. Free individualism has been reduced to its most definite terms; sheer utilitarianism has been brought to its final analysis; and no common denominator has been found. Shall the world then yield to the Decadent, or shall the individual submit to the utilitarian? Genuine individualism, the critical individualism of the future, is willing to abide by neither result; the individualism of the future insists upon the mutual understanding of the inner and outer, of the self and society, while it holds itself ready to re-define both the self and society in such a way as to effect harmony between them.

Pessimism may be understood as the conviction that the world is so constituted as to afford no place for the human will. The fault lies, not in the will alone, but in the world where the will tries to introduce itself. The question at hand, then, has to do with the possi-

bility of work in the world, rather than with the mere power of the individual's will. In the striking instance of Schopenhauer, the classic treatment of the pessimistic problem does not confine itself to a discourse upon the sadness of life or the pathos of the human situation as such; it expresses itself in a manner more radical. It is quite true that Schopenhauer did develop the cosmic and eudaemonistic forms of the pessimistic philosophy; yet the essence of his conception of the problem is to be found in the contention that the highest life-ideal consists in the negation of the will, when it is the very genius of the will to assert itself. Thus, it is not that the will lacks power, or that the will, with its knowledge of the will-to-live, is wanting in intelligence; it is the feeling that the work of the will can only be in vain, that, as we to-day should say, it cannot elaborate values in the world. The will has all power, for its participation in the one Will-to-Live makes it almighty; *der Wille ist nicht nur frei, sondern sogar allmächtig*.³⁴ As the rationalism of Geulincx had asserted that the self should will nothing, because it could do nothing, the voluntarism of Schopenhauer insists that the will should will nothing, because it can do everything. Now here is the place where individualism and voluntarism lock horns; individualism is cheered by a metaphysics which attributes limitless power to the will, but sees no reason why the doing all should lead to the doing nought.

In the egoistic affirmation of the individual as a free force, as that which can really and effectually put its will into the world, individualism seeks a more convincing interpretation of the pessimistic philosophy. In the case of the Schopenhauerian Nietzsche, this pessimism may perhaps be found. "Is there," asks Nietzsche, "a pessimism of strength? Is there perhaps suffering in overfullness itself?"³⁵ In Nietzsche's

³⁴ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 53.

³⁵ *Birth of Tragedy*, tr. Haussemann, § 1.

mind, this positive pessimism may be attributed to the eternal Will-to-Live, to God Himself, "who, in creating worlds, frees himself from the anguish of fullness and overfullness."³⁶ There was in Nietzsche no lack of that nihilism which had made its impression upon such intellectualists as Flaubert and Turgénieff; yet, in Nietzsche's case, this nihilism, with its perplexity concerning the relative values of intellect and will, despairs of neither the contemplative nor the active, but seeks a readjustment of these in art and ethics. This readjustment must come about by the recognition of the Dionysian will, just as it must involve the subjugation of the formal intellect to that will. At the same time, the intellect, while losing for a while somewhat of its one-time Apollonian glory, can only be a gainer from a process which affords it new and fuller work in the re-subordination of the titanic, barbaric will. The Apollonian intellect none the less than the Dionysian will, felt itself related to and interested in the chaos of titanic forces, for "Apollo could not live without Dionysus."³⁷ With his mistrust of science, as of all things optimistic and intellectualistic, Nietzsche repudiated the metaphysics of the day, and declared that "Being" was a "fiction invented by those who suffered from becoming."³⁸

As Nietzsche's opposition to passivistic pessimism was doubtless due to his intense individualism, so the individualist everywhere arms himself within against the nihilism which tends to render man passive, workless in the world. Intellectual individualism, which seems to express the most perfect realization of the egoistic "I am," has always suffered from the suspicion that one cannot be one's self within, cannot be one's self without the otherness of things and persons. The history of individualism bears the record of *Ironie*,

³⁶ *Ib.*, § 5.³⁷ *Ib.*, § 4.³⁸ *Ib.*, Int.

Ivory Tower, a morbid *soi-même*, an impossible maisonnette outside the world; for this reason, it becomes the task of individualism to assign to the human self such a work as shall not render man exterior to himself, shall not plunge his will into utilitarianism. One may not wish to remain superfluous, yet that were finer than inferiority; one may not care to stand out in anti-social defiance, yet that is better than abject social submission. The question is largely, if not wholly, a question of worth: Is it worthy to be social, or worthy to be anti-social? The "character" which one is supposed to develop in the stream of the world is not the character which the spiritual life of man has promised to the human self; and it is doubtful whether Goethe would have been satisfied with such a character for himself. On the other hand, decadent individualism, which led Baudelaire to his *les gracieuses Mélancholies et les nobles Désespoirs*,³⁹ is equally unpromising for genuine human character; for man is a human valuer in the world.

Pessimism, if it must be entertained as a doctrine, can be limited to the intellect, even when one may indulge the thought that it is none the less applicable to the will; one view has to do with the mind's outlook upon the world, while the other concerns the will's feeling about itself. Wagner was justified in making his Wotan assume a gloomy attitude toward the world, where he beheld the twilight of the gods; but it does not follow that he was as just in conclusion to the effect that Wotan could only resort to Nirvanism and inactivity. Indeed, the more forbidding the appearance of the exterior order, the stronger should the will become, the more optimistic its feeling. But Wotan, instead of taking a heroic stand, reverses the ideals which the individualist himself is expected to entertain; where

³⁹ *Fleurs du Mal*, Int., 24.

we might imagine him to express sorrow at the impending doom, he confesses that that catastrophe gives him no grief,⁴⁰ and where we might expect him to strive with the hope of overcoming his obstacle, we find him relapsing into passivism, an inexplicable *Nicht Schaffen*. Individualism must dissent from such a presentation of the life-problem; for where one is doubtless justified in assuming a serious, if not pessimistic, attitude toward the world, one must confine one's pessimism to the intellect, which, with its wide range of vision, can hardly help feeling that the world is too vast for the mind; the will, however, with its immediate application to some special form of activity, is not necessarily hindered by the consciousness of obstacle, while it is capable of being thrilled by the possibility of overcoming; its noble blindness and its intimate feeling of strength should equip it for the task which the world presents. With Geulincx and Schopenhauer, it was the intellect which was responsible for the ideal of passivism; with Wagner, who had no such dialectical ability, and who had the consciousness of his work as revolutionist to inspire him, the pessimistic conclusion is to be attributed to an inherent sense of weakness. Now, it is just this anaemic notion that individualism seeks to set aside in its activistic optimism.

The task of individualism is thus seen to consist in de-idealizing the pessimism of the will; only the decadent thought of Baudelaire and Wagner could frame the ideal of "noble despair"; healthy individualism seeks rather to exalt the heroic ideal of striving in the midst of obstacles, even when those obstacles are never minimized by the intellect. In the sublime instance of Buddhistic pessimism, which was present to the minds of both Wagner and Schopenhauer, the passivistic conclusion does not follow from the nihilistic ideal of

⁴⁰ *Walküre*, II Akt, II Sc.

Nirvana, so that one might be an intellectual Nirvanist without resorting to inaction. The clearer the conviction of the nothingness of the world, the more forceful the idea that man has a world-work; such was the life-ideal of Gautama Buddha, as a result of which history records the spread of a most impressive religious cult. With Stoicism, which could find nothing of worth in the world, there is none the less the record of a world-work far superior to anything the life-believing Epicurean had to offer.⁴¹ So likewise in the case of Christianity, where the world is set aside as worthless; how much has Europe owed to this combination of intellectual pessimism and voluntaristic optimism? Optimism of intellect has little to do with optimism of will; indeed, one might even say that the effect of an optimistic intellect in persuading man that life is satisfactory has the effect of softening the will to such a degree as to produce passivism. When, therefore, the individualist is confronted by the question of pessimism, his condition of mind cannot ethically assume the inactivistic ideal, but should find in the pessimistic situation the ground for volitional strength and courage.

III. LIFE THE PLACE OF TRUTHS

There seems to be no inherent reason why life as such should not be as ready to supply the intellect of man with truths as it has been found to furnish his senses with joys, his will with values. By parity of reasoning, it seems credible that the social organization of human existence should be fruitful of all three benefits, joys, values, and truths; although, as a matter of experience, one finds that society seems more inclined to make man's life worthful rather than joyful and truthful. This may be but a fact of appearance; yet the individual has the feeling that, where the social

⁴¹ Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, 3rd Ed., I, 172-177.

order is ready and fit to take care of his values for him, the joy and truth of life must be sought by the individual himself. Values are by nature practical; they represent the needs of the average man whose life is largely an exteriorized life; by virtue of their apparent mediocrity, values may be taken up and developed by a State which cannot be expected to deal in joys and truths. There can be a practical State, but can there be an aesthetic and spiritual State also? The failure of society to account for and further the joy of life led to individualistic decadence with its anti-social corollary; if, now, society cannot supply the demand for the truth of life, the result is likely to reveal a similar result, in the form of anti-social skepticism. Indeed, the impotence of the social order to give to the self such values as should themselves have worth did not fail to reveal the anti-social tendency toward passivistic pessimism. In connection with the present question, individualism comes to the State with Pilate's question; if the State cannot make reply, the individual will have to answer its own question.

I. TRUTH AND LIFE

Far from being a problem which society has left untouched, the query, What is truth? is one which society has ever been ready to answer; indeed, society answered the question before it was asked, just as it has always been ready to thrust upon the credulous mind an excess of answering as soon as the least show of inquiry was apparent. Can society answer the individual's questions? That is a juncture which is of deepest concern with individualism in which the truth of life is of peculiar meaning. Before man ever asked the question, How did the State come into being? did not society declare that the State was of divine origin, or the deduction of reason, or the result of human

compact, or of spontaneous natural generation? God or reason, man or nature, has been the answer to the inquiry concerning the foundation of the social order. That such conceptions may not have been of practical expediency is not the same as that they were veritable solutions of the problem involved; one may live and work under the auspices of that which is an imperfect, if not fictitious, notion; but he cannot so easily think under such conditions. Thus, the problem concerning the truth of social life is by no means the same as the simpler question which involves only the practical working of the social idea. Is the idea of sociality a sufficient answer to the query, What is the truth of man's life? That is the issue here involved.

(1) *Sociality and Truth*

When social thought elaborates an idea concerning the State, social thought does not leave the being of the individual undisturbed; the fate of the species is one with the fate of the genus. The well-known habits of logical thought are at once recognized when one recalls how all thinking is a kind of synthesis in the light of which an idea, instead of being allowed to stand alone, is subordinated to some other idea, or has another idea attached to it as a predicate. In *The Struggle for the Truth of Life*,⁴² it was Nature which acted as the enclosing truth; it was the natural which took its place beside the individual as his predicate. The result was a double, parallel assertion, Man is in Nature, man is of Nature; man's physical existence within the natural order thus led to the assertion of his metaphysical existence there, while man's physical make-up as a creature of the natural order seemed to give thought the right to set up an ethical connection between the subject man

⁴² Cf. *supra* in loc.

and the predicate natural. Such conceptualism and such predication may have been satisfactory to scientism, but the career and behaviour of individualism were such as to show that the human ego must find the truth of his existence elsewhere, in itself alone perhaps. In the present connection, where it is the social instead of the natural, a similar line of procedure will become apparent; the social order will endeavor to cast a circle about the human self and will then attempt to attach to that self the social as a predicative anchor. On its part, individualism will be found repudiating both the including concept and the accompanying predicate, so that the smug propositions, *Man is in society and man is of society*, will tend to fall to the ground.

If the light that is in one be darkness, how great is that darkness! On the subject of life, man cannot be said to be ignorant, when ignorance might perhaps be better for him and more enlightening to his mind; on the subject of life, man has drawn his conclusion to the effect that life is social, that truth is likewise social. To read Stirner is to see how an individualist can come to the contrary conclusion; according to Stirner, man is the ego, truth is the self, whence the ego says, "I am man, and I am truth." Without passing judgment upon this apparent paradox, compare it with the contrary assertion of social thought: *Man is society, truth is social; society equals man, society equals the truth of life*. Over and above the simple fact that society is an idea more extensive than that of the individual, is there any inherent reason why an unprejudiced mind should conclude in favor of the social conception of truth? Where it is no question of work, wherein the social aggregate has the power and versatility to do more than the individual, but a question of truth, is there any reason why one should expect to find truth present in society and absent from the individual? Society as an idea has indeed

become *idée fixe*, so that, as one sees socialized labor, he expects to see socialized truth also; but there is no logical reason why truth should take up its abode in the social order. When one says, I am the truth, whether he be Protagoras or Christ, Descartes or Stirner, one feels as though he were in the presence of a paradox whose dark statement cannot be comprehended; yet the truth of life may be in the individual where it is not in society.

When one attempts to consider truth as something individual, one is confronted by the scruple that truth to be true must be objective; truth must represent, not what the particular individual may think, but what all individuals must think. Truth, so it is felt, must be free from the personal and temperamental; it must have a certain *largesse* about it, whence one turns from the ego to society as the place of truth. That society could have deduced the idea of truth is one thing; that society as now constituted and now understood does contain the truth of life is another. Society is concerned for the man who eats and drinks, who seeks clothing and shelter, who carries on war and commerce; but is society as anxious about man as a creature who seeks the truth of the life which he is living? Social living may perhaps be comprehended in connection with Comte's idea of "social physics," but can social thinking go on upon the basis of such a conception of man's life? The attitude of the individualist toward society is likely to have about it a certain amount of skepticism, due to the fact that the social synthesis of life is too narrow.

The inception of social thinking was effected by an agnostic preliminary. What, at heart, was the meaning of this resolute denial of the Beyond, and why should the apostle of Man think to aid his cause by negating the idea of God? Anselm found the idea of God *in intellectu*, and sought to place it *in re*; Spencer did not

develop a theology which was calculated either to affirm or deny the existence of God as such, or in reality, but attempted to relieve man of the ideal possession of the notion. Thus it was affirmed by agnosticism that, whether there be a transcendent spiritual life or not, we are assured that the idea of this is not an authentic one in the mind. Scientism, then, opposed Scholasticism, not upon theological, but upon psychological grounds, for scientism said, the mind has no just idea of God, no place for it in the scheme of truth. In recognition of the claims thus made by agnostic scientism, it is only fair to say that the theist, like Anselm and Descartes, had been somewhat hasty in his assertion that the human mind contains the idea of an Absolute Being; for, while introspection may indeed show this to be the case, it is not logic to take it for granted. For this reason, philosophy of religion cannot make use of the ontological argument until it has first elaborated a psychological argument. On the other hand, agnostic scientism was as hasty as Scholasticism; for scientism made the assumption that, in the idea of Man, the mind will find truth.

Agnosticism did not fail to recognize the fact that man must have truth, that the mind prizes its ideas in the same way that it deems its sensations and impulses precious things. And, just as the sensation and impulse must have something objective, so the idea demands that upon which it can lean; the idea cannot live *in intellectu solo*. But, we may ask, what has been the exterior support of the idea-making mind? The spiritual having been denied, the mind of man was invited to repose in the idea of the social. The history of individualism has shown us how difficult is this transition from a belief in the remotely spiritual to the immediately social; and, even when one is silent about his desire to know the Beyond, his sense of truth compels him to confess that faith in the social seems no more satisfactory than

an old-time belief in the invisible. Individualism has learned Stirner's lesson that there is as little truth in the idea of Man as in the idea of God, just as it has found, after the manner of Stirner, that the purely humanistic may be as oppressive an idea as was the old conception of a spiritual kingdom. What does man gain intellectual when he places before him the abstract idea of Humanity? The idea seems to have no more reality than the idea of Divinity; yet, at the same time, it is more threatening, since it makes necessary the subsumption of the self in the social, while the idea of God, unless conceived in a purely pantheistic fashion, expressed no such antipathy to the individual. In the case of Wagner, the exchange of the humanistic for the spiritual and religious was no more helpful or convincing. If a Wotan cannot convince us of Divinity in life, a Siegfried is equally impotent to bring us to the conclusion that Humanity is true.

Individualism is thus led to feel that society is hardly to be called the place of truths; its skepticism assumes certain definite forms. The first difficulty in the mind of him who is anxious to find truth in the social is that which involves the peculiar Realism of the argument. With Platonism, this classic realism was not inappropriate, nor did it fail to produce something like a satisfactory notion in the Platonic idea of the State. Such was likewise the fortune of Scholasticism which, insisting that *universalia sunt realia*, was able thus to synthesize all individual examples under such general heads as Man and Church. Whether scientism has the right to make use of a method so alien to its positivism is important, but inconsistency of method is not the supreme consideration. The question is, What kind of universal has agnostic scientism spread out over the head of the individual? One might, perhaps, believe in the classic State, for the idea thereof was formed in

connection with ideas already approved by the intellect; one might place his affair upon the scholastic Church, since the formulation of this idea was not carried on in ignorance of the intellect's desires. But can one similarly believe, or attempt to believe, in the Social? The formation of this idea, if indeed it ever took place, had nothing of the intellectual about, and even when one may have little interest in intellectualism, the mind as such is not given to groundless beliefs.

In the ethics of social evolution, the metaphysical has been as important as the moral; the system has appealed to the intellect as well as to the will. Spencer sought to shun this metaphysical implication when he closed the agnostic door against the alleged realities of the Beyond; Stephen introduced his scheme in a manner no less agnostic, as also with the expressed determination to "postpone metaphysical problems."⁴³ Perhaps Stephen was sincere and careful in his choice of the word "postponement"; for, instead of assuming a complete denial of their existence, he merely indulged in delay. The study of the social and the faithful pursuit of the evolutionary did not permit as much delay, however, as the science of ethics seemed to promise; hence, it was not long before the social evolutionist was found making use of mediaeval realism. In his anxiety to secure a basis for morality, Stephen reverts to the ontological example of the "State" and the "Church"⁴⁴ after the analogy of which he proceeds to elaborate the scientific idea of the "Social Organism."⁴⁵ Nor does this ontology stop at the idea of ethics as a science; it continues until it has changed the moral norm from a nominalist "Do this" to a realist "Be this."⁴⁶ Now it must appear that, in the intellectual idea of "Social Organism," as also in the ontological command to be

⁴³ *Science of Ethics*, I, 3.

⁴⁴ *Ib.*, III, 21.

⁴⁵ *Ib.*, III, 31.

⁴⁶ *Ib.*, IV, 16.

social, there is room for much individualistic doubt. The truth of life seems unwilling to inhabit such a conception of man.

Not only does the social idea destroy the idea of God, but it acts destructively upon the idea of man; where first it fails to grant belief in Divinity, it ends by removing belief in Humanity. When one objectifies his ideas and thus, with Plato, endeavors to find himself in the State, or when such objectification seeks the objectification of the individual's faith in the form of a Church, the character of individualism is more or less faithfully preserved; but when one objectifies his physical nature and thus makes up the idea of Society upon a biological basis, the ego cannot dwell in the house which he has himself built. The result is that the individualist must indulge in complete agnosticism and thus deny both forms of spiritual life; the Divine and the Human become equally unknowable when they are subjected to the treatment of scientism and sociality. If there is no God in the one, there is no Man in the other; man no longer believes in either Deity or Individuality. By concentrating attention upon the physical and social, modern thought hoped to drive truth into a corner; but now it appears that the truth of life is not to be found in this restricted area.

(2) *Humanity and Truth*

That there is a life-truth in Humanity as an order, apart from the "I think" of the individual, need not itself be doubted, even when the socialized formulation of this life-truth appears incredible and unconvincing. Humanity is at once a way of doing and a way of thinking, while Humanity's aim has been both the exterior elaboration of civilization and an interior perfection through culture. The truths of life which have been created by humanity have been one with the works of

the same human spirit; ancient works and ancient ideals, mediaeval creations and mediaeval creeds, modern energies and modern norms, have been concomitant and interactive. Man has always had the desire, not only to do, but to understand what he was doing, so that the activities of the will have united with the activities of the intellect. Instead of being an idea framed in the free by some especially gifted thinker, the idea of humanity came into being at a time when the individual was wanting in philosophic profundity, but when mankind was seeking some new form of life for itself. It was from the Stoics rather than from an earnest Socrates or a lofty Plato or an encyclopedic Aristotle that the idea of humanity came. But, when humanity in the intensiveness of existence formulates the general idea of its own being, the result is not the same as that achieved when a socialized age endeavors to express the truth of life by regarding all existence *sub specie sociatatis*.

If society be given the deep interpretation, it becomes possible to regard society as the place of truths. Perhaps the trouble with the age of sociality lies in the fact that the pursuit of truth has not been made as serious a matter as the pursuit of value, so that the social idea, instead of representing what the age has thought about human life in the world, really stands for no more than a corollary to the general proposition concerning the values of man's life. In social thinking, there is indeed a show of earnestness, but it does not appear that the modern mind has labored as assiduously in the development of truth as it has in the elaboration of worth; the modern mind has had more anxiety about nature than about man, so that its opinions of human life, as these are expressed socially, should not stand for the logical result which might otherwise be drawn. When thought regards society as the place of truth, it

is possible to raise the condition of human life above mediocrity, while it will provide a place for the individual who is now expatriated. Society as the place of utilities makes for none but the workers of the race and those who furnish such ideals as may be utilized; society as the place of truths will afford an empire for the enlightened.

The failure to recognize the larger, deeper meaning of the social is due to the failure to give an adequate definition of man. From the utilitarian standpoint, man is the eater, the fighter, the worker, the man of exteriority; from the individualistic point of view, man is none the less the thinker, the artist, the worshipper, the man of interiority. Our study of man leads us to view the primitive human being as one who had needs, while our conception of the man of the present is of one whose interests are industrial; when the viewpoint of inner individualism is assumed, it becomes possible to consider the primitive man as the one who gave us our ideals of art and religion, just as we are able to look upon the perfected man of civilization as one who stands in need of ideals as well as utilities. By what right do we define man after the manner of economics alone, when the facts of history do not fail to point out the possibility of an ethical interpretation as well? The individualist cannot come to an understanding with society because the social ideal, instead of including the spiritual strivings of humanity, draws around mankind the circle of utility and material progress. The duty of philosophy in this connection does not consist in the exaltation and elaboration of needs, which are so urgent in themselves as to deserve no philosophical furtherance, but has to do with the expression of the ideals which are just as characteristic of humanity, but which are likely to be overlooked in the midst of immediate necessities. Where social life is purely utilitarian, those

who would pursue ideals of joy and enlightenment are forced to assume an anti-social attitude, even when they recognize and confess that they have not thought of severing their connection with humanity.

Since society as its life is lived and its ideals are generated is not altogether the place of truths, the individualist fears to take his place in the world of work lest he lose the meaning of his own existence. Will and intellect are so intimately related that, while the will cannot operate apart from ideational assistance, when this has been granted, it is the tendency of the volitional process to cover up its tracks, and thus hide from the actor the essential purpose of his work. It might seem as though an individual who threw himself into the world of affairs there to mingle with his fellows, there to co-operate with them in the industrial perfection of nature, would be the one best fitted to inform mankind as to the purpose of human life. The activist, instead of viewing the world from afar, has entered it, handled its forces, and observed its ways, so that we are tempted to look to him for advice concerning the plan of the whole which the man of contemplation views *au distance*. Unhappily enough, such is not the case; for the opinions of practical man are opinions indeed, deduced from time to time in the midst of practical needs, while he who would understand his life feels the need of a view upon which he may base his ideal of a life-value for humanity. It is the lack of interior life which makes the position of the practical man so pathetic and ignoble; wanting in enjoyment, the practical man suffers even more from lack of insight into the meaning of the life about which he is so assiduous. To what extent, we may inquire, is ignorance of the issues of life due to the limitations of the mind, to what degree has the question of the life-value been obscured by undue social activity? It is undeniable

that society in the nineteenth century took no pains to enlighten its members concerning the meaning of their existence or the motive of their work; society has not been the place of truth.

As a generalization, then, the "social" appears to be wanting in those marks which are inwardly characteristic of man as man; the physical should not obscure the human, the economic the ethical. The conduct of the positivistic social thinker has not been unlike that of a modern archaeologist who seeks to determine the genuineness of a statue alleged to be Phidian or Praxitelian by making a chemical analysis of the marble that he may conclude from the absence or presence of the Pentelic or Parian whether the Venus was hewn from the ancient quarry or not; if this were the sole archaeological method, our art-ideals would be as much at the mercy of science as are many of our ethical hopes. "Social physics" is not likely to prevent the social skepticism which now threatens us, so that the physical generalization of mankind stands in need of the addition of such humanistic marks as shall make possible the definition of man as man.

2. THE INDIVIDUAL AS SKEPTIC

From the foregoing consideration of the truth of society, we must pass on and consider the causes of that skepticism which follows in its wake. At the very outset, one might think to suggest that such a consideration were unnecessary in view of the fact that social thinking began under the auspices of an agnosticism which was as frank and painstaking a form of the skeptical as one could desire. This skepticism concerning the spiritual order, with which social thinking initiated its career, has been examined already; now is the time to observe how anti-social thinkers have found it as necessary to doubt the truth of the immediate as the

social thinker had thought to doubt the truth of the remote; for it is the social itself which has of late come under the cloud of doubt. Man may doubt the God-idea and think thus to concentrate all his belief upon the man-idea; but the fact now confronts us that man doubts man, for the idea of humanity seems as illogical as that of divinity.

(I) *Skepticism as Dilettantism*

As the anti-social in Decadence showed itself first in passive aestheticism, as social pessimism began as nihilism, so the full social skepticism of the day had its beginning in the dilettantism of the cultured man. Between dilettantism and skepticism, there is as close a connection as that between those parallel forms of protest against the socialization of life, whereby the individualist was led to entertain an anti-social attitude toward the world because it seemed far from being a world of joys or a world of values. Skeptical dilettantism cannot be more fully persuaded that society is the place of truths. This dilettantism, while it directs itself most perfectly against the social as idea, has not failed to find some kind or degree of expression in the midst of Decadence and nihilism; Baudelaire was thus a dilettant, as was the case also with Flaubert. In its most essential form, dilettantism consists in the inability on the part of the individual to solve the disjunctive dilemma of the mind and thus say either yes or no. Baudelaire thus fell between joy and sorrow, beauty and ugliness, as Flaubert was Hamlet-like in his attitude toward action and thought. In the case of the Dilettant, there is a peculiar inability to decide between the claims of the true and the false in social life. According to Bourget, the psychology of dilettantism may be understood when one considers how the culture of the modern epoch is characterized by the mind's participation in "an infinite

fecundity of things," whence arises a melange of ideas and the "conflict among the dreams of the universe elaborated by diverse races."⁴⁷

The semi-skeptical attitude of the dilettant is eminently the condition of the individualist of the day, so that, in the larger sense, Wagner and Ibsen may be said to belong to this class of thinkers, even when the dilettant attitude as such seems to represent the ideas of a later period, just as it involves a type of mind somewhat alien to the constructive aesthetics of these masters. There is in dilettantism a certain absence of metaphysics which is not conspicuous in either Wagner or Ibsen; furthermore, both of these geniuses, Ibsen in his social plays and Wagner in the *Nibelungen Ring*, refused to keep aloof from the social problems of their day; now, the dilettant is neither social nor anti-social, for his attitude is more that of the superior man. In such capacity, the dilettant treats the real world in a spirit thoroughly Laodicean; he cannot affirm, is unwilling to deny, so that he can only regard the spectacle of reality with a certain wistfulness born of perplexity.

In the history of individualism, the world has been the subject of, first, a sharp negation, then, an equally vivid affirmation. The method of rationalism was such as to make possible the complete negation of the natural and social orders as such, whence the desire to prove the existence of the outer world, the reality of the social order. When positivism took the place of this individualistic rationalism, the same relentless attitude was to be observed, although the method had so reversed itself as to involve the affirmation of the exterior and the negation of the interior. Yet, in either case, the spirit was the same; the power of the mind to affirm or deny, as the case may have been, was whole and sound. Now, with rationalism already passed and with

⁴⁷ *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, 65, 67.

positivism passing, the mind has not the will to say either yes or no to its impressions or its feelings. The nihilistic inability to act reappears in the dilettant inability to choose; in the instance of nihilism, the difficulty seemed to lie in the preponderance of inner sentiment over outward-going volition; with dilettantism, the difficulty seems to reveal itself in the peculiar conditions of the exterior order of both nature and society. There, in the external world, the individual is immediately confronted by an indefinite, limitless number of things, as these have been discovered by science, which has spent its time in submitting them to definite analysis. In the attempt to elaborate a synthesis of the manifold in its quantitative and qualitative complexity, the individual finds that science has, in its methods, a suggestion of the diversity which is so peculiar to the facts. No longer can we say, Science is one, philosophies are many; for the lack of unity in science, as shown by its several geometries, its different chemistries, its various evolutions, unfits it for the synoptic grasp of the world as this was possible with Comte.

The confusion of facts and theories, as we must continually remind ourselves, pertains, not to the spiritual order, but to the natural and social one. Positivism has not kept its promise with man, for when positivism agreed to reveal Matter if we would turn away from Spirit, agreed to show us Man if we would ignore God, it has not been able to keep its word. At this time, we will not stop to develop the thought that, perhaps, it was this very dualism of the human understanding which is now responsible for the dilemma in which we are placed; nor will we pause to ask ourselves whether or not the mind is so constituted that it cannot comprehend the immediate without viewing the remote, the outer apart from the inner. Our chief interest is now the fate of natural and social thinking in the attempt of this style

of reasoning to view the world and humanity as such. In Bourget's essay on Renan,⁴⁸ the author of *La Vie de Jesu* is made the symbol of modern dilettantism; but the fine analysis of this trait of contemporary culture seems to extend far beyond the limits of Renan's genius. Furthermore, where Renan fell into his dilettant skepticism upon the theological rather than the positivistic side of contemporary culture, the present-day dilettant seems to be assuming the attitude of indecision toward things temporal and human. At the same time, it may be said of the man of the hour that, like Renan, he suffers from *l'horrible manie de certitude*.⁴⁹ Man feels that he must comprehend the world in which he lives: hence the theory of evolution which seeks to bring to the light data and principles which have the most remote reference to the life of man to-day; hence heredity, which refuses to take the given individual for granted; hence history, which cannot accept the present as such.

In literature, the same act of extension has made war upon the intensive behavior of the mind from which the sense of life's unified purpose is supposed to come. The more that is portrayed, the less that is demonstrated; for the writer has become the descriptive scientist, who is content to unearth facts, when he is not ready to assume either mental or moral responsibility for them. This dialectic of dilettantism appears most strikingly in fiction, where the literary art is so replete with manners, motives, emotions, temperaments, and situations that there is no room for morals, acts, ideals, purposes. In the same manner, criticism loses its way in the superficial manifold, whence it is unable to discern whether there be aesthetic value in the art under examination. The dilettant writer places himself in a position where he cannot identify himself with his work; cannot be

⁴⁸ *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, in loc.

⁴⁹ Cf. Bourget, *Op. cit.*, 74.

one with his favorite characters, as Wagner was kin to his Wotan, Ibsen to his Brand, his Stockman, his Rosmer, his Master Builder. Yet, for the most part, these literary works speak for the present situation, as this is shown in the scientific and social; but, here, it seems there is no opportunity for the artist to affirm an ideal or to lay down a principle. As the scientist is forced to build a wall within his soul and thus keep his science here, his personality there, so the artist must fence his art by his will.

However paradoxical it may appear, the skepticism of the dilettant is due to an overperfect comprehension of the world, whereby the ability to exercise choice and decision becomes weakened. According to Morice, "dilettantism is the anaesthesia of the creative faculties by the hypertrophy of the faculties of comprehension."⁵⁰ In the cases of Ernest Renan and Anatole France, the spirit of dilettantism reveals itself in the uncertainty with which these geniuses laid hold upon the present and the corresponding certainty which they felt in handling things of the past. In the special case of Anatole France, there was a certain touch of futurism, which may seem to have redeemed this thinker from skepticism concerning the present; but the airy utopianism of *The White Stone*, with its spineless, nerveless State, reveals the author as one who had not wholly freed himself from capitalism to lay a firm grasp upon collectivism. In default of conviction, the thinker seeks to content his intellect through literary style.⁵¹ One should not be too severe perhaps with those who are neither hot nor cold, who in their inability to exercise preference are neither in the present nor out of it; so puzzling are the conditions of contemporary thought, with its individualism and socialism, positivism and humanism, intellectualism

⁵⁰ *La Littérature de Tout à L'Heure*, 257.

⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Roche, V, 183, et seq.

and voluntarism, that one cannot so easily adjust the claims of these opposed tendencies. In the absence of any thorough distinction between truth and error, between good and bad, beautiful and ugly, the student of contemporary thought can give himself up to the study of that which has been achieved in the past or that which is dreamed of for the future; but to interpret the present in the light of the past, and to base the future upon the present, is an act of grave, comprehensive thinking of practical impossibility.

The inability of the contemporary thinker to come to an understanding with his mind appears, not only in connection with the intellect, but likewise in the affairs of the emotions and the will. If one is expected to "contemplate the spectacle of life with appropriate emotions," the art of the day places him in a position where this emotional contemplation is all but impossible. The scientifico-social spectacle of life can arouse no emotions which shall be appropriate to the object or characteristic of the subject; hence one must assume the attitude of indifference. The same condition of things appears in the region of morals, where there is a pathetic want of ability to distinguish between good and bad. In an age of activism and vast enterprise, no one acts; the history of the present, therefore, must regard us as being almost Taoistic and Yoga-like in our worklessness. There is movement and "functioning," but there is no action, for the reason that man does not know what he should do. When life demands action as such, which is volition according to ideation, we seek to settle our account by mere change or movement; hence, work, instead of springing from the fullness of the self, is only a means of filling up an inward emptiness. The same situation obtains in the intellectual life, where man is even more incapacitated to affirm that which is significant and true. Knowledge is no longer

the power which Bacon attributed to the knowing mind; for knowledge has made the mind feeble and hesitant. The more we gather by way of data, the more critical we become in our theories of theory, the less certitude we seem to possess.

(2) *Social Skepticism*

The difference between dilettantism and skepticism appears chiefly as a difference of degree; the skeptic goes farther than the dilettant. But, in addition to this obvious distinction, it may be said that skepticism doubts, not only the current means of securing truth, but truth itself. In the case before us, where we are anxious to discover the nature of social truth, the skeptic, instead of assuming that such truth reposes in the social order, and merely awaits its interpretation, questions whether it is there at all. Plato had a method of passing from the physical to the social, and the *Republic* is as genuine a piece of work as the *Timaeus*; but the scientism of our day, infinitely different from the dialectics of Plato, has no such ease in making the transition from the facts of nature to the forms of social life. Then, in the case of Plato, the ancient thinker was so happily placed that he could subordinate the individual; but, with the rise of modern individualism, the task is by no means so easy, especially when the social thinker, instead of relegating the individual to a noble conception of society, an ideal Republic or a City of God, seeks to subsume the ego under an order of life the counterpart of which may be found in the animal order. The individual must listen to the "fable of the bees," to the fable of the cows, to the amiable story of how nature has employed her realistic arts to group the individuals in the organic order.

Man is so constituted that he feels the need of revering something outside himself, and it is this belief in

and reverence for the non-egoistic which makes the problem of individualism a severe one. Man will believe in all other things before he will believe in himself; in his curiosity, he will question concerning the nature of all things extra-egoistic before he will ask, "Who am I?" For this reason, the obvious egoism of a Stirner, with its simple, "I am," and the just egoism of an Ibsen, with its, "Live thy life," seem ridiculous and dangerous. But, if it were not for the social prejudice, such individualism could be enjoyed in full naïveté. In his instinctive desire to have beliefs, man seeks to exercise faith in something objective. That society may be conceived of as "true" is indeed a rational, possible idea; but is the present formulation of the social principle credible? Two important elements of the concept appear to be lacking in the present formulation of the social idea: the particular and the universal. The individual with his inner life as a human being has not been included in the process, while the universal as a truly generic affair has not been made the object of the generalizing process. The scientific "state" is thus a subject as far removed from the species as from the genus.

The neutralization of the individualism of man has been the constant contention of individualism, so that the present criticism of society need do no more than point out that a theoretical process of subordination has no logical right to relate the particular to the general where that general cannot be said to contain the particular. The analysis of the particular is necessitated to abstract those marks of the thing as these are essential to the latter, as root, trunk, branch, to the tree. In the social generalization of the subject Man, that which is essential to humanity has been left out of consideration; namely, joy, worth, truth. The animalistic features of the species may have been included, but the humanistic ones have been ignored; so that the social

concept Man has not been justly formed. If the social generalization had been adequately made, there had been no more call for the intense individualism of modern times than there was a demand for individualism with the ancient state. The Platonic Republic may be an unworthy ideal ethically viewed; but, since the logic of the idea does not omit the superioristic elements of mankind, the generalization cannot be questioned.

From the standpoint of the universal, or with regard to the idea of state as such, there is no less complaint on the part of those who seek the adjustment of the individual to society. Extreme individualism may oppose the idea of social organization as such, and that with the feeling that the spiritual qualities of humanity are not such as to permit this organization; but it is the specially social organization of mankind which is now before us. The social state is a scientific idea, and thus involves all the peculiarities of positivism. These may be summed up by saying that, as positivism can credit only that which is of immediate interest and exact proof, thus the scientific state must not advance beyond this circle of the practical and perceptible. With ancient thought, the circle of the state-idea was of such a diameter as to include the ideal, as this was educed by philosophy, while the rulers were to be the philosophers themselves. With mediaevalism, the religious consciousness was of such influence as to introduce, not ancient wisdom, but piety into the state idea, whence the state was viewed as holy. How has the state fared in a period like the modern one, in which philosophic wisdom and spiritual piety have no place? The elaboration of the modern state-idea has been such as to ignore the superior attributes of humanity, as these were sincerely incorporated in State and Church, and to introduce only the inferiorities to humanity; for it is with the obvious and inferior that science is forced to deal.

The individual has grown skeptical concerning society, because the social ideal has failed to take account of the most characteristic quality of humanity, humanistic culture. In the theory of social contract, as suggested originally by Hobbes, the basis of union among the previously isolated, inimical individuals was that of immediate need, of utility; in the plan of social evolution, which has escaped the artificialities of the earlier view of society, the indifference to the essential humanism of man is equally, if not more, marked. If, as is indeed the case, man is by nature cultural, should not the social ideal consult the intellectual as well as the sensuous? In Fichte's philosophy of rights, it was asserted that the true Fatherland is that state which is most highly cultured.⁵² Is it not possible for a less idealistic system to affirm that some recognition of the cultural shall be made by the philosopher of the social? One might imagine that social skepticism may be explained when it is said that the individual feels all too keenly the pressure of material wants; but our contemporary social consciousness seems to be protesting that the scientific state fails to satisfy, not merely the demands of the body, but those of the mind also.

The effect of Decadence was to reveal something more than the clearness of the individual's consciousness; none the less did it suggest the obscurity of the social idea. What shall we expect the idea of society to yield in the way of attributes, utility and nothing more? Individualism seems to have undertaken its revolt against the state because the state-idea failed to afford the mind such notions as truth, virtue, and beauty; the lack of these humanistic qualities is at the basis of our present-day social skepticism. The validity of the social ideal is doubted because this ideal has about it no sense of the truth and worth of life. Do not our most charac-

⁵² *Werke*, VII, 212.

teristic, our most precious interests concern themselves with these spiritual goods as well as with the purely material ones which society has sought to supply? Does it not appear that the discontented among us, unhappy at the thought of the unequal distribution of wealth, are duly clamorous for some of the advantages which accrue from wealth as well as for wealth itself? "Learned leisure" may not of itself present a worthy ideal for the individual; still less may it be assumed that it is the business of society to afford this to its members; nevertheless, it may be asserted that society should so be organized upon the basis of truth and value that these attributes shall make their appeal to those who are organized under the idea of the state.

It may seem strange that one should expect society to deal in such impalpable benefits, but it cannot be denied that individualism has been disappointed at its failure to find these elements in the social state. In the case of Stirner, who was about the first to repudiate the social ideal, the individualistic relapse in skepticism, which he assumed, was due to the failure to find in the Hegelian State anything more real than "a spectre, *ein Spuk*." As Stirner could thus find no intellectual support in Society, so Wagner turned away in dismay from the idea of a state that so confused the economic ideal as to exalt an Alberic while it involved as ethical complications the triumph of a Hunding and the defeat of a noble Siegmund. The truth of life, so he seemed to reason, cannot be found in such inferior conceptions of property and morality; so that, if such be the method of Society, one can only negate it as untrue. In the instance of Ibsen, society seemed to lack the support which should come from "freedom and truth," whence the artist raises the question whether such a society should stand.⁵³ Wilde's rather anarchistic tract, *The*

⁵³ *Pillars of Society*, Act III.

Soul of Man under Socialism, assumes its extreme position, not because society fails to feed its members, which sad fact he takes care to note, but because this society is indifferent to beauty and culture, in which he finds the truth of life.

The intellectual needs of the submerged members of society have come under the special notice of Gorky, whose *Night Refuge* is significant, among other things, for the following ideas: that, much as mankind may need bread and may suffer from the lack of it, the deeper need of the soul is for truth; no matter what man may be called upon to suffer, he never sinks below his inherent humanity, for man is always man in his picturesqueness and dignity. When Gorky plunges his people into the depths of despair, and inflicts them with hunger, misery, and alcoholism, he does not allow his readers to attribute the melancholy to anything peculiar to the exterior existence of man in an alien, antagonistic world; furthermore, when these afflicted characters lament, it is not because of any fault which they find with the world as such, for their woes are internal, while the redemption from them is, in their minds, something to be effected by the individual himself. The sorrow is their own, the heart knoweth its own bitterness; it is due to lack of individuality and lack of insight on the part of the sufferer. The suffering sophist, Luka, thus voices the general woe of mankind when he sings, "In the darkness of midnight, no path can be found,"⁵⁴ while the alcoholic actor, whose name had long since passed into oblivion, corroborates this when he asks, "Why am I lost? Because I believe in myself no more. I am through."⁵⁵ The "Baron," who longs yet fears to be a "contemplator," believes that he "must have been born for something," even when it seemed to him that

⁵⁴ *Night Refuge*, tr. Hopkins, Act I.

⁵⁵ *Ib.*, Act II.

his whole life long "a fog lay on his brow";⁵⁶ while Anna, the dying consumptive, who cannot remember ever to have had enough to eat, does not complain of, but inquires about, her sad fate in the world, asking, "Why should this have been?"⁵⁷ Gorky pursues such a psychology until it further reveals the fact that the keenness of hunger may also sharpen the wits, for the worker is also the thinker. "Peasants and working-men . . . they toil all their lives for a mere trifle . . . And, all of a sudden, they say something you'd never think out for yourself in a century."⁵⁸

In addition to the emphasis laid upon intelligence and individuality, this social logic expresses also a peculiar faith in humanity as such and a characteristic doubt concerning the value of truth. In the social skepticism which thus comes to the foreground, the point of view is not that truth is difficult to find but desirable to possess, but the contrary; man can have truth, but truth does nothing for him. In the midst of this, there prevails a Protagoreanism of the humanity of truth. "The more I contemplate man," says Luka, "the more interesting he grows . . . poorer and poorer he sinks and higher and higher his aspirations mount . . . Whatever else he may become, he still remains a human being."⁵⁹ To Kleschtsch, the locksmith, humanistic truth seems forever impossible and in vain. "What is the truth?" asks he, springing up as though pierced by the word. "Where is the truth? What is it to me? Why should we have truth?"⁶⁰ When, after the departure of the pilgrim Luka, the locksmith renews his attack upon truth, he is met by the humanism of Sahtin, who declares, "Mankind is the truth . . . Man—that is the truth . . . Man alone exists, the rest is the

⁵⁶ *Ib.*, Act. IV.⁵⁷ *Ib.*, Act II.⁵⁸ *Foma Gordyeeff*, tr. Hapgood, 343.⁵⁹ *Night Refuge*, Act II.⁶⁰ *Ib.*, Act III.

work of his hand and brow. M-an! phenomenal, how loftily it sounds, M-a-n." ⁶¹

The skeptico-humanistic ideals thus represented by those who toil and suffer seem to express the thought that there is no truth in the social order as now constituted, just as perhaps there may be no truth in the organized life of man. Assemble men, and you may get utility, but you fail to secure insight into the truth of life, as this slumbers in the individual. In the light of these intense ideals, it may further be assumed that the pursuit of commerce without the quest of culture is in vain; for, while work is a part of life, the important thing for man is to discover why he lives and works. Where culture should arrange and organize life, society has used its blind powers to construct a prison rather than a dwelling. The individual has thus been brought to the place where he is led to doubt most deeply that which is apparently most useful to him in his life; that is industrial activity in its socialized form. Were we a generation of artists, or were the present generation characterized by aesthetical rather than by utilitarian ideals, we might understand the skepticism which now clouds our brows and halts our hands; for beauty, however entertaining it may be, does not seem to supply our minds with sufficient content for credence, or such clearness of form as to assume the character of the convincing. But our life-ideal is that of utility, something good and right at hand; and yet the intellectual product of the industrial age is such as to throw dust into the eyes, so that we do not believe in what we are doing. It is thus the truth of the social order, not the mere value and advantage of it, which comes in for the cynical skepticism of those who are most perfectly identified with the industrial organization of life. The individual has shown his ability to live with-

⁶¹ *Night Refuge*, Act IV.

out joy, has demonstrated the fact that he can endure without the sense of worth, but he has still to show us that he can live and labor without truth.

The primary and most urgent need of the individual is a place in the sun, for the children of the sun cannot work and endure without knowing the meaning of life as such. What reason for existence, what motive for work is forthcoming from the philosophy of industrialism? At best, industrialism can do no more than point out the obvious fact that work is necessary for man, just as it may add to this deterministic contention the more acceptable thought that work may be a means of happiness also, if not likewise a source of insight into the causal world in which man has his being, in which he is supposed to find his destiny. That society is not the place of joys and values is a truth which individualism has been forced to recognize, but the worst threat of industrial life is expressed when that form of living shows the tendency to invade, not vein and nerve alone, but the brain itself. It involves a kind of renunciation which even the most ascetic of religions has not attempted to ask of the devotee, the surrender of life's meaning. The Buddhist has never been called upon to relinquish insight into the meaning of his earth-life; indeed, Buddhism thinks to follow the path of renunciation for the very purpose of coming to an understanding with the world. Now socially organized industrialism, upon which the age prides itself, involves more self-relinquishment, more self-deception than the most exacting of spiritual religions.

Perhaps industrialism, with its close affiliation with science, has been assuming that man may rejoice in truth, except that his culture of truth must now content itself with terrestrial affairs as these are presented in a pluralistic and practical fashion. The brain which has interpreted nature in such a manner and to such a

degree of sufficiency as to have brought forth and put into operation the industrial machinery of modern life, may not feel the sense of guilt when, as is now the case in society, it is asserted that man has so lost the sense of life as to be suffering for want of truth. But the kind of knowledge which applied scientism has furnished is ill qualified to furnish the individual with that kind of truth which is supposed to make man free. Scientific insight does supply what Schopenhauer calls "knowledge of the Will-to-Live," but does not follow Schopenhauer when he demands of art, ethics, and religion to deliver the soul from such deterministic knowing. At the same time, it may be pointed out that, whatever scientism was supposed to do, the result of its application to the actual life of mankind has been to cloud the minds of those who have handled it most faithfully. The individual needs to know what he is doing, but the knowledge which has come forth from scientism has either gone back into nature, to render intelligible the workings of inorganic matter and the behaviour of organisms, or it has been incorporated into machines whose aspect is to the worker no more intelligible than the smile of the Sphinx.

The plight of the individual seems to be due to the fact that knowledge has been thrust to the poles of the abstract here, the concrete there; the temperate zones of human existence have not been allowed to see their own sun. There is truth in thinking, and there is truth in doing; none the less is there truth in living. One may know "things" without thus knowing the scheme of which they are a part; may know men, without knowing humanity. When philosophy insisted that knowledge could come only as one cultivated the abstract, one could justly claim that the scholastic had sundered man from himself; and when, as is now the case, it is assumed that knowledge can grasp nought

but the perceptible and practical, we find men complaining that again they have been torn from their own lives. To be convinced that man has indeed lost the sense of life, we need only observe how perplexed is man when he seeks to answer the questions, What is being one's self? What is the obvious meaning of the social organization of individuals? The ego does not know the ego; society does not know society; the light within is but darkness. In spite of this actual ignorance of things humanistic, in spite of the skepticism, it may be pointed out that, while the individual is disposed to view himself and his social environment with intellectual despair, he is still possessed of the thought that truth has the power to redeem man from any actual condition to which he may seek. Man does not doubt humanity, even where he is intensely skeptical about his present condition. It is on this account that the individual seeks, not social joy and social worth alone, but social truth also; the individual demands that society shall feed, clothe, and shelter, and that it shall likewise supply the mind with knowledge of social life as such.

BOOK THREE
THE HIGHER SYNTHESIS

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THE HIGHER SYNTHESIS

WHERE, now, do we stand, what have we to do, what must we think? If the formal individualism of the Enlightenment led to the self-expulsion of the ego, the real individualism of the nineteenth century has led to the self-assertion of the individual by means of the anti-natural and anti-social. Where the earlier movement found the individual exercising imaginary control of the physical and political, the later development of the individualistic doctrine views the ego endeavoring to secure real control of its soul-states, volitions, and ideas. The attempt to discover the ground and goal of human life called upon the individual for aesthetic decadence, immoralistic pessimism, and irrationalistic irreligion, a triple movement by means of which the individual asserted his destiny in the natural order, his dignity in the social one. For the self to come into being, it was doubtless necessary for the egoist to assume an anti-natural and anti-social attitude; but, for individualism to remain in this polemical condition, in which he is ever threatened by self-skepticism and self-renunciation, is intolerable, if not impossible. Individualism is certainly a means to an end, whence the "I think," the "I will," and the "I am" may lead the human soul to genuine existence in nature, genuine work in humanity; but isolated selfhood, however rich its inner content, cannot be regarded as the supreme end of human existence. For this reason, philosophy of life is called upon to elaborate a higher synthesis in the light of which the inner self may find its true objective; the lower synthesis found the self as a mere atom in the physical order, a mere

member of the social one, so that it is only by advancing to a trans-scientific view of nature and a trans-social conception of humanity that the self may be properly objectified.

However complicated the philosophy of life may appear to be, its problems, when surveyed from the standpoint of the individual which lives and enjoys that "life," fall naturally into questions concerning the enjoyment, expression, and realization of that life as something which has its ground and goal within the self. Nothing would seem to be more obvious for man than to say, "I think," "I will," "I am"; yet the complications of scientific thinking and social doing have long been such as to obscure the true life-issue. With a vast array of ideas, the individual finds none that he may call his own; with an equally impressive display of motives within him, there is no work which may be done personally; in like manner, the ultimate significance of existence is not for him. Where psycho-physical monism ever tended to forbid independent existence, spontaneous action, and independent thought, scientifico-social monism has been even more inimical to that which the self would esteem its own. This monism has reckoned without its host; it has perfected a view of the world by leaving the ego outside the wall, so that it presents the view of a house without a tenant. In response to this walling up of the world, individualism set up a rival camp in which the ego devoted itself to its own existence, own impulses, own ideas, as these appeared in aestheticism, immoralism, and irreligion. Now genuine individualism concludes that both views are wrong; philosophy of life can be neither monistic nor egoistic. For this reason, individualism takes up the problem of the higher synthesis for the purpose of showing how a liberal view of the exterior world of both things and persons may justly be regarded as the place of enjoy-

ment, of worth, and of truth. Such enjoyment is now to be considered aesthetically, as that which leads to a philosophy of culture, while the problem of worth assumes the form of a philosophy of action which further involves a philosophy of the state, just as the problem of truth makes necessary a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of religion.

PART ONE

THE JOY OF LIFE IN THE WORLD-WHOLE

THE elaboration of a philosophy of life carries with it the temptation to make that philosophy consist of either thinking or doing, metaphysics or morality; at the same time, a genuine philosophic should concern itself with the unity of these two in a study of the world without and life within. When the speculative and practical are combined, the fusion of the two produces something new in the form of feeling, whence to the sense of truth and worth in human existence there are to be added certain dialectical convictions as to the veritable joy of life. In the history of individualism, the joy of life has been put to the test of outward pleasure and inward joy; for individualism has included both self-love and self-culture. As individualism seeks the higher synthesis of the self with the world and humanity, it now finds it necessary to revise its conception of life-joy, so that pleasure in things and joy in inward experiences may give way to a more perfect, more permanent sense of human happiness. This joy of life is none the less the individual's, and it is by means of, rather than in spite of, the self that the joy of life is to be made convincing. Thus, individualism, having observed the anti-naturalism and anti-sociality of the egoistic movement, must now attempt to make satisfactory answer to the question what being one's self really means. When the essence of selfhood is thus determined, a new individualism will be in a position to examine the possibilities of that higher synthesis of life which seem to lurk in the aesthetic consciousness of humanity. Hence, the larger discussion of the joy of life must include a study of selfhood and life-joy, the

aesthetic synthesis of humanity and the question of culture. Is it possible for the joy of life to relate the individual to the objective orders of nature here and humanity there? The bond between the self on the one hand and science and sociality on the other has been broken; may another bond be substituted for it?

I. ONE'S OWN LIFE

Individualism has been brought to the realization that one cannot be himself within himself, through himself, and by making the self the end of life. At the same time, when philosophy of life attempts to settle accounts with individualism, it realizes that selfhood must be construed in such a manner as to preserve the integrity of the soul-state, the independence of the will's initiative, and the ideal character of the self as such. Yet, while maintaining the uniqueness of that which is within, goes on within, and expresses itself from within, one may seek the ground and goal of human life without using this triple contention for the purpose of negating nature or neutralizing society. If individualism was right in resorting to an irrationalism which delivered the self from scientism, and in asserting an immoralism which saved the self from sociality, individualism was right only in a temporary and relative sense, so that one must seek the ground and goal of life in something beyond individualism. If the ground of life is not to be found in naturalism as interpreted by scientific thought, if the goal does not appear in a sociality of scientific origin, it may hardly be assumed that the ground and goal will become manifest in anti-naturalism or anti-social idealism. At the same time, individualism is not called upon to surrender the self or even to retreat from the position which it has won; rather must individualism be more emphatic in its self-assertion, while it must go even

farther forward into the depths of human life. Man must be viewed as human; the individual must be allowed to have and to enjoy his own life.

I. EGOISM AND INDIVIDUALISM

In asserting the obvious fact that the individual has his own life which he is expected to live, we must run the risk of repetition and again assert that all those moralists who start out with the rationalistic assumption that life begins with selfhood in both nature and humanity are guilty of that *posterior prius* for which the Enlightenment was famous. The Enlightenment assumed that the lower had come from the higher, the imperfect from the perfect; thus, the Enlightenment assumed that law had come from a rational sense of rights, established worship from a pure sense of religion, social morality from the condescending benevolence of free individuals. The historical facts and relations in the case seem to be exactly the opposite: first come law, worship, and conventional morality; whence, at a later period, are asserted rights, spiritual religion, and individualistic ethics. In this reversal of the Enlightenment's reasoning, the nineteenth century was led to assert that the ego came from society, not society from the ego, and the free condition of life in accordance with which each lives his own life cannot be found in the past, but in the future. The human self has not yet appeared, but it should appear in the course of time.

Far from taking the self for granted, individualism ever asserted that the self can come into being only as the ego insists upon his own inner life, asserts his self-willed volitions, and posits his own selfhood. If the self exists so thoroughly, as the Enlightenment had insisted, why should individualism resort to such vigorous and vicious measures to bring the self into being? If, like Descartes, one is sure of the self but doubtful

about the exterior world; if, like Hobbes, one is convinced of the ego but anxious about society, why should he adopt the extreme individualistic measures which with individualism were the measures of irrationalism and immoralism? Irrationalism was resorted to by the individualist like Stirner because the individualist realized that the exterior world had the upper hand; immoralism was asserted by Nietzsche because the individualist saw that his cause was nothing in the eyes of the social order. According to individualism, reason is a snare, morality a yoke; when reason becomes scientism, the snare is doubly meshed; when morality becomes sociality, the yoke is no longer of wood but of iron. The aim of individualism has been to escape from the scientific snare, to extricate the neck from the social yoke. Hence, for every extreme to which the individualist has gone, there is a reason, a justification.

That upon which the individualistic egoist has insisted in connection with the proposition, "The individual has his own life," has had to do with the independence of soul-states and the freedom of the inner life. In asserting such inwardness, egoism has sought the joy of life in the midst of his soul-states rather than the particular pleasures which come from commerce with things of the world; at the same time, the egoist has endeavored to preserve his precious inner being instead of pouring it out upon that anonymous thing called society. The joy in one's soul-states led the individual to aestheticism; the desire to be individual rather than social resulted in decadence. The egoism of the enlightenment was no less selfish, for the egoism of this period sought the pleasure of sensuous objects, while it endeavored to make these sensuous joys universal. In this, early egoism sought to come to an understanding with nature, which it used for the sake of those particular pleasures which nature could bestow; in the same manner, ego-

ism sought to settle accounts with the social order by arranging for a general distribution of this world's goods. Utilitarianism expressed this genial notion when it set up its crass ideal, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number." But suppose the moralist is dealing in satisfactions which do not come from the world without but from the self within; how then can these internal benefits be divided and shared? Does not egoism have to its credit the idea that it is seeking only those experiences in life which are noble in their inwardness, and is not altruism to be blamed for its universal selfishness?

Where once it was the conflict between egoism and altruism, it is now the strife between individualism and social existence. The difference between the two problems will appear as soon as one observes that individualism, far from continuing the assumption that one seeks his own pleasure when he should endeavor to promote the pleasures of others, now insists that it is better to emphasize inner life within the self than outer existence in the social order. In accordance with the conditions of the new dualism, it is insisted that intellectualism is superior to industrialism, culture to commerce, humanity to sociality. Far from urging his own cause as mere egoism, the individualist asserts the supremacy of selfhood in order that the genuine values of life may be conserved. Let sociality maintain its sway and, while the exterior condition of man might be better for the time being, the life-values of art, science, and philosophy would be called upon to suffer, since they depend upon the isolated activity of the cultured individual aiming at ideal satisfaction in his own life. For this reason, altruism cannot be employed as an offset to individualistic egoism; for, where altruism aims at exterior benefits, individualism is interested in soul-states and life-ideals. To seek the pleasure of

another or the material welfare of society is to seek such pleasure and benefit in a region which does not appeal to the individual; such an individual may be an aesthete or a decadent, but he does not seek to compete with those whose life-aim is material benefit. It is apparent in the general conditions of ethics and culture to-day that individualism stands in need of some corrective, whether purification of its principles or the extension of its ideals; but such a corrective is not to be found in any system of social ethics in which the needs of the inner life are neglected for the sake of ameliorating the exterior situation. Furthermore, individualism must be the physician who heals himself.

The opponent of individualism, in his perverse assumption that the self may be taken for granted, makes the confusion still more disconcerting when he further presumes that it is the aim of the individual to dictate to the world and domineer over the social order. Instead of such offensiveness on the part of individualism, the ego has for a century been on the defensive in a conflict for the true ground and worthy goal of human life. That which the ego strives to do is to assert himself as such, whence he may call his soul, not nature's or society's, but his own. In this manner, the struggle for selfhood has been little else than a struggle for the conservation of the inner life; and, while this inner life might perhaps be expressed in some other manner, as is the case with such a thinker as Eucken, it seems as though the definite meaning and intrinsic value of that life might become clearer when the thinker uses the idea of selfhood in particular to indicate inner life in general. When one says, "spiritual life — *Geistesleben*," inner experience does not always assure us that we have grasped the idea in question; furthermore, the idea of inner life may be treated in such an effeminate manner that it will soon be discountenanced by the force-

ful and ponderous contentions of scientism and sociality, where the inner life of a defiant egoism is not so easily overcome. Indeed, the inner life of the self is sometimes something to be dreaded, whence as one may observe in the case of Nordau, it becomes necessary for the scientifico-social thinker to adopt tactics of defense against a Stirner and an Ibsen, a Nietzsche and a Strindberg. Against these, no law of altruism can prevail.

Far from being premised as a fact, "one's own life" is merely postulated as an ideal. In striving after such an idea, the individualist has adopted as one of his methods that of aestheticism. While the aesthetic method might seem eminently weak, it now appears that, when the self takes its stand upon its feelings and tastes, it is not easily dislodged. Let the egoist avail himself of moral motives or metaphysical principles in the assertion of his selfhood, and all the exterior forces of sociality and scientism are arrayed against him; but when the argument is aesthetical, these dull weapons fail to cut. Walled without by a militant aestheticism, the individualist is none the less armed within; his feelings give him a peculiar sense of selfhood, where his volitions and ideas are likely to go forth from within and mingle with the clamor of common moralistic and metaphysical forces. If the individual enjoys his own inner life, it is fair to assume that that life is his own; enjoyment is by nature so internal, so characteristic that it is not likely to suffer from that scientific and social objectification which has played havoc with recent ideals. Because individualism has instinctively adopted the aesthetic and eudaemonistic method, it has expressed itself in art, as in decadent poetry, in the realistic novel, and in the immoralistic drama. There is indeed an ethics of individualism, as also a logic; but the earliest and most characteristic of individualistic arguments was expressed in an aesthetic manner.

The all-desired distinction between the old egoism and the new individualism will appear more clearly when we observe how the contrast between the quantitative and qualitative here applies. That which egoism sought for the human self, was the enjoyment of as much pleasure as the self would contain, while that which altruism was willing to allow was the gratification of as many desires as might be possible for the ego in the social state. At heart, there was no ethical difference between the ideals of egoism and altruism; both aimed at the idea of exterior enjoyment, but where egoism sought all, altruism could see its way clear to permit only some of this objective happiness. In opposition to this quantitative and extensive conception of happiness, individualism lays stress on the intensive quality of the feeling which the self would enjoy. No matter to what minimum the self might seek to limit his desires, if these were to consist in the enjoyment of things, individualism could not give its consent to the life-program; on the other hand, where the enjoyment was the ideal gratification of soul-states known to the man of culture, individualism could not find it in its heart to say that these interior enjoyments should be limited for the sake of others. Thus, it was the quantitative within limits here and the qualitative without limits there which characterized the egoistic and individualistic respectively. Taking its stand upon the intensive and qualitative, individualism was unwilling to suffer the ego to be enclosed by any objectively altruistic system.

Where the ideal of quantity of life gave place to that of quality of life, individualism as such did not fail to suffer from an excess of intension, from the attempt to apply to the soul too many subjective attributes. In this manner, individualism became over-fine and extra-delicate, as one may see from the character of Schlegel's

Lucinde, Huysmans' *Des Esseintes*, and Wilde's *Dorian Gray*, who became aesthetical and *precieuse*. Now, when one seeks the ground and goal of life in that which is inwardly removed from the scientific and the social, he must become aware of the extreme fineness of the individualistic doctrine. If he cannot convincingly repudiate it, he may firmly reject it; meanwhile, he can show from the history of individualism that aestheticism carried to the extreme point of which it was capable has been unable to sustain the responsibilities of human selfhood, still less to relate selfhood to nature and humanity without. To prepare the self for its entrance into the exterior order and to effect the cure of subjectivism, philosophy of life must have in the self a worthy candidate. Individualism was right in separating the self from the minor world-orders of scientism and sociality, but when individualism developed selfhood to the extreme of aestheticism and decadence, it made its argument too good to be true. Just individualism separates the self from the special formulations of the exterior order as these appear in scientism and sociality, but such individualism does not thereby divorce the self from the exterior orders of nature and humanity.

2. NATURISTIC POSSIBILITIES OF SELFHOOD

When individualism seeks to sever its connection with anti-natural decadence, it is led to wonder how it will be possible for the future ideal of selfhood to assert itself in the omnipotent natural order. As long as anti-natural individualism kept out of the exterior order, as it did in the irrationalism of Stirner and the decadence of Huysmans, it was not difficult for the ego to believe in its selfhood; but, when the validity of the natural is recognized, the synthetic and continuous character of the world seems to make all attempts at private exist-

ence in vain. The conception of nature which obtained in the Enlightenment was so static and rationalistic that the human self was able to feel more or less at home in the exterior order. How far apart are now the forces of naturism and individualism! Yet, in the midst of the melancholy distance between the outer world and the inner life, individualism is cheered by the consciousness that the sense of selfhood is so clear and convincing that it seems to have just begun its career in the world. While the world of nature has nothing to offer the self, not a crumb of metaphysical or moral comfort, the self rejoices in a burning, shining inner light, and asserts its independence of the whole exterior order. But how is individualism to make peace with the world, how cast its shadow in the objective order?

The conflict between the world and the self has been a strident one, because neither would give any place to the other. Where scientism cast out all spiritual ideals, aestheticism was just as ready to neutralize all natural notions and motives. In the domain of literature, the temporary triumph of scientism was observed in the artist's readiness to indulge in descriptions of exact detail without any improvising activity of his imagination, while the forces which were allowed to control the action of the drama or the plot of the romance were borrowed from scientism, and assumed the special form of heredity or environment. That such realism no longer holds sway one may see from the rise of the neo-romantic movement of the twentieth century; exterior facts and forces are now secondary to the spontaneous activity of the human soul. The ideal of life is still that of individualism, but an individualism in which the splenetic and vicious have given place to that which is more healthy and natural. From the indications afforded by contemporary art, one may go so far as to assume that individualism has at last found it

possible to enjoy the inner life and assert the self, no longer in decadent defiance of the world, but in connection with the natural order. At last it is appreciated that the universe is capable of containing both the world and the self; for, as the world is much more than scientism, so the self as self is more normal than the *solitaire* of the decadent school. With a new conception of the world and a purified ideal of selfhood, by what means may the two be brought to an understanding, so that one shall live his own very life in the objective order?

In trying to replace the human self in the world for which that self had such decadent disdain, it may not be possible to discover the true dialectic which shall justify the assertion that one can now be himself without resorting to the extreme of anti-naturalism: again, such a dialectic of life may be unnecessary when one is inwardly convinced that there is a living synthesis of these one-time opposites. Nevertheless, the place where that higher synthesis is to be made may be indicated, just as the method of perfecting it may be pointed out. One must live his own life; of that, individualism is now convinced. But one must live that life, not in an ivory tower of Romanticism, not in a *maisonette* of Decadence, but in the free of the world. The claims of the self are no greater than the claims of the world, and *vice versa*. In the readjustment of the self and the world, it is well to consider how human thought has laid its emphasis first here, then there.

According to the rationalism of early modern thought, it was asserted that ideas determine things; realism retorted to this by contending that things determine ideas. In the case of the human mind, which is neither angelic nor animalistic, it would seem as though there were truth on both sides of the dualism. When one takes the rationalistic point of view, and thus asserts

the supremacy of the idea over the thing, he is always puzzled to explain how ideas within the mind should conform to things in the world; when one takes the realistic point of view, he is at a loss to account for the agreement of things without and ideas within. The rationalist is forced to admit that experience has something to do with the production of ideas, while the realist cannot deny the presence of the *a priori* within the mind. Schelling, whose System of Identity made note of this situation in philosophy, sought relief in the notion of aesthetic monism; individualism may perhaps solve the problem without the aid of a method which finds thought and thing to be the expression of some third and unknown entity. With individualism, it is the idea of the ego within its own world which tends to do away with the dualism of subject and object; at the same time, the problem, instead of being a formal one for thought, is a real one for life, since it has to do with the relation of the inner self to the exterior order. In what way can the aesthetic ideal serve the purposes of that reunion of the self and the world which philosophy is now seeking?

Where the question of *One's Own Work* and *One's Own Self* must re-establish the relation of the ego with nature in their own manner, the problem of *One's Own Life* bases its solution of the question upon the idea of enjoyment. The self is in a world-order which seems to be alien to its nature and inimical to its strivings; to assert rationalism is to lose the world, while to submit to realism is to lose the self; but to assume eudaemonism is to save both the self and the world. The practical working out of eudaemonism has to do with the sense of enjoyment which the ego experiences in the natural order; and, where there is that sense of satisfaction, it may be assumed that the dualism of the self and the world is overcome. The self makes the world

its own, not by thinking of the world in the form of ideas, not by accepting the world in the form of things, but by enjoying the world as the place where the self is at home. In the synthesis of inner and outer, the very essence of happiness is to be found, since genuine happiness consists in the adaptation of the inner life to the outer world. The egoistic hedonist has no self-conscious happiness, because he has no self for the experiencing of this happiness; the egoistic decadent has no joy of life, since he has no world to which the inward sense of happiness can correspond; but the true individualist finds in his complete life-joy something which makes for both delight and dialectics at the same time, inasmuch as his complete sense of happiness is an assurance that he is one with the world. Such happiness, while wanting in the technique of logic, is significant of that harmony of inner and outer which logic aims to promote in the form of judgment.

Where scientism attempts to forbid the inner life, whence individualism finds it necessary to resort to decadence for its deliverance, the same conflict reappears when the self seeks to add to its idea of inwardness that of freedom. According to the dualism which results from the competitive claims of libertarianism and determinism, one must choose between liberty and law, so that, where there is freedom there is no causality, where there is causality there is no freedom. One might perhaps imitate Kant and thus divide the field between freedom and law, but the result would only be the same dualism in another form. When one puts forth an ethical argument, he arrives at the idea of freedom; when he makes use of physical reasoning, the result is causality. Here, one is conscious of freedom; there, he is aware of law. The difficulty in this case is parallel to the difficulty encountered when individualism sought to save both the inner life and the outer world, and as

thought seemed to threaten things, so freedom tends to violate law, and as things neutralize thought, so law vitiates the meaning of human spontaneity. Where, in the case of inner life and outer world, individualism rested its case upon the idea of an enjoyment which enabled the self to pass out from its states within to the things of the exterior order, now, in the case of freedom, individualism makes use of the idea of creativeness for the purpose of showing how the self may impress its will upon the world. In this manner, the right to enjoy the world and the freedom of working therein appear as the essentials of one's own life. Anything less would leave the self in mere positivism; anything more would cause the ego to return to a decadence where the inner life was morbid, while the will was vicious.

In contrast with the libertarian conception of freedom, the ideal of freedom as creativeness has the advantage of demonstrating its reality in the world. It is true that the libertarian could always point to ethical acts which have about them a certain air of freedom, but the actual works of creative freedom are far more palpable and permanent. By appealing to the sense of creative freedom, one may indicate the whole system of human work as this appears in civilization without and culture within. Upon the basis of determinism, it would indeed be difficult to understand how mankind could have taken up the burden of a specifically human work, and have perfected this in the complete manner incident upon the history of humanity. If one still feels that natural causation is responsible for all that has taken place in the world, let him hypothetically eliminate the spontaneity of the human soul and then attempt to account for such a thing as Greek tragedy or Gothic architecture. That nature can somehow invent forms of plant and animal life by means of natural selection

is not to be questioned for a moment; but that nature can use the same principle for the perfection of the human species, and then in a derivative manner employ that principle for the perfection of some definite artwork is too much to ask of her. The reason why determinism has been able to give a quasi-explanation of human activity is because it has assumed responsibility for nothing more serious than the isolated act of the average man; when the creative work of human genius is presented as the problem for explanation, the naïve methods of determinism fall to the ground. By appealing to this sense of creativeness, as he has previously referred to the sense of enjoyment, the individual may construct an argument for the independence of the human self in the world.

To be joyous and creative, then, are means by which the ego escapes the quasi-solipsism of the decadent school; and it is only in such quarters that one finds the faintest trace of that solipsistic danger upon which academic philosophy has laid such stress. Apart from aesthetics, and perhaps religion also, there is no possibility of solipsism; metaphysics and morality are too thoroughly occupied with things and duties to make such a conclusion possible. Now solipsism, in its living, aesthetic form, has been the means of redeeming the human self from the hands of its naturistic enemies; for, when the ego retired to the depths of its private melancholy, there was no way of eliciting it from without. Nevertheless, individualism has no desire to further solipsism, so that individualism will do no more than hold it in reserve in case the forces of naturalism make a renewed attempt to render the whole world objective and impersonal; individualism is anxious to prove no more than the existence of the self in the world. This is to be done by delivering the self from the species.

To perfect generalizations has been one of the thinker's favorite occupations ever since the days of Socrates. Working both deductively and inductively, human thought has longed to draw its circles about the various objects of nature, which seemed strangely adapted to the class-groups so readily established. In the case of man, the scientific-social generalization appeared quite attractive, so that most individuals were ready to be assembled under the head of the species or society. It was at this point that decadence showed itself to be of genuine value, since it was decadence which resisted the generalization and urged the individual to take his stand outside the conceptual circle, to build without the wall. The place where the scientific treatment of man failed was where that treatment, strengthened by its classification of plants and animals, sought to impose the same formal and objective methods upon humanity. Now, in humanity, the species fails to show that measure of supremacy which appears so strikingly in the animal order; where, with the animal, the species determines the specimen, in humanity the specimen often determines the species. This is due to the fact that man, who lives a form of life somewhat detached from nature, is possessed of a life-content which can be realized by the exceptional individual rather than the mass; whence a Plato, a Shakespeare, or a Goethe will give to the species far more than he receives. Scientific thought can make headway only as it ignores this content, but in so doing, scientific thought leaves out the meaning of the problem which it is trying to solve. The self-asserting individual either breaks the conceptual circle or rises above it to a higher synthesis.

To all those who persist in pursuing the biological analogy, individualism must insist upon the intrinsic content of human life wherein happiness and creativeness serve to show how independent of the species the

individual may be. Granted that there are such superficial likenesses among the children of men whereby one might seek to include all under one head, there still remains the fact that individuals and races are conscious of the differences between themselves and others, so that the anthropological generalization is usually wanting in the content of genuine human life. Observe the innate difference between Aryan and Semite as shown in language and habits of thinking; contrast the oriental with the occidental, the German with the Slav; note how mankind experiences the warfare of class with class, sex with sex, and you will scarce be able to credit the idea that of all these varieties there is a fundamental unity. To find that unity, one must penetrate beneath the surface of the anthropological and lay hold of that which is essential to humanity, and it is in the essential that the individual lives and enjoys his own life.

The physical possibilities of selfhood would seem to be limitless, and it is only because our thought has resorted to cramping and trimming that we have been led to feel that life has no place for the independent life of the human ego. At the worst, nature is only indifferent to the existence and enjoyment of the inner life of the individual; for such individualism, nature provides due form and adequate content. According to the principle of individuation, as this appears in the natural order, it is as possible for the individual to have his own life as it is for him to have his own face. While nature may not be monadological, she makes it possible for the sum and substance of the world to repeat itself in each individual. To this liberality of form, nature has a rich content for the ego's life; this appears in the manifold of impressions which come from without and the vast array of impulses which spring from within, so that the ego never lacks for variety of life-experience or life-expression. To eliminate the individual, as scientism

endeavors to do, would be to defeat the obvious plan of the world, so that the ardent individualist may still be friendly to nature, even where his attitude may be the anti-scientific one. Art has learned to survey the spectacle of nature apart from the formalities of scientism; why should philosophy hesitate to follow her example?

3. SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF SELFHOOD

In contrast with the optimistic assumption that the individual is in complete possession of the outer social order, individualism indulges in a pessimism which brings it to the realization that it is society which is in possession of the world in which the ego is trying to exist. This same pessimism led the individualist to see how thoroughly was the human self at the mercy of the naturalistic order of scientism, and it was upon the pessimistic basis that individualism made its anti-natural, anti-social revolt. To comprehend the individualistic situation, one must have sense and taste for the strong pessimism in which this is couched. Not for a moment does the individual pretend to either solipsism in the natural order or egoism in the social one; the individual smiles, and that somewhat scornfully, when he sees these devotees of modern scientism and sociality as they endeavor to combat the supposedly solipsistic situation, according to which the human self seems to forbid the existence of things, and the egoistic arrangement in the light of which this same self seems to defy the existence of the social order. To be solipsistic toward nature and egoistic toward society has ever been far from the individual's power; and no one but the individualist realizes that there is in the human self but the least trace of that sense of selfhood which might lead to the solipsism of "I am" and the egoism of "I will." Would that there might come upon contemporary culture a renewed sense of inner life whereby the solipsistic and egoistic should

"threaten" our absurd ideals. Our greatest need at the present hour is a touch of solipsistic egoism.

The social situation, with its relentless anti-egoism, is such as to demand conformity of all individuals, so that one might easily believe that the inhabitants of the earth were so many bodies without souls, so many pairs of hands without wills to direct them. With the social organization of life and labor, all power of initiative, all will to improvise, has been strangled. At first, machinery was applied to work, with the effect of lowering action from the higher centres of the brain to the lower centres of the nervous system; then, with the introduction of "efficiency," the organizing movement invaded the brain itself and made life doubly mechanical and only half as valuable as it was before. The present situation is bad in the extreme; why? because it does not offer the individual the opportunity to live his own life. It will of course be said that "life" is better now than it was a century ago, that people are more wealthy and have greater opportunities; but what is this mysterious "life" that is neither thine nor mine? Yet what is to be done? It is not for philosophy to attempt any practical solution of the industrial problem, and it may be that only life itself in its thoughtless progress holds the secret of the situation. But philosophy can and must always identify life-ideals, so that it is upon the authority of philosophy that one is able to conclude that life is true or false, good or bad according to its ability to evince selfhood in humanity. Where one upholds reactionism, where one points to some sort of utopianism, he indicates the fact that the present situation is intolerable in that it fails to make room for the existence and enjoyment of inner life. Thus, it is upon the individual that philosophy of life places its affair.

The outer struggle with the social order, as the latter is organized industrially, is itself enough of a problem

for the ego, but this is only half of the battle; the social method of philosophizing, of moralizing, not content with its domination over the self from without, has shown a disposition to rule the self from within. The ardent individual, expecting the realization of selfhood's promise both without and within, is dismayed when he finds that the world has been taken from him; but he consoles himself with the thought that, within, his own soul remains intact in its individuality. He re-enters what he is pleased to call his own soul, and to find what? He finds that the sociality which outwardly was a net is inwardly a snare. Sociality has first crippled his limbs, then infected his blood. This infection appears in the sociality of "ethics," whence being good has come to mean being social. At the same time, sociality has sought complete corruption of inward sentiment; whence the individual's moral conscience has become so much social sentiment, while his emotions have been run into the altruistic channel. Nineteenth-century scientism is responsible for the quasi-ethical movement which has had the effect of taking the self from the centre of spiritual life and placing it upon the remote periphery. This appears in the scientific treatment of conscience and benevolence.

That scientific ethics has done something toward explaining certain characteristics of conscience need not be denied even by those who despise the scientific conception of social life. Yet, in the old conscience, there was an element of individualism which the ethics of scientific sociality was never able to explain away. From the older, individualistic point of view, conscience was so much individualistic sentiment in the light of which the self saw its own duty as such. Let all the world go its way, but as for me I must go according to the dictates of my own conscience; such was the view-point of the older moralist whose life-ideal, when emphasized by

action, was anti-social in its character. From the scientific point of view, the "voice of conscience" was nothing but the voice of society, while the sense of compunction which resulted from wrong-doing was supposed to come from the violation of an inward social sentiment. The action of the individual seemed to be thoroughly individualistic; the explanation of the action became clear when it was subjected to social interpretation. Granted that the average acts of conscience may be explained upon the social basis, there are always certainly exquisitely ethical acts which depend upon the anti-social individual for their validity. At the same time, progress from one social period to another is always made possible by the individual's violation of contemporary standards, whence the individualistic becomes far more important than the social. The moral person, Moses, Socrates, Luther, shows his morality by repudiating the standard of "goodness" which is set for him by the age; in this manner, non-conformity and the violation of the social sanction of morality become the very marks of human goodness.

If conscience is so utterly social, how is the contrite individual to live his own life? To be social is to be moral; and yet, with the exalted individual in critical circumstances, to be social means to be immoral. In this manner, the free-thinker or the reformer satisfies his own conscience by violating the conscience of the race. He becomes moral only by first becoming immoral. Butler made conscience the equivalent of "reasonable self-love"; Darwin viewed it as "reflection and sociability"; that is, where the older master says, "think about your self," the newer thinker, the scientist, says, "think about the species." Which is right, Butler or Darwin? Unable to decide between the methods of the rationalist and the scientist, individualism has usually decided to go ahead without any conscience at all; the

individualist has been at once anti-moral and anti-social. Yet, in all this, it must be said that it was the socialization of conscience which gave the individualist courage to repudiate the moral law, since a morality for society's sake could hardly be expected to deter the vigorous egoist from violent action. The individualism which endeavors to come to an understanding with humanity, so that the self shall no longer live as a *solitaire* or *insurrecto*, finds it necessary to attempt the solution of the conscience-problem. Suppose one grant that the individualistic conscience of Butler is in vain; suppose he grant further that the Darwinian conscience is as practically ineffective as the Butlerian was unconvincing; what kind of ethical reasoning is now open to him?

The individualist was right in insisting that conscience is very largely an affair of one's own; it is my conscience which approves or disapproves. The scientist has been right in insisting that conscience is epical as well as lyrical, that it relates itself to something outside the individual's own private feelings. How may these contradictory claims be re-adjusted? The individual has now come to the place where he is anxious to re-enter the humanistic order; but he will not do this unless he be allowed to live his own life, which includes the private satisfaction of a personal conscience which has its self-styled feelings of approval and disapproval. Now, cannot this demand for genuine exteriority of life be satisfied when, instead of a narrow, shallow social ideal, one postulates the ideal of Humanity? Such a conception gives all that one now finds in sociality, and something more besides. At the same time, it affords the ego adequate objectivity by placing him in an order of life in which he may well be at home. Conscience, then, would seem to be, not the peevish voice of a petty social order, crying out for immediate recognition, but

the august tones of an ever-living humanity within the soul of the individual.

When the individualist is confronted by this higher synthesis of the self and humanity, he has no right to complain that his inner life is being torn from him, since humanity, while epic and exterior, is of the same genus as the individual himself. In the case of the non-conformist who violates the social standard for the sake of his individualistic ideals, it is possible to reason to the effect that, in thus transcending the social order, he is but allying himself with an ideal order very like that which he finds within his own nature. The reformer repudiates the contemporary order, not for the purpose of removing order altogether, but with the idea of initiating a superior one which has not yet appeared, and which exists only ideally in his own mind. In the course of time, society approximates to this ideal, whereupon the enlightened individual outlines a still higher synthesis, and so on forever. Where the new moral idea arises in the spontaneity of the individual's soul, it stagnates when it is adopted by all mankind; whence renewed spontaneity must come in to make progress possible.

Conscience is sometimes social, sometimes anti-social, sometimes individualistic, sometimes anti-individualistic, but at all times it is humanistic. The same may be said of another ethical problem, that of altruism; here, as in the case of conscience, the individual learns how to come forth from the seclusion of selfhood, not for the purpose of becoming social, but with the idea of being thoroughly human. Social thinking has been relentless in its treatment of man's ideals, and it is not to be wondered at that revolutionary egoism resorted to the extreme measures of immoralism and decadence for the purpose of evincing the free selfhood of the soul. But one is not forced to choose between abject sociality with

all its disgusting ideals and decadence with its fatal tendencies; one may be human. Individualism has opposed altruism because altruism did no more than present in the alter-ego another being, the ego itself, because altruism expected the cultured individual to surrender to a purely industrial society, and because altruism overlooked the fact that the individual has his own life. But the cure of egoism, upon which the higher synthesis of life depends, is not to be found in either selfishness or sociality: selfishness is the indulgence of each; sociality, the indulgence of all.

Individualism escapes from the social predicament by postulating humanity with its inwardness in place of society with its purely exterior form of existence; individualism must now escape from altruism by making use of the humanistic ideal. In more than one way, altruism defeats its own aims. Altruism expects the human ego to appreciate the life-situation of the alter-ego; but the moment altruism forbids egoism, it tends to make the individual blind to the meaning of life. When one has been tempted, he is able to succor those who are tempted; and when one has for himself felt the meaning of life, he is able to appreciate the same life-feeling in others; but, where a system of ethics forbids that the ego should taste life, the ego has no idea of what is in the cup that he offers to the alter-ego. In addition to this paradox of living for others when one has no idea of what life itself means, altruism is so unfortunate as to open up a way of escape for those who have neither the wit nor the courage to live their own lives; for he who begins to entertain the sad presentiment that he has no value in the world, conceals his embarrassment by covering his poor soul with altruistic cloaks, as if to say, "I never intended to realize my own life." Better than such morbid altruism is the morbid egoism of the decadent school; better than this

"social service" is the calm retreat into the *maisonette* of solipsistic selfhood. Nevertheless, individualism is still possessed of the belief that one can be himself, not within alone, but in the free of the limitless humanistic order, since objectivity in life does not necessarily imply enclosure.

To be human without being social is by no means impossible for him who is willing to make ethical distinctions; and to be one's self while having due concern for the essential welfare of mankind is not a paradox for him who appreciates the meaning of humanity. Christianity keeps reminding the individual that his own soul has supreme worth while still persuading the individual that he should elaborate such a wide conception of selfhood as to include the genuine welfare of those who have like passions with himself. Buddhism, with its insistence upon self-salvation, has a morality of mercy which assumes responsibility for the welfare of, not only other human beings, but that of serpents and insects as well. Russian nihilism, which is inimical to all social institutions, entertains a most profound love of humanity; nowhere in the western world does one find either such destructiveness or such compassion. Such examples of life-philosophy lead one to put the pertinent question, Where, then, is humanity to be found, without or within? Sociality has its answer ready: humanity exists in exterior manner as an assemblage of persons and an arrangement of institutions. Individualism insists that humanity dwells within so that the greater the sense of genuine life the greater the sense of compassion.

To be sympathetic, one must be himself: by means of philanthropy one may make use of his extra-individualistic possessions to "help" humanity; by means of social service, one may perhaps dedicate a crude form of impersonal activity; but to be of worth to mankind involves something more sincere, more substantial.

Between practical altruism and essential sympathism there yawns a deep gulf; altruism is limited by its optimism, sympathism has beneath and beyond it all the depths of human pessimism. According to optimistic altruism, it is the ethical business of the individual to improve the conditions under which the sons of men live and toil; according to pessimistic sympathism, man is called upon to realize how hard it is to be human, how terrible are the conditions of spiritual life upon earth. In addition to a sincere appreciation of man's true condition, sympathism is possessed of the idea that, instead of laying the emphasis upon the exterior conditions of life as these loom up with all the absurdities of the industrial order, help can come only by means of enlightenment and beauty. In this spirit, the Idiot-Prince of Dostoïevsky, after he had heard the nihilist say, "Railways have corrupted the springs of life," ventured the assertion that "beauty will save the world."¹ If art rather than industry is to save the world, one may thus assert that aesthetic personality, the living of one's own life, rather than industrial efficiency, is to be the means of human salvation. In the aesthetical, one can be himself indeed; so that individualism can offer no complaint; then, perhaps, beauty will save the world.

II. THE ENJOYMENT OF EXISTENCE

In the higher synthesis of the self and the world-whole, the first step to be taken involves the heart-felt but obscure question of the joy of life. In the eudaemonistic field, individualism is not without precedent, although one may hardly assume that the stupid sense of self-love characteristic of the Enlightenment or the morbid sense of self-culture famous in the nineteenth century provides a sufficient reason for the fine propo-

¹ *The Idiot*, tr. Garnett, Pt. III, Chs. IV-V.

sition that existence is enjoyment. Self-love had its basis in the animalism of human nature; self-culture depended for its verity upon a kind of human emotion-alism; genuine self-realization through the joy of life must find its ground in something more fundamental and dignified. Since it is not the temporary enjoyment which comes from pleasure, nor the exceptional happiness due to aesthetic ecstasy, but a total and permanent experience of life-enjoyment upon which life rests, it becomes necessary for philosophy of life to discover the true dialectic of human happiness. Furthermore, upon this substantial sense of enjoyment depends the verity of self-knowledge, the true ground of one's own life; in the same manner, philosophy of life must provide for the aesthetic synthesis of the self and the world-whole, as this comes about through culture. Upon the sense of substantial enjoyment does the burden of life really rest, as the entablature upon a caryatid, whence it becomes necessary to have the idea of enjoyment firm and worthy. Life might perhaps go on and attain to some sort of goal as that which is valuable and rational; but a complete life-philosophy must not fail to include the joy of life along with the conviction that life has worth and truth.

I. JOY AND PLEASURE

That there can be life apart from doing and thinking would seem to be impossible; that there can be genuine existence without enjoyment is a proposition equally groundless. Philosophy of life insists upon eudaemonism, not solely for the sake of the sense of happiness which such a philosophy implies, but because of the very sense of life which is conveyed by enjoyment as its vehicle. One fatality in all scientific and social thinking is found in the bland endeavor to view life as so much reaction upon the world, so much representation

of the world's forms without any internal sense of the total meaning which life within and the world without should impart. In its psychology, scientism has persisted in looking upon the soul as a mere condition of indifferent consciousness without the inward appreciation of the warm content of the soul-states involved; encouraged by this negation of the inner life, social thought has tried to explain the life of humanity in such a way as to prevent the self from the private enjoyment of its own soul-state. Without again resorting to the fine, the vicious, or the morbid, individualism must continue to indicate the return to the inner life, which it may do by emphasizing a substantial and worthy sense of enjoyment.

It is indeed natural and plausible to look upon pleasure as the most important experience in life, because pleasure makes such an immediate appeal to consciousness. In the same manner, the sensation of sweetness, due to the excitation of gustatory cells at the tip of the tongue, seems to be pre-eminent among the gustatory sensations, if not among the others as well. But the sense of pleasure among the sons of men is disintegrating, whence the higher synthesis of human souls under the form of humanity would seem to be impossible hedonistically. In addition to this general objection, there is at least one other, to the effect that the temporary experience of pleasure ever tends to forbid the development of selfhood within; to overcome this preliminary difficulty, individualism must resort to a critical examination of eudaemonism in order that it may observe where mere pleasure is wanting and how this lack may be relieved. In purely ethical thought, the tendency has been either to affirm pleasure as such or to negate it summarily; where Epicureans say, "yes," Stoics say, "no." But, to deal justly with the feeling of pleasure, it is far wiser to analyze the felicitic ex-

perience, and then, having observed the shortcomings of the feeling, find some essential way of grounding it, in order that it may take its due place in philosophy of life.

From the hedonistic point of view, the chief argument for pleasure lies in the fact that pleasure is ever present in the consciousness of the individual. As the invariable accompaniment of life, pleasure co-exists with consciousness, as either a desire for enjoyment or an aversion to pain; yet, how much argument may be found in the obvious fact that man as man is called upon to live in connection with his feelings? Breathing and eating are likewise invariable accompaniments of life, and yet ethics is not disposed to make life purely respiratory or gastronomic. Since man has lungs, digestive organs, and arteries, it is to be expected that breathing, eating, and feeling should suggest something in connection with his life; but mere suggestion is far from being convincing. In the special case of feeling, psychology does not fail to recognize that the experience of pleasure is something momentary, isolated, and complete; the self has the feeling now, but that is all there is to the experience. It is true that such feelings have been had before, and will be experienced again; but the feeling of the moment is of the present alone, having no memorial connection with the past or anticipatory relation to the future. Now to attempt the alignment of a life-ideal upon the basis of such isolated pleasures would be to attempt to draw a flowing line by means of fixed points. In the realization of pleasure's limits, scientific hedonism removed the feeling from its central position in consciousness and made it but the symptom of organic well-being.

In the complete philosophy of hedonism, it is a significant fact that the experience of pleasure has played no essential part; if Epicurus was the prophet of pleas-

ure in particular, it was Aristotle who upheld happiness in general. When, therefore, the issue became one of permanent enjoyment instead of temporary felicity, sense gave way to will and intellect, whence the question resolved itself into an issue between voluntarists and intellectualists, who argued here for the will as the spring of life-joy, there for the intellect as the source of human happiness. As a philosophy of eudaemonism, the voluntaristic and intellectualistic have their due places, and they must contend between themselves for the honor of providing joy for the human soul. At the same time, the philosophy of eudaemonism, maintained by Voltaire and Goethe, by Turgénieff and Flaubert, all of whom upheld the will as the source of happiness, has the good effect of neutralizing that dogmatic hedonism which has ever made impossible the genuine appreciation of human feeling. But, when eudaemonism asserts that happiness, instead of being found in feeling, consists either in doing or thinking, individualism in its quest of the joy of life is not so ready to abandon feeling, which must contain some sense of life's meaning. The question then arises, if mere hedonism is unable to express the meaning of human happiness, is there not another way of placing feeling upon its proper basis whence it may become the ground of the joy of life? The answer to this question is to be found in the *aesthetical*. Now it was in the pursuit of the *aesthetical* rather than of the hedonistic that individualism sought to emancipate the self from the outer world.

Before the *aesthetical* element in human feeling may be submitted to any technical analysis of its forms, it is expedient to consider just wherein the living content of such *aesthesia* consists. This is not to be found in the hedonic, which might have been dismissed with even less attention than has just been devoted to it. Like the poor, the feelings of pleasure and pain will ever be with

us, yet their mere persistence is no ground for our regarding them as the ground of human existence. With a shallow psychology of life according to which pleasure and pain were made the foci of human existence, hedonism made its cause still more dubious by passing over directly into the ethical. Even with a crippled psychology, hedonism might have made a show of plausibility if, instead of indulging the dream that it was solving the moral problem as such, it had made no more of its scheme than a general philosophy of life, or perhaps an aesthetics like that of Burke. In its desire to secure a predicate for the subject, "virtue," hedonism promptly decided upon pleasure, whence it elaborated the rough and ready ethical judgment, "Virtue is pleasure." In most instances, the hedonist was anxious to escape from the egoistic corollary implied by such an unhappy synthesis, so that the history of hedonism is punctuated with the ideals of benevolence, sympathy, and social sentiment; nevertheless, this attempt at ethical *largesse* indicated no departure from the primary principles of immediate feeling, since it was always the pleasure of somebody which was involved in the hedonic ideal. With its strange compunctions, the hedonist insisted that it was right for one to promote pleasure so long as that pleasure was not his own. Between the approved pleasure of the alter-ego and the disapproved pleasure of the ego himself, the sense of life fell between two stools.

If the redemption of hedonism is not to be found in altruism, it is a question whether it was brought about by nineteenth-century individualism when the latter sought so to refine the feeling that it might appear worthy of being entertained by the ego. No longer was it the crass pleasure of sensational experience with all its temporary gratification, but the inner consciousness of feeling as that which is aesthetically fine. Where

Romanticism made this feeling exquisite and frappant, Decadence colored it with the melancholy and morbid, while Symbolism has advanced it to the innermost realm of nervous aesthesia. There is perhaps more hope for the ethical success of feeling when, instead of being looked upon as so much raw *hedonia*, it is appreciated with all the refinements of *aesthesia*, so that one may give ear to Schlegel and Baudelaire where he cannot assent to the hedonism of Burke and Pope. At the same time, it cannot be doubted that the fortunes of individualism were more secure with Romanticism than they had been with the more classic and realistic thinker. By means of aesthesia, the inward sense of life was delivered from the domination of an absurd naturalism, while the retreat to the inner life served to save the self-conscious individual from the ready synthesis of all souls under the generalization of "society." Bentham, Mills, and Spencers might mesh themselves with their social philosophy, but Blakes, Stirners, and Ibsens were not to be caught so easily. The lime on the branch caught no prey, because the bird did not alight.

The problem which now confronts the individualist, who must believe that social hedonism is an overcome standpoint, is whether individualistic aesthesia is sufficient to explain the meaning and satisfy the demands of the ego's inner life. The service of aestheticism in evincing the independent form of the self in its soul-states and in endowing the self with due content, cannot be set aside by any staid criticism of aestheticism as decadence; at the same time, the incompleteness of aestheticism is well known to the sincere individualist. The meaning of aesthetic individualism appears at once when one compares the older hedonic method with the more advanced doctrine of aesthesia; where hedonism sought to provide happiness as the enjoyment of exterior things as objects of pleasure, aestheticism made

the attempt to construe happiness as the enjoyment of soul-states as subjects of beauty. Taken by itself, aestheticism might appear as so much hysteria which could only end in illusion; but, when it is appreciated that hedonism never penetrates to the inner self of either the ego or the alter-ego, the relative worth of the aesthetic method cannot be questioned, since it was by means of aesthesia that the individual came into the consciousness of his interior humanity. To seek happiness in things and to seek the promotion of universal happiness in the same exteriorizing manner is fatal to all humanism; for neither egoism nor altruism has the power to elicit the genuine springs of humanity within man. To seek happiness in soul-states apart from any real rapport with the external order, is more noble and more promising; but the lack of objectivity is fatal to the hopes of the aesthete who would come to an understanding with himself. At the same time, the subjectivism of Blake and Nietzsche seems more hopeful than the objectivism of Bentham and Spencer.

The joy of life comes into being when the individual with his own soul-states comes into intelligible relations with the world of exterior things and persons. Apart from any dialectic of subject and object, of thought and thing, philosophy of life comes to the conclusion that the adjustment of the inner life to the outer world of nature and humanity is the one thing needful for the joy of life as such. Ethics has its way of relating the will to the world through conduct; metaphysics is equally adept in passing from reason to reality; aestheticism should be equally effectual in providing for a means of transition from the inner life of feeling to the outer world of beauty. It cannot be denied that individualism in the form of aestheticism has been subjectivism, even where it must be admitted that such subjectivism has been a willed subjectivism which has never feared

lest it might end in solipsism. Indeed, to be as nearly solipsistic as possible, to ignore the exteriority of things and persons, has been the open aim rather than the unhappy conclusion of the individualistic doctrine. Where the egoism of the Enlightenment in both its metaphysical and moralistic forms, began to doubt the validity of its doctrine of selfhood the moment that solipsism appeared, the individualism of the nineteenth century looked upon the appearance of solipsism as the signal for genuine effort on the part of the would-be self-willed ego. If egoism feared that solipsism might render void the things of the world, individualism hoped for that very consummation whereby the self might breathe freely in a world without things or persons. Schlegel thus gloried in his *Ironie*; Stirner placed his affair upon nothing; Baudelaire sought nothing but the *moi-même*; Ibsen and Nietzsche disavowed all duty except that which is devoted to the self. Hence, it was not selfhood in spite of solipsism, but selfhood by means of solipsism which was upheld by the egoists of the nineteenth century; in the midst of their strivings, these egoists were wise enough to realize that, in the eternal conflict between inner and outer, it is always the outer which prevails, whence it is absurd to fear lest one's sense of selfhood or one's will-to-selfhood will have the effect of actually making null the heavy, organized world of scientism and sociality. In the face of a predominant objectivism, the individualist has asserted all the subjectivism which lay in his power.

Not by the enjoyment of things which tend to mask the meaning of soul-states, not by the enjoyment of inward states which render one oblivious of things, but by the enjoyment of such states of consciousness as may relate themselves to the things of the world does happiness come to the individual. To cook the hare, one must first catch it; to enjoy the world in which the self

appears, one must first come into possession of the self. Let it be granted that individualism has been subjective and mystical, and that, in the midst of his individualism of inner states, free initiatives, and spontaneous ideals, he has not found it in his power or according to his pleasure to relate himself to either nature or humanity: it is still possible for the lyrical subject with his fineness of emotion to relate his being to the epic order of things and persons with all their stolidity. From this relation between inner and outer, a genuine inner and a worthy outer, the joy of life must come. Individualism has shunned the world, because the world has insisted upon the objective recognition of things apart from the inner meaning which these may have for the self; but, in so doing, individualism has pursued its quasi-solipsistic way under the unhappy impression that nature was nothing but scientism, humanity only so much crude sociality. In such scientized nature with its insistence upon fact as fact, in such socialized humanity with its interpretation of worth as mere utility, there was indeed no place for the individual with his intensified and idealized inner life; but nature is more extensive than scientism, humanity more intensive than sociality, whence the individual may issue forth from his provisional solipsism toward the objective order of full nature and free humanity. For purposes of system, it may have been necessary to render the world scientific and social, but the organization of exteriority according to positivism must not be taken as the final word; if positivism, with its immediate synthesis of the obvious was ever true, it is not true to the conditions of contemporary life and thought, so that the time is ripe for the higher synthesis of the naturalistic and humanistic.

2. THE AESTHETIC NATURE OF ENJOYMENT

Enjoyment, then, is neither the appreciation of things nor the indulgence of soul-states. In the paradoxical

condition of human feeling, there has always appeared this contradiction: where hedonism seemed to provide pleasure by means of things objective, the result was purely subjective and selfish; where aestheticism attempted to find its joy through states subjective, aestheticism always had about it an air of trans-individualistic mysticism in accordance with which it overcame its own subjectivism, and elaborated some sort of exterior existence. The more objective hedonism tried to be, the more subjective it became; the more subjective aestheticism sought to be, the more objective was the result. The true aim of individualism is to remove from personal feeling that element of immediate interest which prevents the feeling from becoming a topic of universal meaning and permanent satisfaction. Now, to expand the inner soul-state until it shall take on the proportions of exterior existence may seem to be a hopeless task, if not a psychological contradiction; yet individualism was never far from such a kingdom, while aesthetics has long been in full possession of it. From the aesthetic point of view, it is possible to take a simple feeling of pleasure and relate it to the whole of man's life within and the totality of the world without; if this were not the case, and man was forced to enjoy pleasure in its merely temporary feltness, there could be no science of aesthetics. The individual who adopts the aesthetic attitude takes the world-whole of things and persons into his own mind, which becomes more than ever internal and yet more than ever universal, while outer things and inner states become unified in a superior form of perception.

The aesthetic joy of life makes possible the conservation of life's value within and the correspondence of that inner life with the exterior world, as this is found in both nature and humanity. If there is to be a higher synthesis, in the light of which the self shall reunite its

self with nature and humanity, it is possible that such a synthesis may be perfected by means of the aesthetic consciousness; but, before this can be done, the depth of that consciousness must be sounded, lest our philosophy repose too confidently in that which may be more fine than substantial. To build up interior life upon the basis of pleasure was a task which hedonism attempted with ill success; nor was its solution of the life-problem made more convincing when hedonism took the pleasure from the ego and transferred it to the alter-ego. Aesthetic philosophy makes use of no such altruistic makeshift, since it believes that what is unworthy with one is equally unworthy with the other. Aesthetic thought seeks to overcome the difficulty between egoism and altruism by calling attention to those values which are so large and superior that they cannot be appropriated by the individual alone, while they are so integral that they cannot be divided into lots to be shared by isolated egos. Aestheticism distinguishes joy from pleasure by making that joy profoundly internal, while it saves joy from threat of selfishness by relegating it to the remote. Now pleasure is superficial in the individual's life just as it is immediate in his world; whence arise all the dilemmas of egoism and altruism. Aesthetic thought fights fire with fire; beauty displaces merely temporary enjoyment, while the full satisfaction of the individual's life removes him from all pettiness.

Where the technical principles of aesthetics may serve for the interpretation of the fine arts, they do not always make possible an aesthetic philosophy of life, still less the aesthetic synthesis of man with his humanity. Yet one need do no more than expand the academic ideals of beauty to lay down the principles of a philosophy of life, as Schiller derived the ideal of aesthetic education of mankind from the scientific aesthetics of Kant. Art is not life, nor is either ethics or philosophy; yet life

may make use of these cultural disciplines for the purpose of discovering its own ground and goal. Where life makes use of the aesthetical, it seizes upon the factors of disinterestedness and remoteness as these appear in the artist consciousness; these life uses for the purpose of placing the individual and the world in such positions that they may come to mutual understanding. By means of the disinterested, the self is led to find joy in that which does not concern his private satisfactions in life; whence the more subjective the self becomes, the more objective are its soul-states. By means of the remote, the things of the world are made to concern themselves with the real advantages which they are calculated to impart, rather than with the immediate satisfactions which lie upon their surface. Then, when the intensified soul lays hold of the remote objects of the world, the dualism between the self and the world is at once forgotten. That which is essential in man is *en rapport* with that which is fundamental in the world; so that, instead of having the private ego making use of the manifold of phenomenal objects, philosophy of life is dealing with the major self in its relation to the world. Plato contemplating the world of ideas, Dante viewing the spectacle of the universe, and Goethe laying hold of nature, are examples of the aesthetic consciousness in operation. Where the purely aesthetical falls short of this life-ideal appears, first of all, in the emphasis which aesthetics lays upon pleasure.

The desire to view beauty as mere pleasure fails to free the mind from the idea of interest which seems so fatal to all aestheticism; further, if the mind is aesthetically disinterested, what matters it whether the feeling under contemplation is one of pleasure or of pain? "A thing of beauty is a joy forever," because it is based upon pleasure without interest. Yet, in such a conception of the aesthetic, it is the permanent rather

than the pleasurable that lends itself most readily to the idea of beauty. With the Decadence, it was the element of sorrow, not that of joy, which was supposed to constitute the idea of beauty. It was in this connection that Poe made Decadence possible when he said, "Regarding, then, beauty as my province, my next question referred to the tone of its highest manifestation, and all experience has shown that this tone is one of sadness Melancholy is thus the most legitimate of all the poetic tones."² Baudelaire made sadness imperative when he said, *Sois belle et sois triste!* If it still be insisted that pure beauty concerns itself with ideal pleasure, it will be difficult to account for more than a part of the fine arts, where the idealization of feeling has been quite indifferent to the idea of pleasure as such. All drama would have to be comedy; all sublimity and pathos would have to be excluded. The idea of pleasure may carry the aesthetical a part of the way, but to complete the journey to the Gate Beautiful something more substantial becomes necessary. While this problem is held in abeyance, the question which accompanies it must be taken up for consideration.

The second problem concerns the passivistic ideal involved in the doctrine of pleasure minus interest. This conception of the beautiful involves the idea that, when interest is removed from the mind, the will is so neutralized that the mind loses its spontaneous sense of activity. While such a passivism might be recommended in connection with ethics and religion, and while certain phases of the beautiful may be said to possess it, the most significant factor in the sense of beauty consists in the ability to arouse powers which otherwise might lag or slumber. Thus it is more in the spirit of truth than of jest when we speak of pleasure minus interest, not as aesthetic, but as anaesthetic. Again, however unhappy

² *Philosophy of Composition, in loc.*

the suggestion, where formal aesthetics seems to regard art as anti-aphrodisiac, real art is more likely to act in the aphrodisiac manner. Those fine arts which are essentially static may perhaps have the cooling effect upon the mind, but such temporalistic arts as poetry, music, and dancing cannot be said to render the mind passive. Even with architecture, sculpture, and painting, the quieting of ordinary feelings may be followed by the evoking of unusual ones. In this manner, the idea of passivity seems to suffer the fate of its companion notion of pleasure, since beauty and art are so often painful and dynamic in their character.

In spite of this criticism directed toward the formal ideas of pleasure and passivity, it cannot be said that the essence of the aesthetical is conveyed by means of these imperfect notions. When the idea of disinterestedness is applied to pleasure, it appears that it is not so much pleasure itself that aesthetics insists upon; rather is it the exceptional conscious state, which is so independent of interest that it may be either pleasurable or painful. The art of the Decadence sought its satisfaction in the morbid in which pleasure and pain were curiously blended. The explanation of this aesthetic situation is to be found in the idea of the disinterested feeling; that is, a feeling which was not identified with the average life of man. For this purpose, the painful was as good as the pleasurable. Thus, it is not disinterested pleasure so much as it is disinterested feeling which lies at the heart of the aesthetic ideal, while the idea of disinterestedness seems to signify the detached condition of the self when it is under the spell of the beautiful. As a result of this criticism of the usual doctrine of the beautiful, the ideal of disinterested pleasure is changed to that of detached feeling.

When the idea of disinterestedness is applied to the other question of aesthetics, the notion of passivity re-

ceives appropriate modification. The process of taking interest out of pleasure does not consist in merely making pleasure a Less; it may as fitly become a More. In either case, ordinary life-feeling with its organic connections is set aside in favor of a sentiment which, in one case, bears the stamp of the ethical, where in the other it is more thoroughly artistic. In either case, the aesthetic feeling signalizes a departure from ordinary experience, since the aesthetic feeling is either a subdued decline from or an excited elevation above the ordinary. Where the natural and social order tend to produce and promote average feeling calculated to make the individual either healthy or useful, aesthetic feeling abandons the ordinary feeling for the sake of internalizing it. Thus, the leading idea of aesthetic feeling, while it is suggested by the ideal of disinterestedness, is more completely and worthily expressed by means of the idea of elevation. If in the midst of the aesthetical, there be no philosophy of life, there can appear to be little reason why the soul should thus be elevated; the result will be the decadence of art for art's sake: the poetic principle will produce the "poem which is a poem and nothing more, the poem written for the poem's sake," as Poe expressed it.³ Individualism, however, so postulates the reunion of the self with the world that it can but regard aesthetic elevation as a means of attaining this height.

The essential meaning and worth of the aesthetical as a means of establishing the joy of life will appear more clearly when the aesthetical with its boundless freedom is compared with the moral, wherein the will is ever under a certain sense of restraint. Be the ethical theory naturistic or characteristic, let it aim at desire or duty, the sense of obligation is such that it lays upon the will an imperative, whether hypothetical or categorical, inas-

³ *Poetic Principle*, in *loc.*

much as the pursuit of either desire or duty involves a definite degree of ethical concentration and moral earnestness. To assert the things of sense after the manner of the desiderative or to reject them in connection with duty, involves the will in the work of attention or inhibition. Now, the aesthetic consciousness so involves the whole self with the totality of the world that the self relieves the will of responsibility by refraining from both yea and nay. The aesthetic consciousness simply plays with the object of sense, neither pole of which, negative or positive, has attractions for it. Where ethical consciousness is necessarily wrapped up in interest, be that realistic or idealistic, the aesthetic consciousness emancipates itself by merely hovering over the object, which is neither sought nor shunned. To have the satisfaction of desire may be at the expense of duty; to have the satisfaction of duty may be at the expense of desire; but to have aesthetic satisfaction is to exercise the soul in its integrity apart from the painful dualism which morality so often engenders. Where the aesthetical transcends the dualism of desire and duty, it allows the soul to repose in its totality; and from this sense of totality within arises the idea that there is none the less reality without. In these two allied principles is involved the very joy of life. Stated in general terms, human happiness arises when the inner life is adjusted to exterior existence. Now this adjustment cannot come about when philosophy attempts to relate some isolated function of the self, like the will, to some special phase of the world, like that of energy. But, when the complete soul is one with the whole world, man is happy.

The functions of doing and the forms of thinking can undoubtedly supply the soul with satisfaction; but the validity of work and culture as principles of happiness depends upon the acceptance of feeling as their proper *terminus a quo*. Where the aesthetical element is ig-

nored, the sense of happiness, as this comes from either action or thought, is bound to be hurriedly conceived and scantily furnished with content. Earlier individualism took its stand upon eudaemonism because eudaemonism seemed to promise the reality of the inward soul-state as such; the error of such individualism has been found to consist in the aestheticism which so relished the soul-state that the mind became morbid. Nevertheless, there are possibilities of eudaemonistic existence in the internal state of the soul, and these possibilities are to be realized in such a way as individualism may think proper and sufficient. Individualistic eudaemonism can neither repose in the immediate soul-state nor make hurried departure from it toward the kingdoms of doing and thinking; individualism must either tarry in the internal soul-state until that state has been realized to the full, or lay upon it the light but permanent touch of the aesthetic consciousness. Indeed, that which seems difficult for the hedonist, who would repose in the inward sense of pleasure, that which again seems unworthy to the rigorist who would find the genuine joy of life in the sterner affairs of work and conquest, becomes reasonably simple to the aesthete who would merely touch pleasure with that skill and lightness which is possible to him who has a consistent sense of the joy of life. Furthermore, it is more becoming for the apostle of will to set about in the elaboration of the ideal of worth, just as it were well for the intellectualist to busy himself with the difficult problem of the truth of life; in the midst of these more serious concerns, it is fitting that the aesthetic eudaemonist should be allowed the field of feeling in which he may have the opportunity to evoke the life-ideal of happiness.

The philosophical possibilities of the joy of living appear still further when the subjective and objective relations of existence are considered. In its haste to

complete its philosophy, the mind has usually concluded that life consists either in taking from the exterior world or in giving to it. Where the philosophy has been of an empirical character, it has laid its emphasis upon the receptive form of spiritual life. In the case of knowledge, it has been assumed that mind is of such a nature as to be convinced by the external impression that truth was of an outer nature; in the case of ethics, it has been the same external order which has been supposed to content the mind through the experience of pleasure. On the other hand, where the character of the philosophic has been idealistic, the mind has sought to impress its innate forms upon the world, while the moral will has been equally earnest in working from within outward toward the exterior order. Those who have opposed the empirical method of thinking and doing have sought to point out that receptivity without reaction is not sufficient to account for the ideas of truth and goodness, just as these critics have indicated that such a realistic conception of the problem failed to account for the strange adaptability of the inner intellect and will to the outer impression and incentive. When such idealistic thinkers have set up their view, their realistic critics have not failed to suggest that idealism too was not without its shortcomings. If philosophy ignores the nature of the exterior world, how can it account for the adaptability of that world to the inward ideas and motives of the interior mind? It is not the office of aestheticism to seek a settlement of this traditional dispute, since aestheticism is content to suggest that before the object is sundered from the subject, or the subject from the object, it is well to realize the possibilities of immediacy as these appear in the aesthetic conception of man and the world. In this immediate unity of subject and object, the sense of existence does not fail to appear, and it is this original sense or joy

of existence which may ultimately be of service in solving the problems of thinking and doing.

From the aesthetic standpoint of immediate existence in the world, it is the duty of philosophy of life to insist upon the fact of existence as such. It is quite likely that, from this intuitive sense of existence, philosophy may be able to deduce the more advanced ideas of worth and truth, but these tend to invalidate themselves where their original point of departure is forgotten or ignored. Primarily, life is neither a receiving nor a giving, but an existing; the self may react or may reflect upon the world, but it must first realize the world. From the aesthetic viewpoint, the first task of the self is to exist and absorb its experience. If, after that, subject and object must separate, and the claims of each be measured, no harm can come to either intellect or will, which have had in the immediate sense of existence the preparation needed for their work in the world. The earlier individualism of Decadence was so impressed with the importance of the soul-state and the joy of existence that it could not conceal its antipathy to the sense of worth and truth which had ever tended to render null the immediate sense of existence; the newer individualism, not less interested in the free soul-state or the inviolate joy of life, is inclined to regard the aesthetic sense of inwardness as something preparatory to the sterner issues of worth and truth. The joy of life is thus the beginning, but not the end of a complete philosophy of life.

3. ENJOYMENT AS VISION

The existence of life as such, apart from the sense of worth and truth which this life may finally be found to possess, involves the idea that, at the outset, philosophy consists of free, intellectual vision. The very fact that the self can say, "I am," contains in it a sense of

truth independent of the reaction of the practical will and the reflection of the speculative intellect. The exercise of free vision would thus seem to obtain in advance of the deductions which are drawn from the mind and the inductions which are based upon the observation of nature's behavior: indeed, if the mind has not been previously prepared by the inherent sense of existence, it is difficult to see how the understanding can make intelligible use of its logical powers, or how the facts of experience can find their proper place in the mind. The character of the mind which, prior to induction and deduction, exercises free, intellectual vision, is neither a *tabula rasa* nor a completely organized understanding; it is rather the character of *intellectus ipse*; it is intellectual life.

The need of philosophy is the need of appreciating the immediacy of intellectual life independent of both inner forms and outer facts. Mediaevalism went from form to form until, by living on its own tissue, the mind became emaciated; modernism has gone from fact to fact, until it has become burdened by the concrete. In connection with modern thought especially, the need of intellectual vision becomes more and more apparent, since the passion for predicating, for attributing to subjects a vast array of adjectival qualities, has so burdened the substantial that it can no longer bear the burden. The chief subjects of all philosophy are found in the ideas of "world" and "mind." Under the influence of synthetic thinking, such a subject as the world has undergone indefinite predication until, with the vast array of qualitative attributes, the original sense of the world as a complete, unified substance is all but wholly lost to view. The same may be observed in the realm of the psychological; here, the original sense of mind as such has succumbed to the excessive predication due to psychological investigation. The attributes have sub-

merged the substance; the qualities have overcome the thing.

Where the deductive, rationalistic method of thought has sought to check this excessive synthetic tendency, it has been able to do little more than indicate the particular method according to which realistic thinking has been able to accumulate its data. Rationalistic thought has thus failed to lead the mind back to its original unity; for, where rationalistic thought has been able to proceed with a limited number of principles, realistic thought has demanded an unlimited number of facts. In both rationalism and realism, the pluralistic holds sway. The remedy for such an unhappy condition of things, where the whole seems less than the part, is to be found in the native sense of unity inherent in the intellect as a life, a life which shows itself capable of free vision. It might seem that such intellectual vision, based as it is upon the idea of existence as such, were none other than the ancient Parmenidean principle, "Being is being, Being is thinking." Yet free intellectualism, while it must insist that existence as such contains a certain amount of insight apart from calculation, cannot repose in the purely static and rationalistic ideal of the ancient thinker. The philosophy of free vision does indeed rest upon the idea of sheer existence as the prerequisite for all doing and thinking, just as it further emphasizes the importance of immediate knowing apart from reasoning and calculating; but such free vision bases itself upon the immediate sense of life, whence the ego is able to say, in a manner the converse of that of Descartes and Augustine, "I am, therefore I know — *sum, ergo scio.*"

To this method of intellectual vision based upon the existence of the self as self, it will be objected that it closes the door of knowledge the moment it is opened, as if it were to settle all problems of existence by say-

ing, "Being is being," and answer all questions concerning knowledge by asserting, "Thinking is thinking." But such is far from the purpose or end of aesthetic intellectualism. Such a free aestheticism closes no door, because it has opened none; and it has opened none, because it has seen none to open; the vision of aesthetic intellectualism has ever been a vision in the free. That which is difficult for logic with its idea of truth, that which is difficult for ethics with its idea of worth, has not the same difficulty for aesthetics with its idea of beauty. This sense of beauty is found in immediate existence in the experience of which comes the joy of life. To depart from this original intuition, in order that here the object and there the subject may be perfected in detail, is quite natural, quite necessary; yet, this departure need not cause the mind to forget that there is in the midst of its doing and thinking a unity of life and existence.

Idealism hesitates to yield to the objective order lest the independence of thought be lost to it; idealism thus insists upon the absolute in the form of either a first principle or a necessary ground. To this attempt to fixate all knowledge, realism responds by pointing out that, when the first principle is premised as point of departure, it becomes necessary to assume a beginning of such beginning, whence appears a series of absolutes corresponding to the series of relatives from which idealism sought to deliver thought; in the same manner, realism contends that, when a ground for the relative has been found, a further ground for that absolute must also be found. In this manner, thought is ever called upon to premise an origin of origins, a ground of grounds. It is well known that Kant appealed to the ethical to save him from such a contradiction, and that Schelling made use of the Kantian aesthetic to effect his own deliverance from the antinomy involved in the conflict-

ing claims of idealism and realism. The philosophy of life seeks to avoid this contradiction by observing that life as life enjoys the immediate unity of subject and object, of absolute and relative, a unity in which the beauty of the world and the joy of life are immediately found. From such unified intuition of life, philosophy proceeds to make its academic distinctions from which result the formal notions of worth and truth; were there no such unity, the distinction between subject and object, absolute and relative would have no meaning. Where Transcendentalism sought to reunite the halves of the immediate unity, aestheticism shows no disposition to divide unified life into its possible pairs of opposites.

The enjoyment and exercise of free, intellectual vision based upon the immediate unity of mind with the world does not fail to have effect upon the secondary methods of philosophy of life as these have to do with action and thought; that is, with reaction upon the world and reflection upon the ideas which the world conveys to the mind. When philosophy is considered as a form of intellectual life in which free vision is predominant, the usual dualisms of thought and thing, of practical and speculative are unnecessary and misleading. Individualistic philosophy of life premises an "I am" before it seems to conclude, "I will," and "I think"; such individualism does not merely work toward or look forward to existence, rather does it begin by enjoying existence. The reason why the self, which enjoys the immediate existence of the world, is led to seek beyond the joy of life the worth and truth of life, is found in the fact that the self seeks in the ideas of worth and truth acceptable forms of self-expression. The self, which begins by enjoying life as such, is led to seek after a world of work and a world of knowledge, a world-order in which it may come to its own. Only as the immediate, aesthetic unity of the self with the

world is premised is it possible to elaborate a consistent view of either work or knowledge.

The validity of such an immediate unity of the mind with the world cannot be doubted by him who is aware and appreciative of the aesthetic ideal as that which is constituted by the universal and necessary without the generalization and abstraction of the logical concept. Kant, who made aesthetic thinking possible, should have placed the aesthetic at the beginning instead of at the end of his critical system; should have regarded it as the original, not as the acquired, unity of sense and understanding, of practical and speculative. When aesthetic truth is understood as that which contains the original unity of mind as existence, it becomes possible to conceive of the aesthetic idea as something natural, rather than as something extraordinary. The aesthetic idea contains the universal and necessary, but not in the general and abstract manner of logic. This idea is to be explained in the light of the fact that it was from the immediate necessity and universality of the idea that logic proceeded when it went on to analyze the necessary in the form of the abstract, the universal in the form of the general. Had not the universal and necessary already existed in the aesthetic idea, the derivation of them by logic would have been impossible. Now, it is the originally necessary and universal which afford the basis of the mind's existence, just as it is upon these grounds that the joy of existence becomes possible. The immediate sense and enjoyment of existence is then completely distinguished from the derivative ideas of worth and truth, inasmuch as one phase of beauty makes no distinctions of interest, while the other ignores the distinction of particular and general. In the original intuition of the aesthetic mind, it is free vision and enjoyment in which as yet no suggestion of interest and the concept have appeared.

III. THE AESTHETIC SYNTHESIS

The misunderstanding that has arisen between the inner self and the outer world has been due to the fact that individualism has ever entertained too limited a conception of selfhood, while scientism has indulged in a conception of nature too prosaic to permit one to regard the world as the place of the human soul. In the same manner, the ethical discussion of the question of life in the world has proceeded to oppose the selfish ego to the practical order of sociality. Where Descartes defined selfhood in such a manner as to render impossible any sort of metaphysical commerce with the exterior world, Hobbes described the human self in a way which at once forbade any genuine relationship between the individual and society. When genuine individualism arose in the nineteenth century, the conception of the ego as the will-to-selfhood and the notion of nature as a system of blind striving served only to make a bad matter worse. Man and the world, so it seemed, had had a serious falling out. On the humanistic side, the situation was no better, since the ego of self-culture was far from having a place in the socialized order. Where self-consciousness opposed itself to the static arrangement of the world, self-will set itself at variance with the world viewed dynamically, so that man and his world were at sword's points. Where self-love tended to negate the political arrangement of humanity, self-culture was out of tune with humanity as social; whence man could find his humanity only as he retreated to his inner life. Solipsism and egoism, irrationalism and immoralism, were the forms in which the independence of the self expressed itself. Now scientism and sociality wish the individual to be something less than these; but individualism believes that the hope of establishing a new synthesis of the self and the world depends upon the individual's becoming something more.

I. THE AESTHETIC SYNTHESIS WITH NATURE

In order to calculate how the better self of humanity may take and occupy its place in the larger world of nature, one must consider just how the inferior ego was led to abandon his place in the world of scientism. Modern thought began as no other movement than the complete naturalization of the world without and within; that desire to dominate the individual which in Paganism had raised the State above the self, which in Mediaevalism had walled the individual within the Church, showed itself in the attempt to submerge the ego in the scientific, social State. At the same time, the subordination of humanity was not so complete as the principles of naturalism would seem to indicate. The physical view of the world was so closely connected with a humanistic conception of mankind that the result of the Enlightenment was at once naturistic and humanistic. Furthermore, the mathematical notions of the times were such as to make the world appear mental; whence the new physics had about it a subjectivism which ended by saying that our only knowledge is the knowledge of ideas. When thought became biological, as it did in the nineteenth century, it made the social one with the natural, so that a certain amount of humanism was to be found in the midst of the crass naturalism. Then the biological ideals of the age were tempted to extend their sway over the psychological; whence another method of escape was provided for the individual. The result, as our treatment of *The Naturalization of Life* showed, was quite ambiguous, in that humanity and the individual, far from being driven from the field, were enhanced and strengthened by the application of the natural to human life. Like wisdom, nature is justified of her children, so that one might regard naturalism as a hen which has hatched out a

duckling, whose aqueous propensities are so surprising to the land-bird.

Even when the conclusions of scientism in both physical and biological forms were ambiguous, there went abroad the impression that scientism had driven spiritual life from the world. Art lost its one-time sway; ethics became either utilitarian or formal; religion was forced to submit to scientific cosmology and sociology. But the fact remained that the self was still in the world; and, even when the principles of outer existence were developed so rapidly and so completely as to leave the ideals of the inner life far in the rear, man was not wholly distanced in the race for the goal of life. At a time when life had all but passed into the hands of scientism, at a time when the scientific thinker had become as dogmatic and intolerant as the scholastic theologian, the individualistic revolt asserted the independence of the self in its soul-states. Having no means of appreciating these soul-states, scientism had looked upon them as so many inward events comparable to exterior happenings; wanting in a sense of taste, scientism had reduced all phenomena to a dead level, whence one fact became as fine as another, the outer as good as the inner. The lack of perspective which distorted the picture of the world, was supplied in part by the individualistic movement, which brought the self to the foreground. It is not to be doubted that individualism exaggerated the importance of the individual's private experiences; for, where scientism had made the soul-state but one fact among a host of others, individualism allowed the inner experience of the soul-state to blot out the meaning of the exterior order. The *Ironie* of Schlegel, the *culte de soi-meme* of Baudelaire, and the solipsism of Huysmans in his *maisonette*, are so many examples of this exaggeration. Nevertheless, it was just poison which served to cure the soul of its naturalistic malady.

The self still exists! In its unearthliness, its anti-naturalness, individualism may have been wrong, but its solipsistic sin was a *felix culpa*. In its romantic, decadent, symbolistic aestheticism, individualism saved the self from the toils of scientism; where taste was needed to render the view of nature selective and appropriate, such individualism invoked the superfine, the hysterical, and the morbid for the purpose of placing the soul-state in a different light from that which naturalism was shedding upon it. No one who has toiled under the sun of naturalism can regret the cool shadows of what otherwise would be a doubtful philosophy of life. When scientism played Comte, individualism replied with Stirner; when Mill appeared, Wagner checkmated his utilitarianism; the naturalism of Darwin was neutralized by the Satanism of Baudelaire, while Spencer was no match for Ibsen. Erotic, morbid, and lyrical, the individualist was still true to humanity; the individualist defended the self from the attacks of unscrupulous scientism.

Scientism has become one of the most unnatural movements in the history of human culture. For the sake of perfecting its forms, scientism has been as vicious as scholasticism in violating the content of its own subject matter. Where Scholasticism made relentless use of the abstract, scientism has been as perverse in its employment of the analytic; where Scholasticism sought the empty general, scientism has been equally devoted to the particular. The plea under which scientism has advanced the culture of the analytic has been based upon the notion that truth is to be found in the fact; now nature as such does not consist in an array of facts or in an immediate assemblage of facts; nature is obviously a systematic whole the comprehension of which depends upon a form of culture which is able to view the world in its totality. Within the limits of mere scientific investigation, the fallacy of scientism as

a system fails to reveal itself; but, when life seeks to reproduce itself through realistic art, the secret becomes known. Scientific art, possessed of the idea that it reflects the real as given in experience, attempts to place all facts upon the same level, whence the reflection of nature assumes the form of a thirteenth-century picture with its pathetic lack of depth. The result is the very opposite of the natural, for the immediate reproduction of the world apart from the ideal background and spiritual atmosphere of the scene produces a false impression; whence, the truer the art, the more false it is; the truer to the fact, the more false to the idea contained in the fact.

In its unnaturalness, realism has made the perceptible without to correspond to the pleasurable within; that is, as art sought the immediate fact in the exterior order, it sought likewise the immediate response in the inner one. For the beholder the problem became suspiciously simple: perceive the particular fact and enjoy the special feeling which that fact arouses, and you have the essence of aesthetic enjoyment. If reality were willing to display itself in such particular percepts and such particular pleasures, scientific art had been a success; but there is about reality a totalizing tendency, whence the particular fact in nature is meaningless apart from the whole, while the particular feeling in consciousness is blind when severed from the fulness of consciousness itself. The most natural and obvious impression of the world is received when all the self contemplates the whole world; the effect becomes strained and unnatural when a particular feeling seeks to respond to a definite percept, whence nature as a series of phenomena and mind as a succession of feelings fail to produce an artistic impression. Individualism sought to correct this artistic error by postulating the independence of soul-states and the unity of the inner life; the result was to

divorce the individual from the world to which he owed his life and in which he seemed to have his destiny. Now that individualism has shown itself capable of a more liberal and healthy conception of one's own life, it remains to be seen whether the exterior order is capable of supporting an explanation which shall respond to this.

With all its pretense at sheer realism, science has assumed to be naïve and disinterested. In considering such a claim, individualism is called upon to observe two things: whether it is possible for the human mind to analyze any problem of the world in complete forgetfulness of humanity; whether scientism has actually done this in the case of modern naturalism. To consider the particular claims of scientism first, it may be said again, as was said before in reviewing *The Naturalization of Life*, that as an historical fact scientism took up the work of rendering the world wholly cosmic, not for the sake of what it saw in that world, but with the aim of freeing man himself from the limitations of mediaeval cosmology, whence scientism became humanism. When, in the second period of modern thought, scientism passed on to biological considerations, it was with the result of establishing a social conception of mankind. Thus, instead of establishing a purely cosmic or naturalistic conception of the exterior order, scientism had the fate to involve just as much of the anthropic as had been involved before. Instead of being naïve, scientism revealed much of the care and craft of the scholastic period; indeed, where scholasticism demanded that art and philosophy should serve theology, scientism has demanded that art and philosophy should serve the interests of science. It was against such a subsumption of the human ego under the new generalization that individualism took up its work of insurrection.

If the system of scientism has not been disinterested,

is it possible for the human mind to contemplate the world in a manner wholly non-anthropocentric? In seeking an answer to this question, one must bear in mind that, instead of viewing the world with the intuitions of an angel or the perceptions of an animal, man views the world after the manner of the human mind as such. To speak of "mind" is to indulge in a foolish abstraction. The fact that it is the human mind which contemplates the world without, keeps thrusting itself forward in connection with the inevitable distinctions which man's mind makes. These humanized distinctions appear in the contrast between the phenomenal and the real, the sensuous and rational, the free and determined. In ultimate reality, if such an idea may be entertained, such divisions of thought into an Either-Or cannot be said to obtain; but, in man's reality, philosophic progress is made in no other way than this divisive one. The secret of this dualism in thought is explicable in the light of the humanism which is involved in the various questions which arise, so that it seems impossible to entertain a view of the world which shall involve the human mind apart from humanity itself; a purely cosmic consideration is as false and misleading as the purely ecclesiastical ideal of Scholasticism.

In order to guard against the inevitable humanism of all views of the world, individualism is now in a position to present as subject for cosmic contemplation the thoroughly unified ego. Where scientism viewed the self as that which perceives without and finds pleasure within, where Decadence considered the ego as that which rejoices in the complete inwardness of rare and morbid emotions, a revised individualism is anxious to perfect a higher synthesis of self and world, whence one may live his own genuine life in a genuine order of nature. That which is requisite for such a reunion of the self and the world is a more natural conception

of the world, the world in independence of Scholasticism and scientism. About such a higher view of the natural order there is nothing mysterious, at any rate nothing more mysterious than nature herself; the higher, or trans-scientific, view of the world is found when one surveys that world in its manifest totality. Aesthetic individualism has no real desire to dismiss nature, since nature when viewed naïvely is the very place of enjoyment; it is opposition to an academic conception of the world in which individualism has indulged. When a scientist like Haeckel signifies his desire to intuit the world in such a manner as to view in its special forms the semblance of the True, Good, and Beautiful, he is only expressing this desire to look up from the itemized and analytical view of things to a synthetic unity of that which seems to possess ideal significance. This more liberal conception of the world, which has never really forsaken the mind of the artist, is the *unum necessarium* of the superior synthesis of selfhood and nature. Given nature in the scientific form of its actualities, and there can be no sort of communion between the individual and the world; but, with the ideal interpretation of nature in its totality, the reunion is made possible.

To whom does nature belong? Scholasticism sought to enclose it in a cloister; scientism has been equally unjust in its attempt to imprison it in a laboratory. So far as human philosophy is concerned, nature must be thought of as belonging to man, to his scholastic sense of faith or his scientific sense of truth. But by what intellectual right does one assume that nature in passing over into the hands of scientism is really in the possession of scientism, and by what right does scientism hold title to all nature? With the weakness of contemporary art, as shown in symbolism, and with the strength of a well-intrenched scientism, it seems impossible to advance

the obvious proposition that nature is as much the possession of the contemplating artist as of the observing scientist; yet, if one were to review the history of human culture, one would easily find a period in which art had the upper hand, as in the days of eighteenth-century classicism. With Goethe as poet and Schelling as philosopher, one has before one the spectacle of nature in the possession of art and philosophy combined; somewhat the same may be said of American culture in the days of Emerson and Poe. While, at the present time, it is undeniable that nature rests in the hands of scientism, there to suffer from the tyranny of minds which, alas! are often mediocre and purely imitative, it does not follow that nature belongs there, or that she will continue to submit to the staid analyses of the scientific mind which is now beginning to repeat the things it learned from more original minds in the earlier days of scientism. Scientism cannot go on to new triumphs; as early as Comte, it declared that the goal had been attained.

The hope of re-establishing a connection between the inner self and the outer world seems now to depend upon a change from that purely analytical work of scientism which resulted in nothing more than the deduction of the actual, to the synthetic activity of thought whereby an ideal interpretation of the world will become possible. All that scientism can be expected to yield is fact, form, or force; that which is demanded for the reunion of the self and the world is a view of the universe in its totality. In the idea of the aesthetical, both the individualistic and the cosmic may well meet; for, where the ethical tends to lay its emphasis upon the subject, where the metaphysical changes the point of view to the object, the aesthetical is so constituted that it may include both subject and object in one synthesis. The pure subject contemplating the uni-

fied object blends objective and subjective in one. Just as long as scientism persists in viewing the world part by part, just as long as egoism contends for an atomic and solipsistic view of humanity, just so long will the misunderstanding between man and the world continue. But, where the world is viewed as a whole while the self is looked upon in a trans-egoistic sense, the breach between the two realms of thought may be repaired.

If we look to the aesthetical to overcome the antipathy between the two opposed realms, we have a right to expect that the aesthetical will realize its major possibilities as a form of human culture. When the Decadence severed its connection with metaphysics, as with morality also, the artist had before him the spectacle of the world viewed under the form of science; and it was thus that Baudelaire spoke of poetry as being independent of science. But it is reasonable to believe that nature has not been exhausted by the scientific method of investigation, so that a more liberal and less formal view of the world will make possible the participation of the self in its own world. It is of course difficult to believe that science can be wrong when science ever proceeds upon the basis of exact observation and convincing experiment; but the exactness and certainty of science are confined to a disintegrated view of the natural order, and when the totality of the world is made the object of consideration the special formulas of scientism are of no avail. Thus, it is not that science is incorrect, but that it is incomplete; where it has established rational connection among the phenomena of nature in particular, it has not supplied an ideal interpretation of these phenomena as a whole. As a result, there has arisen between a scientific view of the world and an ideal interpretation of life an antinomy which can be removed only as the scientific conception of things yields to a more generous interpretation of the world-order.

The conflict of art with science, which is the complement of the warfare of science with religion, should have the effect of promoting a more fluid conception of the world. Why the religionist assumed the attitude of defense alone is for the religionist to explain, but it is not necessary for the artist to apologize for his attitude toward science. Apart from the school of realism, which vainly endeavored to imitate the scientific method of exact observation and naturalistic explanation, the art of the nineteenth century, however extravagant its special ideals may have been, revealed its loyalty to the idea of beauty, of art as absolute. Far from surrendering to the dictates of scientism, aestheticism rejoiced in its own light, so that the more insistent was scientism, the more perverse was art. To recall the names of Poe and Baudelaire, Huysmans and Wilde, Hauptmann and Maeterlinck, is to remember that aestheticism stood fast in the liberty of its own freedom. But the work of the decadent was only a half-work; the completion of his artistic endeavor appears in a newer and larger view of the world, in which the self may find its true place.

2. THE AESTHETIC SYNTHESIS WITH HUMANITY

Where the aesthetic synthesis with nature tends to overcome the antipathy between the self and the world as this was aroused by *The Naturalization of Life*, the aesthetic synthesis of the self and humanity should save the individual from *The Socialization of Life*. Of the two movements, the latter was the more inimical, inasmuch as the actual socialization of life had its direct effect upon the will, while the naturalization of life was but suggestive to the intellect. Under the auspices of naturalism, one might still hold fast to his sense of selfhood and be guilty of no more than absurdity; but opposition to the social order involved the practical will in real difficulty. With life viewed as so much natural-

ism, the face of nature was not really altered; but with life organized socially, the character of humanity became essentially different. By nature a social creature, man has been called upon to witness the extra-socialization of his life, as this has been brought about by the socialization of labor. Against this practical assembling of human egos, against this excessive inter-relating of human wills, aestheticism as Decadence insisted upon an independent inner life which, the more morbid it became, the less likely its identification with the exterior social order.

The reunion of the self with the human order is to come about only as philosophy is able to effect a higher synthesis of individual and society. Such a reunion is not to submerge the individual in the social, but to relate the individual to the order which has the right to claim him as its own. The individual still exists! The bland social thinker who opposes what he calls "individualism," still has in mind the impossible ego of the Enlightenment, the punctual individual who entertained the vain idea that his life was by nature solitary, while the realization of this life was supposed to consist in the indulgence of self-love. If this ego has passed away, its place has been taken by another and more real example of individualism, the aesthetic ego of the nineteenth century. Realizing the hold which the social had upon him, the aesthetic ego went to every extreme with the aim of asserting a sort of social solipsism. Considered by itself, such decadent egoism could not be condemned too thoroughly; but, viewed as an attempt to deliver the human self from the toils of the social order, decadent egoism must be praised for its desire to place the individual in a position outside of the social world-order, *dehors du monde*. The particular method employed by the decadent ego was that of eudaemonism, the insistence upon the joy of life as such. Where the

social order failed to show itself the true place of joy, decadence set about elaborating inward joys of the ego's own devising.

Sociality has been one of the most inhuman of movements in the history of ethics. With the apparent aim of arranging life for the sons of men, sociality has perfected an abstract system of benefit to all and none. The ancient State with its innocence of individualism, the mediaeval Church with its insistence upon the catholic or whole in religion, and modern Society with its devotion to abstract sociality, are so many examples of anti-individualism; of the three, the last-mentioned would seem to be the most relentless. Sociality has assumed that one might express the meaning of life by bringing individuals together; indeed, sociality has had no other idea than that of togetherness. When the ancient thinker built the individual into the State as a real edifice, his State was an aesthetico-political reality; when the mediaevalist subsumed man under the idea of a Church, his Church was a politico-religious reality; but the modern social thinker has sought to assemble souls under the form of an idea which in itself has no spiritual content, whence Stirner felt justified in styling it a "spook," while Ibsen called it a "ghost." Remove all individuals from the ancient State, and Plato could still consider that State as having some kind and degree of reality; let all egos forsake the mediaeval Church, and Aquinas might still entertain the idea of the Church as such; but, deprive the modern idea of Society of all particular individuals, and that idea falls to the ground. Like the modern ideal of scientism in nature, the notion of sociality is wanting in a third dimension; so that, where it may exercise some degree of sway over the unthinking individual, it has no real hold upon the idea of humanity.

To whom does the idea of humanity belong? Social-

ity has assumed that, by its very nature as a general idea, humanity belongs to social thought; the individual may have humanity only as he approaches it through sociality. This raises the question, Where is humanity to be found: in the individual or in society? It is most natural to regard humanity in *extenso* as a general notion calculated to cover all individuals; the idea of humanity is thus formed after the manner of the well-known logical concept. Yet, this method of assembling souls under a formal notion is far from conserving the content of humanity as that which is lived within after the manner of the joy of life. The looser method of collectivism and the stricter practice of social synthesis perfects its unity only as it ignores the most characteristic elements of human existence. The grand result of such an assembling fails to yield the idea of humanity as this idea has been experienced and expressed by mankind in the free. The social thinker has followed the analogy of scientism by means of which plants and animals have been arranged in compact and convenient groups. Where the particulars involved have no inner life, no sense of life in its totality, the fallacy of the composition has not been so threatening; but, where these particulars are none other than human individuals with their inherent sense of life's meaning and life's joy, the emptiness of the generalization has become painfully apparent.

But what is there to "humanity" that fails to respond to the smooth social synopsis? In reply to such a question, the individualist comes forth with the answer that humanity is just as likely to be a quality which attaches to an individual as an idea which arches over him. While most of the reasoning concerning humanity has had to do with a purely substantival form, much of the actual experience of humanity has expressed itself in an adjectival manner, as though humanity were a mood

to be cultivated, a character of life to be promoted. From the adjectival point of view, there may be just as much humanity in the individual as in the race. One might perhaps seek to adjust the substantival and social conception of humanity to the adjectival and individualistic by pointing out how the *ratio essendi* of humanity is found in the individual, while the *ratio cognoscendi* is reserved for the social. The humanity of the Greeks found one way of existing in such individuals as Plato and Socrates, Sophocles and Phidias, while it was in a different manner that this humanity expressed itself in the Greeks as a people. Given the concrete humanity of the individual, the humanistic generalization becomes possible; but, ignore the independent humanity of the self, and the generalization falls to the ground.

It would seem, then, that there are two humanities, that which concerns the individual as the quality of his inner life and that which assumes only the quantitative form of a generalization. In the case of the beast, there is but one kind of animality, and with the beast the general impress of the species is the important factor. With mankind, however, due room must be made, not only for individualistic differences incident upon the principle of individuation, but also for the universally distributed sense of inwardness which is open to each individual. With the animal, the bond of union in the species is exterior, due as it is to the common reaction upon nature; with men, the connecting principle is due to the interior consciousness of one spiritual nature. For this reason, the social endeavor to assemble men under a general head should have about it something more than a biological basis; it should recognize the ethical quality of the humanistic synthesis. Herding is common in higher forms of life, but the herding instinct fails to operate as the genuine synthesis of human souls with their special sense of inward enjoyment and inward

realization. In contrast with minor humanity, which is content with the exterior assembling of men under an idea, there is a major humanity which seeks to postulate a real and worthy bond between individuals with a characteristic inner life. Upon the basis of this superior synthesis rests the hope of establishing a reunion of the individual and society.

By emphasizing the distinction between qualitative ethical humanism and quantitative biological sociality, one begins to understand just how the word "humanity" should be employed. When the characteristic in humanity becomes the point of departure, it becomes possible to see how a special individual may have the power to convey the meaning of humanity when this power is not applicable to men in the mass. This appears in the instance of the genius, the very word indicating the thought that the generic or total significance of mankind is to be found in isolation. Not only in the special case of the genius, but in the aesthetic consciousness generally does the characteristic ideal of humanity appear. In art, the principle of aesthetic judgment expresses the notion that the feeling of beauty which gives private pleasure is the basis of a judgment of taste, to the effect that such beauty which pleases is calculated to give similar pleasure to all mankind. When the aesthetic feeling in order to become aesthetic assumes the form of disinterestedness, it conveys in itself the sense of all mankind; conscious of beauty, the individual is conscious of all humanity. The universal idea of humanity, instead of being reached in exterior manner as a generalization, is acquired by perfect interiorization; perfect enjoyment has begotten perfect sympathy. If it be true that beauty can save the world of men, it is because the appreciation of beauty depends for its existence upon an aestheticism in which the total sense of humanity is the invariable accompaniment of that sense of beauty.

To the scientific and social thinker, the masters of the present age, the claims of aesthetic humanism and the hope that art will serve as the means of uniting men will seem psychologically empty and logically absurd. That beauty saves the world by creating an aesthetic sense of the unity of mankind is a proposition whose validity depends upon the nature of the idea, "humanity." If humanity be taken to signify nought but the biological being and social existence of men, then beauty can mean little more than so much artless entertainment; but, if there be another sense attaching to the term "humanity," then it may be possible to attribute to the aesthetical the soteriological office so naïvely suggested by the Russian epileptic whose fits revealed to him "the highest synthesis of life." In the common consciousness of mankind, there exists a double doctrine of humanity: here it is aesthetic *humanism* based upon culture; there it is ethical *humanitarianism* based upon biology. The first doctrine is ancient, the second modern; the earlier doctrine sought the unity of mankind within, the later dogma abandoned the inner for the outer. Where one conception of humanity is concerned with individual humanism as a quality of soul, the other is interested in social humanism as a type of exterior life. Where inner humanism expressed the general sentiment that beauty had power to bind men to one another, outer, social humanism looks to industry to effect the union of all souls. Here, it is the aristocratic and superior in mankind, there the altruistic and sympathetic which receives the emphasis. Convinced of the essential unity within, the older humanist was careless of the exterior realization of this in society; despairing of a mutual, inward understanding in the doubtful realm of spiritual life, the social humanist has taken his stand upon the exterior conditions of mankind in the world. All that aesthetic humanism is interested to assert is that such an aesthetic humanism exists as a fact.

If beauty as beauty cannot wholly save the world, it may point to the aesthetic realm of life in which the unity of man with man may be effected. Up to the present time, when the sensuous life of humanity has been the point of departure for social theory, it has been the sense of common happiness that has been supposed to bring about mutual understanding. Unfortunately for the hedonic method of synthesizing the sons of men, happiness is one of the most disintegrating of human tendencies in human life. Utilitarianism may set up its proud ideal of the greatest happiness of the greatest number; but when individuals seek happiness, they find themselves in mutual disagreement. The same may be said of a more materializing conception of immediate welfare, that of utility. The social thinker as pacifist and utopian has been fond of pointing to industrialism as the cure of militarism; where the code of militarism has had the effect of disintegrating men, the code of industrialism, by pointing out the community of life-interest and the interdependence necessary for world-commerce, has been supposed to supply a bond of union among all wills. If the recent war is a criterion, one may argue that, instead of producing amity, commerce has the effect of arousing enmity among the nations of the world. Where the principles of pleasure and utility have the effect of working divisively, the principles of art and culture seem to raise mankind above that sense of enmity which makes man to man a wolf, *homo homini lupus*. If the aesthetic consciousness cannot save the world by creating the sense of a common spiritual life within, the commercial consciousness is still farther from producing a sense of community among the exterior interests of mankind.

Raw humanity working in the world of sense is in no condition to come to an understanding with mankind. But, where man cultivates his inherent humanity, even

when that involves certain extremes of individualism, he is not far from the kingdom of peace. It was in appreciation of this fact that Fichte was led to say, "Nothing in the world of sense, nothing which concerns our acts or affections, has value except as it makes for culture."⁴ The same principle obtains among nations: where the national aim is economic, it is most difficult for that nation to come to agreement with other nations; where "sweetness and light" guide a people, the nation is in a condition where international agreement is not far to seek. Here again, Fichte has a word of wisdom to offer: "The culture of freedom should be the end of national unity."⁵ In contrast with the commerce-state, which is ever ready for war, the culture-state constantly deepens the cause of peace. Nations fight to defend their commerce; culture needs no exterior defense. It would seem then that the office of the aesthetical is to cultivate the humanity which slumbers in the individual and the individual nation; this done, it becomes possible to promote peace and the genuine unity of men with men.

Where humanity depends upon the benefits which come from culture, it becomes possible to share these benefits without causing sacrifice; but, where pleasure or material benefit is the aim of society, the wealth of one is the poverty of the other. Since cultural goods can be shared without division, the aesthetical is eminently fitted to become the basis of the humanistic synthesis. In the instance of national culture, the member of the nation becomes a direct participant in the aesthetic life of the whole order, while the nation itself has the opportunity to elaborate a type of artistic life peculiar to its own genius. In this manner, England has become utilitarian, France dilettant, Germany dogmatic, Russia nihilistic, although in each case the adjective

⁴ *Werke*, VI, 86.

⁵ *Ib.*, 101.

should be taken to signify something meritorious. Since aestheticism evokes the humanity of the individual, it is calculated to evince the larger humanity of the race, whence the synthesis of the individual and society becomes possible. The more intensive the culture, the more extensive it is; and, if the cultural is capable of uniting the individual with his own nation, it is none the less capable of effecting the synthesis of nation and nation in one domain of beauty, the beauty which saves the world.

Culture, which is itself but a means to an end, sets before the mind the ideal of a perfect humanity, complete in both character and extent. Great as has been the emphasis which human thought has laid upon the idea of man, it may safely be assumed that the idea of humanity has been left to take care of itself. Humanity is an ideal which has fallen between the two stools of the Natural here and the Absolute there, whence that which is of neither Earth alone nor Heaven alone has been sorely neglected. Religion with its avowed preference for the heavenly Absolute has not been permitted to perfect that idea of an intrinsic human life which has always been implicit in its beliefs and strivings. Art with its suggestions of sense and immediate enjoyment has been similarly frustrated in its manifest desire to create man in its own image. Art has been looked upon for the mere adornment of the world of things, the mere entertainment of the human beholder. Religion has been expected to answer questions concerning remote possibilities, when it is of the very genius of religion to elaborate the inner life of man on earth. Culture is artistic and religious in one and the same moment; it is artistic because it ever emphasizes the inward sense of enjoyment, religious because it warns man that life-satisfaction is to be found in some sense of remoteness. Life as actually experienced postulates the aesthetic

synthesis of the self with the world. Every effort to promote human life has been an endeavor to perfect the relations obtaining between man and the world. Such is the synthetic unity of the self, nature, and humanity.

PART TWO

THE WORTH OF LIFE IN THE WORLD-WHOLE

THE search for the higher synthesis in the realm of joy revealed the power of the self to assert its inner nature in the form of aesthetic satisfaction, whence reunion with nature and humanity became possible through culture. By means of such a higher synthesis, the conflict between aestheticism here and the scientifico-social there was overcome. When the same synthetic method is applied to the problem of life's value, it becomes necessary to inquire whether the self as will can transcend its immoralistic pessimism and adapt itself to the world as a world of values. The atmosphere of the second inquiry must be ethical where the auspices under which the first question was considered were aesthetical. The particular form which the question of the practical synthesis of the self and the world must consider is that of work. For the purpose of answering the question whether man has a genuine work in the world, one must first consider what is really meant by the idea of one's own work; then it should be possible to consider whether a free and intelligible idea of work in the world is such as to make possible the practical synthesis of the self with the world of nature and humanity. Where the scientific and the social have tended to suggest that man no longer has a work in the world, individualism has responded by setting up its ideals of immoralistic willing and of pessimistic negation. If the nihilism of the individualistic movement is to be overcome, it will be necessary to re-examine the character of human will-

ing to see whether it is not possible to bring about a reunion of the will with the exterior order of nature and humanity. The particular phase of the work-problem appears in connection with the idea of "character"; not whether the individual himself has private character, but whether the life of action is such as to produce that which is characteristic of man.

I. ONE'S OWN WORK

It was the fate of individualism to insist upon the will rather than the work of the ego; that which resulted from this was the contention for the ego's free initiative and the value of its volitions. In taking up the question of the ego's work in the world, philosophy of life has no right to attempt any higher synthesis of the self and the world unless these contentions be met: within, the will must spring freely from its own initiative; without, the will must have the privilege of creating values. Where the interpretation of the world is such as to forbid the initiatory "I will," the idea of work cannot be true; where the arrangement of the world is such as to deprive the will of the right to create values, the character of work cannot be said to have worth. If the aesthetic view of the world, as this has just been entertained, is such as to grant self-existence to the human ego, it is to be hoped that there may be an ethical conception also in the light of which the ego will be accorded due self-expression. If life seems capable of culture, it should appear none the less capable of character; and as the scientifico-social conception of things was forced to ignore culture, so it will be found equally careless of character. And as the individual has learned to trust in culture as a means of taking one's place in the world, so he must learn to believe in the character of life in which true worth is to be found.

I. THE TRUTH OF WORK IN NATURE

Where earlier modern thought feared the idea of self-existence lest it lead to solipsism, it was none the less anxious lest the desire for self-expression might end in egoism. But he who appreciates the fact that scientism has such a hold upon the mind that the dread of solipsism is ill-founded, will be none the less appreciative of the idea that, with the sway of sociality, the modern is far removed from the possibilities of egoism. Would that there might be some genuine dread of a speculative solipsism and a practical egoism; then one could believe that the hold which the scientific and social now enjoy were not so firm as it appears to be. However anti-egoistic the practical world may seem to be, the individualist is cheered by the hope that, when the true nature of work is presented, the "I will" of individualism may be in a position to look upon its spontaneous volitions as constituting genuine work.

(1) *Work as Creative*

With all its strength of volition, individualism lacked one thing, an object of volition. Perhaps it was because individualism could find nothing worthy upon which the "I will" might rest; still the fact remains that self-willed individualism set up as the object of volition either the self or the nought. "What shall I will?" was a question which individualism could answer in no substantial manner, as one may learn from interrogating the pages of Emerson and Stirner, the dramas of Wagner and Ibsen. At times, the militant egoist feared lest he become superfluous in the midst of his superiority, anti-social in the midst of his self-will; yet he could find nothing in the scientifico-social order which attracted him. When, however, individualism attempts to correct its own errors, individualism realizes that the one thing

needful is a conception of volition which shall read into will the meaning of work, and translate work in terms of character. In this spirit, activistic egoism is now casting about for a conception of willing which shall avoid the extremes of the idle, the vicious, the nihilistic, while it shall conserve the fundamental principle of spontaneity. Life has become so unutterably socialized and the individual is so thoroughly individualized that the reunion of the two seems all but impossible; yet, is not this reunion possible?

The answer to this question is to be found in the idea of the creativeness which seems to reside both in the powers of the will and in the plastic nature of the world. The pre-voluntaristic philosophy, as this labored on until the dawning of the nineteenth century, had no problem of work to solve, because it had no ideal of world-activity to present. In Classicism, the idea of work was prohibited by the fixed and limited character which the idea of the world assumed in the mind: man could imitate nature in art, could copy the world of ideas in the mind which sought truth in the criterion of correspondence of thought and thing, but nothing essential and novel could be done. In Scholasticism, the will was called upon to conform to the authoritarian, but all attempts at a free initiative were limited by the wall of the Church. In Rationalism, the active ego could do no more than strive to know the true to which it must submit with something like the cheerfulness of Spinoza in his "acquiescence." Where, as in the case of Kant and Fichte, the will seemed about to break down the barriers of reason, the beginning and end of action were bounded by relentless moral imperativeness. The coming of voluntarism finds the ego circumscribed by the scientific and the social, but it is doubtful whether these inferior and secular forms of restraint can longer prohibit and prevent the self-assertion of the individual,

who is determined to will both himself and his work. For, if the Positivist and Agnostic suggest that there is no Beyond for the intellect, they cannot convince the individual that there is no Beyond for the will; man has decided to will himself freely and fully, even where this may lead him to the irrationalistic and immoralistic, the anti-natural and anti-social. For this reason, it has become necessary to indicate the way in which the will can best proceed. The voluntaristic within and the activististic without give a new face to the problem of the truth of work.

When once we raise the question, "What shall man will?" we are placed in a position where no commonplace answer can avail. In the solution of this problem, some help may come from an appeal to the parallel case of cognition, where arises the question, "What can man know?" In considering these twin interrogations, let it be borne in mind that philosophy has been as ready to question one as the other; both genuine knowledge and essential activity have been the subject of skepticism, although it must be said that, since the days of Socrates, it has usually been assumed that the problem of action was more easily solved than that of knowledge. It is undeniable that, as the mind can perceive the individual object, so the will can perform the particular act; but with such particular facts neither the intellect nor the will is satisfied. The mind thinks the world as a whole; but is this the case with the will? Is the will "not only free, but almighty"? There are plenty of examples of a philosophic in which the command to will naught is clearly expressed, as a glance at T'aoism, Vedanta, Christianity, and modern pessimism will show; but is it so easy to affirm a categorical imperative which shall counsel, "Will all"? In the first place, however paradoxical it may appear, the ideal of willing the **nothing** is paramount to that of willing the all; for the

negativistic ideal, far from neutralizing the activistic one, includes the thought that, in refraining from the affirmation of everything in its particularity, the will is but preparing for a volition which shall aim at things in their totality, whence it seems that man wills all or nought. Examples of this universal volition may be found in aesthetics, wherein the work of art is a volition which creates the typical and universal in the object, in ethics, where the commandment is intrinsic and imperative, in religion, where the self affirms its being in all the unity of its nature; so that a work of art, a moral, or a religious affirmation is an expression of the mind willing the world as a whole.

Now that upon which the truth of life seems to depend is the ability of the individual to will the idea, to express his nature in the ideo-volitional. Had we not the voluntaristic psychology of contemporary thought, it were difficult to establish the idea that the will, which seems to be so ready to come forth in response to something good and desiderative, was no less ready to reply to the abstractness of an idea. It is true that human culture has ever afforded examples of such ideo-volitional activity, as the foregoing instances of art, ethics, and religion cannot fail to show; but the truth of this activism does not repose upon the surface of these splendid forms of human activity. In art, man wills an intuition the essential nature of which is more intellectual than otherwise. The thing of beauty is both joyous and convincing; it contains both satisfactions and truths. The ideational character of the aesthetic, which might not appear at once in the artistic creation and aesthetic contemplation of the particular statue or canvas, refuses to be hidden when the mind sets about establishing norms of taste, whence arise in ideational form the types and schools known as classic, romantic, realistic. In these elaborations of the beautiful, there is a *largesse* which

can find expression in no other form than the intellectual, even where their immediate products in definite works of art are capable of a less advanced interpretation. If the artist does not work for the creation of an idea, if the beholder looks for no such intellectualism, the artistico-aesthetic principle as a unity gives expression to nothing else.

The same ideo-volitional quality makes its presence felt in the familiar principles of the ethical; here, it is no longer the norm of taste, but the ideal of moral judgment. As in the case of the aesthetical, one does not need to assume that the individual in the performance of a special duty or in the pursuit of a definite virtue is guilty of such moral pedantry as to involve in his act the whole plan of his ethical philosophy; for we do not expect the rigorist to weight his act with the ponderous Categorical Imperative, or the hedonist to keep before his eyes the Greatest Good of the Greatest Number. Nevertheless, when the moral habit has established itself with a race or in a period of history, the mind finds the ethical expressing itself after the manner of the ancient Good and the modern Duty. That which was first an immediate appeal to the will has finally become an ideo-volitional affair in which the truth of life as then conceived found its expression.

Réligion, with its ideal of Godhead, has not been wanting in this same responsiveness to a remote idea; and, even where certain periods in the history of human worship have sought to employ useful fictions for the achieving of temporary results, the truth of life has not failed to break through the utilitarian tissue. The religious devotee performs this or that act, whether ceremonial or moral, with an eye to the immediate performance and the direct consequence; but the totality of the act on the part of all worshippers establishes itself in an intellectual fashion as a permanent, silent

idea. In this manner, Buddhistic and Christian charities, no matter how immediate and expedient they may have seemed in the act of performance, have assumed an ideational character in the culture of mankind. Now, had there been nothing of the intellectual in the acts themselves, it would be difficult to explain how the religious form of activity had been kept by the mind of man. Thus, it seems to follow that, with all its desiderative qualities, human action is such that man may will an idea, be it a norm, an ideal, or a belief; in the ideo-volition, the truth of life does not fail to appear; creation and ideation go hand in hand in the larger work of humanity in the world.

(2) *Work as Intelligible*

The possibility of such a voluntaristic participation in the work of the world is assured to the will when the essential character of the world is more closely analyzed, while the answer to the question, "How is work possible?" comes immediately in the idea, Time. As the world is given to the mind in the general form of experience, it is soon found to express its secret in a temporalistic form, since existence, instead of constituting itself a placid system of Being, is just as thoroughly a scheme of Behavior. To be is to exist and to express forms; but to be is none the less to act and to reveal functions. This activistic and, as it were, functional conception of the world is of advantage metaphysically in placing the problem of the Real in the proper light; for, instead of constituting a sphere where one could find only the opposed poles of noumenal and phenomenal, thing and quality, substance and attribute, the Real has its zones of change, causality, and time, in which the connection between reality and appearance becomes evident. For this reason, the apprehension of the world is not dependent upon conception and per-

ception alone, but has to do with volition as well; whence one may think the world, perceive the world, and will the world. At the same time, when the ego endeavors to put his will into the world, he discovers that the ontological character of the world is such as, not to forbid, but to invite just such participation and possession.

The more definite methods by which the will seeks its place in and its possession of the world appear in connection with certain forms of humanistic culture, which have at heart no other principle than the one just mentioned, the active possession of the world. Knocking, seeking, asking, are followed by opening, finding, giving. In art, the sensuous activity of the creative will has the effect of fixating the fleeting impression whose aesthetic enjoyment thus becomes permanent, as "a thing of beauty is a joy forever." In the animal consciousness, as also to some extent in the uncultured mind, the same impression, instead of assuming the place as a first among equals, is merely an experience which has its place among others, which flow on in the same stream. Art, however, exercises the power of realizing the impression by eternalizing it, whence the fleeting and sensuous becomes permanent and spiritual. In a similar manner, the ethical act is derived from the elasticity of the will, which proceeds outwards in a fashion purely temporary and opportune. By means of such ethical eternalization, an impulse becomes an idea, and man is said to "act," and not merely to move. It matters not whether the ethical act assumes the form of a classic virtue or of a romantic duty; its metaphysical character as a permanent object has been established in the form of the truth of the will. Religion, likewise, is capable of the same dialectical interpretation, for it is of the very genius of religion to take things temporal and make them eternal. The special form of willing

which appears in religion is best expressed as "affirmation"; for, where art employs sense, and morality the will, religion proceeds by the expression of the inner self in its totality.

When, now, we endeavor to assure ourselves of the truth of life, as this should come through the creative activity of the will, we find that art, ethics, and religion afford genuine examples of the ego's attempt to verify his life by willing the characteristic features of the world; whence these, no longer viewed as temporal, become eternal and true. If the world were sheer substance, no such eternalizing work could be done; if it were purely phenomenal and attributive, the attempt to mould it would be as bricks without straw; but, since the world is also activistic, the will may evince the truth of life by exercising the creative activities of art, morality, and religion. From this dialectical analysis of the world as a form of activity, it would seem to follow that man has a work in the world; if he fails to find it or to perform it, the blame must be his own, for the phenomenal is ripe for reality, while time is ready for eternity.

It remains to be discovered whether the will is able and willing to respond to the invitation so readily held out to it in the plastic universe; we have answered the question, "What shall man will?" and must now inquire whether man really possesses the will to work in the world. The behavior of the will is such that, without much difficulty, one can see how easily human volitions respond to the immediacies of inclination and consequence, the one ante-volitional, the other post-volitional; is there also an intra-volitional form of activity? The volition of inclination expresses itself most clearly in the form of desire, whence the individual is led to seek either that which seems to promise immediate pleasure or a more remote and general form of self-

gratification. At this point, we need not plunge too deeply into the psychology of desire, and thus dispute whether the desiderative is so pledged to the pleasurable that one cannot possibly desire the painful; for, in either case, the fact would remain that man naturally and immediately sought that which seemed to him to be good and satisfying. It may be assumed, then, that volition is desiderative, but not to the exclusion of other springs of action. On the other hand, it appears that the volitional subject has an eye to the remote consequences of the act which he is about to perform, whence the direct inclination at the beginning must give way before the anticipation of the enjoyable consequences at the end of the activity. In character, the consequential form of volition is in no wise different from that of inclination; both participate in the desiderative, differing only in the temporal reference. One desires food, just as one desires the money which will buy the food. Nevertheless, life is not so surrendered to the immediate that human volition should depend upon mere inclination and desire; there are other motives in the mind.

2. THE WORTH OF WORK

The obvious necessity of work in both physical and ethical forms has already been given due recognition, so that the discussion of worth and work need not be detained by a resumption of this idea. Still, it may be pointed out that, as the necessitarian character of activity could not prevent the extra idea of the truth of work, so it is likely that the companion idea of worth may be found to transcend the simple notion of physical and moral imperatives. Where work has been found to create truths, it should also be efficient in elaborating values, and only as it exceeds itself and bears humanistic fruit can it be anything more than a form of

physical energy. Man does more than exist in the world; he lives his own human life there; in the same way, man does more than act in the world; he performs a world-work. As a creator of human truths, which are verified by work, so is man the maker of human values, which are to be tested by his employment of them. With this introduction to the subject of human work as that which has worth, it becomes necessary to analyze human activity in order that the essence of work may be considered more clearly. When the idea of work is thus subjected to close scrutiny, it appears that worthy human action is at once, eudaemonistic, characteristic, and intelligible.

(1) *The Eudaemonistic Element in Work*

The discussion of the topic, *One's Own Life*, brought us to the point at which the idea of work had to give way to that of culture, inasmuch as activity seemed to fail at the place where it pretended to supply the individual with the means and method of being himself. In spite of the shortcomings which the factor of work has been found to contain, we need not conclude against work altogether, or deny that in activity there is something of the joy of life; nevertheless, the attempt to evince the eudaemonistic character of work must proceed critically and with caution. Certain it is that one cannot rashly idealize the industrialism of our present-day life with the high-sounding phrase, "The dignity of labor," for the brutality and dullness of our laboring class is a perpetual and convincing contention against any such mock idealism. Furthermore, it is to be questioned whether the romantic minds which have deduced and applied this subtle expression were really sincere; for one can easily suspect that it was for some sinister purpose that the idea of labor was thus plated with golden sentiment that work might continue to serve

those who were making vicious use of the laborer's activities. There may indeed be some joy attributable to human work; there is a great deal more sorrow; so that it were more sincere to indulge in a philosophical cruelty and thus say that, for weal or woe, the work of the world shall go on: this is the unexpressed and perhaps unconscious logic of capitalism.

When individualism speaks of work as something felicitic, it would be understood to mean that the activity itself, and not the exterior fruits of the work, is capable of creating a conscious joy. Upon what principles of the human will does this tenet depend? In opposition to a bald hedonism with its assumption that life is realized through pleasures which merely receive and register the kinds and degrees of sensation of which the mind is capable, eudaemonism asserts that genuine joy comes only as the mind arouses itself to activity. Passive hedonism, as this was exploited originally in the Garden of Epicurus, finds it impossible to effect any unity among the pleasurable sensations from which the mind hopes to secure permanent satisfaction, so that the attempt to have joy without action has been found to be a vain one. The doctrine of ataraxy, which claims that the highest joy consists in indifference to desire, seems to close forever the gate of the hedonic garden; hence one turns from the quiet hedonism of Epicurus to the energistic eudaemonism of Aristotle.

With the energistic ideal of joy, whence one concludes that it is energy which promotes pleasure, it becomes possible to assert that the end of happiness is reached in the proper functioning of the mind's activities; the reception of pleasant sensations is not sufficient, for one must react upon them. Enjoyment thus becomes a kind of exercise; and, since the individual has powers, it seems to follow without argument that these powers are to be employed, if one expects to find

joy in the world. Even intellectualism, with its contentions in favor of culture as the true life for man, must pay some tribute to the energistic ideal, and thus admit that it is not the mind alone, but the activity of the mind, which has the secret of joy in life. To the extent that joy may be considered the end of life, it may be asserted that such a eudaemonistic ideal must be set up in the light of man's nature as such; and, since man's nature is largely active, his mind essentially functional, it is not hard to conclude in favor of energistic eudaemonism. If man would be happy in the Garden of Epicurus, he must cultivate the garden, although not in the blind, hopeless manner indicated by Voltaire's *Candide*.

The functional ideal of happiness as an argument for life as something active, finds further approval in individualistic circles, when it is pointed out that such a conception, because it emphasizes the employment of conscious, creative faculties, is essentially interior. The ego works from within, whence follows the joy of life. Functioning, if we may continue to use such a doubtful term, suggests, not only the idea of acting from something interior and therefore precious in life, but none the less the thought of work as a means of self-expression, from which individualism may deduce its supreme, "I do." The end of life, as this idea has been brooding over all our considerations, is none other than self-existence and self-expression: without culture, one cannot be said to exist within; without work, he can find no means of realizing the purpose of his being as self-expression. It was at this point that Huysmans' *Des Esseintes* singularly failed. Indeed, one might thrust that reproach even farther back into the history of Decadence and Romanticism, and thus condemn the *Ironie* of Schlegel and the *Melancholie* of Baudelaire by pointing out that these unhappy, if not ridiculous, con-

sequences of their individualism were due to the want of the activistic ideal.

In the midst of this admission that activity is just and wise, we must keep asking whether and to what degree activity has the power and the authority to express the self-existence of the individual. We verily know that labor as now conceived and conducted does not minister to the joy of life, but it may be possible to frame a conception of work which shall escape the consequences of industrialism. Our industrial condition is such that we must say with Balzac, in *Beatrice*, "We have products nowadays; we no longer have works." Man is happy, that is in some degree, when he does that which is essentially in him to do; he is unhappy, although not irredeemably so, when he cannot discover in which direction his lines of activity should extend, or when he is prevented from pursuing the course which his tastes and abilities dictate for him. The individual, we have said, must work from within; only such interiorized activity can avail in the attainment of that happiness which is situated at the remote goal of life. But, where there is little in the way of inwardness, when the maximum of activity quickly exhausts the minimum of internal possession, the hope of achieving happiness through work, is deferred and denied.

Where work is carried on, not freely, but in connection with industrial organization, the opportunity for self-expression is reduced to a mere shadow. That which calls forth activity in the work is no internal sense of a vocation, but an external compulsion which tends to strangle happiness at the moment of its birth. Moreover, the conduct of such industrial activity, far from supplying satisfaction in the very performance of labor, has no other effect than stupefying the worker into a state of dullness in which the desire for happiness is driven down into the unconscious. The goal is like-

wise no interior sense of self-realization, but consists of that sad external thing we call pay or reward. No energistic eudaemonism, whether that of Aristotle or Goethe, can give satisfactory account of the activities of men, as these exert and exhaust themselves in the productions of such an age as our own. Even if we admit that, as a form of production, industrialism has succeeded in solving a practical problem—an admission which is far from the truth—we are still in a position where we must agree that the spiritual cost has involved a debt which the satisfactions of our modern life can never hope to repay.

Work, then, as a means of self-expression and self-realization, is in no wise identifiable with the industrial activity which yields our mechanical products. Its effect has been, and always must be, to exteriorize the worker to such a degree that he will live and act external to himself; the worker cannot be one with his own inner self, nor can he give expression to that self; he is one thing, his work another. Ye are not your own, says the Apostle; when we accept his statement as though he would say that each individual really belongs and is indebted to the spiritual world-order, we do not hide the lamentable fact that in another sense the individual belongs to an order of life, not superior and inviting, but inferior and repulsive. Each individual belongs to himself and to the spiritual order which contains the truth and worth of his inner life, so that any attempt to sever him from his own being and thus exteriorize his life is false and cruel. There is an ideal of joy in work, but it is one which industrialism has failed to realize.

(2) *The Characteristic Element in Work*

That the individual should have character seems even more obvious a proposition than the foregoing one to the effect that the individual should have joy in life;

for this reason, individualism must seek to adjust itself to the ethical as well as to the eudaemonistic. Now the laboring class seems to be as far removed from character as from enjoyment; the toiler is neither joyful nor virtuous. At this point, individualism insists that we define "character" in such an inclusive manner as to make room for what we have just called the "characteristic"; we may affirm the former without negating the latter, without allowing the ethical to absorb the individualistic. When this distinction has once been made, it will be possible to inquire whether activity is calculated to evoke and express that which is within man; first, however, we must be careful to define the characteristic within its moralic limitations.

The subjugation of the individual under the moralic ideal is not to be criticized rashly, yet we need not fear to point out that such a moralization of the human soul leaves much to be desired in the way of genuine living. In its essence, the moral law is akin to the physical principle of necessity in that it stands for that which is inevitable in human life. The function of morality is to compel action, as also to restrain natural impulses which are expected to exhaust themselves within the fixed circle of the obligatory. For this reason, we are led to doubt whether moralism is capable of sustaining the idea of work, without which the individual cannot express the meaning of his inner life; moralism leads to action, individualism to work. Between the moral act and the individualistic deed there is a difference which cannot be overcome by any extension of the moralic idea, while there is in the individualistic deed a peculiar spontaneity which cannot find expression in moral obligation. For the individual to seek self-expression in morality would be but cultivating the desert, where there would be plenty of action, but no fruitful work.

When the moralistic and humanistic are further com-

pared, it appears that the worker as moralist is forced to content himself with the exercise and elaboration of such virtues as are not calculated to bring out the best and most characteristic within him. Plato was honest enough to limit the virtue of the artisan to that of temperance, reserving courage for the warrior, wisdom for the philosopher; at the same time, Plato allotted to the man in the highest station, not merely his characteristic virtue, but the exercise of the two lower functions as well. But where the morale concerns the worker, it is not so easy to attribute to him any participation in the higher virtues; for he is expected to be himself, and realize himself, upon the basis of his proper virtue, and that alone. Platonic temperance, which was equivalent to self-mastery, was impotent to produce any such sense of self-existence and self-expression as individualism demands of the ego; in modern life, where the class-idea is by no means so formal and artistic as it was with Plato, somewhat the same may be said. The virtues which the life of labor arouses are not such as permit the expression of the self in work; for can man be himself when he is only temperate, industrious, and faithful? Selfhood is formed of more noble stuff than temperance and industry; so that the worker, if he be bent upon discovering and displaying his personality, must transcend the moralic principles inherent in his work.

The elaboration of the "characteristic" in the individual demands something more than the moralistic; it demands the humanistic; that is, the interior life of man conceived in its totality, expressed in its integrity. The trans-moralic conception of character has not failed to find expression in the more recent philosophy of life, where it concerns itself less with the special acts performed by man and more with the general source of his activity as a whole. Pre-eminent among those who have

sought character for man stands Eucken, whose *Der Kampf um einen Geistigen Lebensinhalt* reveals the modern struggle on the part of idealism in its attempt to establish, not only the independence, but also the character of spiritual life.¹ It is in this spirit that one may speak of both the essence and the character of religion, just as it is that in this manner the individual is to be understood as having an independent life and an intrinsic character. This character is not of his own making, but consists of the essential and intrinsic qualities which as man he possesses; so that the problem of work, instead of concerning itself with nothing but the traits of individual, moral character as expressed through special virtues, has to do with the characteristic of man as human. Now science and social thinking have entered into a conspiracy to silence, if not to efface, this precious element of character; so that it may be said of the worker, not merely that he lacks morality, but that he is wanting in "character"; that is, he does not display in his labor that which is in him, does not do that which is in him to do.

It is at this point that individualism takes up the question of the "dignity of labor." Individualism denies the truth and worth of the idea thus expressed, because individualism cannot believe that work, as now understood and now performed, is capable of producing the characteristic in man. The truth of work was found to consist in the creative and intelligible; and where, as is now the case, work is mechanical and blind, it cannot be said to possess either truth or worth. Where work, as conceived in theory, consists in a reaction upon nature, as in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and the like, it does not fail to suggest dignity, or truth, or worth; but the industrial method of production fails to adjust the individual worker to his task, in that it does not

¹ *Op. cit.*, 96-212.

permit him to realize what he is doing. Man may need to act, but just as surely does he need to know why he is acting, and what he is doing. It is, then, the lack of intelligence which spoils in fact that which appears so fair in theory, while it is the lack of intelligence which prevents the worker from acquiring the dignity and character which, under other circumstances, might well be his. Because of his want of comprehension, the worker fails to participate in his work; hence the opportunity for character is lost to him.

In still another sense does work lack worth; that is when it assumes the subtle form of a "working for others." The eighteenth-century ideal of benevolence and the nineteenth-century notion of utility have conspired to take work completely out of the hands of the worker, while the general spirit of altruism has further made forbidding the ideal of doing one's own work. It would sound at once strange and strident were we to assert that egoism is more worthy than altruism; and he who should dare to make such an affirmation would stand in danger of bringing down upon his head all the moralic wrath of four centuries of intense, earnest moral thinking. But, whatever may be true and right in the abstract condition of mankind, it can hardly be denied that, to-day, the more sensible, the more worthy ideal is that of living for one's self. Altruism is usually understood to mean a kind of free, self-conscious, and heart-felt act whereby the individual seeks not his own, but yields to the necessity of others. But there is another more real and more general form of altruism which has its seat in the unconscious and involuntary region of the mind, and from this inferior altruism has sprung the manifold industry of modern times. As a result of this more subtle spring of action, the vast majority of men are to-day living and working, not for themselves, but for others whom they will never know.

Individualism finds it necessary to oppose this kind of work for no other reason than that, in two distinct ways, it forces the human self to live exterior to his own being. Owing to lack of intelligence, the individual worker is forced to carry on an exteriorizing form of activity when he sets himself to the subduing of things of nature whose meaning is not known to him. Again, the individual is exteriorized and rendered alien to himself when he is compelled to work for others. Now man should work from within; to do this, he must have knowledge of the impulses which proceed from his will, and not work in a mechanical fashion with routine taking the place of spontaneity; and man should further work from within and thus produce that which has a value for his own life. Those who construct fine houses do not dwell within them; and those who till the fields do not enjoy their fruits. Individualism now insists that such an exteriorization, however necessary it may be shown to be as a matter of fact, can never be worthy, so that there is no use in striving to be optimistic about it. The recognition of the ill may freely be made, even when one can suggest no remedy; hence, individualism says, "Life is false and in vain."

In spite of this undeniable pessimism, individualism does not go to the extreme of asserting that all work is so lacking in creative intelligence and joyous character that work has no truth or worth whatsoever. Individualism realizes that, if not with the artisan, then with the artist, genuine work may be and has been done. Without the faintest suggestion of utilitarian altruism, the artist has ever done worthy work, just as he has ministered unto the interests of mankind in general. The work of the artist, which seems to be the most superior type of human action, has ever been an interiorizing one, since the artist has worked from within in the perfection of that which could be called his own

work. When art is compared with industry, it may be said that, if it be moralistically wrong for man to work in such a way that his product does not extend beyond the selfish borders of his own being, it is humanistically wrong for man to work in such a manner as forbids him to create from within and produce his own work. It is sad to think that man has no work to offer for the service of others; it is equally sad to consider that man has no work of his own. The lesson that cannot fail to impress itself upon the mind is that, under the present auspices of labor, the supreme duty of man is to have and to do a work of his own.

II. THE CHARACTER OF WORLD-WORK

Where the individual responds to the demand for a higher synthesis in the realm of activity, it remains to be seen whether the idea of activity in the exterior order is capable of the same elevation. If the individual rose above his anti-natural immoralism and set before himself the ideal of creative, characteristic work, may something similar be expected of the world in which this work is to be done? Unless this can be done, unless the world can be construed as the true place of human work, the question of life's worth can be met with nothing better than the old doubt and denial. Individualism, in its desire to come to a new understanding with the world, does not desire to indulge the blandly anthropic notion that the physical order exists for the purpose of gratifying man's desires or of occupying his private energies; at the same time, individualism is sufficiently loyal to the general principles of humanism to insist that the world must be viewed as the place, not only where things exist, but where human beings express themselves. With all its alleged naturalism, modern thought has not been willing to ignore the claims of humanity; whence the physical ideals of the Enlighten-

ment promptly led to definite political principles, while the biological conceptions of the nineteenth century were often framed with the ulterior purpose of making them the foundation of a socialized view of man's life. If the exterior seems to respond to the idea that man is a political animal or a social being, will it not be just as indulgent with the notion that man is an individualized creature who strives to place values upon things? Under what circumstances, then, may the individual perform his work in the world of things? The answer to this categorical question is, "Freedom": man can work only when he is free, creatively free. The will is not a kite which is raised and held in by a cord, but a bird self-propelled and self-directed.

I. THE FREEDOM OF WORK

Libertarianism calls upon the individual to be satisfied in the mere willing of his volitions; individualism, however, feels that the self is in a position to will the world. But how does determinism help the individualist when he attempts to advance his ideal of universal volition? Determinism, when critically entertained and expressed, does not remove volition from the individual, but seeks to include the volition within a circle of activity beyond the control of the will. According to determinism, man must will, and he must will that which is necessary; his freedom must submit to fate, liberty to law. From the libertarian point of view, this is fatal to freedom, but the individualist's conception of the will is so much vaster that the overtures of determinism seem quite inviting. If man must will, if that which he must will is the necessary, then his act of volition wills the world. Moreover, if the character of the world is such as that man can and must will it, then we know more of the exterior order and are able to press farther into its mysteries than were possible under the auspices of liber-

tarianism. It is only man to whom determinism presents a problem; the beast, which obviously is determined, can complain of no hardship. At the same time, it is only to the free will that determinism offers competition, while it is conceivable that there is a conception of activity which shall synthesize the two opposed points of view. Augustine united voluntarism and the doctrine of pre-destination; Spinoza found intellectual freedom in the midst of a complete determinism; Fichte united freedom and absolutism; Schopenhauer connected both natural force and individual freedom in the one will-to-live.

The individualistic view of creative work, whereby man wills the world, assumes responsibilities far greater than those of a libertarianism, which is content to place the individual upon an independent foundation. Individualism has an anxiety more profound than that which consists in conceiving of the individual in such a manner that he may will himself; individualism is desirous of having the self will the world also, for which reason it clings to determinism, even when such an affiliation may seem dangerous. Determinism, instead of closing up the world against the human self, opens a door through which the self may enter the world, and participate in its operations; but does that door swing both ways? Is there, perhaps, some exchange, so that as the world gains in the obedience of the individual to its laws, the individual himself is a gainer in the transaction?

Such questions, perplexing if not profound as they are, leave the idea of the world undefined, or with no definition save that of force. Yet there is more to the world than a system of forces, while the complete mind of man experiences something more than the sense of necessity which, according to determinism, is laid upon him. From the aesthetic standpoint, the world is the scene of joys; and it is by means of aesthetic partici-

pation in the world that human enjoyment comes. The senses stretch out toward the world of sense only to find satisfaction and nourishment. Then, likewise, the world is a system of truths; and, when the intellect investigates the essential forms of that which is given in experience, it is not disappointed, but comes back refreshed with the vision of knowledge and the answer to its questions. When we raise the question concerning the operations of the will, we find that, instead of willing an act for the sake of the volition therein involved, the activities of man go forth from the self in the quest for values. Now, if the world present itself to the mind as a world of joys and truths, is it not presumable that it is further able to gratify the will by supplying it with the values demanded? Nature may still possess its stark dynamic form of a world of forces, just as in the instances of the aesthetical and logical it may assume a character which does not always yield the joys and the truths which the mind seeks; but it cannot be wholly indifferent to the search for value which is characteristic of the will's activities.

To assure himself that his will has a work in the world, the individual has only to raise the question concerning the manifest purpose of his will. To the senses is the command given, "Get joy out of the world"; to the intellect, "Get truth." Now, to the will the commandment is, "Get value out of the world." For this value, not for the mere sake of willing, does man act; for this he carries on the ceaseless striving of the will; and, unless one assume the standpoint of extreme passivistic pessimism, it is fair to assume that the individual has been as successful in obtaining the values of the will as he has been in securing the peculiar satisfactions of the senses and the intellect. In some ways, the conduct of the will in getting value from the world is more convincing than the behavior of the senses and

the intellect. With the latter, the mind functions in a manner almost altogether receptive; with joy and truth, practically all that the individual can do is to prepare a place for them, and give them due recognition; but, with the will in its inherent activities, there is a definite sense in which the individual creates the values which he seeks to obtain from the world. The world contains the possibility of worths; the realization of them, however, is due to the will.

Because of the volitional character of values, the belief in worth depends almost wholly upon the strength of the will; as a result, it is not really determinism but pessimism which tends to make the will appear to be wanting in freedom. Such is the situation presented in the modern drama, standing out as it does in striking contrast to Greek tragedy. With Sophocles, man was unable to possess the world because his will was presided over by the principle of blind fate, whereby the work of an *Œdipus* was forever in vain, while the attempt to secure knowledge could only end in disaster. Like the *Prometheus* of *Æschylus*, the *Œdipus* of Sophocles was strong and daring in will, but blind fate turned knowledge and activity to catastrophe. Indeed, one can even revert to the Homeric life-ideal where intense activism and nobility of character seemed to avail nought in the blind strife of forces in the world. With the Romantic drama, however, the world is conceived as inimical to man; the fault is within man himself. Thus it is not that the world, stupendous as the idea of it may seem, is too great for man, but that his will is not strong enough for its task; such is the manifest cause of our passivistic pessimism.

Why was it that Ibsen's *Julian* failed? Was it not because he did not have the superman's strength to "will himself"? In that world-drama, Ibsen seems to mask the pessimism due to the will's weakness by an

inappropriate principle of determinism, so that, as the "freed-man under necessity," the hero must will what he has to will,² just as his downfall was attributed to the fact that "the world-will had laid an ambush for him."³ Yet the cause which lay deeper and nearer the heart of the matter appears in Julian's inability to understand the meaning of the Third Empire which he sought to will into existence. Informed by his master that "the world-will had resigned its power into his hands,"⁴ Julian confesses his weakness, complains of nostalgia, while it is only in a feeble, feverish voice that he shouts, "The Third Empire is at hand."⁵ With Julian, to will was to will, not merely to have to will; and, in his inability intelligently and intensely to pursue his volitions, he is called upon to suffer defeat.

Wagner's Wotan, like Julian impressed with the possibility of a futuristic social state peopled with self-willing, fearless heroes, furnishes even a better example of the pessimism which springs from the inner feeling of weakness rather than the idea of external necessity; for, in the case of Wotan, the god, who was pictured as possessing inherent power over all law, the only impediment to the expression of will lay within the soul itself. In *Rheingold*, the god cannot solve his economic problems, nor can he command sufficient power of will to realize his desires, whence he encounters his first defeat. In *Walküre*, where his power dwindles to naught, the complexities of the ethical arrangement so puzzle his mind, and the needs of the new moral situation so exhaust his will, that he is forced to confess his god's plight as one in which he is "the least free of all."⁶ Here, there is no classical suggestion of a nameless law over-ruling the volitions of mankind; rather is it pointed out that when, as in the character

² *Op. cit.*, Act III, Sc. III.

³ *Ib.*, Pt. II, Act V, Sc. IV.

⁴ *Ib.*, Act V, Sc. I.

⁵ *Ib.*, Sc. II.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Act II, Sc. II.

of Wotan, man comes to the highest pitch of human development, he suffers from the feebleness of his own will. To redeem the situation, it is not said that there must be less fate; on the contrary, it is declared that the work of man in the world is to be carried on by one who is freer than the free, *der freier als der Gott*.⁷

The weakness and blindness of the will are to be overcome ethically by summoning strong motives and elaborating worthy goals; in the endeavor to will the world, the individual can be aided by a view of the inherent possibilities of the will. Like the intellect, the will has the power to gain possession of the world; for, as there is a connection between thinking and being, there is none the less a bond between willing and being. The will to reality is the means by which the individual comes into possession of his world; this appears in connection with the idea of time. The world, instead of being a fixed system made up of a solid reality, is made up of an ever changing manifold, so that, on the surface of it at least, the world is a perpetual flux. As the perceiving, conceiving intellect insinuates itself among these many changing things, so the will finds it possible to penetrate into the changing order, there to work out its own ends. Without the work of the will, the fleeting impulse will rule man when it is possible for man to rule it; but when the will is applied to the changing object, the latter becomes fixed, a permanent value organized if not created by the will. The action of the will is both introvertive and extrovertive; by means of attention, the object becomes fixed as idea, while the exteriorizing work of the will has the effect of bringing the object under the sway of the individual with his volition.

The will to realize, whereby values are created in the world, finds its expression in the work of man in the

⁷ *Ib.*, Act III, Sc. III.

world, as this appears in his art and religion. In vain have the phenomena of the world sought to sweep by man unnoticed, unaffected; man has seized them to raise them above the flux and render them eternal and spiritual. The elusive qualities of beauty and sanctity have been subordinated to the power of the human will. If the essence of things has not been changed by the work of the will, their character has been transformed in such a substantial manner as to substitute for the sensuous the spiritual, for the changing the permanent, whence the individual has been able to come into possession of his world. By means of such a dialectic of will, it becomes possible to escape from decadence with its noble despair; for the will has some other than an individual object. Man will will more than himself. It is the fate of the will to issue forth from the privacy of personal life to take up and effect a genuine work in the world.

Where activity is conceived of, neither as mere action nor as sheer inaction, but as creative work, the essential ground of that work is not far to seek. The intellectual view of the world, which construed knowledge as a concrete, active life, its object as a world of phenomena and causes, found it possible to afford the ego a real participation in the world-whole. If the will is equally intelligible in its operations, it should reveal the fact that, as there is a genuine ground for action, so by action the self may come into possession of the world. In the first instance, where the object of knowledge was the question at hand, individualism found it both possible and expedient to effect a temporary departure from the Parmenidean principle of permanence, in order that the intellect might have the benefit of change, as this was promised by the Heraclitean dialectic. How, now, will the case stand, when it is no longer the intellect seeking knowledge, but the will anxious for world-work

which engages our attention? We have no desire to indulge in paradox; but as the usual promises of Parmenides, as understood by Plato, were found unsatisfactory to human knowledge, so the activist assurances of the Heraclitean philosophic will be found to disappoint the self in its desire to take hold of the world.

The apparent value of the Heraclitean, as compared with the Parmenidean, consists in this: the will is an active restless function of the human mind; hence it cannot accept the Parmenidean idea of a fixed and finished world, since such a conception would forbid the notion of work. On the other hand, the Heraclitean world, with its underlying activism and its ceaseless changes, would seem to be the very place for the individual to thrust his will into the world. But Heraclitus, who was not himself convinced of the impossibility of knowing the flowing world, seems to have had the feeling that that world was no place for action, for in the stream of reality one could hope to bathe but once.⁸ When one complains that the world of Parmenides is too fixed and perfect, the world of Heraclitus was too fluid and eternally imperfect for the world-work of the human will.

To turn to Parmenides, and expect his substantialism to supply the will with a principle of action, seems at once impossible and in vain, although much will depend upon the manner in which the *estin einai* is interpreted. If the being which is, has about it a solid nature, then the will cannot hope to effect changes in its character; if it be so perfect that the intellect cannot suggest changes, the volitional effort is hopeless. But suppose that the substantiality, which with Parmenides had no very definite determination, stand for little more than consistency of being; will not the powers of volition approach it with confidence, in the knowledge that work

⁸ *Fragments*, O.

can be done in such a medium as this, ruled as it is by a principle? The ever-yielding content of the flux forbade action, but the moulding of that which is formed according to reason need imply no such impossibilities. Furthermore, the perfection of the Parmenidean substance was a formal one only, so that something by way of work may be accomplished with the undetermined content.

The despair which the individualist felt when he was confronted by the system of substantialism was due, in part, to his failure to appreciate the depth of the causal principle. To the activist, the free causality of *causa transiens* seems to offer promises unknown in the kingdom of *causa immanens*, so that thinkers of the Parmenidean and Spinozistic type usually relapse into determinism. Again, we must revert to the case of Heraclitus, and thus reassure ourselves that a world of flux has in it nothing for the will, for the freedom of the world forbids the freedom of the will. Transient causality, as this expresses itself in a Heraclitean world, fails to explain that which actually occurs when one thing exerts an influence over another. All that the theory of transient causality can do is to prepare the way for a more consistent conception of the interaction among the things which make up the world. When, then, every supposed case of transient action is really an example of immanent action, the way for work in general is prepared. Now, all that the human will can ask is a share in the august work which the world seems to be carrying on; for the will to possess an extra power of action would hardly be in keeping with the ways of the world-whole, for freedom seems to consist of a putting of the will into the world, rather than an opposition of the will to the world.

The substantial world, whose qualitative and causal nature forbids that it should be rigid in its rational

behavior, seems then to promise the will that, when work is attempted, it shall be done; for one may enter the world once, twice, thrice, and so on indefinitely and find it displaying the same principle of being and action. Under such auspices, world-work may be taken up and done by the human will; were the world a mere flux, there would be activity, but no work, for work consists, not merely in movement, but in the realization of results. Where the will proceeds in a temporalistic manner, it stands in need of the opportunity to eternalize the object of its effort; this eternalizing may assume the rigoristic form of the Categorical Imperative, which we here cite for metaphysical rather than for moralistic purposes, or it may express itself in the more liberal forms in which human volition has learned to idealize its impulses.

With a fleeting world, there would be no opportunity for the will to create its characteristic values, without which the work of the will were in vain. Now the achievement of the worth of life, which was impossible with the subjective form of individualism, and which expressed itself in *Ironie* and an empty Will-to-selfhood, becomes possible when the will finds it possible to affirm the reality of the objective order. In a world of flux, where reality would slip through the fingers, no creation of values would be possible; for a world which has nothing fixed about it is incapable of providing the will the opportunity to fixate the values which appear to the individual as desirable. Were one, in the spirit of dialectical disinterestedness, to compare the degree of activism which has entered respectively into idealistic and realistic systems, one would find oneself confronted by the paradox that, while idealism seems to promise nothing in the way of work, except perhaps a fine Aristotelian "energy of contemplation," it has been under the auspices of idealism that the work of worth

has been accomplished. On the other hand, a survey of the world of realism, with its apparent possibility of subduing the soft, mobile elements of human experience, presents no such picture of moral endeavor. Perhaps the idealist has never been able to explain how he would reconcile his principle of activity with his belief in the fixed, finished character of his world, or the realist offer sufficient apology for his slothfulness in a world as promising as that of empirical thought. But, according to the foregoing reasoning, it is the firm, consistent character of the ideal world which assures the worker of the realization of his values, while it is the fluid, fleeting world which warns the realist not to attempt anything essential in the way of work.

Whether this particular line of reasoning be convincing or not, the fact remains that, in the history of ethics, the great moral systems have sprung from the idealistic views of the world in which the absolutistic would seem to forbid the activistic. But this latter has not been the case; one might even say that the more the understanding is convinced of the permanence of the forms of the world, the more intense has been the vigor with which the life-ideal has been made an object of volition. With no thinker before Socrates, whether he was static or dynamic in his style of thinking, do we find the ethical impulse; but, with the coming of intellectualistic substantialism, as in the case of Plato, the intellectual persuasion of the permanence of the world is accompanied by the active pursuit of the good as an object of striving. With Plato, the Idea assumed a dual form: here it was a universal whose reality was assured to the intellect; there it was a goal, or ideal, which made its due impression upon the will. The same may be said of Kant: convinced of the *a priori* certainty of causality as one of the fixed forms of the understanding, who was more insistent than he upon the abject volition of duty?

Kant finds it possible to divide the complete object of the whole reason when he relegates causality to the phenomenal world, freedom to the noumenal order; but even here he evinces most emphatically the possibility of volition in the midst of absolutism, since it is indeed the noumenal which is to be willed.

With an avowedly static system, like that of Spinoza, the belief in absolutism, far from prohibiting action, seems to be the very basis upon which that action is grounded. As Geulincx had premised a *nihil-valeo-nihil volo* as the basis of the speculative part of his ethics, only to lay down upon that basis an activist conception of the actual life of man, so Spinoza finds it possible to introduce action into the sphere of substantialism, while his ideal of acquiescence comes as the conclusion, not as the premise, of his ethical philosophy. On the other hand, a voluntaristic system, like Schopenhauer's, may ascribe to the will the endless possibility of willing, and yet, as was the case with Schopenhauer, may conclude that the application of perfect activity will be wholly in vain. It is from the idealist, who might be thought to have nothing for action in his system, that constructive ethical thinking has ever been forthcoming; realism, which might easily assume that, if there are to be ideals, they must be created by man himself, has been strangely impotent to produce moral motives or to fix moral standards. The fixed world may make the creation of ideals seem difficult, but the fluid world makes this impossible.

2. THE VALUE OF WORK

If the individual as worker looks to nature to give the *terminus a quo* of work, he cannot help expecting the humanistic order to supply its *terminus ad quem*. Where the human will is surveyed in the light of libertarian freedom, all that it asks of nature is the oppor-

tunity for movement, all that it demands of humanity is the privilege of action; but mere movement and sheer action are principles far removed from the explanation of what humanity has actually effected in the world, whence the individualist resorts to the superior ideals of work as that which is constructively free and practically creative. The kind of individual which this conception of freedom has in mind is not so much man in general with his indefinite moral ambitions to do this or that, but man as worker with his desire to create something in his own image. To this notion, nature, herself creative, is not really inimical; what shall be thought of the social order? Does the social order with its works make room for the creative individualist who desires both to do and to know what he is doing?

The individual as worker is in a position directly the contrary of the individual as thinker; where the man of culture seeks to return to the world of things and persons, the man of conquest endeavors to extricate himself from these. Where the intellectualist desires to cast a shadow, the individual as worker longs to kindle a flame. The man of culture is not wanting in energy, but his is the energy of contemplation; the man of action has light, but the light that is in him may be darkness. Thus, it is seen that, if the man of culture is, as it were, hopelessly removed from the world of men, the man of action is as hopelessly submerged in the same human mass; half-brothers as they are, the worker is the child of bond-woman, the thinker, the child of the free. The individual perfects his interior culture, but finds himself strangely removed from the living issues of mankind; the active man performs his work, only to find himself entangled in the machinery of industrial life; for this reason, the problem of life, which consists in relating the ego to humanity and humanity to the ego, now has to do with the adjustment of the

social order to the submerged individual who is so placed that he cannot live his own life, do his own work. In contrast with this problem of individualizing industrialism, the older problem of socializing the individual sinks into comparative indifference.

The conditions of humanity are such that the problem of being one's self is easily paramount. Science has seized the intellect and now dictates the special soul-states to which the ego shall give credence; society has laid hold of the will, and commands the individual to express only such impulses as have a utilitarian significance. But, with the return of individualism and the retreat of the scientific and the social, there appears a hope that man may be himself and do his work. How shall one pass from industry to individuality? It is quite evident that individuality is not to come by means of any negation of work; one may seek superiority but he cannot disclaim allegiance to action; he may not be "superfluous" lest he be fatally idle; he cannot safely or wisely release his soul by means of crime; he must seek his salvation in the very midst of his work. Yet, in all this, it must not be forgotten that it is the primary need and duty of the laboring man to extricate himself from the industrial life which now claims him.

In the study of work, the lesson of Faust is one which we need not to learn, as it was also a principle omitted in the egoistic education of Goethe, its author. The individual whose salvation from care is so earnestly sought by his author and himself was first allowed to enjoy the benefits of the contemplative life, so that his unwonted occupation in the swamp may be looked upon as a sort of vacation-activity whose contrast to the intro-activity of attention to ideas could only come as a relief. Suppose, now, we reverse the operation, and, instead of starting with the gifted personality who, having stolen the fire from heaven, seeks to complete his human career

in the poorest operation of earth; will the conclusion be the same? Faust, it must be remembered, bent over his task in all the superiority of the man who knows what he is seeking and why he is working; in this he has the advantage over the man who begins with work, whose beginning is the deed, but who has no clear idea concerning the meaning of the life in which he is working. As a result, we find our laboring man in a situation exactly the opposite of Faust's. Our laboring man fails to find the all-vaunted joy in work because he does not know what it is all about. Faust was not forced to his task by the need of bread; while the real Faust of our economic era works, not for the work's sake, still less for the happiness which work is supposed to yield, but for the solid purpose of existing. Thus it may be that not the deed but the thought is to become the means of his salvation.

In considering the life-problem which the times thrust upon us, we should observe how likely it may be for the worker to desire some of the thought-life which the intellectual like Goethe has so rashly cast aside. He who works in swamp and factory, not convinced that the activity of the will contains the key to his salvation, may be found longing to seize the fire which Æschylus and Goethe fear to point out to the intellect. Are we not learning from Socialism that man may be seeking a place in the sun? Those who advise the life of impersonal, unthinking activity, like Goethe's Faust and Balzac's *Country Doctor*, betray the imperfection of their argument when they preface their account of holy, helpful activity by a recital of some metaphysical or moral wrong from which the intellectualist has been suffering; Faust had not handled the mind aright; Benassis had been equally at fault in dealing with the moral will. Hence, their retreat to degraded communities and their consolation in eleemosynary work does not present the

normal life-situation, where sincere individualism in both thought and action is asked to decide between the respective merits and satisfactions of private and public existence.

To the advanced Russian consciousness of a Gorky, we may turn to receive advices concerning the spiritual condition of the worker. Gorky's "children of the sun" are strangely innocent of the joys and glories of activity as the more refined Goethe endeavored to indicate. A picture of the laboring class in repose and reflection is afforded by his *The Night Refuge*, while a more complete philosophy, as also a more normal presentation of the life-situation, may be found in his *Foma Gordyéeff*. Gorky was not without knowledge of the Faust-idea, for the polished literature of Turgénieff had acted to exalt the activism which Goethe attempted to teach his contemporaries. Turgénieff, the first literary nihilist, and one who had felt the necessity of settling accounts with the "black earth force," was ready to condemn as "superfluous men" the Hamlets of contemplation.⁹ Now it is the submerged Hamletism in Gorky's people which makes them worthy of a hearing. Why do men really live? That is Gorky's cardinal question. Those who propound it have toiled with all intensity; they believe instinctively that there is truth in work, assert that "man was born to give birth to strength," but suffer from the fear that work will throw dust in the eyes of those who would see what they are doing.

The situation to-day seems to be one in which work is not work; work as carried on is an occupation, an obvious means of living, while as work par excellence it is nothing. Industry and culture stand before man to whom they stretch out their hands: man accepts the offering of industry because it seems more direct, more

⁹ *Virgin Soil*, tr. Hapgood, 109.

nearly obvious; the gifts of culture glitter in vain. In Gorky's *Foma Gordyéeff*, the hero's god-father says to Foma, "If a fool offers you honey, spit it out; if a wise man offers you poison, drink it."¹⁰ The worker of the present has not hesitated to take the honey of industry; the apparent poison of culture he has refused. Like Goethe, Gorky believes that man has a work in the world, although he is by no means ready to accept the idea of the immediately useful task as though that were a human work. In his cynicism, Gorky agrees with Turgénieff in condemning detached men without duties; "You can find a justification for everything on earth. But men, like cockroaches, are altogether superfluous on earth. Everything is for them, and what are they for?"¹¹ The supreme task allotted to man, far from being a romantic flight from or a decadent denial of life, consists in "reducing life to order," in "organizing life," in "arranging life." Then, the individual may find his place; and, when he feels his own value, life has no authority over him. This truth is expressed by individualism when it insists that, for the realization of life as that which has self-existence and self-expression, there must be a higher synthesis than the scientific and the social have been able to offer. The man shall have both a place and a work.

The failure to find one's place in life, a misfortune which has often been the cause of suicide in the gifted youth, represents one side of the situation, while it drives us back to the fundamental consideration concerning the meaning of human existence and the destiny of man. Where one believes in the greatness of man, he is dismayed at discovering how incapacitated to enter the world of persons is the man who has, for a time, given himself up to intellectual perfection. The humanism which inspires the soul to realize itself in accord-

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hapgood, 126.

¹¹ *Ib.*, 268.

ance with the best that is within him, is often at variance with the humanism that concerns itself with the living interests of mankind. To make oneself talented and intelligent is to make oneself useless; to make oneself useful is to deny the soul its right to inner perfection. The rich and poor in spirit alike are threatened with starvation; the man of genius who fails to find a "market for his wares" is one with the unskilled laborer who waits idle in the market-place. This situation is evidently due to the fact that the world of men is organized upon the basis of mediocrity, so that those who stand at the extremes feel the cold of opposed poles. Both are confronted with isolation, whence they are thrown inward upon themselves to feed upon their own hearts, while wisdom and ignorance place them upon the same footing.

This superior problem of labor involves considerations peculiar to both man and his social environment. For the ego who is isolated from the social order, the problem consists in adapting inner life to exterior existence; in the case of the submerged self, the question involves the relation of the outer world to interior life. At present, both must be viewed together. For the more complete analysis of the social situation of the man of genius and the genre character, it is necessary to indicate the manner in which intellect and will branch out from the original sensitivity of the soul. Our present-day psychology has enabled us to see how akin are these two leading phases of our mental life, where the older psychology was content to point out the differences between them. We will not complicate the question by asking which is superior, the will or the intellect, but will seek to discover the particular effect which the employment of each has upon the spiritual condition of mankind. Those who rejoice in ideas, long for the expression of the self as this seems to come from the

will; those who are given up to activity become envious of the individual who has the power to draw away from the world, its cares and tasks, and enjoy the inward picture of life which his imagination has framed for him. Both alike suffer from nostalgia, for where the intellectual man finds misery in his alienation from the world, the man of work is plagued by the feeling that he is separated from himself. Intellect makes all subjective; the will turns all to objectivity.

The more particular curse of intellectualism appears when the ego discovers that his is a world of illusion, while the peril of the will lies in the latter's power to absorb inner existence and render the ego impersonal and automatic. Intellect deludes, where the will stupefies; in both instances, man misses the point in life. One type of life provides the self with mere form where the other yields nought but content. As a result of this, we find an intellectualistic age, like that of the Enlightenment, counseling the individual to act, although it cannot be said that an activistic period is always possessed of the wisdom which advises the ego to think. The present age is an example of the stupefying effect of labor; and where man has exaggerated the value of the "efficient life," instead of seeking relief in culture, he continues to praise the principle that has caused him his discontent. Thus it would appear as though intellectualism, with all of its possible excesses, is the wiser life-ideal, for the reason that, when it has come to the point of excess, it does not fail to indicate the predicament, does not shrink from providing the proper means of deliverance.

Wisdom has ever warned the world against the exaggerations of intellectual activity, so that man is always on guard against his ideals; but the same world-wisdom has not indulged sufficient intellectual justice to warn man against the encroachments of work. Moreover, the

intellectualist is in a mental condition of sensitivity whereby he learns that he suffers, while the activist is only dimly conscious of the ills which beset his poor soul. Where mankind in the mass suffers from a surplus of willing, it has not the power to discover the source of the affliction. For practical purposes, the world of men has always praised work, because work seemed to be essential, while thought was regarded as a luxury. As a result, one hesitates to advance an idea, even when it may lead to a more perfect comprehension of the meaning of life, lest one be told that one's idea is not "practical." At the same time, the activistic prophet has been led to believe that, not only is the will serviceable in a social manner, but the exercise of it is beneficial to the subject of willing. Those who know their Schopenhauer have long since learned that the effect of willing is far from having about it the benefits the voluntaristic advocate is so ready to ascribe. They have learned also how to trace the connection between voluntarism and pessimism, so that the advice, "Cultivate the garden," is not accepted with credulity. The furious cultivation of the garden in America is the source of our national discontent. We have forgotten Emerson in our enthusiasm for Edison, and are now suffering from a disconcerted life-feeling.

To what degree the individual may safely surrender himself to his work depends upon the ability to absorb his volitions, and this in turn involves the mysterious psychology of the will. Is the will friendly to the subject of willing, or does it instill into our veins the poison of fatigue? Is it not from this fatigue of volition that our present-day ego suffers, and is it not with national voluntarism that we are now afflicted? The ability of a nation to endure and revive from the effects of war, as in the fine instance of the French in the last generation, is greater than its power to endure the conflicts

and sufferings of such an industrialism as that with which they are now burdening us. Both prosperity and poverty, finance and labor, present problems of volition which have grown beyond our power to solve. The age throws dust in the eyes, so that, in seeking the realization of life, we lose the consciousness of the life-purpose. Those who are the most energetic are those who have the least sufficient notion of what their energy is supposed to effect, while the plan of existence and the motive for striving are driven back into the unconscious by the stronger motives of action. As a result, we are forced to ask the question, "How long can man endure and act without a clear life-ideal?"

The psychology of this distressing situation involves that community of will and intellect upon which we have based the question activity and culture. Will and intellect, instead of belonging to separate phases of our soul-life, are expressions of one and the same process of mentality; the cognitive consciousness, which has dwindled to the minimum of life-intelligence, is only the other side of the volitional consciousness, which has so thoroughly exaggerated its importance in the life of humanity: consciousness and conduct are thus twin children of the one soul-life. That which arouses the will is an idea which acts as motive, while the conduct of the intellect is made possible by the same will introverted and acting in the character of attention. When the power of the will is almost completely taken up with action, the ability to attend to ideas as such is so crippled that we must act without thinking, must strive onward without conceiving or calculating the goal. Where genuine action is fitted to express ideas in volitions, and where sound thinking is benefited by the exercise of volitions, we have been so blind as to allow the volitional side of our life to submerge the ideational character of intelligent work. In America, we have thus built up a

vast commercial civilization without a thought of its expediency or benefit. We have sought to settle without our host, and are now in a condition of national distrust and discontent.

III. THE PRACTICAL SYNTHESIS

The foregoing analysis of the individual and the world has resulted in showing that the human self is more than a private, punctual ego, just as the world appears to be something more liberal than a Heraclitean system of aimless movements. Where the self and the natural order seem now to be on better terms than was formerly the case, a similar spirit of mutual understanding makes its presence felt in the social order; here, the individual as such is led to believe that his strivings mean something more than merely industrial activity, so that the self may take its place in the social order as worker indeed. But the renewed analysis of both the world and the self has had no more effect than to indicate that the reunion of the self with the world is a possibility; how is this possibility to clothe itself in actuality? Already, we have been gratified in observing how the aesthetical consciousness makes possible an aesthetic synthesis of the self with both nature and humanity; now we must express the hope that the ethical consciousness of humanity will have a similar effect, whence the practical synthesis of the self and the world will be effected.

I. THE HEDONIC SYNTHESIS

It must ever be borne in mind that modern thought, with its separation of thought and thing, of individual and society, has constantly tended to obscure the real issue of human life. Coming up out of the serious thinking of the seventeenth century, the eighteenth-century moralist sought the complete naturalization of

man. Where nature worked upon animal instinct in such an imperious manner as to force upon the beast the congregative tendency, reason seemed to be working in a punctual manner to segregate individuals to a condition of solitariness. How the earnest moralist of that period strove to emulate the naturalistic ideal, as when Shaftesbury appealed to the herding system in nature, while Adam Smith sought to apply the synthetic principle of sympathy to the sons of men. Far different was the attitude of the individualistic immoralist of the nineteenth century: realizing that nature has, not too slender, but too strong a hold upon man, the immoralist repudiated the herding-principle, and sought to place the individual upon his own feet. The anti-naturalism of the later thinker thus stands out in glaring contrast to the pro-naturalism of the earlier one.

(1) *Naturalism and Nihilism*

Which was right, the moralist who aimed to establish a natural synthesis among men, or the immoralist who sought to neutralize the idea that nature subordinates man to the type, the specimen to the species? Was Hobbes just in his attempt to pass from the ego to the body politic, or did Stirner express the truth in the matter when he struggled to go from the State to the ego? The practical synthesis, as this is now being taken up, contends that, if the individual is to be relegated to an order, it must be the individual indeed who is so relegated. Let nature exercise her subtle power and thus assemble specimens under the head of the species, and it does not follow that the natural synthesis will apply in the case of such a self-propelled, value-creating creature as man. The moralist was right in insisting that there must be some kind of synthesis; the immoralist was no less just in asserting that, whatever may be done to man, he must be viewed as though he were none other

than man. Now arises the question, if man is surveyed individualistically as one whose life has intrinsic worth, what kind of arrangement will adapt itself to the synthesis of individuals under some general head, as the State, or Society?

The conflict between the self and the world is the conflict of naturalism and nihilism. Where naturalism supplies a kind of social synthesis, which may appear plausible when viewed from without, nihilism rejects such a synthesis and with it all arrangements of individuals under a general head. True individualism is neither naturalistic nor nihilistic; it agrees with naturalism as to the general idea of organization, while it sympathizes with nihilism when the latter insists that the peculiar value of the individual must never be ignored. When naturalism sought to assemble men under the inclusive head of "society," naturalism appealed to certain human interests, as these seemed to promise the idea of community; when nihilism revolted against the circle which had been drawn about living individuals, it made its appeal to a very different sense within the individual. "Be social, and you will be happy"; such was the promise of scientism. "Be egoistic, and you will be free"; such was the plea of nihilism.

It is easy to be social, since nature arranges human beings according to instinct; it is difficult to be human, for the quality of humanity is elaborated only as the valuating will affirms the character of mankind. Men are easily caught in the net of nature when they betray their fondness for happiness and their interest in the immediate welfare of existence, whence a hedonic and hygienic social arrangement is swiftly consummated. But to arrange human life according to the category of value and to have a synthesis which conserves the character of humanity is a matter of more moment, of greater difficulty; yet, it is the valuational synthesis

which the individualist sets before his eyes as the desired consummation. The sharp difference of issues involved appears at once when one asks oneself the following question: Are we to expect that human organization comes about by means of continuity with nature, or by virtue of a creative arrangement peculiar to the conscious working of the human will? Shall humanity suffer itself to be formed like a hive of bees, or shall it be created like a free republic of men? The social conception of life places its affair in the hands of an organizing nature; humanistic thinking prefers to take the matter into its own hands for the purpose of making the State what the State ought to be.

That which the continuity of naturalism holds out is the promise of happiness, whence sociality becomes so much hedonism. Is it possible for men to unite under the banner of common happiness? Naturalism has made this assumption in behalf of man whom naturalism has looked upon as a creature who seeks immediate satisfaction in the sensuous order. With the idea of pleasure at any price and with the optimistic assumption that life organizes its forces for the very purpose of promoting pleasure, the socializing hedonist proceeds with his hasty generalization. To have abandoned all idea of continuity and to have proceeded from the assumption that human life as such begins just as soon as man wills to live his human life, would have placed the social thinker in a pessimistic predicament from which his optimistic logic had provided no means of escape. In place of optimistic continuity, individualism sets up the ideal of pessimistic creativeness; according to the pessimistic point of view, it is so hard to be human and to be human is such a fine art that, far from trusting to the rough efforts of the natural order, individualized human beings must take the affair into their own hands and evince humanity as an ethical product. Such a

view is pessimistic, not in any popular sense of sad-thinking as opposed to glad-thinking, but because it insists that, with all the passage of time in the natural order and with all the efforts of mankind in the world, humanity has not yet made its appearance upon the globe, nor can humanity come into being until humanity makes use of the emancipated individual and thus wills itself. If humanity were a hedonic arrangement framed for the greatest amount of happiness or the most perfect social health, the problem of life would not be so confusing or contradictory; but, since humanity seems to be an arrangement of values instead of a summation of pleasures, the superficial methods of social thinking do not avail when one seeks a genuine form of human synthesis.

In trusting to nature to arrange for the synthesis of men under the form of humanity, ethics has assumed that such a synthesis can be brought about upon the basis of raw human nature. Again it is the contrast between the mere humanitarianism of nature and the humanism of culture. It is indeed pleasant for brethren to dwell together in unity, but by what means is such a synthetic unity of souls to be brought about? According to the principles of naturalism, this unity is to come about by the exercise and expression of one's outward nature after the manner of what is called altruism; according to another point of view, the desired unity can be consummated only as one cultivates that inner nature whose source is human nature as such. This anti-social yet humanistic view proceeds upon the assumption that humanity is superiority to society, and this "humanity" it considers, not as a substantial form of expression, as though humanity were but a conceptual shell or holder for the individual, but in an adjectival manner as a quality of life. In the light of this distinction, the most social of individuals, say the uncult-

tured philanthropist, might be all but wanting in humanity, while the most human of individuals, say Emerson or Ibsen, might be equally lacking in sociality. It is the question whether humanity is an extensive or an intensive notion, whether it has to do with things which are included under a general head or attributes which are applied to a particular subject. To be human, one must be human; that is, to be human socially, one must first be human individually. Now the prevalent method of grouping men has always been based upon the exterior and extensive method where quantity of life was the leading idea.

The attempt to establish a social synthesis of selfish beings by emphasizing immediate interests and exterior considerations has produced a dilemma in contemporary ethics, whence the moralist cannot determine whether nature divides or unites the sons of men. In the animal order, which has served the moralist as model for morality, there is neither a sense of selfhood nor an idea of sociality, even where animal life is individuated here and synthesized in the species there; for this reason, the affairs of animal existence may well be left in the hands of nature. In man, however, natural individuation becomes an individualistic "I am," while the exterior social synthesis according to the principles of species becomes conscious sociality. To what extent can the principles of naturalism serve to define these two contrary ideas? In what manner can nature bring them to a mutual understanding? Viewed from one angle, man is thoroughly selfish; looked at from another point of view, man is equally social. In the ethical system of Adam Smith, wherein was made the first attempt to place morality upon a social basis, one cannot help perceiving the dualism between the fact of egoism in the idea of acquisitiveness, as this appears in *The Wealth of Nations*, and the equally plausible prin-

ciple of sociability, as this is found in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. The result of such social ethics is merely the rough union of raw human nature. In the dilemma of Darwinism, the same contradiction appears. *The Origin of Species* so emphasizes the struggle for existence that man must appear absolutely selfish, while *The Descent of Man*, ignoring the selfish principle already laid down in general, attempts to postulate a theory of conscience based upon the social nature of mankind. Which is right, the view of man seeking his own welfare and struggling for his own existence or the view of man exercising the sympathetic and conscientious?

When a humanistic philosophy of life takes up the problem at the point where naturalism abandons it, such humanism is forced to the conclusion that naturalism has failed to analyze the factors with which it has been dealing. In the first place, humanism cannot accept as a description of man the idea of an animal ego struggling for his own existence and seeking his own welfare; then, humanism is equally averse to approving of that attempted social synthesis which is expressed under the superficial form of "sociability." The particular animal in the herd may be described as so much struggling for existence here, so much gregariousness there; but the individual in the social order has taken his place in a manner which naturalistic thinking does not attempt to explain. That which naturalism attempts to do is to unite the specimen with the species; the aim of humanism is to reconcile the self-conscious, self-willed individual with humanity.

(2) *Sociality and Humanity*

Where naturalism fails to analyze the elements of its problem in such a manner as to evince the essential nature of the self and society, it is equally lacking in

ability to provide for a synthetic bond between them. Human beings have been expected to meet upon the lower plane of immediate welfare, as animals huddle to keep warm, as savages unite for mutual protection. When the individual had his place in the State, when his being was included in the Church, the resort to such biological expedients for explaining the social synthesis was unnecessary; but, when modern thought dispensed with the ideas of State and Church, it was felt that something must be done to offset the implicit anarchism which resulted from the liberation of the individual. Since the inception of modern thought, the attempt to provide for a practical synthesis among men has assumed various forms which stand out in peculiar contrast to the strong idealism of the ancient State and the mediaeval Church; chief among these naturalistico-human expedients are the juristic and hedonistic, the utilitarian and social. In each one of them, the animating impulse was to provide for the union of men upon the basis of the immediate rather than that of the remote. To subsume individuals under the general head of the State or Church was an effort which called upon the individual to look upwards beyond himself to a higher principle of synthesis, whence the desire to find a more human and more practical basis of union. Now, does not the naturalistico-social conception of life expect the individual to consider something below his humanity when he attempts to account for and further the idea of unity with his fellow men?

In its attempt to bring the principle of human unity down to the level of man as man, modern humanism has builded better than it knew, so that man has now become all-too-human. Where once a supra-humanistic conception of life caused the individual to sever his connection with the remote, as this appeared in the idealistic and the past history of humanity, it now ap-

pears that the actual conception of life has become infra-humanistic in that man considers the ground of his life as that which is beneath rather than in that which is above him. The ancients expected man to look upward for the goal of his life; moderns believe that one should look downward and consider the source of one's existence. As a result, what is now called "humanism," instead of being an attempt to lower the tone of a life which had become too sharp, has become an endeavor to raise the tone of a life which naturalism has made too flat. One humanism was the struggle for humanity in opposition to an excessive superiority; the other humanism has become a striving after a humanity which suffers from that extra-inferiority which appears so habitually in the naturalistic view of things. In the practice of the second humanism, the individualist of the nineteenth century was merely a thinker who wished to make life appear genuinely human rather than merely natural. The first humanism sought to make man's life less remote, less artificial; the second humanism is now striving to make that life appear less immediate, less naturalistic.

When man as man took the affairs of life into his own hands, he began by asserting the rights of mankind in opposition to the traditions which hitherto had guided him. Man seemed sufficient unto himself; by means of reason, man felt able to describe his own existence; through the principle of rights, he felt sufficient unto the demands which life made upon him. The philosophy of rights, as this obtained in the Enlightenment, was little more than the expression of man's desire to define his own being and to dictate his own activities. Such a juristic philosophy, whose ground appeared to be at once anarchistic and atheistic, was brought forth with the optimistic belief that the philosophy of rights was able to contain the spiritual values which had pre-

viously been expressed in the form of prince and priest without the usual impedimenta of State and Church. Then arose the question whether the principle of natural rights had the synthetic power to unite man with man in a purely human society. Where Grotius had proceeded upon the optimistic assumption that the juristic principle was socially synthetic, Hobbes sought to show that the instinct of rights was disintegrating and polemical; whence Puffendorf made his attempt to reconcile the opposition between the social optimism of the one and the egoistic pessimism of the other. The place where humanism takes hold of this historic problem is neither on the altruistic nor the egoistic side, but at the very basis of the problem itself, whence humanism raises the question whether the principles of naturalism, as represented by both Grotius and Hobbes, are sufficient according to any interpretation of them to bring about the union of man with man.

The juristic synthesis of earlier modern thought had its counterpart in the hedonism of the eighteenth century. Where the general principle of life was one of rights for the individual, the particular expression of this juristic sense was found in the sense of pleasure; both private rights and private pleasures have due place in the system of Hobbes. Now that man was to be considered as man, there arose the question whether it is in human nature to make man self-seeking or of social tendency. From one point of view, human nature seemed to make for segregation; from another, the congregative tendency was observed. There were egoists who made a show of consistent psychological argument, and there were altruists whose appeal to human nature was just as favorable; then there were more liberal moralists who sought the natural synthesis of the opposed principles of humanity. The point where individualistic humanism attacks the problem is neither on

this side nor that, but in the very centre. Humanism thus raises the question whether the practical synthesis of self with self, if it can be brought about hedonically, is likely to be sufficient in itself or satisfactory in its character.

The one-time struggle for sociality has now given place to the anthropological assumption that man is by nature gregarious, so that it is no longer an attempt to bring men together, but to adjust the naturally social relations as these obtain among men. No longer the simple principles of rights and pleasures, the synthetic principles which seem to unify men are to be found in the ideas of utility and sociality, in the thought that men work together and live together. As a result of the progress from the Enlightenment to the age of Positivism, it is no longer necessary to contend for the actuality of the social synthesis, which is beyond dispute; the contention is for the character of the synthesis, which is far from being a matter of course. It is theoretically possible to conceive of men working in harmony and living in all good-will without there being any true or worthy bond of unity among them, just as it is possible for one to assume considerable outward discord and mutual misunderstanding in the midst of an implicit unity of a higher character. A nation, like the Germany of the early nineteenth century, may be wholly disintegrated without and yet practically unified within, just as such a nation at a later period may achieve outward unity at the expense of the ideal understanding which had previously prevailed. The spiritual unity of our own country before the Civil War was more perfect in the midst of sectional controversy than it has been since; since when the material unity has come to cover it with a sort of social and industrial veneer. So likewise in the whole social order; it is possible to achieve exterior unity in both idea and deed without

arriving at that true unity whose synthetic principles lie concealed in the hearts of men.

It seems then that there are two distinct and contrary principles of practical synthesis in the heart of man. These have already been indicated by styling one the outer the other the inner; but there are additional methods of observing the clear contrast between them. According to optimistic naturalism, the practical synthesis of men has been achieved when scientific thought has hit upon a plan which provides for the co-existence in so many groups of interrelated human beings. Here, again, it is the zoological ideal of gregariousness which has served the thinker in postulating his social synthesis. Man, so this thinker argues, has sprung from the animal order; if, in this animal order, life makes use of the gregarious idea, it is reasonable to suppose that life has done the same in the case of mankind, whence the aim of morality consists in perfecting and intensifying that implicit sense of sociality which is man's by natural inheritance. On the other hand, there is a pessimistic humanism which, while ready to admit that nature has produced in man a gregarious creature, is still dissatisfied with the kind of synthesis which is found in the organic life of man as such. Pessimism thus admits that it is easy and natural to be social, but contends that it is hard to arrive at humanity as an ideal; with this distinction in mind, the pessimist contends for a humanism which shall represent the life of man in its trans-natural aspects, while it is upon the basis of the trans-natural that the pessimistic humanist seeks to perfect the bonds of unity among the sons of men.

When optimistic sociality and pessimistic humanism are further compared, it appears that the social conception of life lays its emphasis upon joy and love, while the humanistic ideal betrays an affinity for pain and hatred. How, then, may it be assumed that the

pessimistic humanist has at heart a desire for the practical synthesis of men? It is not easy, still less is it plausible, when the pessimistic humanist attempts to construe pain as joy, hatred as love; yet he who is at all familiar with humanity will not fail to observe that man often uses strange and contradictory methods of arriving at his conclusions, in pressing forward toward his goals. Humanistic pain, while in no sense so much conscious joy, is really pledged to an ideal which, now painfully unrealized, still has the power to produce joy when attained. In this manner, Fichte and Goethe may be said to have felt an ideal joy in the thought of a united Germany, while they actually felt pain when they considered the real conditions of the Fatherland. By parity of reasoning, one may express love for a more perfect order of life by emphasizing his hatred of the existing arrangement. This paradox is exemplified in the Slavonic consciousness as revealed in Turgénieff and Dostoïevsky. With the cosmopolitan Turgénieff, the contempt for Russia was hatred and hatred alone. With such a Slavophile as Dostoïevsky, there was just as much nihilistic hatred of country; but Dostoïevsky made use of this for the sake of conveying his essential love of Russia. In speaking of one of the parties of his day, Dostoïevsky says, "This hatred of Russia was quite lately almost regarded by some of our Liberals as sincere love for their country."¹² That which applies so aptly in the case of nations in particular is no less pertinent in the instance of society in general, whence one's joy of life in the human order may express itself as so much pain in the midst of the actual social arrangement, while his love of humanity may express itself after the manner of complementary colors as the hatred of society as actually constituted.

The two contrary attempts at social synthesis shown

¹² *The Idiot*, tr. Garnett, Pt. III, Ch. I.

in connection with the idea of co-existence among men are no less opposed when they are brought to bear upon the idea of co-operation. Men are to live together and to work together; but, under what conditions may man be man, under what auspices may man do his work? According to naturalism, this question is to be answered in terms of that which is given in life; man is here and man works here, hence natural co-existence and natural co-operation. The general effect of nature, as nature is now understood, is to bind men in a rough social synthesis; the general tendency of work in the immediate order is to make this natural synthesis more binding, more intense. Viewed from without as so much socialized existence, it is unnecessary to emphasize that desire for co-existence and co-operation which characterized the earlier period of modern thought; for men are securely linked together by ties of natural existence and socialized work. The pathetic feature of the socialized arrangement of life, as this now appears in both theory and practice, is that the worth of life departs just at the moment when one might expect it to enter. Life is at last understood as that which is social; life is at last organized in the form of socialized labor; nevertheless, life has never appeared so intolerable to those who expect life to have worth as it does at the present hour. Granted that the material possibilities of life are now realized as never before, so that the sons of men in this generation enjoy benefits of which their fathers never dreamed, the fact remains that the spiritual possibilities of life are so removed from actual existence that contradiction in thought and discord in activity are the most emphatic notes of contemporary existence. Scientism has become so sullen in its affirmation of the naturalistic existence of mankind and sociality has become so brutal in its assertion of the co-operative activities of men that the scientifico-social synthesis has become intolerable.

Where individualism long since bade farewell to the scientifically arranged and socially organized world, an individualizing humanism pledges itself to the idea of a bond among the sons of men, but refuses to accept the idea that this bond is to be found in the scientific idea of co-existence and the social ideal of co-operation. Thus arises the question, How is the practical synthesis of life to be described; under what conditions is it to be perfected? To perfect a social program which shall act as a panacea for every ill encountered in the scientific-social order is to presume too much of philosophy, even when philosophy may exercise the right to indicate life-ideals; and ideals man will have in the form of a general conception of life and a persistent motive for action. Let it not be assumed that scientific-social thought has so applied its inherent positivism as to have excluded all forms of the ideal. Such social positivism has very intense ideals which appear as general notions and common aims. No, it is not the existence of the social ideal which one may question, but its character. Where the social ideal of life is rejected by the individualizing humanist, it is incumbent upon this humanist to supply a basis for the practical synthesis of man's active life.

2. VALUE AS SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE

Individualism is interested in the scientific attempt to assemble men upon the basis of sociality; at the same time, individualism cannot convince itself that sociality is the proper basis for that synthesis which is expected to produce humanity as such. The kind of men which sociality attempts to bring together is marked by nothing more than simple, sensuous response to the natural order and equally simple and impulsive reactions upon the things of the world; does this kind of receiving and reacting men supply the mind with the idea of true

humanity? From the view-point of individualism, humanity is made of finer stuff: already we have found humanity to be characterized by the aesthetical; ultimately we shall observe how the life of humanity is intelligible; here we must emphasize the fact that humanity is significant of value. To bring about the essential synthesis of the sons of men, we must reckon with our host, and must thus appreciate the fact that men are marked by aesthetic interests, moral values, and intelligible ideas. In general, the Enlightenment was guilty of poor anthropology, but it was not wanting in ethical ideals; ignorant of man's nature but appreciative of his character, the Enlightenment insisted that man cannot, will not, come into the social order until he is satisfied that such social life is in keeping with his ethical character. It was the work of the scientifico-social nineteenth century to show that man as creature is already in the social order; but, in laying hold of the biological, the nineteenth century let go of the ethical, whence scientific sociality proved the actual fact of the social synthesis without at the same time evincing its ethical worth.

True humanism, which has not forgotten the merits of the Enlightenment, has no desire to relegate man to a condition of naïve egoism; for true humanism recognizes the obvious fact that man finds himself in an order of life at once natural and social. Nevertheless, individualistic humanism, with its persistent ideal of life's value, is anxious to interpret the social synthesis in such a manner as to include something more than mere co-existence and co-operation. As a result of this ethical scruple, humanism would take the social as its *terminus a quo* but not as its *terminus ad quem*; humanism accepts the psychology of sociality but rejects its ethics. With this distinction between the nature of life and the character of life before it, humanism would proceed

from the manifest sociality of human existence to the elaboration of such a synthesis as shall conserve the character of man's life. It is not necessary to confine one's thought to sentiments and general principles in the endeavor to account for the unity of mankind; it is only necessary to make use of the principle of value to arrive at this end. To employ the principle of value as the basis of social synthesis, humanism simply asserts that man as man is a valuing creature rather than a purely perceiving organism, just as man carries on a process of activity which is a work of worth rather than so much organic functioning. It is in terms of ethical value then that humanism attempts to answer the questions, What is man's nature? What is man's work?

(1) *Man as Valuer*

The anthropological conception of man as creature and as member of a species was wholesome in the culture of the western world after man had been over-rationalized and over-moralized; nevertheless, the ethical estimate of man cannot be set aside when scientism seeks to supply the mind with a more impressionistic picture of human existence than the formalism of the Enlightenment was willing to supply. It is man as valuer who is to be related to the social order; it is of men with the inherent values of their human nature that the social order is to be constituted. Where earlier modern thought sought to unite men as beings with rights and pleasures, it is now the duty of ethics to unite men as valuing creatures. Realizing that men can be and are assembled naturally without any juristic calculation of the rights of all, without any hedonic consideration of the happiness of all, social thinking has rested content with the naturalistic grouping of men as this was found in experience. But does nature supply the basis of a real synthesis when nature limits her

influence to the naïve sense of community that is due to common wants and common desires? Such a synthesis, so dear to the sociologist, is little more than a consciousness of species, a feeling that all are members of the same human tribe. To unite men in a synthetic whole makes necessary the appreciation of what men are, not merely what they appear to be; now the essence of humanity seems to make its presence felt in the form of human worth.

When humanism seeks to make answer to the question, "What is value?" it is able to do this in terms of genuine human nature. To the idea of value, overtures may be made in the name of pleasure, even when the moralist has no right to pronounce immediate judgment and thus make value equal to pleasure. To feel pleasure is simply to be a creature of flesh and blood; but to appreciate pleasure, as one does in art and morality, is to involve something more strictly human. In the midst of his warm experiences of pleasure, man is conscious of a hedonic residuum, whence he is led to feel that there is about pleasure something which cannot be wholly absorbed by the emotions, but must be taken up by the intellect in the form of judgment. Thus, when one enjoys pleasure, the pleasurable experience has a meaning to him in the totality of his life as man, whence he is in a position to judge whether life as experienced is something satisfying or disappointing. Again, when one fails to experience an anticipated pleasure, the want of that desired feeling, instead of revealing itself as so much lack of joy, appeals to the mind as so much loss of value. In this manner, the presence of pleasure is the affirmation of value; the absence of pleasure, the negation of value: the purely psychological and temporary gives way before the ethical and permanent, so that out of pleasures and pains the life-values of optimism and pessimism are built up within the soul.

If the independence of value appears when the individual, instead of submitting to his experiences, subjects them to intellectual scrutiny, the more complete emancipation of value from pleasure comes about when the individual indulges his active feelings in the form of desire. Where feeling is peripheral, desire is central; where feeling is passive, desire is active. The presence of volition in desire makes it possible for the individual to seek that which in external experience may be pleasurable, indifferent, or painful; man is ardent in the pursuit of pleasure, but he is no less active in the quest of the indifferent and the painful. In the attempt to answer the difficult psychological question, "How can the mind desire that which is painful?" it is necessary to observe that in such desiderative cases, that which the mind seeks is not pain as such but the object which happens to involve painful experience. If this distinction between pain as a feeling and the painful character of the object sought by desire is not sufficient, it may be noted further that what man desires is promoted and sanctioned by the sense of worth which attaches to the object sought. How man can desire that which is painful is explained by the fact that man judges the object in question to be of value to him; and how it is possible for man to attribute value to that which is actually painful is explained by the fact that what may be painful in some exterior and particular phase of life may be judged valuable in the light of interior life as a whole.

Now it is man as valuer who is to be related to the social order, not man as the exponent of mere rights or the recipient of particular pleasures. At the same time, the purely anthropic notion of man, as a creature whom nature renders ripe for the social order, is guilty of so confining its attention to the sheer form of humanity so simply outlined in social existence that it ignores

the rich valuational content of man's veritable existence. As a result of this formal view of man, the social synthesis becomes a mere sketch to be filled in with the colors of man's essential content of humanity. Instead of striving upward toward this obvious social synthesis, which is given in nature, humanism endeavors to pass onward beyond the crudely social to the truly human. The form which this striving for the human assumes, reveals itself in culture and morality, in connection with which man endeavors to perfect both his inner life and the lines of connection which relate him to his fellow-man. In the case of a nation, America for example, there may be the empirical and economic forms of interdependence which seem to make the people of that nation one; along with this general and exterior form of unity, there may be, as in the case of the French people, an inward unity due to national culture and national morality. From the view-point of sociality, their exterior principle of connection may seem to serve as a social synthesis; from the standpoint of humanism, it becomes necessary to impose upon this lower form of social unity a higher synthesis due to the existence and activity of man as a valuer. With individual nations in particular, with a whole continent in general, and with humanity universally, this inner struggle for human values is one of the most obvious facts of history. Why, then, do social thinkers persist in assuming that the miscellaneous assembling of nature is sufficient in accounting for the existence of humanity?

Only as mankind asserts itself in the form of spiritual values is it possible even to approximate to the synthesis which seems so desirable. In the career of individualism, it was apparent that nothing could be done with man until the characteristic content of his life was made the point of departure for all social consideration. When this content was ignored, the individualist was found

asserting his private, anti-social being by means of immoralistic pessimism. Perhaps the same philosophic pessimism, due as it is to the pathos of the remote in life, may have its place in the social life of man, so that, as individuals are found striving after inner perfection, nations, races, and even larger groups of humanity may appear to be attempting the same thing. In the larger sense, humanistic pessimism is only the arduous, anguished striving after that which nature has not been able or not seen fit to bestow upon the sons of men; that which these humanistic pessimists have before them as their goal is the unity of the individual with his own life and the unity of that life with the life of mankind in general. Germany, previous to 1870, presents a convincing picture of this twofold pessimism in accordance with which chosen individuals, like Lessing seeking classic beauty, Schiller pursuing the ideal of naïve poetry, Kant struggling for the supreme good, Goethe elaborating the harmony of his poetic existence, sought the value of humanity while the whole nation writhed in its struggle for spiritual unity. In contrast with this striving after an inwardly Germanic character, Germanic sociality presents an unconvincing contrast. The career of humanity at large is comparable to the course of a nation in particular, and the history of mankind seems to have set before it the ideal of the complete humanization of the human species as something characteristic and valuable.

The complete humanity of man is an idea which contains the meaning of all progress; man is to become, must become, human both individually and socially. In the Slavonic consciousness, the inherent sense of nihilism is such as to neutralize the meaning of naturalistic evolution and social development, because the inner meaning of life fails to appear in the midst of exterior civilization. It is true that now and then, as in the case

of Dostoïevsky, the complete sense of life, "the highest synthesis of life," appears as in a flash in the sharp light of which the individual feels that he has attained to perfect harmony; but, since the Slavonic mind cannot set this idea of harmony before it as a goal, it relapses into philosophic nihilism. In this spirit, Kirillov, in *The Possessed*, having had fugitive glimpses of such an unearthly harmony, raised the question, "What's the use of evolution when the goal has been attained?" Individualism answers such a question by declaring that, while, from the standpoint of the natural and social, man cannot achieve anything new out of the evolutionary process, from the view-point of humanism he has before him the ideal of that humanization of man in accordance with which the higher, nay highest, life-synthesis may become realizable. Such an idea is not guilty of the fallacy which usually adheres to Utopianism; for, where Utopianism sets its eye upon the ideal goal as such, humanism lays its stress upon the progressive means in accordance with which the implicit goal is to be achieved. Remove this striving after the remote, and you obliterate the meaning of man's moral life. But adhere to the ideal of human harmony and interpret it in the light of value, and the meaning of man's extra-natural, extra-social activity becomes apparent and convincing. Furthermore, it is upon the basis of remote worth that men may be unified indeed, where natural sociality can do no more for them than to place them together in a loose form of co-existence.

(2) *Humanity a World of Values*

The attempt to synthesize human beings upon the basis of value is to be urged, not merely because the idea of value seems to promise a spirit of mutual understanding, but because the individuals who are to be brought together are themselves valuers. If one per-

sists in upholding the idea of the old hedonic synthesis, one is confronted with the problem of assigning universal happiness to creatures who seem to be in quest of some other form of human realization; as a result, happiness for all does not apply to individuals who desire worth for themselves. To abandon the hedonic synthesis, as recent ethics has done, and to seek the unification of men upon the basis of natural social and immediate interest is to overlook the fact that the individual does not want merely natural existence for himself; why, then, should he seek to promote in all men that which does not seem sufficient for each viewed as an individual? It must be apparent that men have been bound together by some principle other than that of common happiness, since the history of nations fails to show that the common bond among members of the body politic was in any sense a universal desire for happiness. Can one review the history of ancient Hebrew and Hindu, the career of Greece and Rome, and the development of modern nations, and then insist that the idea of national happiness was the synthetic principle which operated to make the particular nation what it was? As with nations, so with races: can one speak cogently of "Aryan happiness," of "Semitic joy," or of "Mongolian felicity"? But, where the hedonistic fails to reveal its synthetic power, the principle of worth is of such integrating import that one need not hesitate to reckon upon the basis of "Aryan values" and "Semitic values," of "Chinese values" and "Christian values." Where value unites men, happiness either disintegrates them or leaves them in an ethical position purely problematic.

Valuers are to be united upon the basis of value; such is the method of that humanistic synthesis which, when speaking of the joy of life, found a beginning in the idea of common culture. But what is there about

the principle of value which fits it to serve as an attribute of the individual and a principle of causal connection among men in general? Happiness is frankly divisive, whence enjoyment becomes either a mine or a thine. It is undeniable that an altruistic individual can forego somewhat of his private happiness for the sake of the other person; but the result is so much sacrifice on the part of the one and so much lack of dignity on the part of the other. With value, the case stands otherwise, so that one cannot give that which is so thoroughly his own as his sense of life's value, while the other cannot receive the values of any would-be giver. At the same time, where one may take happiness from life, and that in such a manner as to deprive another of this boon, it is impossible to appropriate any value which is not by its nature a human value as such. If such a discrimination in favor of the value-principle seems dubious to any one, let him for a moment reflect upon the thought that, whereas the feeling of pleasure is an element, the feeling of value is a compound of consciousness, so that more is to be expected of it. In addition to its more complex nature, the sense of value is permanent where the feeling of pleasure is transitory; whence it holds out more promises to both the striving individual and the progressing race. With the strength and largesse which it possesses, the sense of value thus tends to promote the synthesis of men, who may find in the idea of worth something which they have in common.

In the sphere of values, it seems both unnecessary and impossible to make the pathetic distinction between egoism and altruism; such a discrimination is peculiar to the school of hedonistic ethics. Among the ancients, the idea of virtue was pursued without any question concerning a mine or thine; why, then, may there not be a common pursuit of value in which the character of the benefit sought shall be such as to preclude any

social distinctions of private and public? That which both the ancient ideal of virtue and the contemporary ideal of value have in common is the idea of humanity; that is, the promotion of that which is essential to man apart from any thought of whether it is this or that individual who is to receive the benefit of it. When social thinking, laying its usual emphasis upon the mere expediencies of life, attempts to be ethical, it involves itself in certain invidious distinctions, whence morality must submit to the Either-Or of egoistic or social. This fact alone should show that social ethics is not genuine. Social ethics has drawn man's attention away from the real issue of life, whence it has made humanism impossible. That which sociality keeps before the mind, far from being human life with its inwardness, its character, and worth, is mere animal existence with its immediacy. If there is to be a higher synthesis of men, it must come about by an appeal to that which is essential to man, and this we believe to find in the principle of human worth.

The principle of value upon the basis of which humanism attempts to synthesize selfhood and society, stands out in clear contrast to the syntheses of rationalism and positivism. Under the auspices of rationalism, the union of the self with society was sought artificially by means of a calculating utilitarianism which endeavored to show that the greatest happiness of all would come by means of co-operation. It was the good office of positivism to point out that human society, far from being formed in any such manner, was instinctive in mankind, which was social long before the idea of individualism appeared. In attempting to thrust itself forward beyond the positivistic, humanism is led to realize that rationalism, with all of its artificiality, was bent upon making the social assume the character of man as man, whence the general character of humanity was

preserved by the rationalistic synthesis. Where positivism gains in naturalness by its appeal to the instinctive gregariousness in the human species, it loses in ethical character when it perfects a social order which is not worth perfecting. If the perfect health and perfect functioning of the social organism appeals to the moralist as something scientifically true, it does not follow that such a hygienic notion is able to express the apparent meaning of the life of a species which is obviously bent upon working the works of man. Let it be granted that man cannot deliberately create the social order, but let it further be recognized that, when man looks to nature to make his social life possible, there is still something truly human which man must do.

To make man social is as unnecessary as to carry coals to Newcastle; but to take the socialized man and make a human being of him is in no sense supererogatory. It is thus the aim of a humanistic philosophy of life to turn the social into the human, to erect the humanistic synthesis upon the basis of the social synthesis. The elaboration of the humanistic synthesis is to come about by the creation of a world of values; how is such an order of values to be understood? From the form of expression just employed, it might seem as though we looked upon man as having before him the amiable task of placing an entirely new world upon the foundation of the social order which he finds in his human life; but no such creation *de novo* is for a moment proposed. That which humanism sets before itself as its real task consists in the recognition of the fact that man as man has ever been a creator of values — values which appear in his art, his morality, and his religion. If nature, with her tendency to synthesize, has made man social, it has ever been the work of man to make himself human; in humanizing himself, man has taken social life as his point of departure, not as his goal. It may

perhaps be pointed out that the idea of humanity as a world of values is very vague in comparison with the concrete notion of man as a socialized being; but humanism can reply to this criticism by insisting that the purely tribal conception of man as one who lives the life of the community is far from being worthy of the human species which has set before it some more characteristic goal. To have human beings snugly grouped in a social order where they breathe the same air and have the same ideas is not equivalent to the idea of a true synthesis of humanity. When the work of sociality is done, the work of humanity has just begun.

The world of values, instead of being made up of something over and above humanity, is humanity itself. To be human is to avoid the extremes of selfish struggle for existence and social solidarity; it is to perfect that complete system of human life which is found in man as man. In the pursuit of that which is the truly human order, the individualist may appear to be anti-social; but the moral affirmative which seems to be destroying the given order is only asserting the existence of a higher one. The individualist is at heart interested in some sort of human synthesis; he appears anti-social only because he refuses to accept naturalistic sociality in lieu of that unifying conception which he postulates as the veritable goal of all human life on earth. Perhaps it may be said that the humanistic individualist is aiming at the idea of culture or civilization as the synthetic bond which prevails among the sons of men; or, if it still be insisted that the pluralistic view of human life is to be expressed after the manner of the social, then it is upon a liberal conception of the social that the individualist must insist. Where the social is conceived of in such a manner as to make for the internal in man and the remote in his active life, there the social may serve to express the meaning of the world of values; but, where

the social is only the social, the mere togetherness of a life in which the immediate and the expedient are dominant, such sociality cannot be palmed off as man's kingdom of values upon earth.

To view man in the passing present, where the social consideration seems to be supreme, is to indulge the belief that the life of man is indeed made up of the immediacies and expediencies of sociality; but to consider man in the light of his history, where proper perspective enters in, to apportion true shades and values to the picture, is to observe that the real goal of the past period was none other than the world of values which at present seems so ephemeral. That which history has conserved for us is a system of Greek values here, an order of Christian values there, and what we behold in the whole earth viewed historically is so much mystical valuing in the east, so much practical valuing in the west. Upon the basis of such valuing were nations and races bound together, and upon the same valuational foundation is the life of man reared. To attempt the reconstruction of the past by assuming that men were bound together by means of common pleasure, common utility, or common sociality is to see how much more obvious is the valuational principle as the synthetic bond.

Humanity is to be fashioned out of sociality, for it is with sociality rather than with individuality that the moralist is confronted. The difference between sociality and humanity appears at once when we consider that sociality is our given condition, humanity an acquired state of existence. Furthermore, instead of depending upon nature working through instinct, humanity as a system stands or falls upon the deliberate act of the human will as the latter attempts to found a kingdom of values upon earth. From the optimistic point of view, man is to be satisfied with the immediate adjust-

ment of individuals upon the basis of interest and general welfare, with the "health of the social organism"; viewed in the more penetrating light of pessimistic humanism, man has no right to postulate happiness until the adjustment of man to man is accomplished in a manner peculiar to man's own nature. If the social adjustment of the sons of men appears in civilization, the human adjustment finds expression in culture, or the inward relation of man to his fellow in a world-order wherein each is aware of his own being, his own destiny as a human being. As yet, mankind is little more than a tribe in which social existence is fairly satisfactory, while the life of the individual has about it no more than a suggestion of culture. When mankind takes up the burden of humanity, mankind is not expected to uproot itself and plant its being in the midst of the sea; mankind is expected to infuse the humanistic spirit into the preparatory and inferior type of common existence which is guaranteed by natural sociality. Having been social, man may become human; when his humanity sets it, then his individuality will have opportunity to express itself.

PART THREE

THE TRUTH OF LIFE IN THE
WORLD-WHOLE

THE pursuit of the higher synthesis in the world-whole has already witnessed the elaboration of a superior aesthetic synthesis in the world and an elevated point of view in the world of action, which exerted a practical synthesis. It remains to be seen whether the analysis of truth, which led individualism to assume an irrationalistic and anti-natural attitude, is capable of the synoptic conclusion which has come about in two of the three phases of life under discussion. Both nature and humanity, which seemed to succumb to the smug generalization of scientism and sociality, have shown themselves of greater freedom and depth than current thought has been willing to assume; in this manner, nature and humanity have shown their willingness to yield up the ideals of a life-joy and life-worth unknown to the positivistic mind. Will the naturalistic and humanistic suffer themselves to undergo a similar enlargement and deepening when the method of approach to them is that of truth? To answer this question, revised individualism must seek anew to discover just what it sought to affirm by the phrase "one's own self"; for the romantic and pessimistic discussion of human selfhood was such as to flout the restraint and disdain the aid of logic. When one has thus discovered the particular truth of selfhood within, he is expected to examine the meaning of truth without, so that he may bring about some sort of understanding between two contradictory phases of contemporary thought. Life-truth as felt within and world-truth as perceived

without seem mutually destructive. But is there not a freer and fuller view of truth in the light of which one may witness the synthesis of the inner and outer?

I. ONE'S OWN SELF

As the joy of life could not fail to involve the idea of self-existence, and as the worth of life could not exclude the idea of one's own work, so the truth of life is to be advanced only as the individual is viewed as having and as being a self in the world. In the present condition of human culture, the situation is such as to involve most frankly and consistently the idea of worth in life, because the contemporary condition of culture is one of work: to do is categorical; to enjoy is purely hypothetical; to think is disjunctive. Yet, while current culture thinks it possible to view the joy and truth of life in a slanting manner, reserving its direct gaze for the problem of work, the philosophy of life has no right to extend special privileges to the activistic estimate of life. Philosophy of life insisted upon the joy of life, not merely because of the enjoyment involved therein, but because such enjoyment conveyed the idea of existence; for it was by means of the eudaemonistic ideal that the independence of the soul-state was conserved. In the same manner, philosophy of life must now insist upon the idea of life's truth, not merely because the intellectual vision of the truth of things satisfies mental curiosity, but because such intellectualism has the happy fate of upholding the existence of the self which seeks both itself and the world in thought. Let culture continue to centre in the idea of work, let industry continue to emphasize the ideal of worth, and it will be found that the existence of the self in the world of sense and the reality of the self in the world of thought cannot be eliminated or degraded. At the same time, when it is admitted that, owing to

his activistic nature, man cannot live without work, it must likewise be insisted that man cannot live without joy, without truth. For more than half a century, culture has considered man as though he were nothing more than a creature of work; but this blind energism seems to have come to the end of its reign, whence it becomes necessary for philosophy of life to consider anew, not only the claims of life's joys, but the demands of life's truth.

Where joy is doubtless necessary to him who would experience the inward reality of life, the sense of truth is no less imperative for him who would acquire a permanent sense of selfhood. The relation of the self to knowledge has never received sincere treatment; it has ever been expressed after the manner of "thought and thing," "subject and object," "mind and matter." By means of none of these conventional dualisms does the self come into its own. At the same time, knowledge has always been discussed without regard to the kind of being for whom that knowledge seems intended; thus, it has been a lifeless perceiving of things or conceiving of thoughts. As a result, the adjective "human" which slipped into the titles of epistemological works by thinkers like Locke and Hume, failed to color the treatment of the understanding in its cogitations. The kind of knowledge which seems to adapt itself to the work of the understanding as human, is a knowledge based, not upon a frame-work of faculties, principles, or laws, but upon a genuine intellectual life. To consider knowledge as intellectual life is to consider the self as participating in the existence of the world which produced it. Should not such a natural view of the question tend to remove the dualism of thought and thing, and that without driving one to a less hopeful monism in which neither thought nor thing is found?

I. THE SELF AS KNOWER

Knowledge is the supreme means by which the self comes into its selfhood. Idealism assumes with Socrates, Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant, that it is easy to arrive at the idea of selfhood, but difficult if not impossible to move out from this to knowledge of the world. Realism, which is sure of the world, finds it necessary to consider the self only as the self has the ability to represent the world as it is. Neither philosophic, that which looks from the self toward the world or that which looks from the world toward the self, has observed that the intellectual striving of the self has been for the purpose of self-existence. The ego would not merely have subjective thoughts about the world or objective impressions of the world; the ego would come into its own being in the world. The Socratic commandment, "Know thyself," was noble enough, yet the manner in which it is executed often suggests mock heroism on the part of the antique thinker; similarly, the Cartesian struggle for the "I think" fails to represent any quality of that inward effort by which living individuals like Goethe and Shelley, Emerson and Ibsen have sought to arrive at selfhood. The history of individualism has been a struggle for the content of selfhood, in the form of life-joy, life-worth, and life-truth. In the midst of this history, individualism has never assumed the "I think" to be a matter of course or an easy attainment; had this been so, individualism would have been unnecessary.

Along with the difficulty experienced within the self, there would appear to be a corresponding degree of ease in connection with knowledge of the exterior world. In the history of epistemology, the situation has been reversed, so that the question of knowledge seems to have stood in a false light. Traditional thought has said, "We are sure of the self but not so sure of the

world, whence we must do all within the power of our logic to lay down the grounds of objective existence." As a result, theory of knowledge has proceeded from within outwards, from the known self to the world as a possible object of knowledge. In the actual life of the individual, just the reverse seems to be the case; here, one is quite sure of objective things, but is by no means sure of him who perceives them. For this reason, individualism has advised man to turn from the objective order to the self within, there to observe his own being and to make sure of it, if this be possible. The living thought of man has not been anxious to enhance the existence of the exterior order, but it has sought to build up some sort of inner life; on this account, all invitations to come out of the self have been of no avail with a creature who, when he was not philosophizing, was fully aware how extroverted was his poor nature. With its massiveness and power, the exterior world has been able to take care of itself, so that the individual has learned to have a care for his own being; as the architect saw the supremacy of gravity and sought to erect rigid columns and arches which should oppose its force, so the individual has employed the "I think" to oppose the omnipotence of the exterior order.

Theory of knowledge has never been able to forget that most noble of errors which it was the fate of the Enlightenment to elaborate; the egoistic error in question was to the effect that the self as thinker is logically superior to and metaphysically supreme in the physical order. The individualist with his faith in the self might well wish that such solipsism were true; but the individualist knows full well that the shadowy "I think" peculiar to the Enlightenment is in no position to make itself the ground of either the world without or the self within. As a result of the situation which life itself presents, it is the duty of the self, not to establish the world,

which stands in need of no such subjective bolstering, but to establish the ego, which exists only by good fortune and lives only by courtesy. The traditional egoist has never taken the time or had the courage to abide by the results of his preliminary egoism. Thus, the Socratic "Know thyself" surrendered to the Platonic world of ideas; the Cartesian *cogito* yielded to the Spinozistic substance; Kant's *ich denke* longed for the moral order; while Fichte's *Ich* sought the Absolute.

The beginning of the self, as the final form of an individualistic philosophy of life, has not thus far been urged; instead of hastening to the formalism of such a notion, the present method has seen fit to develop the idea of self-life in the world of sense, where the feeling of free, full enjoyment has assured us that the self has its own definite existence as the recipient of life's joy. Furthermore, the method of individualism pursued has found it expedient to regard the self of joy as the individual who has a work of its own in the world. When, finally, individualism seeks to come to an understanding with life, individualism becomes anxious to discover what kind and measure of reality may be attributed to the self which, thus far, has exhibited its nature in enjoyment, its character in work. Thus viewed, the idea of selfhood, instead of being a formal premise to the aesthetical and ethical conceptions of life, tends to assume the form of a concrete postulate the study of which is taken up, not primarily for its own sake, but with the aim of assuring philosophy of life whether the hope of self-enjoyment and self-activity was well founded. If there be no ultimate reality to the self, then the desire for enjoyment can only be denied, the claim to work invalidated. There must be something real which enjoys the aesthetic soul-states, something permanent which seeks self-expression through work in the world.

Again, in the attempt to determine the reality of this personal factor in the worlds of enjoyment and action, in culture and social life, individualism does not proceed in Cartesian fashion from an "I think" to an "I am"; for the existence of the self has already been shown through aesthetic enjoyment and worthy work. All that individualism attempts to do in its appeal to the intellectualistic principle is to show that the self-existent ego which has revealed itself in both the joy and work of life is an ego indeed; that is, that this ego is so intelligible in its character as to make self-knowledge possible; the man may know what spirit he is of. In attempting to find a basis for the self, Descartes proceeded from self-knowledge to self-existence, while Kant regarded the proposition, "I think, therefore I am," so synthetic that it was impossible for the understanding to deduce the predicate from the subject. According to the method which we have employed, it is not necessary to assert the "I am," since this personal proposition has already found abundant and irrefutable expression in the joy and work of the self. The proposition now to be defended is, therefore, "I am, therefore I think"; that is, since the self has been found to exist in its states and impulses, it must be shown how such self-existence involves self-knowledge. Where the older individualism of both Socrates and Descartes sought to pass from thought to existence, modern individualism has busied itself with the actual task of bringing the self into existence through enjoyment and energy, so that the only task which remains for present-day individualism consists in showing that the claim to self-existence in both nature and humanity is well-founded and intelligible. In its decadent and nihilistic character, individualism has shown that self indeed exists, and that in a most striking manner; to show that such intense selfhood is rational and philosophically

worthy is practically the only task of individualism at the present time.

In most strident contrast to the formal individualism expressed in the abstractionism of the Cartesian *cogito* and the Kantian *ich denke*, stand out the living expressions of individualism peculiar to the egoistic movement. The romantic joy of Schlegel, the morbid self-scrutiny of Poe, the impassibility of Baudelaire, and the self-seclusion of Huysmans forbid that we should doubt the existence of self-conscious states. The immoralistic ideals of Stendhal, the strong selfhood of Emerson, the criminal consciousness of Dostoïevsky, and the anti-social self-assertion of Barrès make it impossible that we should question the self-activity of the ego. The Satanism of Blake, the irrationalism of Stirner, and the irreligion of Wagner, are equally effective in evoking the self-existence of the ego as idea. When individualism was represented by the theologian and logician, it was quite easy to consider the self as a mere shadow; but when individualism was enforced by aestheticist, immoralist, and irreligionist, the attempt to think the self away became impossible. Having shown its reason for being, the self demands the right to exist, so that no notion short of reality will suffice to explain the individualistic phenomena of the nineteenth century.

In the history of individualism, the idea of self-knowledge has expressed its tenets under the auspices of irrationalism; as a result, the religion of the self became irreligion. At the outset, the religion of irreligion, if we may so style it, was appreciated by Schleiermacher, who was devout and believing even when he was in the act of separating religion, here from reason and metaphysics, there from ethics and morality. With Schleiermacher, as later with Wagner, the deepest truths of religion were expressed in the form of irreligion, the most profound concerns of reason in connection with

irrationalism. With Stirner, the repudiation of the religion of Hegelian Humanity led only to a negative irreligion, while with Baudelaire the essence of religion was clouded by a morbid mysticism. Nevertheless, the irreligious movement had at heart the interests of genuine religion, even when this movement could do no more than offer bitter opposition to the religion of reason and the religion of science. Now that religion has been delivered from its false friends and has been delivered over to its friendly foes, it is time for individualism to develop the thoroughly religious ideal implicit in the idea of self-existence and self-knowledge.

When one seeks, not "truth" in the abstract, but the truth of life, he places himself in a position where he is led to make knowledge a means to an end. To express this more accurately and more worthily, what the individualist does is to make knowledge *the* means to *the* end. Just as individualism insisted upon the Joy of Life in order that the self-consciousness of the soul-state might receive recognition, just as it urged the Worth of Life in order that self-activity might be seen to spring from an independent initiative, so it must now insist upon the Truth of Life in order that the idea of self-existence may be grounded in knowledge. In thus making knowledge the means to the end, individualism is not descending to any kind of utilitarianism or instrumentalism, according to which thinking exists and goes on for the sake of this or that exterior end. With a superior teleology, individualism views knowledge as though it existed and exerted itself for the sake of an end which is single and supreme. In all this, there may be a kind of logical heteronomy; but it is the character of the other-than-knowledge-itself principle which redeems thought from utilitarian pragmatism. With such pragmatism, individualism agrees that knowledge does not exist for the sake of pure, nameless cognition; the

point of separation between the two appears when individualism insists that the purpose of knowledge is to establish the self, while pragmatism seems to insist that the end of knowing is for the purpose of establishing some of the many secondary ends of that self which this pragmatism takes no care to substantiate. As joy is not for the mere purpose of entertaining pleasant feelings, but for the sake of establishing the self; as value is more for the sake of the valuer than the evaluated; so truth and thought are elaborated by the self in order that the self may make sure of its own being as such. There should be no doubt that individualism has made use of knowledge as means to end; indeed, individualism has at times resorted to irrationalism for just this purpose.

However paradoxical it may seem, the *nescio* of irrationalism and the *cogito* of intellectualism have at heart the sole aim of giving expression to the self-existence of the human ego. When thought is so perfected without that there seems to be no room for the free self in the world, it becomes necessary for the self to employ principles of irrationalism in order to assert the reality of that which lies outside of the narrow synthetic circle of what is called the known. But, when at last the narrow synthesis has been repudiated, and room for the self has been made, it becomes urgent for the individualist to set about developing some positive idea of the self for which he is contending; this can be done, as we have seen, by insisting upon that sense of joy which evokes the inner state of consciousness as independent, by asserting the sense of interior worth as that which is intrinsic; but such forms of self-assertion stand in need of the final form of selfhood in the act of thinking. Thus, it is by means of thought that the ego is able to assert itself in its superiority, so that thought, while not at all instrumental, has the effect of establish-

ing something more than propositions. Thought is the supreme means of establishing the existence of the self. The dogmatism of the Enlightenment felt justified in assuming the existence of the ego, through which the world in seeking its existence was forced to pass as a camel through the eye of a needle; but the conditions of contemporary culture are such that, instead of assuming the existence of the self, philosophy of life must assert this self-existence, and this it does with the spirit, but not according to the method, of irrationalism. By means of empirical thought, we have become sure of the exterior world; by means of another kind of thought, we must become aware of the self.

The thought-method by means of which the self comes into being is thus neither rationalism nor irrationalism, but super-rationalism; such super-rationalism does not attempt to show by what means science may be possible, nor does it content itself with the anti-scientific assertion of the ego's existence as such, as was done by Kant and Nietzsche respectively; super-rationalism is merely anxious to indicate that higher synthesis which shall have the effect of including the self in the world-whole. Rationalism thought to express the supremacy of the self by making the world depend for its existence upon the "I think" of the ego; irrationalism, dismayed at the discovery that the ego was no longer in the world, sought pessimistic consolation in the idea that the ego may exist independently, and in opposition to the objective order. Super-rationalism would neither exercise lordship over the world nor carry on sabotage against it; rather would it seek in the world the place which the self should occupy. In a word, super-rationalism would have the self participate in the world. Where rationalism would regard the self as though it gave laws to the objective order, where realism considers the world as though it gave laws to the mind, the

intellectualism which appeals to the individualist is content to have the independent ego participate in the principles of knowledge which make the objective world what it is. Participation is thus neither a ruling nor a serving, but a sharing of the world's truth. From this point of view, the self can no longer say, "I rule the world," nor does it need to assert, "I oppose the world," for it is sufficient for the self to say, "I live in the world."

2. SELFHOOD AND SOLIPSISM

The participation of the self in the world has the effect of turning knowledge from a mere perceiving of the outer or a mere thinking of the inner into a genuine intellectual life within the world as a whole. However obvious such a conception of thought, the idea of an independent life within the world, as a play within the play, is somewhat new to the individualist. Thus far in the history of modern thought, the ego has been confronted by the diremption of an Either-Or; the self was all in rationalism, nought in empiricism. In the career of individualism as such, that is, in the nineteenth century, positivism persisted in dismissing the ego that the scientifico-social order might exist undisturbed, while romanticism was just as relentless in its assertion, "The world does not exist for the self." Neither dogmatic scientism nor nihilistic egoism is possible in the world-whole; the self cannot be dismissed as a bird is driven from a corn-field, nor can the world be relegated to non-existence by the ego that simply rises above it. Driven out of the kingdom by the Saul of jealous scientism, the David of egoism is now permitted to return to the realm it is destined to inherit. To effect the return of the self and to bring about the reunion of the self and the world, the one thing needful is the higher synthesis of selfhood and worldhood.

The misunderstanding that has arisen between the self and the world has been due to the theories of knowledge that have assumed the right to interpret the method by which the mind thinks the world. These theories have been rationalism and empiricism, romantic idealism and positivism; it was on the side of the rationalistic and romantic that the egoist took his stand; for, where these seem to promise everything, empiricism and positivism were frankly opposed to the idea of independent selfhood. Thus adjusted to the question of knowledge, Descartes and the French classicists had no difficulty in establishing the supremacy of mind, while Fichte and the German romanticists were equally successful in asserting the independent existence of the self. But robbing Peter to pay Paul is hardly honest, and to despoil the world for the sake of improving the self is equally improper. The advocates of mind and the self, while justified in their enthusiasm for the "I think" and "I will," were not aware of the injustice toward the world-whole as an organization of things and persons; Kant's rationalism was intolerant when it asserted that the human understanding gives laws to nature while the human will dictates to the moral order; Baudelaire's romanticism was vicious when it affirmed that the self may think and act aesthetically in defiance of truth and duty. From the ultimate effects of such irrationalism and immoralism, individualism is now slowly recovering.

To cure individualism of the ills of irrationalism, philosophy must now cast about for a theory of knowledge which shall explain what is to be explained; that is, not the self here and the world there, but the self within its own world. The situation is not one in which the self rules the world or the world the self; it is a situation in which each exists and expresses its nature in its own way. Given the world and the self in mutual

opposition, it becomes impossible to account for the most obvious of things, namely the natural commerce between thought and thing; postulate the mutual agreement of the pair, and the problem of thought becomes simple and straightforward. The nature of this implicit agreement of macrocosm and microcosm seems to find more or less perfect expression in the idea of knowledge as an intellectual life within the world, where the thinking ego had its origin and has had its development. The philosophical endeavor to relate the mind to the world, after the mind has first been constituted and conceived of in independent manner, is as absurd as the political attempt to relate the self-constituted ego to a social order alien to its own nature. As Hobbes perverted the political problem, Descartes prejudiced the philosophical question. Upon his return to Denmark, Hamlet may seem to be a stranger, yet he was to the manner born; the development of the mind may make it appear alien to the world, yet it is in the world that the mind finds its true place. When knowledge is viewed as intellectual life, wherein the cultural is as significant as the speculative, the empirical contention that things exist in independence of the mind's forms does no harm to the notion that the mind itself is free within; on the other hand, the idealistic contention that the mind has the right and the power to reduce the world to order does no violence to the existence and behavior of things. It is not sufficient for the mind merely to think, for its genuine thinking consists in knowing what exists; again, it is not sufficient for the thing simply to exist, for the thing's complete existence must include the idea of being known.

When mind as intellectual life within a knowable world receives due consideration, the imperfections of traditional views of knowledge immediately appear. Given a purely empirical point of view, it becomes diffi-

cult to explain how the mind can copy its ideas of things from an order of existence conceived of as independent. To make the empirical copy, the mind must have a certain capacity for things, just as he who imitates nature must be somewhat of an artist. On the other hand, if the rationalist is right in asserting that ideas determine things, it is still to be explained how the mind can gain supremacy of an alien objective order. When, however, it is assumed that knowledge of the world comes about by the participation of intellectual life in the world, it is no longer necessary to assert either that things create ideas or that ideas create things; it is sufficient to assert that the mind naturally recognizes things as they are, a knowledge with which the mind is content. One can hardly wish for the self if one must lose truth, nor can one care for that purely objective conception of truth which leaves the self out; but is such a choice necessary? Vedanta lays hold of the self in the very moment that it secures its hold upon the world of things; Platonism constitutes the mind in the very act of comprehending the world. It is only our modern rationalism and romanticism that have sought to elaborate the ego in defiance of the world. As the result of modern thinking, the solipsistic implication has arisen.

In itself, the solipsistic situation is more a matter of curiosity than of concern; at the same time, theoretical solipsism affords an opportunity to consider the merits of the knowledge problem as this concerns the self. The difference in attitude between the individualist and the non-individualist may be expressed with strength if not with clearness when it is noted that individualism takes a pessimistic point of viewing in knowledge, while the rationalist has been content to rejoice in a kind of naïve optimism. The optimism of the rationalist has been of such a nature as to lead the thinker to assume

that, by indulging a due amount of thought, he may establish the reality of the self within and that so conclusively as to disestablish the reality of the world without. How grand the assumption and how intense the fatuity of the rationalist when, sublimely convinced of self-existence, he began to exercise painful concern for the reality of the exterior order! Oh, that the world without might be as sure of itself as is the ego within! Such a solipsistic assumption was childish and optimistic; in its vapid notions individualism has never participated. The pessimism of the individualist has been so intense and so real as to lead him to conclusions quite the contrary of school-solipsism. Pessimistic individualism has sought to work toward rather than away from all solipsistic assumptions; it has worked, not for the sake of the exterior order, but against it. Striving after that selfhood which the rationalist had so vainly assumed, the romantic egoist sought to dismiss the world as a dream; the decadent condemned it as inferior; the symbolist disavowed allegiance to it by saying, *le monde n'existe pas pour moi*; egoists like Stirner and Nietzsche sought refuge in an irrationalism which should dismiss the world of things and persons. In this manner, the individualist has never really been a solipsist, but he has tried to be; the individualist has never been able to deny the presence of the exterior, but he has done all in his power to dismiss it as something inferior and malign.

This paradox tends to clear up when one reflects upon the actual situation in the world of knowledge; here it appears that knowledge of the world is easy and obvious, while knowledge of the self is difficult and dubious. Rationalism views the situation in exactly the opposite light; but, while one might hesitate to assert flatly, "rationalism is wrong," it cannot be doubted that to-day the knowledge of the physical order has advanced so far beyond the knowledge of the self that solipsism,

which is in itself impossible, is more of a desideratum than a danger. Individualism courts solipsism, because individualism sees that, although it were an error to believe that the self alone exists, it is wise to assert that the self does have some degree of existence in the world. The attitude of the anti-solipsist in the physical realm is akin to that of the anti-egoist in the social order; failing to note that physical and social forces are in marked ascendancy, the anti-individualistic thinker persists in giving to him that hath already, for which purpose he tries to take away from the ego the little that it hath in its napkin. The social order has no right to demand altruism of the individual, who has already been forced to take his place exterior to himself; the physical order has as little right to insist upon realism, since the self has done far too much for the establishment of the exterior world. The just demand of the day is for a complete individualism in both the physical and social; thereby, the rights of the "I think" and "I am" may come in for recognition. Thus far in the history of knowledge, the influence of thought has not been cast in favor of the creature that has done the thinking; Protagoras has had no school.

The individualism which seeks to effect a reunion of the self with the world is now convinced that, with all its brave resistance and strong self-assertion, the old individualism of irrationalism is a lost cause. In reviewing the history of this movement, as this appeared under the divisions, *The Struggle for the Truth of Life* and *Life the Place of Truths*, the new individualism, if such it may be styled, keeps reminding itself that rationalistic thinking ever tends to remove rather than to establish the thinker, just as the voter may vote away his rights. At the same time, individualism realizes that the old resort to irrationalism was in vain, even when it had the effect of showing that the self is different

from the rest of the world. The solution of the problem seems destined to come about only as the self makes use of thought as such, even when that may constantly threaten the self with destructive generalizations; the self must learn how to exist in some kind of intellectual order. In the same spirit, individualism must learn how to live within the world of things, even when pure subjectivity tends to afford a more convincing form of selfhood. Without the world, the self is as insignificant as "Columbus without America."

The individualist has chosen the self rather than the truth; for of what value was that "truth" which eliminated him from the world of existence? The choice to which the individualist was driven was due to that invidious tendency to survey the world apart from the self, the self apart from the world. But is the due aim of thought to establish difference or likeness between idea and thing? Just as long as thought and thing are looked upon dualistically as two principles, or monistically as two phases of some mysterious third, the conflict for priority and supremacy will obtain. But, when the self is viewed naturally as something within the world, the adjustment becomes simple and mutual. The self has shown its ability to find joy in a world which might seem to be cold and colorless; the self has found value in a world which seems to be made up of nothing but mere reality; and the self can find truth in the world that seems to consist in nothing but things. The older individualist sought joy, worth, and truth at the expense of the objective order; his opponent insisted upon objective reality at the expense of soul-states, free initiatives, and subjective affirmations. Both would appear to be wrong. The subjective realizes itself in the objective; the objective is discovered by the subjective; Columbus becomes Columbus only as he discovers America, while America is nought for man until

it has been discovered. The self alone is a morbid product moved more by Baudelarian "spleen" than by "ideal"; the world alone is a dull and silent affair until the ego takes his place in its midst. Both the self and the world lose when they are kept apart; they gain when they are brought together.

The higher synthesis which is implicit in the reunion of the self with the world comes about only as thought becomes more liberal, more versatile. As Classicism expressed the belief that all essential things were so thoroughly known that no real future was possible or desirable for humanity, as Scholasticism was inwardly persuaded that the establishment of its creeds marked the culmination of man's intellectual effort, so scientism has recently attempted to cast its fixed circle of knowledge about the human mind, whence the appeal to the future is forever in vain. Aristotle, Aquinas, and Comte thus reveal one of the most annoying characteristics of the human soul. The spirit of free, inward humanity has ever shown its readiness to elaborate higher syntheses, and the time for a new departure is at hand. The need of wholesome novelty has been shown in the career of individualism, according to which the truth of life can be found only as one entertains and enjoys a fuller and finer conception of the world.

It is quite plausible to assert that truth exists in and for itself, but it is just as tenable to affirm that truth exerts an influence in behalf of all that it touches. Instead of being a fixed quality like classic beauty, truth is like that sense of grace which Schiller likened to the girdle of Venus, because it could be put on and worn by one goddess as well as by another.¹ Thus viewed, truth refuses to become the property of one thing to the exclusion of another, just as it disdains allegiance to one phase of existence rather than another. With

¹ *Über Anmut und Würde, in loc.*

such a versatile ideal of the true, it becomes possible to gain the world without losing the soul, to secure the world without sacrificing the self. The fate of the subjective is one with the destiny of the objective; indeed, as the idea of the world becomes clearer and more convincing, the truth of the self becomes more plausible and perfect. Would one attempt to argue that, when the world-idea in the mind of man was weak, the self-idea was correspondingly strong, and that because the self-idea encountered no opposition from without? With the primitive man, where there is little comprehension of the facts and forces of the exterior world, there is just as little appreciation of the inner life; physics and psychology are equally imperfect. But, when the knowledge of the world becomes more perfect, the affairs of the self grow brighter, since it is the perfected and not the primitive condition of culture which witnesses the appearance of both the world-idea and the self-idea. The correction of that solipsism which seems to threaten the existence of the exterior world, is to be found not in less but in more of the self-idea; when this is extended an extra diameter, the self tends to become coincident with the world.

3. INDIVIDUALISM AND NOMINALISM

Just as there has been a misunderstanding between the self and the world, so there has been a pathetic lack of agreement between the self and society. The egoist has refused to be considered a thing among things; he has opposed the attempt to make him a mere "cell in the social organism." The success of social thinking in its systematic attempt to round out a social order comparable to the physical world, has been due to that constant violation of the self's inner content for which the social thinker is famous. As a result of such generalizing, social thought has entertained a conception of the self

which is practically worthless. The "individual" of social science is so wanting in power and character that the social thinker has had no difficulty in casting the net about him. The history of the nineteenth century thus witnessed a peculiar and distressing condition of human affairs. On the one side, scientific thought treated the self in such a formal manner that the resultant idea could never be a factor in the adjustment of the ego to the social order. On the other hand, the elaboration of a content of life for the individual was carried on almost exclusively by the aesthetic thinker, who succeeded in developing a rich content of soul-stuff, but that with so little in the way of formal description that the admirer of individualism was unable to discover what being one's self really meant. To the question, "How?" the egoist could give no essential answer. Upon the philosophic side, where form and content are supposed to be discussed together, there were few who took up the individualistic problem; so that all one heard was the nay of science and the yea of art. Among the philosophical egoists of the period in question were Emerson and Stirner, neither of whom could boast an independent dialectic; both of these contended for the self by making an appeal to the old nominalism.

Mediaeval methods are not to be despised simply because they are mediaeval, so that, if the old contrast between particular and universal, as this appeared in the scholastic opposition between nominalism and realism, seems serviceable, the problem of the self may well be conducted along nominalistic lines. Both parties in the conflict are candidates for the truth; upon which side will truth throw its favor; which of the two, the individual or the universal, shall wear the girdle of grace and truth? The competition between the self and society carries with it the contrast between content and form. Upon the individualistic side, it can hardly be

denied that an individualized inner life, devoted to joy, worth, and truth, is in a position to develop a life-content unknown in the vast and impersonal order. Individualism is intensive where social thought is extensive. On the other hand, it is the social order which is in a position to perfect the form of humanity. Now everybody knows that form and content must go together, just as everybody realizes that humanity must be made up of the individual and the social taken together; but the recognition of such formal truths is by no means the same as the solution of the practical problem proposed by the antinomy of selfhood and society. The relation of the self to nature is wholly theoretical, since the self cannot change the natural order of physical things, but must rest content with acceptable ideas concerning the ego and the world; but, with the self and society, both factors are subject to change, since the self can act upon its social environment, just as the social order can mould the individual. For this reason, the adjustment of the two members must be carried on with critical care. Combinations of complementary colors may be made in such a way as to bring about either mutual assistance or complete neutralization. The actual situation is such that to-day most men are denied individual existence, while some are in an anti-social condition.

In dealing with particulars which thought seeks to render intelligible, the most natural thing to do is to unite them in the form of a generalization. In this manner, trees and animals are easily assembled under as many convenient heads, so that the particular is now found in the general. Where, in other departments of contemporary thought, there is downright prejudice against the generalization, in social thinking the conceptual general has been allowed full sway. On the whole, it may be said, all physical generalization is blamed, all social generalization is praised. Were not

this the tendency, it had been impossible for the social thinker to perfect the general which is now so current and authoritative in the form of "society." Things, which could not complain of the generalizing treatment, have escaped; persons have not been so fortunate. Evolution has had the effect of neutralizing the animalistic concept without working so satisfactorily in behalf of the humanistic one; thus, when Darwinism discusses man as a species, it opens the conceptual circle upon the lower side, whence the lower animal participates in the life of man, but closes it on the higher side, where the individual would break out into free individualism. Biologically viewed, the generalization, man, is loose; on the ethical side, it is so tight that the individual is threatened with solidarity. In all this, there is formal inconsistency which puzzles the mind of the disinterested thinker; furthermore, there is, in such reasoning, an ethical injustice that is sure to offend the conscious individual. If the lower animal may enter into the circle of mankind, why may not the higher human being pass out?

Generalization is always questionable, inasmuch as it must involve a process of abstraction in connection with which the most characteristic qualities of the individual thing are eliminated. As metal, gold is not yellow; as tree, the branches of the poplar do not shoot up; as plant, the rose is not red. The thing in its characteristic particularity must pay dearly for its initiation into the circle of the general. When the humanistic generalization is made, the individual is called upon to relinquish that which is most characteristic and precious, whence generalization becomes a process of dubious value. When mankind is thus massed in the concept, what byway of aesthetical or ethical content can the individual call his own? Only the most obvious and commonplace may come in for recognition; for which

reason the "man" of social speculation and economic calculation is a poor imitation of the self-conscious, self-willed ego. If science demands such sacrifices, it is not to be wondered at that the individualist is often ready to fling himself into the arms of a hearty irrationalism.

But generalization were not so bad for the human self if the concept "man" merely stood off to one side in contrast with the living individual; this, however, is not the attitude of the concept at all. The place that the concept assumes is a superior one, since it takes its position above the particular thing or person, which latter must consent to subordination. Under the deep shadow of the general notion, the individual fades and droops. Any conceptual generalization which seeks to overshadow the striving suffering individual, is bound to be injurious; so that men are wont to worship the idea of something that refuses classification, whence the Hindu declares, "Brahman is that which is," while the Hebrew made his Jahveh say, "I am that I am." In the case of the human ego, the general ills of subordination are made unusually bad by the scientific attempt to subsume the self under the social concept. When this formal notion of logic is duly comprehended, it can more easily be seen why the egoist insisted upon an inward joy which should not flow out into the conceptual general of man as animal, why he asserted free initiatives which should express themselves as the general work of the social order, and why he resorted to an irrationalism which should redeem him from all classification. If there is to be any synthesis of the self and the human order, it must consist of some kind of synecdoche according to which the individual relates to the species as the species relates to the individual.

Nominalistic egoism, which has ever been ready to appeal to the irrational in life, has thus suffered from the smooth processes of generalization and subordina-

tion. Along with these, one notes the logical work of predication by means of which things in general are defined, but through whose influence the human self is fettered. It was against such invidious predication that egoism protested, as was observed in the section, *The Struggle for the Truth of Life*. The passion for predication, which has often connected things with impossible attributes, has had the effect of linking the individual with an array of adjectival qualities whose effect has been to discolor the inner life of the individual. As splendid statues gain nothing when they are painted, so the ego is no better but worse off when social thinking attempts to attribute to it a series of scientific and social qualities which the acute thinker has been able to ferret out of the life of man in the world of sense. To mention this general tendency to predicate as witnessed in scientific-social thinking is to recall how the form of the free individual has been colored by attributes peculiar to heredity and environment, by adjectives racial and climatic, eugenic and hygienic. In the midst of this performance, which has been more foolish than false, the individual has shown himself to be thoroughly human, since "a man's a man for a' that." If the ego were but a thing among things, the work of predication might go on undisturbed, but it is of the very genius of individualism to assert the ego, in spite of the qualifying limitations which a heedless science tends to drape about him.

Individualism has shown what qualities may be attached to the human self as subject. Individualism has asserted that man must be viewed in such a manner as to include a system of soul-states which the individual enjoys and through which he realizes himself. In addition to such eudaemonism, the individualistic demand includes the freedom of initiative in conjunction with which the self says, "I will," in the light of which it

takes up its own work in the world. Finally, the joy and worth of life are accompanied by an inner sense of truth, which the individual refuses to confine to mere things, but which he would apply to himself also. These are phases of that living content which individualism would now employ as so many predicates of man as such. If there be no place for such a self in the social order, then the ego must either proceed in anti-social manner, or recast the conception of social existence in such a manner as to make a characteristic generalization possible. To apply purely social characteristics to the self is to lose the subject in the predicate.

If the elaboration of a humanistic generalization is more difficult than is the case with other concepts, the very difficulty involved may make the solution correspondingly easy. In the case of the plant, the inclusion of the particular under the head of the general proceeds in a satisfactory manner, since the particularity of the plant betokens no inward individuality; the same may be said of the animal, where the principle of individuation has no essential meaning to the creature involved in it. But, in the case of man, the particular and individuated have taken special forms, which the self expresses after the manner of an "I am," "I will," "I think." For this reason, individuation must receive special treatment. On the other hand, the synthesis of human individuals in the form of a social generalization has the effect of yielding something more than a corresponding generalization of plants and animals could yield. The human generalization produces the idea of "humanity." But this was just the result of that individualism which at first seemed so inimical to the social. From all of this, what follows? The more perfect the individuation, the more perfect the humanity; the more perfect the socialization, the nearer the approach to humanity. That is, both the self and society have something in common; it is the ideal of humanity.

At heart, the true aim of all individualism has not been the development of the self as such, else were all individualism a merely hedonic egoism; individualism has aimed at the humanity of the self, as this appeared in soul-states, free initiatives, and inward assertions. On the other side of the case, it may be said that all social thinking, however crass it has often been, has had no other desire than the perfection of that humanity which to the social thinker seemed to lie implicit in the social order. Perhaps one has failed as much as the other; perhaps the intensive humanism of the individualist has been as remiss as the extensive humanism of the social thinker; nevertheless, the idea of humanity has not been wholly overlooked in the two-fold operation. In the higher synthesis of the self and the world, the presence of humanity must come in for special note. When the synthetic method is employed, the old diremption should disappear. Formerly, the disjunction involved seemed to consist of but two members, the individual and the social; now it appears that there are three. As a result of this new situation, one is not called upon to choose between the egoistic and the social, for he may choose the human; hence, he who approaches the problem of life from the social side may make his own way toward a supreme humanity, while he who entertains the egoistic prejudice is in a position where he may see the realization of his ideals in the same notion.

By virtue of the participation of the self in humanity, the old difficulties peculiar to subsumption and predication fall away. That to which the egoist objected when the elaboration of the concept society was carried on, was the subordination of the self to the social generalization. In this manner, the egoistic assertion, "I am," was made to read, "I am a social being," just as one would say, "the dog is an animal." As now viewed,

the egoist may relegate himself to a concept in such a manner as to say, "I am a human being," which assertion is scarcely calculated to arouse egoistic animosity. The same principle applies to the problem of predication, so that, where once ethics sought to apply the adjective "social" to the subject man, it is now called upon to employ the humanistic predicate. The idea of humanity contains implicitly all that "individual" sought to make explicit in its contention for the life-content of joy, worth, and truth. At the same time, the notion of "humanity" belongs to the individual just as thoroughly as it pertains to society, and that because humanity is made up of both form and content, just as it is extensive and intensive.

II. KNOWLEDGE AS INTELLECTUAL LIFE

Since the individual has shown his ability and willingness to transcend his one-time solipsism and nominalism, it remains to be seen whether knowledge as such is in a position to rise above its traditional prejudices in such a way and to such a degree as shall make possible the higher synthesis of the knowing self and the known world. The ego as enjoyer was able to mate with the idea of enjoyment as such, and the self as worker was none the less capable of uniting with the ideal of world-work; why, then, should there not be a possible union of the self as knower and the principles of knowledge? The particular interpretation of knowledge which seems necessary for the desired reconciliation of the two parties expresses itself in the form of the caption, "Knowledge as intellectual life." In the history of modern epistemology, such a conception, while here and there it may have been implicit in the discussion, has never been brought to the foreground; on the contrary, theory of knowledge has spent its time and its force seeking to discover whether knowledge should consist in some kind

of perceiving from without or some sort of conceiving within. Here, it has been a contention in favor of knowledge after experience; there, for knowledge before experience; the possibility of knowledge in experience has been allowed to fall between two stools. Meanwhile the actual process of knowing the world has gone on in art and science, in religion and general life, so that the lack of adequate theory has been felt more by the theorizer than by the man who has sought simply to know. The knowledge which actual knowing has involved seems to consist of an intellectual life.

I. THE UNDERSTANDING AS HUMAN

All discussions of the "human understanding" must be at once human and rational; the old rationalism without humanism was as misleading as the neo-humanism without rationalism. In the same manner, the old empiricism was as careless of man the experiencer as neo-realism has been negligent of man the perceiver. To sustain a balance of man and mind is far from easy, perhaps; yet one can aim to make the humanistic rational, the rationalistic human. The traditional schools of epistemology, from whose influence we need try to rid our minds, were both guilty of what, for want of a better term, may be called "ideology." Both indulged in the academic idea of man thinking when the subject in question is also man living. Knowledge is indeed an analytical operation in accordance with which isolated ideas have their place and exert their influence; at the same time, knowledge is a kind of culture whose synthetic creations have had at least much to do with the history of humanity as has the ideological.

To indulge the ideological, which makes all thinking appear direct and clear-cut, is to make man live in his mind alone; other interests, like the aesthetical, ethical, and religious, come by courtesy only. From the stand-

point of rationalism, man was expected to live in his ideas, while empiricism was just as insistent upon the point that man must live in the things that he perceives. How much intellectual life as life and what kind of human culture the realization of this notion would have produced, is difficult to determine; but it is well to observe that the intellectual operations of the human spirit have been carried on in delightful ignorance of the great decisions which were being made by the authoritarian epistemologists. In the last analysis, all epistemological knowledge was a knowledge of ideas, whether these were evoked freely from within or elaborated more toilingly from without. In neither case was the individual knower able to live in the world and thus become acquainted with it naturally; rather was he forced to abandon the self and turn to things or flee from things and give himself to thoughts. Now thinking thoughts and perceiving things are poor substitutes for living an intellectual life in the world.

An empiricist like Locke, even when his thought was free from the bombast of Bacon, did far less for nature than empiricists have imagined; a rationalist like Kant was just about as ineffectual in doing something for the individual, whose understanding was made to appear so magisterial. The self-constituted world on the one side and the self-asserting ego on the other were forced to look after their own affairs when they realized that theories of knowledge had not kept their promises. The empiricist seeks to make the world all by making the mind nothing; viewed as a *tabula rasa*, the mind must humbly accept what the world of things may choose to give it. The rationalist matched this extraordinary thesis with one of his own, according to which the mind is all, the world nought; all that the exterior order can ever hope to become depends upon the dictate of the *a priori* understanding of man. Here, the mind can

anticipate nothing; there, it anticipates every possible perception of reality. In spite of the fact that thinkers like Locke and Kant seem to be at such swords' points, they are finally forced to admit that, instead of dealing with genuine knowledge of the world by the self, they are only speaking of "ideas"; both end in ideology; both fail to discover the principles of intellectual life; both shun the plain question, "What is truth?"

In the special case of the Kantian epistemology, which now seems to represent the general situation, the philosopher out-Pilates Pilate. Feeling that he was possessed of morality as a sort of fourth dimension, Kant seems to have indulged the notion that, when the world of thought became too complicated, he could make his ethical escape from the six sides of thought; it was in this spirit that he indulged his grim humor at the expense of truth. In the mind of this moralic transcendentalist, "the land of truth—*das Land der Wahrheit*," is indeed a charming land, but one removed from the experience of man and screened from his vision. Far off in the stormy sea and surrounded by cloud-bank, the land of truth allures the hapless mariner to discover that which he is destined never to know.² This touch of Teutonic *Sturm und Drang* makes interesting reading; but does it really represent the speculative situation? Columbus must discover the western continent, but not so the eastern one; perhaps the mind of man is already in possession of that which it seeks to know.

If man does not live in the land of truth, where does he make his home? If knowledge is a knowledge of ideas rather than of things, how is the origin of these mysterious ideas to be explained? Those who cling to the history of modern philosophy and that with the feeling that, in general, the thinkers there were not wholly

² *Critique*, tr. Müller, 205.

mistaken, are often at a loss to know just what to do with these extraordinary epistemologies. If one must "destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith," if one must relinquish truth for the sake of thinkable ideas, he feels that epistemology is far too expensive for the philosophic pocket. As Locke's epistemology began with nothing, Kant's ended in nothing, so that nihilistic ideology seems to be the fate in store for him who follows traditional theory. What wonder that individualism has been so ready to accept and employ a frank irrationalism. When the logical ideal of truth as the correspondence of thought and thing was changed to the coherence of thought and thought, the attractiveness and worth of that truth seem to have lost their meaning. It is all very well to believe that reality consists of the causal connection of things without, and that truth involves the rational relation of thoughts within; but such dualism disappoints him who would view the world as intelligible, the mind as real. That which knowledge endeavors to establish as its general proposition is, "The mind knows the world." However naïve such an assumption, something like this has been the underlying principle of all real knowing in the realms of science and culture.

In striking contrast with such forbidding ideology, we are called upon to observe the operations which a living intellectualism has carried on in the mind's attempt to reduce the things of the world to order. Thus it must be quite plain to the disinterested observer that some other than the ideological principle of knowing ideas has been the support and inspiration of the knowing mind in its culture of the world. In more than one way, ideology was of value in pointing out that ideas have their place in the art of knowing things, hence all who take another than an ideological point of view must exercise care lest they make knowledge to consist of an

operation in which ideas have no part at all. Thus, it is not sufficient that the *ratio essendi* is a bland knowing of things apart from ideas, or that the *ratio cognoscendi* of truth is something purely humanistic when the ideational is one of the most characteristic of human attributes. Things are not merely things, men are not merely men. At the same time, the idea, which seems to be equally favorable to both thought and thing, may be of service in explaining the agreement of inner with outer, of outer with inner. Perhaps then it may be said that the spirit of modern ideology was just, so that it is only the severely academic method of procedure that one should seek to criticize.

The veritable situation as presented by living knowledge appears to be one according to which the mind is within the world in whose life and nature it has ever been participating. Growing up in the world, man has sought to become acquainted with its forms and functions; man is not as one without who tries to gain an entrance into the charmed circle of its forms and truths; rather is he within the system of existence to which he owes his origin. Nor is the world outside of man making it necessary for his mind to wait for experience to acquaint him with its realities; on the contrary, the spirit of the world characterizes man's nature in such a manner as to make knowledge of reality native to him. Man in the world and the world in man, that seems to be the most natural idea which confronts one when he attempts to present the question of human knowledge.

The intellectualistic presentation of the knowledge-situation would indulge the thought that what we have to explain is an intellectual life striving to acquaint itself with its world, rather than that of an alien mind attempting to discover the world, or a foreign world using sensation to effect an entrance into the mind. As an intellectual life, the inner nature and activity of reason be-

comes far more comprehensible than it has been under the auspices of either empiricism or rationalism. The real intellect of man is not an experience-registering or a category-functioning affair, but an intellectual life growing up into a knowledge of the world within and without it. Such an intellectual life expresses itself in culture rather than in calculation, whether that calculation be of an empirical or a rationalistic sort. Is it not possible, then, to consider human philosophical knowledge as a cosmic culture, or an attempt to secure living knowledge of the world as a whole? If mind is a *tabula rasa*, if the world is a *terra incognita*, then the attempt to secure knowledge of reality can end in nothing more than a knowledge of ideas; but if a living mind seeks to acquaint itself with the world in which it is placed, there is some chance of that mind's gaining a knowledge of truth. Furthermore, something like knowledge of truth has been gained by the mind; shall we be so skeptical of our human culture as to insist that such knowledge is but a knowledge of ideas?

2. THE ORIGIN AND GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE

The conception of knowledge as an intellectual life within the world, rather than of an intellect placed outside reality, aids us in considering the modern question concerning the origin of knowledge. Locke's scruple was so great that he could not allow the mind as such to possess any innate ideas; Kant's anxiety for the mind was so great that he found it necessary to place all possible knowledge within the understanding. Which was right, Locke or Kant: which was the right point of view, that which premised nothing, or that which premised everything? If there was no knowledge in the mind at the beginning, how was it possible for the mind to acquire its knowledge? If all knowledge was originally in the understanding, how was it possible to

make the acquisition of knowledge genuine? Empiricism cannot convince us of the possibility, dogmatism cannot reveal to us the need, of knowledge; in one case, the mind has everything to learn, in the other nothing. In the midst of this modern dispute between the two schools, it has been overlooked that the mind has in its own way acquired truths, religious and artistic ones at the beginning, philosophic and scientific ones as it advanced; how is this actual knowledge, this human culture, to be explained? In addition to such general knowledge which has instructed the mind and nourished the soul, the intellect has not failed to develop a special form of world-knowledge in metaphysics; has this science been dependent upon the theory of knowledge? According to Kant, it was necessary to know the possibilities of the mind before one could know the realities of the world; but the actual situation seems to be one in which the question of knowledge as such, instead of standing apart as the judge of that which should be considered real, was itself involved in the larger question of knowledge, as where, with Parmenides and Plato, knowing and being were one. Where the ancient thinker would place knowledge and reality upon the same basis, the modern has sought to assume the primary position for knowing, the secondary for being.

The origin of knowledge, whether in the general, cultural, or the special, metaphysical, form seems to be neither within nor without the mind; the views of both empiricism and rationalism appear equally hopeless. The solution of this paradox seems to be found in the thought which we are now indulging; namely, that knowledge is not a mere knowing, but an intellectual life, that knowledge is not acquired from a position without the world as a kind of discovery, but within the world as an acquaintance. Concerning the sensation-recording mind of Locke and the category-functioning mind of Kant,

we can simply say that such a "mind" does not exist. Such a "mind" which seeks reality in the one case and is sought by reality in the other, is a fiction; mind, as we know it through its acquisition of knowledge and its inward culture, is something which lives and works within the world. Mind is not below the world, not above the world; mind is neither transcended by reality, nor does it itself transcend reality; mind is in reality. Both empiricism and rationalism confuse us with their question concerning the origin of ideas, because they persist in placing the mind in a position outside the world; once there, the mind has no hope of coming into its kingdom, whether from below or from above.

With the thought of mind as an intellectual life, a life which is responsible for art and religion as well as for science and metaphysics, we are in a position where we may safely handle the question concerning the absolutism and relativism of knowledge. Where empiricism places mind below the world and makes its ideas dependent upon sensation, knowledge can never be more than a relative knowledge; where rationalism lifts the understanding to a position beyond the world, all knowledge must be absolutistic. But, where knowledge is an intellectual life, the question of absolutism and relativism loses much of its meaning, whence we are able to affirm that neither situation presents the real position of the mind in the world. There is indeed something absolutistic in the thought that the human mind within the world occupies a central position, whence none of its dignity is lost to it from its non-rationalistic origin. In the same manner, there is something relativistic about the mind, for the reason that, while in its central position, it must recognize that the periphery of the world lies beyond it, so that its knowledge is a growing and becoming. The mind is not placed in a position where it must pronounce a kind of "all or nought"; the living mind in the world

shows itself to be in possession of knowledge which gradually becomes clearer and more perfect, whence knowledge partakes more of the nature of culture than of thought.

While it is only in a general way that we may insist upon the absolutism of knowledge, the truth inherent in the idea of the absolutistic still obtains in the form of the supremacy and dignity of the knowing process. In a certain sense, there is nothing extraordinary about knowledge, while at the same time there is nothing to be compared with the relation between the knower and the known unless we cite the instance of the will and its object. These two forms of mental expression, the intellectualistic and the voluntaristic, cannot be compared with other things which take place in the world; indeed, as a matter of fact, knowing and doing are not to be called events. The view of knowledge as an intellectual life within the world would express the relation between knowledge and its object, not by placing the two side by side in the form of a parallelism, but by adjusting the knower to a central position within the circle of that which is to be known. Just why the knowing process is thus placed within the world of knowledge rather than outside and alongside of it, can be answered only by saying that that is where the mind is found; for it is only an artificial dualism which, having first extracted the mind from the world, attempts to range the knowing process parallel with that which it is expected to know. The naturalness of knowledge and the spontaneity of human culture indicate that it is not necessary to inflict upon the mind sensations from without, not necessary to endow the mind with inexplicable categories to be inflicted upon the world from within.

Intellectual life concerns itself with knowledge rather than the theory of knowledge; its categorical imperative is, I must know! Does subjectivism make knowl-

edge possible? In opposition to subjectivism, it may be urged that, not only does it deny us the right to possess our world, but it takes our selfhood from us; in place of "I am" and "I know," it puts a mere "I perceive," or an "I think." It is, of course, possible for the subjectivist to insist that there can be no attempt at knowledge of the outer world which does not make due allowance for the fact that such knowledge must come to the mind in the form of subjective impression or inward thought; but such attempts at idealization have the effect of defeating themselves, inasmuch as they hide from us the reality within as well as the reality without the mind, just as Kant's *Second Antinomy* is as fatal to the soul as the *First Antinomy* is to the world. On this account, it becomes necessary for the individualist to deny himself the friendship and furtherance of idealism whose perceptual and conceptual forms are impotent to assert the independent existence of the self with its inner life of culture. It is not something less than such idealism, but something more, which is required to content the ambitions of the mind as intellectual life.¹ The abiding truth of idealism peculiar as it is to both Plato and Kant, consists in the assertion that mind is equal to the problem of knowledge, inasmuch as mind is itself possessed of the intellectual forms and functions which true knowledge involves. With Plato and Kant, this truth is expressed in the form of the mind's power to "anticipate" knowledge, although with Kant this anticipation was urged to such an extreme that the transcendentalist assumed the position that the fundamental forms of reality could be known from a study of the mind alone, as in the instances of the quantitative, qualitative, casual, and substantial.

Yet, such an "anticipation" of experience, essential as it is to intellectual life, may be expressed in a less questionable form when, instead of removing from

knowledge the natural element of surprise, we change the emphasis to the sufficiency of the mind to the task which the world presents. When realism strives to view the mind as a naïve view of a world with which mind is expected to have no affinity, it makes it difficult to see how mind can become acquainted with what is so alien as the world, while it further complicates the natural knowing of the world by the suggestion that mind is wholly unprepared for its work as knower of the world. In addition to the fixed forms of knowledge by which, according to Kant, the mind was supposed to have a ready place for the manifold of reality, the mind is equipped with a native love of knowledge, *amor intellectualis*, while the instinctive desire for happiness is such as to remain unsatisfied apart from an intellectual participation in the world. It is in such intellectualistic eudaemonism that the mind reveals itself as intellectual life able not only to reflect and react upon the world, but prepared to enjoy existence through the knowledge of that which is. Such a desire for intellectual enjoyment is equivalent to the idea of anticipation, while it makes none of the specific assertions which rendered Kant's epistemology so forbidding. The mind is adapted to the knowledge of reality, for in that knowledge the functions of the mind have their true exercise; enjoying, working, and comprehending the world—these are the specific forms of intellectual life.

The living enjoyment of knowledge, the use and realization of the intellect as intellectual life, make the usual criteria of knowledge seem indirect and hesitating. Where ancient thought was wont to maintain the correspondence of thought and thing, modern epistemology has found it necessary to advocate a parallelism according to which the coherence of ideas within has been supposed to accompany the coherent order of things without. With the method of correspondence, there was

always the suggestion that the objective world was more authentic than the inner life, to which was accorded such functions as "imitation" of and "participation" in the real order of things; in the case of "coherence," the tendency was toward the subjective, as the philosophies of Malebranche, Berkeley, and Kant attest. Of the two ideals of knowledge, that of correspondence seems more authentic, for the idea of coherence suggests that, after all, it is the correspondence of the whole coherent order within to the coherent order without which constitutes the idea of truth. From the viewpoint of intellectual life within the world, the idea of correspondence is supplanted by the notion of a living participation of the subject with the object, the subject can be satisfied only as it goes forth from itself into the living world of things. In the same manner, the ideal of inner coherence cannot satisfy the mind, which longs for a more vital apprehension of the world than the perfect order and connection of its inner ideas can supply. The mind desires a sense of intellectual enjoyment which must mean more than the satisfaction which might come from witnessing the consistent play of ideas with the mind. Indeed, the idea of inward coherence was never wholly free from the morbidness and irrationalism from which the individualism of the future is bound to deliver itself.

Just as the conception of knowledge as intellectual life delivers the self from merely formal criteria of truth, so the living view of truth makes it possible for the mind to adopt a more satisfactory attitude toward the given form of the world. This form is that of change and becoming. With both ancient and modern idealism, with Plato and Spinoza, no knowledge seemed possible in a world of change and progress, so that the rationalist has ever been as a monarch who would command the sea to stand still. But, if the element of permanence is found in the mind, which may view its world *sub spe-*

cie aeternitatis, there is no need of having the object of the knowledge as something fixed. The idea of fixity in knowledge seems to have sprung from a false conception of reality, whence the thinker has been led to expect of existence that of which existence was not capable. The rationalist who postulates permanence as the essential of knowledge is prone to consider reality as constituted by a thing-in-itself, when the most consistent and promising conception of reality makes room for the qualities of the thing and the states of its being. It is undeniable that such qualities and states are not possessed of unlimited freedom, for they move and vary in accordance with the nature of the thing which they constitute; but, within their proper sphere, they are privileged to come and go as they are worked upon by the principle of change. The known reality of the thing then is discoverable in the principle which synthesizes the states of existence; this principle of order makes possible all the change of which the thing is capable.

Because of the plastic conception of reality, it may be said that, not only does knowledge permit of motion in its object, but knowledge actually demands such motion as the condition under which it is able to do its synthetic work. Because of the plastic and at times unorganized condition of the object of knowledge, the mind is able to do genuine thought-work, which were impossible if the object were a fixed thing-in-itself. In the case of perception, the synthetic act of knowledge is made possible by the heterogeneous character of the qualities involved in the transaction, for perception is a fusion of states under the head of objectivity. To perceive such an object as an apple, is to assemble and unite such divergent qualities as red color, sweet taste, smooth tactual quality, spicy odor, and the like. The work of perception is thus done in the midst of a changing manifold of sensations. The same may be said of

conception; here, the various examples which make up the general idea are possessed of considerable differences with but a minimum of likeness, so that the understanding is called upon to exert itself in order to unite these different things under one head. Were there no differentiations, were there no changes, it were difficult to comprehend how the mind could do its work of thought. The mental permanence which the mind so desires is a condition acquired in the midst of difference and change. In this manner, the dialectic of Parmenides seems weak and ineffectual because it fails to yield one iota to the Heraclitean flux, in which the challenge to the mind was such as to evoke the genuine synthetic powers of thought. In the case of the more advanced and richer dialectic of Plato, the significance of the Heraclitean confusion was not thoroughly appreciated; Heraclitus was the friendly foe who made possible the deduction of the very Idea which his philosophy seemed to forbid. With the skeptical Hume, Kant was more liberal than were these ancient masters with their adversaries; yet, even with Kant, who was pledged to the synthetic in knowledge, there was the desire to subdue the outer world to the inner life, rather than to allow the subject to weave knowledge out of the threads of sensation. Now it is as weaving rather than as moulding that knowledge is to be understood.

Knowledge is at once desiderative and dialectical; viewed as intellectual life, knowledge is an intense longing for truth rather than a mere acceptance of it as something imposed upon the mind from without. The desire to know is in many ways as important as the ability to know, so that one may not justly complain of his mental condition when he is poor in knowledge but rich in desire—*des Wissens bar, doch des Wunches voll*—inasmuch as intellectual desire carries with it the power to create ideas. In place of the search for knowledge

which some, like Lessing, have prized more highly than the possession knowledge itself, intellectualism would exalt an intellectual life in which desire assumes a dialectical character, and from which spring the forms of knowledge which, while somewhat foreign to logic and ethics, do not fail to find their place and exert their influence in art and religion.

. 3. THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

Where individualistic thought looks upon knowledge, neither as an anticipation nor as an imitation in the world, but as an intellectual life within that world, it places itself in a position where it feels secure of its known object. Such intellectualistic individualism is certainly delivered from the question whether knowledge has an object, so that it need only inquire concerning the manifest nature of that object. Intellectualism, in the free sense of the present interpretation, does not assume to dictate the character of the knowable world; nevertheless, intellectualism is able to render some decision concerning the contrary views of the world, as this world is an object of thought. The crux of the difficulty is found in the opposed claims of the world as fixed and the world as fleeting, as this distinction has come down to our thought from the elder days of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Now it is well known that Socrates was annoyed by the subjectivism of Protagoras, just as Plato looked with dismay upon the impossibilities of Heraclitus. As a result, when the subjectivism of Protagoras seemed to fuse with the "flux" of Heraclitus, Socrates and Plato decided upon a firm synthesis of all changing particulars under the head of the substantial Ideas. In the epistemological thought of the day, there is a feeling that, perhaps, this classic synthesis was elaborated too hurriedly, too fixedly. Idealism

clings to the old order of thinking, while realism seems ready to negate it altogether.

From the standpoint of intellectualism, it seems expedient to inquire concerning the relative values of the promises which the Heraclitean and Parmenidean hold out to the human mind. To the classic idealist, there was nothing in the Heraclitean, everything in the Parmenidean. The contention expressed itself in this manner: since conceptual knowledge demands a fixed object, it can do nothing but accept a view of the world as fixed, and reject a world-view which has in it nothing but change. As Socrates had repudiated the notion of every individual having his own subjective opinion, so Plato set at naught the claim that each changing thing, or phenomenon, of the manifold has, as it were, its own reality. The result was the Socratic Definition, the Platonic Idea. Suppose, now, one return for a moment to the situation before the idealistic synthesis had fixed the ideas in the intellectual firmament; perhaps he may find something noteworthy and trustworthy in the Dionysian and Heraclitean.

No little amount of logic depends upon what one expects to find in reality; if, with dogmatism, he assumes that reality is indeed the Parmenidean *estin-einai*, he cannot find much encouragement in the Heraclitean-Protagorean conception of knowledge as a knowledge of the varying particular. If, however, one sees in reality, not the substantial alone, but the qualitative and causal, also, he will find no less in Parmenides, and more in Heraclitus. According to this conception of reality,³ things do not exist apart from their qualities or actions. From this point of view, a thing is what it, in its phenomenalistic qualities, shows itself to be; a thing is what it does; a thing is what it is. Thus, the substantialistic in being, instead of coming forth at the beginning,

³ Cf. *The Ego and its Place in the World*.

appears at the end of the dialectical search; for, as qualities cannot exist without appropriate causes, so causes cannot operate without the substantial ground afforded them by nothing else than substance itself. The world may not be of solid substance; none the less is the world of qualities and causes of substantialistic character.

This qualitative, causal conception of reality now becomes of supreme value as the mind seeks its objective. Where the older substantialism of Parmenides and Plato protested that there could be no knowledge except as it was a kind of *noiein-einai*, wherein thinking and being were one, a more advanced and more critical substantialism finds it possible to apprehend the meaning of substance in the changing manifold, in the caused qualities of a less rigid world. Indeed, with its firm belief in the substantial and the substantial's ability to guard its own ontological fortunes, intellectualism goes so far as to assert that it is not in spite of the changing manifold that substance persists, but by means of this very tendency in the world of things that substance is enabled to show to the mind just what it is. For, with a rich manifold of qualities, some of which, as in the case of complementary colors and opposed poles, could not be displayed at the same metaphysical moment, the principle of change becomes necessary in the complete display of that which being is. Not all of the many, varied qualities can make their appearance at one time; but, with the process of change within the domain of reality, the total revelation becomes possible.

On the side of the mind, while the intellect reserves the right to pass final judgment, the function of sensation is indispensable; for, without it, the content of being would remain an empty thinghood, a Parmenidean *estin-einai*. The service of sensation cannot be lightly set aside by the superior intellect, even where the intellect has the authentic power to arrange the qualities of

sensation in appropriate groups whose totality will betray the meaning of reality in a manner unknown to the abstractness of the intellect or the concreteness of perception. In the same way, the will aids the intellect in affording intelligence concerning the dynamic character of the exterior object; and, while the will, like sensation, must ultimately submit to the intellect, the fact that doing is a step towards knowing cannot be dogmatically denied.

If, now, as has been the case with dogmatism, knowledge is conceived of as standing outside the world, the concreteness and dynamic character of the world will never prove aught but a puzzle, a contradiction; but where the intellect is placed within the world where it had its origin, the significance of both sensation and volition cannot fail to appear. In the system of Heraclitus, the promises of knowledge were thus more sincere than the idealist was able to see, for the reason that the idealist of the day was convinced that "to be" meant simply "to be." With Heraclitus, moreover, there was ever a sense of permanence, expressed as this was in his doctrine of the Logos. And it is as much the Heraclitean Logos as it is the Anaxagorean Nous, or even the Platonistic Idea, which intellectualism is ready to accept as the principle of knowledge upon which intellectual life is based. Intellectual life in the Logos, with all the phenomenalism and dynamism of the latter, is more to the individualist than the dogmatic rationalism which bases its claims to the interpretation of the world upon fixed concepts.

In the midst of this contention that the qualitative, causal character of the world does not forbid knowledge, individualism further contends that idealism, which might be supposed to have nothing to learn from the world, has borne the burden of speculative thought, as this has been going on since the days of Vedanta and Greek philosophy. Apart from what has been the case,

one might expect that a realistic system placing its affair upon the actual facts of the world, would have gathered the insight which has made philosophy what it is, while idealism could only stand aloof, offering now and then a criticism concerning the work of its more active colleague. History, however, has a different lesson to impart; from it we learn that it has been idealism, with its indirect reference to the facts of experience, which has shaped the systems of philosophy; and realism has not been idle; its work has consisted in the secondary activity of opposing generalizations, in challenging conclusions. It has been from the intellectualistic conception of things as ideal that the individual has been able to evince the truth of life.

III. THE INTELLECTUAL SYNTHESIS

The third and final form of the higher synthesis which the reunion of the self and the world demands is an intellectual one, calculated to establish the truth of life. As genuine enjoyment makes possible the aesthetic synthesis, as genuine action perfects the practical synthesis, so a sincere conception of knowledge should bring self and world to a position of mutual understanding. That which the intellectual synthesis must confront is the individualistic attempt to evince the truth of life apart from any objective reference, the attempt which led to irrationalism and irreligion. The self with its ideals of inner existence makes demands which are not usually met in theories of knowledge, where objectivity is the most obvious criterion of truth. The foregoing discussion of *The Truth of Life*, where the self is the knower and the world the known, promises an ideal of knowledge which may be able to effect the reunion of the irrational self with the world, although it does not follow from this that the world may still be viewed as though it were purely scientific and social. To establish the reunion

of the self and the world, as these have been separated not by dialectics but by life itself, it becomes necessary to involve a deeper conception of both man and the world than contemporary thought is willing to allow; furthermore, the ideal of knowledge must be refreshed by a new conception of the knowing process, which latter has hardly been able to raise itself above the disjunction of rationalism and empiricism. The conception of knowledge which should reform subject and object, as well as the method of knowledge itself, is that of *interpretation*, the intellectual interpretation of the world as a whole.

I. KNOWLEDGE AS INTERPRETATION

Under the auspices of conventional systems of knowledge, the knowing process limited itself arbitrarily to the identification of things and the connection of causes in the world; that there might be an interpretation of the world as a whole was lost to view in the more technical and academic manner of considering the epistemological question. Such a method of knowledge, which involved a minor logic, had the effect of driving the individual out of the world, since the individual could not regard himself as a mere thing among things, or consider his inner life as something whose essence promised nothing more than a psycho-physical relation of mind and matter, or an epistemological distinction between subject and object. In such a dualism, as also with the monism which was ever implicit in it, the relation of the self to the world failed to appear. The individual felt itself to be more than "mind" and somewhat different from "subject," since these formal notions failed to express the content of an inner life appreciable in art, morality, and religion. But, with knowledge as an idealistic interpretation of the world as a whole, the individual has a right to expect that knowledge will

have the effect of restoring the self to the world, the world to the self. What is expedient for the one may be accepted by the other.

If such a conception of knowledge seems to involve a sort of transcendentalism, then it can only be pointed out that a philosophy of life, dissatisfied with the usual arrangement of the world in the form of ideas and things, has tacitly decided to rise above or descend below this, as the exigencies of the case might demand. If philosophy as such is content with the formal view, art, morality, and religion are not. Mystical thinking may assert, as in the case of Plotinus, that it is "beyond thinking and being," or may claim, as with Schelling, that the unity of subject and object is found in a lower realm of unconsciousness; all that philosophy of life desires to do is to interpret life in independence of academic distinctions. Kant protested that his transcendentalism did not pretend to arrive at the idea of pure thinghood; but this innocence of the transcendent is wanting in his ethics and aesthetics. That which was disallowed reason, was granted to will and sense; for Kant professes to find a superior good-in-itself and an equally superior beauty-in-itself where he cannot find a mental thing-in-itself. In this manner, Kant's morality and art succeed where his logic fails. The present attempt at a higher synthesis of those functions of life which have to do with joy, worth, and truth, has proceeded thus far with the result of showing that no extra-aesthetics is needed to satisfy the inward sense of beauty, which latter may well come to itself in complete aesthetic harmony with the world and with humanity. In the same manner, it has been indicated that no over-ethical doctrine is needed to supply the demand for life's worth, since genuine human values may be established when man is one with nature and humanity. Have we not a right to expect as much complaisance from knowledge,

so that knowledge, instead of constituting a noble, individualistic irrationalism, shall take its place beside joy and worth in the world-whole of things and persons?

To assert, as Scholasticism expressed it, that the idea in the mind is *ante rem*, is about the same as to affirm that the mind of the individual has the right to advance from the simple identification of the things of sense through their causal connection to an idealistic interpretation of the world as a whole. In a certain sense, this is transcendentalism; yet the epistemology involved has less to say about any superior position that the mind might be conceived as occupying than about the exalted character which that mind may be supposed to possess. Below things of sense or beside them, mind might perhaps show its intrinsic intellectual worth; but it seems as though the character of the mind were best conserved after the manner of an idealism which tends to place the idea above the sensuous object. In more ways than one, the transcendental logic of Kant achieved the goal of genuine knowledge, so that one may well wonder why Kant was so prone to despair of the results which the *Kritik* had achieved. When one rises above the rationalism and empiricism of the Enlightenment, he finds it possible to forget whether the idea makes the thing or the thing the idea, since he sees that the idea is in a position to give the thing an idealistic interpretation. No longer is the question of, no object without subject or no subject without object, since object and subject so-called may lie down together like lamb and lion.

The present system, which suggests a kind of humanistic intellectualism, is bound to feel no little sympathy for the old scheme of rationalism, since it was such a way of thinking as kept before the philosophical mind the idea of the individual's character and worth. In explaining the inward strivings of the mind as these exhibited themselves in the culture of humanity and

to justify those ideals which that culture perfected, the rationalistic conception of knowledge as pure cognition has been of inestimable value. Were one to assume that mind is content to think things either singly or in mutual relations, one would find it difficult to account for that world-old mental habit of thinking about ideas in their detachment from the things of sense-experience. Under such auspices, art were but imitation, aesthetic enjoyment naught but so much immediate pleasure. On the other hand, it is a question whether the individual is able to pay the cost which the eminent possession of such free ideals involves, for the idealism thus involved calls upon the individual to relinquish his hold upon the world, and develop talent in solitude, beauty and piety in seclusion. Of these ideals, so it seems, the world is not worthy. By its very nature, the inner life, prone as it is to decadence, needs to be renewed and refreshed by contact with the exterior order. Indeed, it is detachment from nature and humanity which has had the effect of bringing about the crisis in individualism. In this spirit of faith in the world of things and persons, one turns from the subjectivity of Huysmans to the objectivity of Loti, from the aestheticism of Wilde to the naturism of Hardy. For the sake of the individual, even when he may have no real interest in things and men, it is advisable that individualism establish some sort of reunion with the world; and, as this has appeared possible in connection with the ideals of beauty and worth, so it should appear no less plausible a plea when philosophy advises the self to seek its truth in the world-whole of nature and humanity.

The aim of knowledge is no longer to be expressed in militaristic manner as conquering things or being conquered by them; rather is it the more pacific ideal of learning how to live securely and worthily within the world of things. In this manner, the higher synthe-

sis of the self in its unity and the world in its totality expresses itself in the form of intellectual participation. The history of the human intellect does not reveal the mind trying to get out of reality; that is only the rationalistic way of looking upon the matter. From what the work of human contemplation has been doing, it would appear as though man were trying to work himself into reality, in order that he may find his true place there. To participate in the world means more than to exercise the mere occupancy of existence in the world; genuine participation means that man, instead of dwelling in the land like the aborigine, comes into possession of the world which he seems destined to inherit. This involves genuine knowledge of the world, and is far removed from merely experiencing impressions from without or thinking thoughts as these arise within. It is the knowledge by means of intellectual life.

To advance the plain and obvious proposition involved in genuine knowledge, one has simply to say, "I know the world." Experience of impressions and thought concerning ideas are in no sense substitutes for this direct notion of knowledge. Modern realism has met modern idealism with a proposition which, while resembling the notion just expressed, fails to do justice to either thought or thing. In opposition to the claim that mind thinks ideas, realism asserts that mind knows things; the contrast between the two may be represented thus:

Mind : Idea :: World : Thing.

That which realism endeavors to do is to remove the subjectivistic screen from the outside world and behold this world as such; meanwhile, idealism contends, either that one can know only the subjectivistic screen, or that it can gain its only hint of the objective world by looking through this ideological device. Either we cannot know the world, or, if we know it, such knowledge

can never be more than something indirect and inferential. Unfortunately for the mind, idealism is in no position to tell us anything more worthy of it than that it has the power to think; unfortunately for the world, realism can do no more than assure us that it exists. Now those who are anxious to place the self in the world are equally anxious to entertain a sufficient idea of both the self and the world which are to be related, so that the problem of perception does not express all the issues of the proposition, "I know the world."

Another view of the situation, and one which borrows from both idealism and realism, would present the matter in such a manner as to let the idealistic mind know the realistic world. This would appear in the following manner :

Intellectual Life . Self :: Thing World-Whole.

When, therefore, we assert that the mind knows the thing, we are asserting also that it is not merely mind as something reflective and representative, but as living which knows; and when we add the assertion that the thing is known, we are not content with its immediate existence as object of perception, but see in it the semblance of the world in its totality. Idealism may still insist that the thinking mind shall place its screen before the object, just as realism may continue its contention that the idea of the world-whole is screened from and mediated to the mind by sense, but the view of intellectual life in the world can allow these half-significant suggestions only as their exponents admit that mind is more than mind, thing more than thing.

The idealistic estimate of mind as the subject which knows is not sufficient to the demands of mind as that which lives. It is of the very genius of mind to be spontaneous and creative, rather than calculating and repre-

sentative. If knowledge were all logic, if mind did not have culture, such a partial conception of mind as thought-process might obtain; but mind has ever shown itself to be contemplative and creative; capable of art and religion as well as logic and metaphysics. The thought-process in mind, instead of being the sole form of intellectual activity, is but a special form of concentration in which all the phases of intellectual life are specialized in the form of judgment. This rationalistic method of treating mind is justifiable, not as the inherent principle of mind as intellectual life, but as a means of conceiving and communicating that which the mind has gathered from the world. To experience and enjoy are prerogatives of the intellectual life of the mind as such; to conceive of this content in a definite form and communicate it in proper fashion are privileges of the more rationalistic phases of thought. Thought is thus the vehicle of knowledge; knowledge itself is anterior to and independent of that which expresses it.

The "world" in which the thought of man seeks to participate shows itself to consist of a world of forms, but not of that alone; already it has been pointed out that the world-whole is broad enough to be none the less a world of joys and a world of values. In order to gather the fruit of these, and not for the sake of emphasizing the mere fact of order, the formal character of the world now comes in for expression. In all three forms of the world-whole, the aesthetical, the practical, and the intellectual, the individual seeks adequate objectivity. With its permanent interest in the subject, idealism is ever ready to sacrifice the world in order that the self may enjoy independent, integral existence; for the sake of clearness and completeness in the objective order, realism is just as ready to eliminate the ego, which it can only regard as an interloper in the world of things. Yet all that idealism may really demand of existence is

that the integrity of the soul be safeguarded from without; all that realism has a right to expect is that the order of the objective world be preserved. But the complete unity of things, while it cannot obtain where the subject opposes the object, or the object the subject, may well be preserved when the self takes its place in the world as a principality within a kingdom, a play within a play. The self cannot be expected to think itself out of the world, nor has the self a right to expect that subjective cogitation will have the effect of removing the objective order in the case of either nature or humanity.

In the case of individualism, in whose behalf all the foregoing study has been carried on, it may now be pointed out that, while scientism has no right to give to its exclusive interpretation of nature or sociality the authority to dictate to man concerning all humanity, the objective orders of nature and humanity as such are safe for the individual. The earlier individualism, dismayed at the crass objectivity of life, sought joy, worth, and truth within the narrow confines of its own nature. The result did more harm to the self than to the world, while it tended to point out that thought cannot perfect its ideal of complete subjectivity unless it involve a due degree of objectivity. But, if there be no worthy and adequate objectivity in the scientifico-social system, it does not follow that there is no hope of objectivity at all. There is in nature a greater extension and intension than is found in the scientific conception of nature, and thus it becomes the duty of philosophy to change the form of nature from a genitive to a secure nominative. In the same manner, humanity implies more content than has been found in the idea of society, so that again philosophy must seek to re-establish a higher synthesis according to which humanity in general shall take the place long occupied by the simple conception of society. When the aesthetical and ethical forms of philosophy applied them-

selves to the higher synthesis, it appeared that both nature and humanity were capable of accommodating themselves to a higher view of joy and worth; in the same fashion, the consideration of life's truth should reveal the fact that nature and humanity are able to supply a superior conception of truth, which fails to appear in the scientific and social treatment of the world in which the individual lives. Then, with all three phases of individualism expanded an extra diameter, it may be assumed that both the self and the world are able to meet upon a higher plane on which the joy and worth and truth of life may be found without violating either the subjective or the objective.

2. THE ESSENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY

The conception of knowledge as an interpretation of the world as a whole tends to prevent party-thinking from urging the special claims of its favorite principle, whether subject or object. If life were a library or a laboratory, where all objects to be known were duly classified and catalogued and where the life-interest was purely intellectualistic, then the neglect of subjectivity might be indulged without risk of spiritual disaster. But the given hurly-burly, in which unanalyzed things and unorganized ideas are in constant confusion, warns the thinker that he must have an eye to the welfare of that life which is involved in this manifold. Exterior life, as this appears in industry, in social interest, and in material progress, has been organized to an extent and degree unknown in the life that is interior; the outer unity is far more perfect than the inner unity. As a result of this condition of external superiority, our human experience furnishes us with more than we can comprehend; we do better than we know, live where we do not learn,

and perfect the immediate at the expense of the remote. The pursuit of the practical has something plebian about it, while the devotion to immediacy rather than remoteness does not fail to suggest provincialism. That which keeps thought from the cultivation of those internal ends, which are acknowledged to express the most significant characteristics of humanity, is the dread of subjectivity. At this point, theory of knowledge suffers at the hands of both its enemies and its friends. The enemies of subjectivity exalt the exterior world of scientific research and social endeavor, and threaten with solipsism and egoism all who attempt to speak in favor of the inner life. The friends of subjectivity, from whom the devotee of the inner life must pray for deliverance, have prejudiced the plausibility of the subjective by treating it in a manner at once formal and polemical; formal in its lack of content, polemical in that the subjective has habitually been employed to discredit the existence of things. As a result, one might perhaps venture the assertion that as yet, in the history of thought, subjectivity has not been made the theme of philosophical study.

In the midst of this pessimistic situation, the subjective has been allowed to pass over into the hands of those who, with their interest centered in art, ethics, and religion, have been able to defend the claims of subjectivity; but, in their ardor and with their special interests, they have ascribed to the inner life more value than validity. At this juncture, theory of knowledge appears and assumes more complete responsibility for that sense of interiority which in epistemological parlance is known as subjectivity. The self demands knowledge as intellectual indemnity for the spiritual losses which it has suffered. Subjective notions, whether ideas or values, may not secure for the self its place in the world, but they may make the life of the self more

secure within, as a man's house is his castle. From this point of view, subjectivity is not urged for the sake of showing that any other theory of knowledge is wrong, but with the aim of asserting that certain important life-interests are substantial in their character. The scientific opponents of subjectivity often fail to realize that; with their professional interests in particular, they may have general interests incident upon the fact that they are human beings as well as investigators of nature and history. When they oppose subjectivity, they contend against themselves; and it is an ill bird that fouls its own nest. There are certain valid reasons for urging the claims of subjectivity, but it must not be assumed that these interests are subjectivistic as such.

If we assume that complete objectivity with its attendant neutralization of consciousness is wrong, if we likewise admit that the subjective thinker is at fault when he contends that all existence is so much consciousness, it becomes necessary to adjust the conscious and subjective within to the objective order. The most natural expedient at such a juncture is that quantitative one which assumes that a part of the field in question is subjective, a part objective. Those who avail themselves of this simple device may even go so far as to stipulate that the subjective order is made up of values, while the content of the objective may be considered to be that of things. Apart from the manifest dualism which is hereby implied, there is another and more grievous difficulty which this principle of partition involves. That which the quantitative division of the field suggests is that the values within the subject have nothing thing-like or substantial about them, while the things which make up the objective order are wanting in worth. Now this arrangement, which may perhaps satisfy the artistic mind here and the scientific mind there, is far from being adequate for the philosophic mind, which is

anxious to believe in the reality of human values and the worth of worldly things. Thus the division of the realms which puts the sea in one place and the land in another overlooks the fact that both sea and land make up one and the same globe.

In more or less immediate relation with this principle of simple partition, one encounters the notion that subjective and objective, ideas and things, may be left to themselves in particular if they are related to some common principle in general. Such an appeal to a tertiary principle appears most strikingly in Spinoza and Schelling. This exalted attempt to postulate the unity of that which exists within and without is likely to commend itself to all those who have liberal interests in philosophical speculation, just as it may be imagined to contain the essence of ultimate explanation; yet it is not a prize to be grasped at greedily. At the outset, when it has been declared that the finite mind cannot perceive things as they are, but can perceive them only as they have previously been related to the Infinite Mind, as Malebranche suggested, it becomes difficult to understand how the Infinite is any better off when it comes to perceiving things. Indeed, one might even contend that, on the contrary, it is the finite mind which is likely to perceive things, since by virtue of its nature as finite it is much nearer and more like those things than is the Infinite Mind.

In the instance of the dualism which simply separates the realms of subjective and objective, and with the hasty monism which so rapidly relates them to a common third-principle, there appears a difficulty which is more strident than the formal one to the effect that the tertiary principle, which by the way is never described in terms of human knowledge, is in no happier a position and is no more effectual as knower than is the finite mind. This difficulty expresses itself in the form of a

complaint that the rash disjunction of thought and thing and the rapid reunion of the two makes it impossible for philosophy to indulge in a satisfactory examination of the content involved here in the idea, there in the thing. What is the nature of that subject which is so different from the object? Wherein consists the essence of that object which seems to defy subjective interference? The quantitative adjustment of the two, for they are still distinct even after the attempted fusion of the monist, is guilty of overlooking the fact that both the subjective and the objective have a rich content which deserves adequate analysis. The psychological is not helped when the subjective is set off by itself; the interests of the physical are not advanced when the object is placed in isolation. This is a real rather than a formal difficulty; it seeks to identify essence and form without heeding the claims of content and character. Relief from such an unhappy situation is to be found only as thought appeals to a qualitative discrimination rather than a purely quantitative distinction between subject and object.

That which first provokes and then furthers the qualitative discrimination between subject and object is the general notion which is guiding the present student of the epistemological problem. This general notion is to the effect that knowledge is best understood as an intellectual life awakening within the world, not a thought-principle which is trying to make out the meaning of some alien realm. In this sense, knowledge is like a creature of earth trying to become acquainted with his habitat rather than like a scientific mind attempting to establish communication with another planet. Subject and object are in one and the same system; their difference is one of kind rather than one of position. For the theory of knowledge, nothing can be more important than to enable man to discover the spirit that he is of.

But this is what subjective thinking has always refrained from doing. Subjective thinking has taken the subject for granted and then, as though sighing for other worlds to conquer, has taken upon itself the task of explaining objectivity, which it has regarded as so much consciousness in general or so much perception in particular. Let it be granted that the objective order does stand in need of explanation, and let it further be admitted that the scientific method of description is often *Hamlet* minus the melancholy Dane; it may still be pointed out, and that pessimistically, that subjectivity has still to account for the subject, which thus far has been little more than a name or a form.

The subjective explanation of the subject, when this is taken up in a qualitative manner, begins by laying down a principle of intro-activity as that which, more than introspection, characterizes the inner life of the subject. The inherent difference between the intro-active and the introspective lies in the following facts of human experience. The human mind, instead of merely accepting its ideas, whether they be regarded as innate or derivative, has acted upon these in a manner characteristic of its own nature. The result is that subjectivity is made up of a system of human products whose existence and meaning are due to human culture. In the economic realm, the raw things of the world have been transmuted into values; in aesthetics, the simple impressions of pleasure and pain have become principles of beauty or ugliness; in ethics, the spontaneous impulses have been changed into ideal courses of conduct; in religion, the general sense of life in the world, whether optimistic or pessimistic, has been elevated to such notions as belief and blessedness. No matter how the mind may have originated, no matter what was its primitive condition, the fact remains that the human mind as such is now characterized by the results of

humanistic culture; and it is this mind as human which is to be related to the objective order. If it be objected that the epistemological problem concerns mind as mind, it can only be said in rebuttal that mind as mind has shown itself to be an active, aggressive principle which, instead of taking what is given it by the world, makes up its content out of that given. In that constructed content the essence of true subjectivity is to be found, since theory of knowledge seeks to explain, not the mind of the animal, but the mind of man. Philosophy is not so naïve as to make raw nature its object; it should not be so naïve as to continue in its practice of making raw man the subject. On the outside, it is nature explained scientifically which proposes the problem; within it should be man considered in the light of human culture.

The emphasis which has been laid above upon the active and qualitative characteristics of subjectivity, tends to indicate that the subject is different rather than distinct from the object. At the same time, this manifest difference between the content of ideas and that of things may make the relation of subject to object appear, not less, but more plausible than is the case when subjectivity is merely a rationalistic form. When it is appreciated that subjectivity is qualitatively different from objectivity, the old competition between thought and thing tends to pass away. What ambition an idealistic system must have entertained to have imagined that thought could play the part of thing, and how equally ill-timed the materialistic hope that the thing might so perfect its nature as to become thought! Until subjectivity has been established and thus consists of something more than purely psychological content of impressions and representations, it will be necessary for thought to do far more than it has done toward realizing the essential content of the subjective. This content as such is not

wanting, since the careers of such things as art, morality, and religion are indicative of what can be done with subjectivistic stuff; but the rationale of this implicit subjectivity is not yet at hand although it has long been needed.

In the special instances of Aristotle and Hegel, it must be admitted that the culture of humanity has received due dialectical regard, and these encyclopedic systems have not been guilty of neglecting material offered them. But in the case of the ancient thinker, the manifold of culture was not placed in sufficiently close connection with the conceptualism of the thinker's theory of knowledge; with the modern philosopher, the connection was made unduly intimate, whence the facts of history and culture were unlawfully subsumed under the forms of an artificial dialectic. With Plato and Leibnitz, the desired relationship between things and ideas was not frustrated; but the acceptance of such systems necessarily involves the peculiar notions of Platonistic "participation" and the Leibnitzian principle of cosmic consciousness marked by infinite gradations. Furthermore, these superior thinkers have been so fearful of irrationalism that they have prejudiced their systems against every principle of spontaneity; Plato and Hegel could not tolerate it at all, Aristotle and Leibnitz would allow it only as it submitted to the domination of a conceptualizing reason. Still less happy was the fate of the individual among these thinkers; alone among the four mentioned, Leibnitz employed a principle of individuation; but, while his *Monadology* was punctuated by separate forms of being, the superintendence of pre-established harmony was such as to preclude every individualistic initiative. Now the absence of activity and individuality are felt more seriously in any philosophic which is interested in man as such.

3. THE CHARACTER OF OBJECTIVITY

The opposition of the modern individual to the world, accompanied by various forms of decadence, pessimism, and nihilism, sprang from the unconscious feeling that the world, as interpreted by scientism and sociality, was both too small and too colorless to contain and content the human ego. In one sense, the truth of scientism could never be called into question, since such scientism advanced deliberately and not without justification for its system of ideas. But, in another sense, the whole scientific system, no matter how complete or convincing it might become, can be criticized as being insufficient, since it has ever been forced to ignore the content of the data which it fuses into general principles. In the same manner, the goodness of social thought, which accompanied the truth of scientism, was equally impervious to adverse criticism, since such social thought proceeded soberly and justly from its fundamental principles. At the same time, individualism was not wholly at fault when it asserted that the social conception of life, however complete and consistent it might appear to be, was guilty of avoiding the character of the individual which it sought to weave into its system. Scientifico-social thinking has been able to build a wall whose symmetry and stability cannot be questioned, but the fate of the individual stone among the other stones in the wall is far from being a happy one. On the aesthetic side, individualism has protested that the things of the world are not to be absorbed by analytical science, which cannot appreciate the significance of them; on the ethical side, this same individualism has objected to the social tendency to assemble and analyze human beings without taking into account the character of humanity as such. Science is no longer natural; sociality is not human. The truth and worth of science and

sociality are not equivalent to the truth and worth of life as lived by man in the world.

The lack of truthfulness which appears in the midst of scientific truth appears at once in the attempt on the part of analytical thought to reduce man to the level of things, in order that the scientific arrangement of the world may be smooth and complete. In the spirit of a cynical optimism, scientism has insisted upon a kind of self-abnegation which is bound to appear ridiculous in a scientific age where all theoretical and practical activities are consecrated to the selfish desire to obtain the greatest possible benefit from the world. Science is thus modern in its theoretical ideals, but more than mediaeval in its ethics; in the midst of its academic interests, it calls upon man to practice remorseless self-abnegation. In its superstition, scientism calls upon man to sacrifice his soul in behalf of an idea, as Abraham felt constrained to sacrifice his son for the sake of an abstract principle. The individual is thus placed in a position where he is called upon to choose between the sense of selfhood as something intrinsic and valuable within him and the ideal of science as a complete and optimistic arrangement of things in the exterior world. To accept inorganic science, one must take the Copernican astronomy at the risk of losing his place in the world; and to embrace organic existence, as this shapes itself in Darwinism, he must surrender the notion that his life is characteristic and worthy. The truth without is the sworn foe of the truth within.

It is commonly supposed that religion and religion alone has appeared as the opponent of the scientific view of the world, but the review of individualism, which this work has been taking up, should serve to show that art and morality have been no less inimical to the scientific generalization. Individualism has assumed that the joy, worth, and truth of life are true, and has not hesitated

to oppose the truth of these to the truthfulness of the scientific. In few cases, like those of Stirner and Nietzsche, has the opposition to the intellectual ideals of the day been direct and definite; yet it must not be overlooked that the scientifico-social synthesis has had the effect of driving the individualist to a position of irrationalism, which amounts to the practical repudiation of all those truths which the scientific mind has seen fit to express. The situation engendered by this opposition between scientism and irrationalism is a difficult one to meet, since science with its secular truths has not been questioned as has been religion with its sacred ones: then, the spirit of doubt is of such a nature that it allows itself to attack only those things that are precious in human life, which amounts to saying that there can always be religious doubt but never scientific skepticism. In the midst of this predicament, let it be borne in mind that art, morality, and religion have long been in opposition to scientism, even when they have not made use of logical methods to refute what they have felt free to repudiate. How is this opposition to be overcome without surrendering the values of the inner life or the accepted principles of scientific reasoning?

In the endeavor on the part of individualism to adjust itself to scientism, it may be pointed out that such scientism has been guilty of doing both too much and too little. Scientism has done too much in passing onward from its principle of science physical to science social, a movement in connection with which it has allowed its optimistic ideal of smooth continuity to urge it on and present trim philosophical notions. This exaggerated activity of the scientific mind appeared in the Enlightenment when, after it was shown that nature is mechanical and rational, it was concluded that life is likewise rational and formal. The unhappy effect of

such an extension of logic appeared in special connection with natural rights and natural religion, whose invalidity has long since been recognized. After the passing of the Enlightenment, the age of Positivism urged that, since the things of the world may be understood in a manner purely naturalistic, so may also the sons of men be measured. It was in the spirit of counter-Positivism that individualism arose. In assuming the role of artist, moralist, and religionist, the scientific thinker was found in a contradictory position. On the other hand, it may be pointed out that scientism, which did too much in one field, was guilty of omitting something significant in another. Scientism has failed to supply the mind with a view of the world as a whole; that is, scientism has failed to account for nature as nature is understood and appreciated in the general experience of mankind. If scientism had overcome its ambition to dictate values to mankind, and had used its surplus energy in producing a more complete view of the natural order, many misunderstandings might have been avoided. What scientism has done has been to draw its smooth lines of latitude and longitude over the rough and ready globe; but, instead of evincing the idea of nature, scientism has developed a mere frame-work of theoretical completeness. As a result of this scientific hypostasis, the individualist was driven out of nature to find his values in an anti-natural manner, as David was driven out of his inheritance by Saul, who said, "Go serve other gods."

Nature has been overlooked in the midst of the conflict between scientism and individualism, and it is upon the basis of nature, conceived in its totality, that the higher synthesis of self and the world is to be made. This is in no sense a new thought, nor does it imply the assumption that science must be superseded by a higher form of intellectual life, even when one may be enough

of a futurist to believe that just such a new form of intellectual life is destined to appear. All that such a naturalism implies is that the ideal of nature, as this has long obtained in human thought, shall be allowed to enter into a view of the world that has recently been subsumed under the special forms of scientific reasoning. Such an idea of nature is not vague, since it has constantly been involved in the considerations of the aesthetic consciousness; nor has it been long lost to view, since it appears clearly in Goethe and Emerson, just as glimpses of it are seen in more recent prophets. The misunderstanding which has arisen has been due to the fact that we in our scientific enthusiasm have been guilty of assuming that science is equivalent to nature, just as the Greeks were wont to imagine that nature was found in art and art alone. The concept nature is deep and rich enough to include both man and nature, as well as other forms of human culture which may be derived from it. In the idea of nature, which is more disinterested than indefinite, the higher synthesis of self and world should be found.

In a corresponding fashion, relief from the contradiction between selfhood and society may be found in a higher synthesis which subsumes both these notions under the form of humanity. The lack of worth in the concept society appears, for the good which society seeks to bestow is at once "for all and none." In order that the social program may be made smooth and complete, it becomes necessary to emasculate humanity; the social thinker then has his labor for his pains. Just as scientism calls upon the intellect to indulge in complete self-abnegation, so sociality can proceed only as the individual indulges in a kind of self-renunciation. Like scientism, sociality is advanced in its theory but reactionary and mediaeval in its ethics, since sociality calls upon the individual to forfeit all that is characteristic

of him and dear to him, for the sake of a generalization. When sociality attempts to construct human life, its positive work is as distressing as the destructive activity of a scientism which is death to all ideals. Social art, social morality, and social religion appear worse than that absence of all that is aesthetic, moral, and religious in scientism. The friendship of sociality is thus worse than the enmity of scientism; and to the former one must attribute all that decadence, immoralism, and irreligion which modern individualism has felt called upon to develop. Were one forced to choose between the life-ideals of sociality and the distressing standards of decadent individualism, he would have no right to choose in favor of the drab principles of social life, since the lurid and frightful norms of decadence would still have the advantage of conserving the true spirit of art, ethics, and belief.

Like scientism, sociality has attempted too great a task here, too small a problem there; sociality has sought to elaborate the content of life when it is privileged to indicate its form only. Sociality has been guilty of making an ideal of the obvious, when ideals are ever made of those interests which the natural tendencies of man are in danger of neglecting. Just as mankind is forced to relate itself to the world of things, so men are expected to adjust themselves to one another; and just as scientism has sought to idealize this obvious principle, so sociality has sought to lay down a principle on the basis of the plain fact that, with industrial and social interdependence, men are more and more called upon to have larger and larger social interests. But, with this obvious arrangement of life's practical affairs, it is not possible to go on and contend that the aesthetical, ethical, and religious content of life is to be reduced to the social level, for there may be level roads without the leveling of the whole country. Sociality is

to be judged by its failure to evince the idea of humanity as a whole; indeed, it has been the fate and good fortune of individualistic periods to produce this genial ideal. Ordinarily, one criticizes social thinking for the way in which it has treated the idea of individuality, but social thinking has been just as faulty as its treatment of mankind at large, whence the idea of social humanity, natural in itself, is not far from being a contradiction in terms. Social thinking has spent its time plaguing the individual rather than in perfecting the idea of humanity.

As has been pointed out from time to time in the foregoing work, humanity is an idea which is at once quantitative and qualitative, extensive and intensive. From both points of view, social thinking has failed to produce anything like a genuine humanism. In suggesting that scientism has failed to yield the idea of nature and that sociality has been equally unsatisfactory in its attempt to elaborate the idea of humanity, we pass criticism which may seem incredible, inasmuch as these forms of human culture have aimed at nothing else than the ideas in question. Yet, as one must often claim that theology fails to express the nature of religion and as law often produces a caricature of justice, so we may continue to insist that nature has escaped scientism while humanity has eluded sociality. The result has been to produce a spurious sense of objectivity, so that the man of the present hour has no world that may be called a world; the scientifico-social frame-work which so often passes for a world-order is far from being the place in which the individual lives and moves and has his being.

The failure to provide objectivity for the individual is corroborated by the thought that, in the proffered world of scientism and sociality, there is no sense of either human destiny or human dignity. In a certain

sense, the whole meaning of the individualistic revolt may be summed up by calling this nihilistic movement a demand for human destiny in nature and human dignity in the social order. Just what these ideas connote need not be repeated, since their meaning has been constantly implied in connection with *The Struggle for Selfhood* and *The Repudiation of Sociality*; nevertheless, it may not be out of place to indicate that the restoration of human destiny and dignity should come about by means of an adequate life-objectivity, as this appears in nature and humanity as such. In the midst of its struggle for independent existence, individualism has been at fault in contenting itself with the inner unity of life, which cannot long endure apart from an objective unity in nature and humanity. The substitution of nature and humanity for the minor ideals of science and society should have the effect of cleansing individualism of its decadence and nihilism; at the same time, the change from minor to major conceptions can do no harm to a sincere view of the world or a worthy estimate of human life. There is a ground of human life and a goal also; if these fail to appear in the scientific treatment of things and in the social philosophy of persons, the ground may be found in a just view of nature, the goal in a dignified conception of humanity.

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